Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe

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The Atlantic Initiative (AI) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization, established in Sarajevo in 2009 by a group of academics and journalists concerned about the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the slow pace of its accession to NATO and the European Union.

We believe that Bosnia’s integration into NATO and the EU is of crucial importance for the country, but are equally convinced that lively and informed public debate before and during this process is sine qua non for its successful completion. In that spirit, we wish to initiate, encourage and enable this debate through a wide range of activities on various platforms in order to reach and involve multiple audiences.

The journal "Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe" is only one of our projects under this stated aim, carried out in partnership with the governments of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Norway. We are thankful for the encouragement from several non-governmental organizations in the region and particularly grateful for the support of the NATO HQ Sarajevo, the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Bosnian Ministry of Defense and the George Marshall Alumni Association in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For more information on the Atlantic Initiative, please visit our web page:
http://www.atlantskainicijatova.org/
Dear readers,

This is the first issue of Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe, a publication designed to promote Euro-Atlantic values and a culture of dialogue in Bosnia-Herzeogovina and the region.

The selection of the name as well as the contents of the magazine reflect our belief that the transition process towards establishing functional democracies, rule of law and human rights protection in the region is closely connected with security models. We believe that security is a precondition for democracy.

Security is most often defined as a condition without danger or without threat, or as the provision of protection against a threat. However, it is much more.

American psychologist Abraham Maslow placed security at the very foundation of his own hierarchical pyramid of key human needs. Immediately after the basic biological needs, such as the need for food, water, oxygen and sleep, Maslow listed security as the basic psychological need. It includes protection against violence; safety of home, family and health; protection of property; having a steady income; a need for order and predictability of events in the near and distant future. Maslow maintains that the fulfillment of these needs helps a person grow and develop as a human being.

“The fact is that people are good. Give them care and safety, and they will give care back and be secure in their feelings and behavior,” he wrote. Only when a person fulfills their need for security will they be able to start fulfilling other primary needs – for belonging, love, respect and self-actualization.

In a post conflict society, such as in Bosnia-Herzeogovina, where the conscious and continuous introduction of insecurity and fear into public discourse is undeniably politically motivated, it does not seem particularly wise or justified to continue keeping the discussions and decisions on security solutions in the exclusive domain of local political elites. It is almost unnecessary to warn against the possible consequences of such a monopoly for the development of democracy. In addition, the Dayton institutionalization of Bosnia-Herzeogovina’s state legal provisions, which incorporates the dynamics of the previous conflict, urges that debate on security models finally be extended to civil society too.

Starting with this magazine, the Atlantic Initiative in Bosnia-Herzeogovina wants to launch a forum for thought and debate on these issues and enable readers to develop opinions on the key problems of democracy and security, based on knowledge of the facts and understanding of the relevant processes. In so doing, we want to contribute to the creation of a society of knowledge, one where the competition of ideas represents a commitment to progress, and not a constant source of seemingly unsolvable disputes.
“Peace in the Balkans was not brought by Dayton, but by Avignon. Dayton brought unrest. Peace was brought by the planes that took off from the NATO base in this Italian town.”1 Hadžem Hajdarević’s statement laconically summarizes NATO’s role in the achievement of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and South-Eastern Europe and into promotion into peace-maker. South-Eastern Europe has helped NATO not only to maintain its reputation of a safety alliance, but also to affirm itself as a war and a political formation. It was in the region of South-Eastern Europe, where NATO undertook a few operations (Deny Flight, 1993; Sharp Guard 1993-1996; Deliberate Force, 1995, and later Essential Harvest, 2001), operated outside of the Article 5 framework, and waged its first humanitarian war against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) in 1999. Without South-Eastern Europe, NATO’s development as an intervening force would be neither this smooth nor this quick, because, in the doctrinaire sense, it was only at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 that it was decided that defense shall be extended outside the area specified in Article 5. This resulted in the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, comprising of 44 countries, and marked a shift from guarding the security of NATO members to guarding international security.

The dynamics of the BH war was “a systemic benchmark” in the forming of a new NATO, which in 1996 prompted the Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff in State Department, Daniel Hamilton, to say that the NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was, probably, “the most important one for the future of the Alliance”.2 Without Bosnia and the deployment of NATO forces there, the atmosphere would not have been created for the intervention in Kosovo and the construction of Bonsteel, the second biggest American military base in the world. This is not a coincidence, since NATO in South-Eastern Europe was and has remained at the service of Pax Americana as a means for the pacification and geopolitical unification of the region, rather than the lever used by one country to settle its accounts with another. This was clearly demonstrated in 1995 when NATO, encouraged by the US, denied aerial support to the Croatian Army in its campaign to gain control over Banja Luka.

The geopolitical situation in South-Eastern Europe represents, doubtlessly, NATO’s tactical triumph. However, this region is ceasing to be a motivator of NATO strategy, which is, in the 21st century, directed towards the Middle East, Central Asia and Far East.
I pointed to this already in 1996, when my assessment involved the statement that the old NATO had seemingly been created so that Americans would die for Berlin, and that the new NATO was not being established so that Americans would die in Europe again, because “if a war would start again, NATO, Americans would primarily provide technical support (transport aircrafts, communication systems, intelligence satellites, combat helicopters, and similar), while ‘partner allies’ would provide multinational and well-trained soldiers. In late 1993, Christopher loudly said that Europe was no longer the dominant part of the world, so the American’s apparent withdrawal from Europe should be understood as American military preparation for a Pacific century and a security spread to the east.”

However, the mere spread to the European east gave NATO interpretative problems with Russia, which took this as a strategic siege and the taking over of its borders. The cautious former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher in an interview to the weekly Der Spiegel (3/1997) remarked that it had been wrong to call this reformulation of NATO “the spread of NATO to the East”, and that a far more adequate expression would have been the term “admission of new members”. The imperative of such international redefining resulted in such swelling of NATO rhetoric that war started being perceived as the final stage of democracy. NATO was advertising itself as an international political and economic organization, which in the future, due to its efficiency, was to replace the UN Security Council, that, unlike NATO, remained a pre-Cold War organization, while NATO has managed to reshape itself into a post-Cold War organization.

NATO pictured itself as being at the service of democratic globalization in which the top interest was no longer force, but values as strategic necessities, such as freedom, the open market and human rights. The 1999 war against Serbia showed that NATO’s interest is, in the end, the classical interest, interpreted by Hans Morgentau as the interest defined by force. Since it was unable to control Milosevic’s rationalizing, NATO controlled its force through the strategic goods of a new alliance, and public relations reflexes became more important then the reasons for the inaccuracy of fallen bombs. French philosopher Alain Badiou used this occasion to summarize NATO’s ideology in three premises: Democracies attack totalitarian dictatorships.

In remembrance of the Shoah, ethnic Cleansers shall be attacked.

Troops of the truth bomb propagandistic lies."

The controversies of NATO’s pacifistic ideology, the effects of its attacks and the spread to the East create various kinds of opponents. According to Badiou, the Hague Tribunal should have asked for the dissolution of NATO as an irresponsible international armed gang which threatens the rights of people and nations, since Americans used the war for Kosovo to humiliate the Russians without any direct confrontation, and warn China whose embassy in Belgrade was not hit accidentally. This war was, in fact, the test of force: “The logic of force has never been the consequence of noble principles, even when the force wanted to believe in it.” There has always been this imperial maxims: “First, an army that conquers; second, trade which creates markets; and third, proselytizing missionaries.” (Political) philosophy should never support that sort of propaganda. Does that, therefore, mean that analyzing NATO’s strategy makes us participate in its missionary spread and apologetics? Although there are “missionaries” who are, on the basis of interest, focused on relations between NATO and South-Eastern Europe, who, like Janusz Bugajski from the Washington CSIS, uncritically take on NATO’s vocabulary and forget the differences between proclamations and achievements, it is completely intellectually legitimate to autonomously analyze the strategic innovations and movements of NATO. In 1999 I wrote about the development of NATO as a global security organization, which I defined as an condition for its survival. I wrote this long before new motives were found to sustain this option (global terrorism, natural disasters, pirates, hackers, trafficking, drugs smuggling). NATO is forced to enter this sort of an engagement primarily by Pax Americana, which is not eager to conquer territories, and, in the ideal sense, lends to end Hobbes’ eternal war and pronounce Kant’s eternal peace, while in the practical sense, still assume the basic starting positions in case of a collusion with Russia, which is less probable, and with China, which is more probable in the long run.

The geopolitical situation in South-Eastern Europe represents, doubtlessly, NATO’s tactical triumph. However, this region is ceasing to be a motivator of NATO strategy, which is, in the 21st century, directed towards the Middle East, Central Asia and Far East. The Chinese expert for international affairs, Li Zhongcheng, has recognized the context of South-Eastern Europe as the region NATO used in 1994 and 1995 to set in motion its plans related to “the expansion towards the East.” After initiating the idea of the expansion of NATO and the creation of its Partnership for Peace (1994), China organized in 1996 the Shanghai Five group, together with Central Asian countries which had joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994. (One should not neglect the factor of China, which is very involved in developments in South-Eastern Europe, since it provided military support to Albania from 1964 to 1978, and has strengthened bilateral relations with Serbia after 1999, including a strategic treaty in 2009.)

South-Eastern Europe has, security-wise, been “Pax Americanized” and “NATO-ized”: Slovenia, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Albania and Croatia form NATO’s security ring, which encompasses and neutralizes Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, or more precisely, Republika Srpska, which count on possible Russia’s geopolitical revisionism. There are no realistic chances for a Russian strategic penetration, just like they did not exist after Kosovo, when Romania and Bulgaria refused to allow Russian military forces to enter their air space: they were rewarded with their admission in NATO (2004) and the EU (2007). The degree to which the strategies of the USA and NATO overlap in South-Eastern Europe is best reflected in the American initiative of the “American-Adriatic Charter”, which was signed in Tirana in 2003 by Albania, Macedonia and Croatia. This Charter represented a sort of a multilateral preparation of these countries for their admission into NATO.

Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2009, and Macedonia, which is completely ready, did not, due to its long-running dispute with Greece, which insists that an adjective be added to the name of Macedonia to distinguish it from the Greek region of Macedonia. However, the former Yugoslavian Macedonia has been brought under the umbrella of Pax Americana through a steadfast agreement with the USA. Montenegro got the action plan for joining NATO last year, and the Head of Force Planning Department of NATO Defence Policy and Planning Division, Frank Boland, predicts that it could become a full member as early as 2012. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006. The new American ambassador to Serbia, Mary Warlick, said on February 5 this year that NATO’s door was open for Serbia, and that new projects of the Partnership for Peace would enhance the cooperation between the USA and Serbia. The only state not included in the formal program for admission into NATO is Kosovo, which represents a huge political problem for the admission of Serbia into both NATO and the EU, although Kosovo is labeled “a NATO state” in informal discourse. NATO troops in Kosovo (KFOR) will have been reduced to 4,000 by 2012, which is also one of the indicators that instability and new wars are not expected to engulf South-Eastern Europe, even though outgoing Croatian president Stjepan Mesic announced military activities, first by Croatia, and then by NATO, if Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik announces a referendum on the secession of the entity.

Last month in Istanbul NATO announced significant cost-cutting measures, while recession reached its membership in South-Eastern Europe as well. Croatia promised NATO it will have formed an armored battalion by 2015, but the purchase of vehicles from the Finnish Patria was postponed due to the financial crisis. Slovenian civil associations are preparing a petition for the dissolution of army, an idea dating back to 1990 due to the perception that the Slovenian Army is no longer defending Slovenian sovereignty, but needlessly participating in NATO’s wars. The government and part of the opposition disavow this utopian pacifism and demilitarization in the unsafe times, suggesting instead that the 500 million euro defense budget be used to develop export-oriented military strategies which would decide on why, when and how the Slovenian Army should participate in NATO’s war activities.

While other countries in the region are content to maintain their current levels of military capability, only Kosovo has the ambition of strengthening its armed forces capacity, an ambition which has earned NATO’s support and Serbia’s reproach.

Although there are speculations on the construction of a Russian base on the Serbia-Kosovo border, word has also spread on the establishment of a Russian-Serbian coordination and logistical center near the Nis airport. This is a geo-economic penetration of Russia into the Balkans, rather than one having to do with Russian geopolitical ambitions, since the ‘South Stream’ gas pipeline route cuts through Nis. Although Serbia chose to be neutral to, among other things, deflect pressure coming from Russia which threatens to recognize Kosovo if Serbia joins NATO, in this geopolitical context, by delaying in joining NATO, Serbia is losing more than it is gaining, since in South-Eastern Europe NATO serves as a gateway to the EU. Considering the initiative by Austria and Greece for the admission of Western Balkan countries as a package in 2014, and unofficial German sources which see Serbia’s admission in 2018, it can be assumed that Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo could join NATO before these EU deadlines.

NATO does not present a problem to Russia in the already pacified South-Eastern Europe and in the above-mentioned “NATO ring” in the Balkans, but it does in Eastern Europe, where NATO is trying to include the rum Georgia and the geopolitically halved Ukraine into its ranks. In a strategic sense, the Baltic countries are not perceived as problematic by Russia either, since NATO has admitted it is not able to defend them because of the current configuration which gives Russia a significant advantage. The trouble are Poland and Czech Republic because of the anti-missile shield which Obama has given up on, announcing the relocation of the systems to Romania and Bulgaria, to emphasize once again that Russia is not the target but the shield is being placed as defense against countries such as Iran and North Korea. Russia’s sometimes overly dramatic critiques of even this reduced anti-missile defense serve as a powerful lever in wider military-diplomatic bargaining with the USA and NATO. Although NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in Moscow that NATO would never attack Russia, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev revealed at this year’s Security Conference in Munich that Russia had a new military doctrine, according to which Russian bigger
st enemy was NATO itself. This is, in fact, a case of preventive containment strategy aimed at persuading NATO not to recruit the countries at Russia’s borders, with invisible aircrafts and new sorts of combat rockets being demonstrated for this purpose.

It was also at this Munich conference that the global repositioning of NATO was discussed. Rasmussen announced that NATO would be developing into a global security center, building a security partnership network and inviting China, India and Pakistan to cooperate with it more closely. Both Rasmussen and Germany’s Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg also clearly opposed NATO as a rival to the UN. This development can be linked to the increased diplomatic activity of the USA in the UN, but also to their trying to soften the mistrust and resistance among Asian countries towards NATO, by sending the signal that a more multilateral balance of power is welcome.

One of the reasons for NATO’s new approach partially results from Obama’s big strategy aimed at a complete ban on nuclear tests and nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear terrorism, which should be followed by the spread of NATO’s security umbrella to the whole world. In a strategic sense, this means the spread of smart weapons and rapid deployment troops to all nuclear spots of the world. This assumes less of a “local” European NATO, and more of a global (read: Asian) NATO, consisting of Middle East and East Asian member states. Through the consensus with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) — which was in force during NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, but not during the Kosovo operation in 1999, — and with ASEAN, NATO should be transformed into the military unit of the UN.7

What this should imply for the countries of South-Eastern Europe was one of the topics discussed by Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul at the Munich Security Conference panel titled “Is Zero Possible?”. He stated that Turkey had no need for nuclear weapons, because it was “part of NATO’s security umbrella, which was enough”. Will Iran, with its nuclear bomb, weaken or strengthen the USA’s influence in the Middle East? According to the American counter-scenario, Iran’s nuclear bomb will do more for the integration of the Persian Gulf states than all American political efforts so far. In fear of NATO’s or America’s penetration into China and the dominance of the USA in the Western Pacific, China wants to strengthen its position in Central Asia through its nuclear politics and proliferation in Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. But it will not appear as NATO’s strategic opponent yet, but rather as Russia’s strategic partner and “a responsible great power”.

Gönül’s claims can easily apply to other South-Eastern European countries as well as NATO members. However, this membership has a price, and its consequences could dearly be seen in Slovenia’s and Croatia’s participation in NATO’s ISAF force in Afghanistan: Croatia will have to allocate 400 million Kuna this year for this purpose alone, sending part of its ground troops on compulsory leave. South-Eastern Europe, just like Western Europe, finds it easier to follow the American geopolitics of NATO when it is focused on guarding European territory. Robert Cooper, the Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, is warning the EU, including South-Eastern Europe, that there is “no such thing as free defense”.8 Unlike in the case of the Cold War, when there was a clear “confrontation strategy” of the USA and NATO towards the USSR, NATO’s modern global strategy is not confrontational, but assimilatory in nature.

A valid strategy, however, takes into account all possible options. If the assimilation strategy gains momentum, NATO will have moved beyond being an intra-Western measure for building security trust — in this sense, NA-TO will have to “de-westernize” and thereby globalize itself, which includes an expansion to new Asian members. This will, most certainly, decrease the security burden carried by Europeans. On the contrary, in case of intercontinental deployments, NATO will retain its Euro-Atlantic profile, which will lead to larger allocations for arming and the establishing of far more complex military formations. ■

NOTES:
1 Hadžić Đakšarević, Život u okviru (Sarajevo, Dobra knjiga, 2010) p. 79. /in print/
3 Ibid, pp. 67-68.
5 Ibid, p. 72.
6 Ibid.
The European Union has got tired of its own enlargement ambition to cover the European geography as a whole, and the attempt to establish an authentic continental geopolitics of peace is on the defensive. According to the messages coming from Brussels, a single Europe is not possible yet and the European political bureaucracy would be really happy if it could cancel the accession of the Western Balkans, possibly with the exception of Croatia, without losing its credibility of a growing political and economic power.

As for us, there is reserved the status of barbarians, those who remain outside the civilization fortress and who require a permanent imperial government because as the Carnegie Commission states so neatly, “the Balkans is a region which failed to justify the big powers’ trust in it being able to take care about itself.”

That is why there is a need of an imposed administrator who, both at the strategic (or state building) and everyday levels sends the message that the citizens of the Balkans belong to zone of the bare-minimum life, to the world which is, as Marina Grzinić lucidly notes, “ruled by the authority that is not founded in any law, so it decides about the bare life, about life and death, outside the law. What we perceive today is exactly the production of the bare life. The Third World (and what are we anyway if not the Third World?) now reveals itself as the world in which the only thing people have is bare life. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the apprehension according to which there is only bare life in the world or in the part of the world, represents a verdict against the very same world which is not based on any kind of legality. Moreover, the token which marks the world as the one of the bare life represents a form of introduction of territories without legality or a bare life zone which then, from there, spreads to the whole world.”

What else is Southeast Europe – with a post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, a “pre-Dayton” Kosovo, a frustrated Serbia, an independent Montenegro under the all-seeing eye of Serb nationalists who reject Mo-
words, categories, expressions, and there would be nothing behind them if NATO were not there; there would be no operational capacities, no people, and no money. The EUFOR mission in BiH is a transformed NATO mission, and not an authentic European idea — this might sound too harsh, but it simply summarizes the European security issue into a precise judgment. The European institutions in Brussels, as the Spanish sociologist Castells notes, “are usually satisfied with their isolated life in the world of technocratic agencies and the decision-making council of ministers”, so they fail to notice that their bureaucratic approach, especially in the security field, does not produce a new security situation on the ground, but instead only presents an existing state of affairs as a qualitatively new situation. A standard example of such an approach is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where international organizations and agencies are bureaucratized and inefficient. And the country is, let’s be blunt, full of weapons: the security culture has not developed at all, there has been no evolution from the militaristic culture of violence to the demilitarized culture of trust.

Let us then look a bit closer into the ESDP-CSDP, which broke the ice in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the EUFOR operation Althea.

The ESDP is based on the Lisbon Treaty, and its new operational acronym is CSDP. It is a culmination of the institutional development of the European defense and security policies. Historically, it evolved from the failed EDC (European Defense Community, 1954) concept, and Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1999), and Nice treaties. “Sovereign-political” limits made it impossible to constitute a successful security and defense alliance for Europe, so NATO took over the role of the guardian of Western Europe during the Cold War. In practice, even now European defense depends on the US, regardless of the fact that the institutional development of the EU has allowed for the conditions of more self-contained European security and defense policies. However, although the ESDP got new “jurisdictions and structures” which enabled the “usage of military capacities,” and also significant “civilian aspects of crisis management,” the CSDP, the Lisbon version of the ESDP, is failing to constitute itself as a “supranational structure.” This concept is instead largely dependent on “intergovernmental cooperation,” i.e. on the policies of EU member states. Although it was planned to develop the ESDP in 2003 in a way that ensures Brussels commands armed forces of 60,000 land troops, and 30,000 airmen and midshipmen for 400 jets and
100 ships," the ESDP is still far away from such strategic development.

The Lisbon Treaty constituted the European defense agency with the general idea of promoting EU operational capacities in the defense field, but there is, again, the impression that it is all about following bureaucratic directives, and not about a real intention to create a European army. Although the idea of the European armed forces appears on the horizon as a logical consequence of the construction of a comprehensive institutional EU logos, its long-term lateness or even its consignment in a dusty drawer of historical redundancy seem as a more realistic future.

What are the reasons for this delay? In addition to economic factors, one should pay attention to two additional sets of reasons. One is related to the lack of EU’s willingness to invest in military structures, as they are increasingly less relevant from the perspective of the EU’s historical development. The second one comes out of the belief that Europe, after the pacification process which has been gathering momentum for a while, should not get militarized again. However, it is important to know whether the rejection of re-militarization (requested by the US in order to recognize Europe as a geopolitical partner) is caused by the progressing peace ideology within the EU (which is commendable) or if the rejection of the European supranational militarization is caused by conservative beliefs that military potential intrinsically and quintessentially fits national states, and the formal creation of the European security and defense structures is only the fulfillment of institutional orders required and asked by the Brussels bureaucratic nucleus’ normative logic. Emphasizing these dilemmas is closely related to the crisis management missions in Southeast Europe, and I am, as it can be seen from this article, highly skeptical about them.

So, that is how the European Union looks when it comes to security and defense: its insecurity strengthens the potential of provincial Balkan policies that are doing fine only when they need to produce the irrational spiral of wild separatism and unacceptable unitarism. However, this is a position which in fact suits everybody. The European Union will stay in the Balkans for an undetermined period of time, and the Balkans, although it belongs to the “moral universe of the European civilization,” will remain outside the EU framework. Within existing European strategies, the Western Balkans will keep joining the EU, without never fully becoming members. It would not be that important if the countries in the region manage to build strong economic and cultural bonds in the meantime: is it possible to develop them within a rotten security agenda? Obviously not, and that is why this article strongly pleads for a new approach to security, one in which NATO would play a dominant role, until a possible dissolution of the imperialistic Pax Americana.

The North Atlantic Alliance, first and foremost, owes a debt to the southeast-European countries, more precisely to the countries of former Yugoslavia, which, by producing violence, made NATO’s historic existence possible. Within the framework of post Cold War geopolitics, the leading security-political alliance of the modern world owes, in a way, to Bosnia and other countries in the region. Why?

The war in Bosnia and the Yugoslav wars in general reduced the confusion created in NATO’s military-political structures by the fall of the Soviet ideological and military block. Without the enemy, the Warsaw pact, which was the meaning and purpose of its existence, NATO was faced with a Hamlet-style dilemma: to be or not to be. Vladimir Petrov, an acquaintance of NATO founding father Dean Acheson, put it perfectly in a 1997 article in the Washington Post: NATO was created to retain Soviet enlargement. It accomplished its mission. Should it be tasked now to make the world more secure for democracy? There is one unspoken reason to preserve NATO – the fear that our influence will diminish, once when Europe makes progress towards integration. The European currency will challenge almighty dollar. Growing NATO bureaucracy could disappear unless some new mission breaths new life into the institution. It is the risk that we have to accept.

Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson understood this and similar messages perfectly. Taking over his position in the alliance, he said openly, without beating around the bush, that NATO will transform in accordance with challenges of this era or it will disappear from the historical arena. It was not an easy task, because the risks emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet empire (proliferation, migrations, trafficing, interstate tensions among former Soviet republics, nationalism, secessionism, the Caucasian ethnic pot...) posed a serious challenge after the Eastern Bloc had been positioning itself as an unitary military and ideological challenge for four decades. The nature of these risks was different from the transparent clarity of danger radiated by the Warsaw pact as a classical military-political alliance.
Other national and international agencies of the Euro-Atlantic political alliance (Interpol, FBI, migration agencies, OSCE, research institutes...) were involved in handling those, predominantly nonmilitary risks and, consequently, it was not simple for NATO strategists to defend a new strategy before national legislators. The new strategy included the preparations of the alliance for nonmilitary dangers and its enlargement to the east of Europe, by accepting new members from the post-communist world. NATO was about to penetrate into the nucleus of those risks and prevent them from spilling over to the Occident.

Both in Europe and in the US, the 1990s were marked by discussions of the reasons, advantages, and shortcomings of NATO enlargement, not only on political and security terms, but also on financial terms. In contrast, the first years of the 21st century were marked by the debate around a new NATO strategy, powerful and effective against different world crises, so the NATO expansion was not limited to Europe, but included central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. However, as a historical fact that should not be neglected, there is still a conclusion that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although fought at the periphery of NATO’s strategic penetration to Eastern Europe, remains one of the key moments that influenced the decision on NATO enlargement. Today, NATO is not a North Atlantic, but a global security alliance, a fact which is, to a certain degree, the result of NATO’s involvement in Bosnia as the first zone of military intervention outside the territories of its member states. That fact possesses a historical capacity. The concentration and transparency of violence in BiH provided the purpose and the reason for the alliance and NATO, armed with the power of its new strategy of engagement outside member states, got a two-fold confirmation, through imposing peace with its operations against the Bosnian Serb army in August 1995, and through the implementation (SFOR) and stabilization (SFOR).

NATO followed up the peace process by its long-term and robust presence in BiH, legitimizing itself through BiH as a favorite of the new security architecture from Atlantic to Ural. After using force in Bosnia, the alliance (un)expectedly easily further deployed its military power to Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia, confirming the fact that Bosnia had far-reaching implications for Euro-Atlantic community, both in theory and in practice.

As Bosnia became the first country where the new post-Cold War strategy was practically implemented, it was pumped with a new geopolitical content which determined it as a different country. It became geopolitically important for NATO as a messenger of the new security approach, but also geo-strategically, as a territory pacified enough to enable NATO to dominate fully and to work out different scenarios of the strategic game.

The latest scenario that was developed – letting so-called European security and defense structures take over the strategic security mission – was not a good solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region, although it unburdened the alliance, pushing it away from the limelight. Although we are aware that EUFOR’s mission would not have had a chance without NATO’s logistic, staff and other forms of support, it is vital for BiH to additionally strengthen the NATO mission which should become the most relevant security factor, the one that is hierarchically above CSDP, i.e. EUFOR.

European security and defense simply do not exist as a supranational concept, they are a grand illusion. And as far as I am informed about BiH’s strategic goals, the country wants to become a part of NATO and not of the grand illusion which many believe is a reality, thanks solely to the existence of the EU as a political and economic alliance. Fiction, pure fiction. I would like to stress this: while the European Union is a notion with no content in the field of security and defense, NATO is both the notion and the content. A relationship between CSDP and NATO is the relationship between fiction and reality.

Since BiH is still a country with many elements of a failed state, its degradation can be stopped by including it into the world’s leading military and political alliance: a full integration to NATO solves a significant dichotomy between Bosnia and Herzegovina as a post-conflict area, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a development area.

The dichotomy of post-conflict community and development community impacts the security dilemma: on the one hand, non-material aspects of ethnic violence are still present in the form of mistrust manipulated by national elites — strengthening the security paradigm. On the other hand, the region demonstrates the potential to overcome the demons of history through civic structures — strengthening the developmental paradigm. But the demons of history will not be overcome if the security dilemma is not solved by BiH’s prompt admission into NATO. This membership would strengthen developmental capacities and direct Bosnian citizenry towards Euro-Atlantic values which can
counter the non-developmental limits of the mythical interpretation of history.

Even though one can understand NATO’s operational strategy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina which rests on the „carrot and the stick“ doctrine, with the intention to delay full membership in order to put pressure on domestic political elites to start a real state building, it can all turn against both Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO. Why?

Depending on the creation of a new geopolitical cartography in the (south)east European division of the Eurasian zone, and the new Russian (post)Cold War geopolitical reasoning, (without ignoring the power of the anti-NATO agenda in Serbia), Republika Srpska could lose interest for a BiH in NATO, preventing the country from join an alliance of fundamental importance. Let me be radical here: the delay can be justified if NATO’s objective is to have BiH as a full-flagged member, which will be the state de jure and de facto, and not only de jure, and if the alliance is going to use all available tools to make it happen in a relatively short period of time (the unity of sovereignty and facts). But if nothing is actually going to be done (except for boring repetitions about how domestic political elites should reach an agreement) to move BiH from like a state to a real state condition, then it is much better to drag two-entity BiH in the alliance so that we do not witness a dramatic development of only the Federation joining the transatlantic security alliance. It is impossible that Huntington’s combat line of future will be drawn along the BiH’s entity lines, and if powerful NATO is afraid that a two-entity Bosnia and Herzegovina with its “two heads” could shake decision mechanisms in the alliance, if that is the reason to prevent the interpolation of the “dual state” in the alliance’s decision-making structures which is based on consensus, then there is nothing left but to get reconciled with the security architecture of the future: NATO will be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be in NATO.

But again, didn’t good old Zbig (Zbigniew Brzezinski) recently suggest that decisions not necessarily made by consensus could also find their place in the new alliance’s strategy?

NOTES:

Eleven years ago, together with a group of military and political representatives from BiH, I participated in a seminar in the NATO school in Oberammergau, not far from Munich, Germany. It was just after a problematic military intervention and the bombing of FR Yugoslavia by NATO. The memories were still fresh and the rage of Serbs from this side of the Drina against NATO was at its peak, maybe even more then when they themselves were bombed towards the end of the war in Bosnia in 1994-95. At the lectures during the seminar, participants were addressed by then NATO Commander, General Wesley Clark and by spokesman Jamie Shea — at that moment probably the most hated member of NATO staff amongst Serbs. Serbian participants from BiH were asking NATO lecturers many unpleasant, open and hard questions. Why is this reminder important for our current situation? Because it shows that part of the political establishment and public opinion in Republika Srpska still hold a predominantly emotional attitude towards NATO, rather than a realistic, rational political attitude. A lot of time has passed since then: the political and security situation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has improved, and NATO has changed as well. During this period, the author of this text himself has experienced a sort of a personal, intellectual “Copernicus twist” and from a critic of the NATO Alliance became an advocate of BiH’s accession to this alliance. On the level of personal intellectual engagement and ideological presumptions, the author of this text has been often critically writing and talking about NATO since the 90s, criticizing with arguments some of its decisions and politics. However, in the case of BiH, I am fully supportive of the accession of BiH to NATO. It may seem contradictory to someone who is not familiar with the situation in the Balkans and the world, and especially in BiH in last 20 years: if BiH were Sweden, I would not argue for its joining NATO, and if BiH were Switzerland or Austria, I would not argue for its accession to NATO either. But BiH not being Sweden, Switzerland or Austria, and being in the Balkans, on a “ticking bomb”, with the tragic experience of mutual wars throughout the history, then because of quite pragmatic reasons, I support BiH’s accession to NATO as a joint security
umbrella that would neutralize the security challenges and threats which have been shaking the region for centuries. Today in Europe there are few old ideological supporters of NATO as a closed military-political alliance: the commitment to NATO today is rather a matter of a rational, practical and pragmatic choice towards something that functions successfully in a radically different security and political environment than it did in the period of the Cold War, but the consequence of fanatical ideological passion and blind one-sided alliance.

The idea of military and political accession to NATO is not entirely new in this region. In a modest and puzzling sense, due to political circumstances, it was conceived in the former joint state at the beginning of the Cold War in the 1950s. More than 50 years ago, after Tito’s split with Stalin and his conflict with Informbiro, as part of Yugoslavia’s opening towards the West, the state leadership of that time considered the option of political accession and possible membership in NATO as one of the political alternatives. This rarely known episode of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy had the purpose of avoiding political isolation after the conflict with Informbiro, softening a possible military threat by USSR and opening to the West for the purpose of getting the necessary loans that would support the country economically.

In the first free and democratic elections in BiH held in 1990, accession to NATO was neither a party goal in the political programs of the then leading parties, nor a matter of serious professional and political analysis: the reasons for this should be sought in the clear signs of inability to maintain the common state. After the wars and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the former republics, now autonomous and independent states, turned to a strategic search for new development possibilities on a regional and global plane, which included membership in economic and political associations — first of all, in the European Union and in NATO as the dominant military-political alliance. That is why in the first postwar, general and democratic elections in BiH held in 1996, many political parties started advocating for BiH membership in EU and NATO in their political programs.

The first concrete steps in the process of BiH’s accession to NATO date back to early 2004. On its 40th session on 17 March 2004, the Presidency of BiH confirmed its commitment that BiH and all of its institutions had to fulfill the conditions necessary for accession to NATO’s Partnership for Peace at the NATO Summit in Istanbul scheduled for June of the same year. At its 41st session, held on 24 March, the Presidency adopted a report on BiH’s progress in the process of defense reform and in fulfilling the conditions for accession to NATO Partnership for Peace. At its 70th session, held on 23 February 2005, the Presidency in a special Statement confirmed the country’s commitment to joining NATO Partnership for Peace and attaining full membership in NATO. The National Assembly of Republika Srpska brought the Declaration of Strategic Commitments of Republika Srpska in Defense System of BiH at its 23rd special session, held on 18 March 2005. In the Preamble of the Declaration, it is stated that the following opinions and conclusions "provide full support to BiH joining PfP and NATO" and in the further text of the declaration it is explicitly said: "Additional guarantees to the security of BiH should present acceptance to PfP, as well as the prompt inclusion of BiH into NATO political membership. Regarding the aspirations of all the countries in the region to joining Euro-Atlantic integration, this would ensure the regional security component as well."

All the main parliamentary parties in the RS Assembly both in power and in opposition at the time (SDS, PDP, SNSD) voted for the Declaration of the RS National Assembly which was adopted on a broad consensus basis.

At the time, the majority ruling structure in the Assembly, the government as well as the position of RS President and in the Parliament of BiH, were held by representatives of a coalition of the SDS, PDP and SRS parties. It is thus surprising that presently the Serb Democratic Party in its press statements displays political attitudes which challenge their previous commitment and support to BiH membership in NATO. In the chapter on Contribution of BiH to international peace and security, the need for an active role by BiH in the international organizations in which it is a member, including NATO, when it becomes a member, is mentioned “with all the obligations included in the membership, with the special feature that BiH would be a demilitarized state.”

After reviewing the Information on the defense system of BiH, the National Assembly held its 26th special session on 30 August 2005, at which it adopted a conclusion as follows: “The RS National Assembly requests the Presidency of BiH to verify the current reform of Armed Forces of BiH with the official NATO institutions as a final phase of structure reform, which will enable Armed Forces of BiH to join NATO.” At the same session the RS National Assembly also adopted a document under
the title of Recommendations for Amendments in the proposed defense reform concept. In its Preamble it says: “Republika Srpska supports the membership of BiH in PIP and NATO.” BiH signed accession to PIP NATO on 15th December 2006. At its session of 18th January 2007, the Presidency of BiH adopted a conclusion giving its approval to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH to send a diplomatic note to NATO Secretary General, expressing the official intention of BiH to open a diplomatic representation office in NATO HQ. The Presidency of BiH filed an application for Membership Action Plan in 2009, which was rejected at the December Summit of NATO due to the country’s insufficient readiness in the implementation of certain reforms.

Compared to other countries, BiH’s accession to NATO has several particularities:

1. BiH’s accession to NATO is happening within a postwar and post conflict transition and stabilization of peace on the basis of the Dayton Peace Agreement as an international agreement, which also has many regional security aspects and dimensions. NATO intervened in the war in BiH. Through the peace-imposing mandate, the Resolution of the UN Security Council is in power in BiH. According to that Resolution, EUFOR and NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo are the successors of SFOR as the stabilizing part of security environment of the country. All of that makes the relationship of BiH to NATO and vice versa a causal connection, that in a logical way is expressed as the continuation of a complementary process: NATO in Bosnia - Bosnia in NATO.

2. The process of accession of the country to NATO is happening at the same time as the process of building the country, armed forces, defense reform and security sector. In this period, the NATO HQ in BiH is providing help in the defense reform of BiH.

3. The political and economical stabilization of the country and its accession to NATO are reciprocities that attract and complete each other. In the process, the country is moving from an object of international relations and “security beneficiary”, to a subject of international relations and “security exporter”.

4. The general commitment to BiH to NATO accession is not a result of a broad, democratic and strategically considered public debate. We could rather say that BiH “surrendered without a fight” into being a NATO candidate, as a consequence of “warriors being tired” from the previous conflict, which exhausted itself, so the NATO “safety umbrella” posed itself as a solution for all formerly conflicted sides and post-war political figures in the country.

5. BiH membership in NATO reconciles two political concepts that BiH has perennially been torn between — the alliance of Europe and the USA.

6. One specificity in BiH’s path to NATO lies also in the fact that BiH incorporated its commitment to full NATO membership as its final goal into the Law on Defense of BiH, a fact that gives this process an obligatory element that cannot be found in other countries. Namely, in Article 84 under the title Activities for Accession to NATO of the Defense Law of BiH, adopted in 2005, it is written: “The Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Ministers BiH, the Presidency, and all subjects of defense will conduct the necessary activities for BiH accession to NATO, in the framework of their own constitutional and legal jurisdiction.”

One thing is certain, in the short term, BiH will profit from NATO membership (in terms of inner stability, economic development and democratization), while in the long term, this membership will certainly bring new challenges and temptations which at this moment cannot be perceived, because they depend on the direction NATO will take as a military-political alliance in the future.

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In this part we analyze the political agendas of parliamentary parties in Republika Srpska in connection to BiH accession to NATO. The first thing that can be noted is that this question does not hold a special place on the written agendas of political parties, or is completely left out and included only in supporting party documents like special statements or the occasional press release. Because of tactical and marketing reasons, the parties in Republika Srpska do not emphasize this question, probably taking into considering that it would not endanger them to voters. The Union of Independent Social Democrats, the strongest and most influential party in Republika Srpska in their last political agenda, in the part titled Goals of Political Activities, presents the 32 main political goals which this party will advocate for in the politics of Republika Srpska and BiH. Only one item, under number 12, addresses the security issue, noting that the “SNSD is advocating for demilitarization of BiH. To reach this goal, Armed Forces of BiH have to be further reduced in number, completely professional, and with basic missions in global peace operations and assistance in removing consequences of natural disasters. The system of security, with principles of efficiency and rationality, has to be in service of the country and
in service of the citizens, decentralized and depoliticized, well-coordinated, with broad trust and support.”

In the Political Agenda of the SNSD, accession to NATO is never mentioned as a political goal and the word NATO does not exist in their political program. SNSD defines and elaborates more concretely on BiH’s accession to NATO in its party declaration under the title Proposal for consideration of gradual demilitarization of BiH as a condition to permanent peace, adopted at the Second Congress of the Union of Independent Social Democrats, held in Banja Luka on June 28th, 2003. In this declaration it is stated: “Therefore we propose that: BiH, Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia start simultaneous activities that lead to the accomplishment of the NATO program called the Partnership for Peace. These activities would lead to BiH membership in PIP, that is, to the NATO political wing. The activities in Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia should go before the activities in BiH, and would lead these two countries to a complete and full membership in NATO. Membership only in PIP, as opposed to full membership, could be requested for BiH, having in mind all of its specificities.” From this short overview it is notable that the political stance of SNSD towards BiH accession to NATO evolved with time, first from a acquiescence to membership only in the PIP program, to advocating full membership in later political documents and Assembly decisions. Therefore, we can see this as a tactic that depended on political conjuncture in the country, security challenges and events in the region, as well as the changes on the global plan. The Serb Democratic Party, for a while the most influential, and now the second most powerful party in Republika Srpska, also has no specific position in its party program about the BiH accession to NATO. But features many party statements and public announcements on the issue on its official website. It can be clearly seen, public announcements such as “SNSD as NATO-party”, “Lies of NATO Corporal Perica Rajčević”, “Serbia does not consider joining NATO”, “Referendum on joining NATO”, “SNSD against NATO referendum and taking away of the stolen property” etc., that this party does not regard this important, strategically political security question, as a state question, but rather as an issue of daily politics used to antagonize their political opponents. The contents of the press releases regarding NATO show that the SDS uses this question as part of a pre-election campaign, with the goal of minimizing their former support to BiH’s NATO accession, discrediting rival SNSD and its politics, tying this question to the official position of Serbia, conditioning the decision about membership to a referendum and preparing the public for an open rejection of a move towards accession. Now, putting aside that it is not possible to decide on BiH’s accession to NATO in an entity referendum, hypothetically speaking, if such a referendum were to be held in the RS, then the SDS would have to publicly campaign for membership, as it is obliged to do so by the decision of the National Assembly of the RS for which they themselves voted, or publicly confess that they changed their mind and given up on that position. The Party of Democratic Progress has supported the commitment to NATO membership in the National Assembly of RS, although in their party documents they do not have a precise and determined position, nor do they refer to the issue in daily political discussions. The Serb Radical Party has a similar stand on this matter as the SDS, decoder the citizens of RS to express their opinion on BiH joining NATO. The Democratic People’s Union and the Socialist Party, the coalition partners of SNSD, are likely to support the political stance of the strongest member of the coalition regarding this question.

There are notable differences and opinions on the issue of BiH membership in NATO among civil society in Republika Srpska as well. BiH’s membership in NATO is openly and most loudly opposed by the NGO Serb People’s Movement “Izbor je naš”, the Student Union of Republika Srpska, the Student Parliament of the University in Banja Luka, etc. On the other side of the spectrum, organizations that support democratic discussion and dialogue on this matter are among others the International Relations Center, informal groups and individuals who took part in public discussions on security in the “Friedrich Ebert” foundation.

In late 2008, upon a request of the Working Group of the Council of Ministers, the Sarajevo agency “Prima research” conducted a poll on citizens’ opinions on BiH joining NATO, revealing that around 70% think that they are insufficiently informed or not informed at all about the process of BiH’s accession to NATO membership. More than 56% of people surveyed are in favor of a referendum on NATO membership, while that number climbs to 89% in the RS. A poll conducted by NATO in mid-2009 showed that 75% of Serbs from the RS do not want BiH to join NATO. According to the research conducted by agency “Prime Communications” at the end of last year, a little over half of the inhabitants of Banja Luka (55%) is against the idea of BiH joining NATO. Also, according to the survey conducted by American National Democratic Institute in RS, in 2009 only 12% of the population supports BiH joining NATO, a percentage that is five times bigger in the Federation. These
surveys only confirm a trend evident in the RS for a longer time, in which support to BiH accession to NATO is increasingly declining. However, relatively significant deviations and differences in information, as well as the lack of credible information on the sample, rightfully put in question the credibility and quality of these public opinion polls. The origin of the opposition to NATO membership by a majority of RS citizens should be sought in the negative war and psychological experiences of Serbs with this alliance in the past period. NATO carried out a military intervention against Serb forces towards the end of the war in BiH in 1994 and 1995 and additionally, the military intervention on FR Yugoslavia in 1999, carried out without the permission of the UN Security Council, provoked even more animosity among political parties and public opinion.

BiH joining NATO should not necessarily be associated to how official Serbia will position itself on this matter, as has been attempted in public discussions on this issue in RS lately: the relation of Serbia and Serbs in BiH to NATO from various political contexts is not, and does not have to be the same. For its own strategic reasons, Serbia has a very careful approach to the possible NATO membership. At this moment, it has decided to observe military neutrality, at the same time reforming and adapting its Armed Forces to NATO standards. In a recent interview to Vrijedno Novosti, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Vuk Jeremić, explicitly said: “In any case, Serbia has precisely defined the policy of military neutrality. We are not entering NATO, or any other military alliance.” Attitudes like this are a legitimate right in the interest of the state of Serbia. This attitude, however, does not have to oblige and limit Serbs from BiH. Serbs in BiH should approach this issue pragmatically, in their own interest and the interest of the joint state of BiH. RS political representatives should support BiH membership in NATO, with full understanding of a different road for Serbia. The issue of accession to NATO is not under the jurisdiction of the entities, but of BiH as a state. As the Constitution of BiH does not include an institution of referendum on any state issues, it is logical to conclude that the decision on that can be made by representative legislative bodies of BiH. Not all countries conducted a referendum on joining NATO (Norway, Albania, Croatia), but all of them carefully evaluated their interests and held public debates. Therefore, it is better to make such an important decision in the RS National Assembly on the broadest multiparty consensual grounds, and then verify it in the joint bodies on the state level. In committing to NATO, one should be released from national myths, wrong choices, political misconceptions, and false moral and election gambling. Membership will require a pragmatic and analytical evaluation of one’s own interests, the interests of the others, and the perception of future events in the region and in the world. It will not be possible to justify wrong decisions by referring to people and hiding behind citizens’ support: Politicians are not here just to defer to people’s decisions but to inform and educate people and present them clear political alternatives, taking responsibility for the best possible choice.

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At the beginning of the 21st century, the security paradigm, that is, the way of thinking on providing security of each individual country and the world as the whole, has changed. Today, there is no individual state which can protect itself against new security threats. Without collective security today there are no guarantees for the security of any individual country, and neither for the peace and stability both in specific regions and around the world. The main principle of collective security was defense and protection of one country and all countries together. In the 21st century, the goal of integration efforts on the security level is directed to the creation of a “security community” in each individual country, as well as in the world as the whole. That is why it is not surprising to read the news that one organization in Russia is advocating for Moscow to join the EU and NATO: many things that seemed politically impossible only yesterday look realistic today. Maybe some new security challenges and threats might make this cooperation more possible in the future than it seems today.

NOTES:
3 Ibid, p. 3
4 Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS, Banja Luka, br. 82, 8. septembar 2005, p. 1.
5 Ibid, p. 2.
8 Ibid, pp. 127-128.
In January 1992, when asked whether NATO would be abolished now that the Cold War rival was gone, Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of UN answered: “The organization of collective security cannot be based solely on political demands and legal procedure. It must be based on common values, practice of very close co-operation, and above all, visible capacities for ensuring the security to its members even in the most difficult conditions. The only system of collective security in Europe today is NATO, and it will remain in the future.” NATO organization is a product of the Cold War, i.e. of the geostrategic situation after the Second World War, and it was created as an answer of Western democratic states to a rising threat from Eastern Europe. The concern of Western states was not only reflected in a military threat: they also saw a great danger to the democratic system coming from the USSR, because communism represented a totalitarian system that was contrary to democratic values. The dissolution of that system and of the “Eastern” threat led NATO to victory in Cold War. That victory also meant a necessary transformation and adaptation to new conditions. The Western institutions very soon were faced with the “victory crisis”. During it, the institutions and mechanisms of national and international security that were formed in the Cold War period failed in certain issues because they were unfit and unsuitable to new challenges. Besides the institutions of national and international security, there are other institutions of Western society that went or are still going through the “victory crisis”. Those are: the free market, welfare state, multiparty democracy, national sovereignty and bureaucracy of national security. Institutions of industrial society cannot fully respond to the dangers that threaten the modern world. A “victory crisis” is especially manifested in the national security sector, because the institutions in that area have to make a big step in order to satisfy new conditions. Besides, the modern world is marked by many “boomerang” effects that are the outcomes of the activities of institutions which should take care of national security, but instead endanger it in the field of freedom and human rights. In the long run, Western democratic societies might have significant consequences on their internal democracy and institution functioning if the trend of increasing the power...
of national security institutions in the name of fight against terrorism continues. In addition to all the above, NATO met with completely new challenges in the international space that led to different constitution of international order, to rapid progress in modern technology area, and to changes in the security and defense paradigms that led towards changes of the organization and use of armed forces of Western societies.

Except the described internal crises, on its foreign agenda NATO was supposed to overtake the responsibility for stability and security in Europe. Although a real war did not happen, one part of Europe seemed just out of a war: the new democratic governments had weak political structures, a bad economy, there was a sudden reduction of military arsenals, demobilization, demilitarization, potential internal ethnic conflicts, etc. To avoid the rise of new instabilities, NATO took on another responsibility: first, stabilizing Central and East Europe through support to new, democratic governments; and second, stabilizing the region of ex-Yugoslavia and repairing the consequences of the dissolution of the socialist federation. In both cases NATO had problems in choosing the mechanisms to achieve its goals, all because of certain restrictions that were there because of the extended functioning of its institutions and Cold War logic.

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One of the mechanisms with which NATO achieved its goal of long-term stabilization of Europe was the full membership in the organization for 12 countries from the former socialist-communist bloc. NATO membership requires more than a plain technical rearrangement of a defense system and all of its mechanisms that are used for protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country: membership also means a change of thinking about the armed forces, that is, adaptation of their missions to new democratic conditions and new threats and dangers, but also adaptation of the entire political system and society to new circumstances of the activities inside the Alliance. New democracies need armed forces which will be capable of acting in a democratic environment, which will contribute to development of a democratic community, but also armed forces which will be capable of taking all the obligations in the sphere of national security and defense, as well as all international obligations with the purpose of establishing a safe and stable environment. All that together means that national states, which enter the projects of democratic, security and defense transition, have to invest significant energy in shaping new security and defense structures, as well as significant financial means. In new democracies, that is, in transitional states, this translates into very complex requests for transformation, and not only of a technical nature.

Western democratic security doctrines had a key impact on shaping the transformation models of security and defense systems of transitional states, as well as development of trans-Atlantic partnership in the defense sector. That was especially reflected in the continued attempts of creating compatibility between the two key European security players: NATO and EU. For example, Robert Baric thinks that one of the results of the cooperation between NATO and EU should be the reduction of divisions between “old” and “new” Europe, as well as the “construction of the systems of cooperative security which could be a seed for broader trans-Atlantic security community...”

NATO had the strongest influence on the adaptation of “new” Europe, devoting most of its activities in the 1990s to providing assistance in defense system transformation of former socialist states. The final goal of the transformation is the division of responsibilities for international security amongst a larger number of the countries, that is, in joining their organization and thereby spreading the space of strategic stability. In that context, “the process of NATO expansion, in addition to its strategic aspects, also has territorial connection: the aspirations are directed to the East and the Southeast.” Already in the mid-1990, NATO defined the program of its further activities by accepting the London Declaration (6 July 1990). The document highlights that security and stability should not only be observed in the light of military arsenals and components, but the Alliance’s goal should be achieving security with the aid of political means for the benefit of a broader community, and not only the Alliance members. The importance of the London Declaration lies in the fact that it proclaimed the need for cooperation with former ideological enemies: the Warsaw Pact members. It includes the proposal on strengthening cooperation between NATO and other Central European and Eastern European countries in various fields of action, and announces the restructuring of the Alliance military forces. During the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO in 1999, then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright clearly noted that the main reason of the expansion was spreading stability in Europe, and not a successful escape to the West away from the problems the countries had in their surroundings or internally. In order for the new countries to accomplish these goals, they have to be ready to take over complicated tasks of international security, that is, to create capacities with which they will take part, together with other members...
and interested countries, in building a safe and stable international environment.

As we have already pointed out, NATO has directed its activities in the last twenty years to assisting the countries which started developing democratic civilian – military relations, that is, to its expansion to new members with the goal of creating an area of stability in Europe. The countries which expressed their wish to join NATO were expected to show a very significant transformation of their security and defense system. Political elites in these countries defined the accession to NATO as one of their main foreign policy goals, and they mostly presented defense system reform in that context. The impression was created in public that the whole reform was conducted only because of accession to NATO and not because of the needs of national security and defense, that is, of consolidation of democracy. It can be said that the discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of membership mostly referred to the accession expenses, which were observed through two components: the financial costs of the defense sector (or more precisely – armed forces), and the use of the armed forces in international operations (which was often presented as participation in satisfying someone else’s interests). It can be freely said that there was almost complete omission of a discussion on the benefits of joining the Alliance which would be related to the following factors: consolidation of democratic relations, development of civilian – military relations, democratic management of security sector, transparency and responsibility of security sector, security sector supervision, and others, including the geopolitical and geostategic benefits of the membership in North Atlantic Council.

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Each evaluation of the advantages and benefits of membership depends on the preconditions which are the grounds for the mentioned discussions. In most discussions in public, the initial preconditions included identification of the situation, as well as assessment of potential profit, advantages, costs or disadvantages of NATO membership. The discussions were most often focused on the financial costs of armed forces transformation – a significant reduction of deliberation of the membership benefits. Each evaluation of advantages and benefits of joining the membership depends on the preconditions which are the basis of the mentioned discussions. Although different sources emphasize various forms of benefits, it seems that there is agreement; on the possible profits that can result from NATO expansion. At the time of shaping the NATO expansion project, it was not only geostategic reasons that were prioritized: the expanded NATO was also observed through the expansion of democratic reforms and political stability to the countries entering NATO and the countries being proposed as candidates. Security integration became important for the economic and political integration of Central European and East European countries in European processes. Potential candidates were expected to solve territorial disputes with neighboring countries, calm down ethnic divisions, reform their security sector and consolidate main democratic institutions, before becoming NATO members.

NATO expansion was also supposed to increase joint defense capacities. This alleged benefit from expansion could be problematic, as the accession of countries which did not develop their defense capacities enough or had problems in financing them, according to some predictions, could decrease the total joint security of all member countries. During the Cold War period, other member countries were able to fill possible weaknesses of the defense line where it was kept by weaker allies with total power of strategic formation and weapons. However, today this is not possible to such an extent anymore because the threats have changed too. In the context of these new threats, the Allies cannot apply their strategic power, because it cannot bring efficient results. In what way can states which have weak organization and capacities of national security sector be assisted in fighting terrorism, organized crime, corruption, illegal migration, illegal trafficking of various sorts, etc.? The only assistance which can be offered is support in building an efficient, responsible and evenly distributed national security system.

Table 1 presents a list of the potential advantages of NATO expansion. All the advantages have a joint problem – the quantification difficulty. For example, how is it possible to express in dollars the value of implementation of democratic reforms, or of support to political integration? Ironically, the advantages that are most easy to quantify – for example, improved distribution of NATO obligations or increase of weapons sales – are either limited or not mentioned listed for obvious political reasons.

According to some authors, the mentioned possible disadvantages of NATO accession present the real costs of the expansion, because each of them requires harmonization of the national security system with new obligations, and certain financial means have to be spent for such change. As pointed out before, the public in candidate states mostly discussed the issues of financial costs, reducing total reforms to the statement that ‘too
much money would be spent for the project.’ The warnings that an independent defense could turn out to be more expensive didn’t soften public insistence on the expenditure side of accession. Two groups of expenses listed in the Table – modernization of the armed forces of entering countries, and improving combat readiness – caused the biggest public interest, because the expenses were mostly observed as an expense and not an investment in improving capacities. But, the costs appear in all countries, regardless if they preparing for membership or are already there.

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The Republic of Croatia became a member of NATO on 2 April 2009. In the last few years the Croatian public had a chance to ask many questions about benefits of joining the Alliance. At that time, benefits were mostly estimated by the experiences of the countries that had joined NATO earlier: political, economic, strategic and geopolitical advantages of NATO membership were pointed out.19 But in addition to the general benefits, which are more or less the same for all member states, there are also elements that are specific for every individual country. Regardless of the same conditions and the same international conjuncture, it does not follow that two countries of similar size and capacity will use the given historical chance in the same way. It depends on many factors, and one of them is the timely reaction to existing circumstances in international space. Entering NATO is not just joining the Alliance, but also an acknowledgement that the country succeeded in its consolidation of democracy and that the needed reforms were carried out in an acceptable way.

We can start the analysis of NATO membership benefits for Croatia by saying that Croatia is now in the company of partners sharing common values and accomplishing their interests in joint action, a group of states that have great influence in many processes in international community. Here are some facts: out of totally eight members of the economic forum known as G8, six of them are NATO members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. The representatives of the European Council and European Commission are being invited to G8 summits, which means the representation of other NATO countries which are members of European Union. If we add Russia and Japan, we get a group of the economically most influential states in the world. If we look at the economic format of G20, there are again seven members of NATO, as well as representatives of the European Union (that represent other 14 members). Out of five members of Security Council, three of them are in NATO: the United Kingdom, France and the United States. Out of 27 members of the EU, 21 are in NATO. There is probably no need for more lists to conclude that the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Albania are now moving in the circles of very influential states in the modern world.
Except “companionship” with the above mentioned group of states, the Republic of Croatia with this membership gets a completely new position in international relations, enabling it to achieve national interests through co-operation inside the Alliance as well. For example, bilateral collaboration with member states is now much simpler for Croatia, especially bilateral relations with the USA and other big NATO countries.

In the last 20 years NATO has outgrown the boundaries of its member states because it has mostly dealt with the questions of global security. NATO got in this position thanks to favorable international conditions in which it did not have to deal with military-strategic affairs only, but could commit itself to new security processes in the international community. In its strategic concept of 1991, NATO concluded that the new strategic situation was appropriate for the development of different international relations that will be based on a better understanding between nations and states, and more collaboration on peace building and security. Such an orientation resulted in the development of a number of initiatives that were aimed at strengthening democratic relations in international communication. Two initiatives can be highlighted as especially important: the project of expansion, that was recorded in the Expansion Study in 1994, and the Partnership for Peace Project, which, with its content and scope, enabled a transformation of many security systems in post-communist world. Both projects enabled the Republic of Croatia to take reform steps which prepared the whole security system for functioning in conditions of democratic surrounding.

Although the Republic of Croatia expressed its desire for entering Partnership for Peace in mid-1990s, that goal was not accomplished until the change of government early 2000. Subsequently, on 25 May 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Tonino Picula, signed the “Framework Document of Partnership for Peace” at a meeting in Florence, making Croatia an official member of that NATO program and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The same year, Croatia started PARP (Planning and Review Process), after the Government of the Republic of Croatia sent its answers to the NATO “Survey of Overall PIP Interoperability”. The initial steps were followed by defining partnership goals with the purpose of the improvement of interoperability between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia and NATO. NATO offered Croatia 32 partnership goals, and the Republic of Croatia accepted 28 in total. In later years, the number of goals increased, until it reached 50 partnership goals in the last year before accession. It should be mentioned that the majority of goals repeated year after year, but the number of activities within each goal was increasing, and the Republic of Croatia defined its priorities of transformation and adaptation through Individual partnership programs each year. For example, it started in 2001 when it determined the areas in which it planned to improve its capacities: the so called C³ system – command, control and communication, the area of civil protection planning, democratic monitoring of the Armed Forces, military exercises, defense planning, budget making and resource managing, defense policy and English language studies.

Already the following year, on 14 May 2001 at a summit in Reykjavik, NATO invited the Republic of Croatia to join the new program – the Membership Action Plan. That invitation additionally invigorated Croatian activities, as was especially visible in a number of projects referring to the change of legislative and other infrastructure of national security system. In spring 2002, the Croatian Parliament accepted a package of laws on the national security area (Defense Law, Law on Security-Intelligence Services, Law on Participation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, Police, Civil Protection and Civil Officers and Servants in Peace Operations and Other Activities Abroad), and two strategic documents: the National Security Strategy and the Defense Strategy. These documents brought organizational and other changes in the system of security sector management, and the direct consequence of the changes was a strengthening of civil-military relations and the civil managing of the system as a whole. The first cycle of the Membership Action Plan started in fall 2002, which meant entering a new phase with a different and more obligatory approach to adaptation to the entire NATO system of standards.

By entering the Membership Action Plan, the Republic of Croatia became an official candidate for membership in NATO. In that moment the obligations of adaptation expanded from the Armed Forces to the adaptation of the complete system of national security and the state for NATO membership. Achieving “institutional operability” is one of the major benefits of joining NATO, and with that the transformation of the security part of the system becomes connected with processes of democratic consolidation, that is, democratic transition, which is the only possible way for achieving success in important reforms of the security sector. The Membership Action Plan enabled the Republic of Croatia to receive expert assistance and the opinion of NATO experts in all important areas. The Republic of Croatia concentrated its activities in five areas: political and economic issues,
defense and military issues, financial issues, security issues and legal issues. In addition to receiving expert assistance, each year the Republic of Croatia went through a process of progress evaluation, which enabled the measuring of effects and transformation of goals in accordance with the needs and abilities. Along with counseling in the above mentioned areas, NATO also estimated the effects of democratic consolidation, thereby expanding the area of reforms significantly. Furthermore, NATO often asked questions in relation to minorities, the return of refugees, collaboration with The Hague Tribunal, fight against corruption and organized crime, judicial reform, etc., thus showing concern for Croatia’s entire social and political development.

After the general partnership goals, already in 2003 the Republic of Croatia decided to define the areas which were directly focused on creating new capacities of defense system. In its Individual Partnership Program in 2003, the Republic of Croatia defined its areas of priority:

- to improve interoperability in the system of command, supervision and communications including information systems, navigation and identification systems,
- to improve the aspects of interoperability through adopting procedures and terminology,
- to plan civil protection,
- to improve defense planning, which includes making the budget and resource management,
- to offer English language courses and thereby increase the number of soldiers, under officers, and officers with STANAG enabling their work in an international environment,
- to improve interoperability of logistics through operational, material and administrative aspects of standardization, through military exercises and respective activities in training,
- to raise total capacities of armed forces for exercising future tasks,
- to accomplish progress in the field of military education, training and doctrine. 

During 2006 and 2007, the Republic of Croatia completed two important documents for the further development of defense system designed for accomplishing high level of interoperability: the “Strategic Defense Review” and the “Long Term Development Plan of Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia 2006-2015”. The “Strategic Defense Review” defines priorities in developing capacities for participation in allied operations, and points out the commitment of the Republic of Croatia to develop completely professional, movable, deployable and financially viable armed forces. The long-term development plan defines the details of a new structure for the armed forces, as well as concrete projects in the field of modernization and equipment for the purpose of the gradual achievement of the necessary capacities by 2015. The Republic of Croatia defined capacity development to be able to deploy up to 8% of its ground forces to operations, while 40% of ground forces should be trained and equipped for operations under the Alliance wing. Through the proposed partnership goals for 2006, the emphasis was on developing armed forces which would be capable of taking responsibility for international security independently, that is, in cooperation with other countries. It is important to note that the Republic of Croatia started from the fact that the transformation was conducted on the basis of NATO being a contractual organization in which each member country was responsible for building its own security capacities. However, in order to accomplish the synergy value of the Alliance, defense capacities should be built on joint needs and evaluations with the purpose of building forces capable of performing operations across the spectrum — from operations of peace prevention and crisis prevention, to operations of imposing peace, as is reflected through the conclusions of Istanbul Summit. 

In addition to the above mentioned advantages referring to institutional and security sector adaptation, the Republic of Croatia achieved many other benefits by being a NATO member. For example, it directly participates with other members in making a new strategic concept of the Alliance, thus, it has an opportunity to discuss the issues which will define the future of NATO and its position in international arena. We have to be aware that this is not just a discussion on the strategy of one organization, but a concept which will define key determinates of total global security. Of course, NATO will view global security in a way that ensures all instruments for achieving the interests of members states, that is, for maintaining the processes in the international environment on a level which most contributes to building international peace and stability.

In addition to global benefits, there are advantages related to this region, and having joined NATO, Croatia achieved a new position in and pertaining to the region. It is a known fact that NATO put huge efforts in managing the crisis which happened after the dissolution of SFRY and the wars waged on its territory — NATO is still present with its troops in the region, and its engagement will certainly continue. The Republic of Croatia now has an
opportunity to participate in creating approaches and policies towards the region, that is, it assume a function which can help strengthening Euro-Atlantic processes, thereby creating a favorable environment which will have a positive impact on the development of the Republic of Croatia as well. For example, the Republic of Croatia is in the group of NATO members countries which advocates the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina to MAF.

Having joined NATO, the Republic of Croatia also changed its geopolitical position in the area; our geopolitical destiny was marked by the function of this area as a buffer, a border which was the place of conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Central European empires. Our present geographical area was then divided between different creations during the period of development of European national movements, and later attempts were again thwarted due to various international and internal conditions, which limited the normal genesis of political communities in the region. Only the independence of the Republic of Croatia enabled the new conditions through which its area started to be valued in a different way. Today it no longer has the “buffer” function, but the new function of “gateway”. That means that the Republic of Croatia has a new role as an initiator of European integration processes and dynamics, directing the region towards NATO and the European Union. This new role will result in strengthening foreign policy activities towards each individual country, as well as all forms of common activities of the countries in the region. It seems that now it is ideal time for establishing new networks of cooperation, because the success of Croatia is a good orientation for other neighboring countries as well.

* * *

It is relatively seldom that small countries have a favorable international conjuncture in which they can achieve their national interests with minimal obstruction. The Republic of Croatia is in such a situation today, and all the other countries from the former SFJY, which opted for Europeanization of their policies and systems and for membership in NATO and European Union, will be in it as well. On a general level, we can conclude that membership benefits can be divided into four groups: first, the benefits related to transformation of security sector; second, total institutional adjustments, that is, strengthening of “institutional interoperability”; third, the benefits from action in the global space; fourth, the benefits from encouraging the development of new regional dynamics. Of course, membership does not mean hiding under the umbrella, but permanent activities and responsibilities for international peace and stability. The international responsibility has now increased for the Republic of Croatia, with a special emphasis on its responsibility to the region. The strengthening of Euro-Atlantic perspectives in the region and encouraging cooperation on all levels and in all aspects brings a new dynamics and creates favorable environment for its further development. Only in such a conflict-free environment, can the Republic of Croatia, together with other countries, count on economic and political prosperity. The advantages of the present geopolitical position of the Republic of Croatia will not be realized unless it defines active support policies for its neighboring countries in the processes of European integration.

NOTES:

Montenegro - the Next Member of the Alliance

Forty percent of Montenegrins unconditionally support their country’s membership of NATO, while 44 percent, in case of a referendum, would be against it. This data — from a survey conducted in December 2009 by the ‘Strategic Marketing’ polling agency for the government’s Coordination Team for the Implementation of Communication Strategy on Euro-Atlantic Integrations — also show that 79% of Montenegrins expect their country to become a NATO member regardless of their opinion on the matter. This data is of increased significance if we keep in mind that the number of citizens supporting NATO membership has increased compared to previous surveys.

Only a week before this data was published, Montenegro received recommendations from the most relevant address possible when it comes to NATO membership – Washington. During the official visit of president Milo Đukanović to the United States of America, one of the key discussion topics was NATO membership. Even if the message sent by the White House — reflected in the fact that „the Vice-President (Joseph Biden) reiterated America’s support for Montenegro’s EU and NATO aspirations“ could be interpreted as the usual protocol support of American officials to applicant countries’ dignitaries, the attitude of the State Department left no place for doubt. On January 20, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton congratulated the Montenegrin Prime Minister on achieving MAP status with NATO, and pledged the United States’ support for Montenegro becoming an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community in the strongest expression of public support from Washington so far. Milo Đukanović replied he was confident Montenegro was going to be the next state to become a member of NATO. Less than two weeks later, a similar attitude was expressed by „the key strategic expert“ of the North-Atlantic Treaty - Frank Boland, the director of NATO’s Defense Policy and Planning Department.

What has made Montenegro such an appealing partner only three and a half years after the proclamation of its independence? Why is NATO’s support...
increasing only a decade after it bombed the rump Yugoslavia, which included Montenegro. And what could make Montenegro stray from its, as it seems, certain path towards the North-Atlantic alliance?

The answer to the first question is simple: Having left a dysfunctional state union, Montenegro has eliminated a major obstacle on its path to the European Union and the only obstacle on its way to the Euro-Atlantic integrations – Serbia. According to both national and European politicians’ estimates, it has now to these legal Western-Balkan state with the highest rate of progress in Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Since both these processes – joining NATO and the European Union – are being conducted simultaneously by Podgorica, it is not possible to analyze them separately.

When it comes to the EU, Montenegro has, since mid 2008, when it was in a way at the same level with Serbia, run a significant course, step by step and without any needless lingering. It applied for EU membership at the end of 2008 and its application was approved in spring 2009. The EU questionnaire was delivered in summer 2009, it was filled in, and it is expected that Montenegro will have become an official candidate by the end of 2010.

In the case of NATO, the process of joining is even quicker. The process of integration into the EU started when Montenegro was still in the union with Serbia, while the process of joining NATO started when independence was restored. Through the proclamation of its independence, i.e. through its Declaration of Independence passed by the Assembly on June 3, 2006, Montenegro opted for Euro-Atlantic integration as one of the priorities in the Government’s activities, stating that the new independent state has strongly chosen to join European and Euro-Atlantic – NATO security structures and continue to contribute to the strengthening of regional stability and security. Admission into the Partnership for Peace followed only six months later in December 2006. In summer 2007, the Law on Defense and the Law on the Military of Montenegro were passed, followed by the National Security Strategy in November 2008 and the Defense Strategy in mid-December of the same year. With these acts Montenegro established the security and defense systems required for its future membership in NATO. Pursuant to these legal acts, the military is under the democratic and civil control of the Assembly of Montenegro, the Government and the Defense and Security Council, while it is supervised by the Parliament through its responsible body – the Defense and Security Board.

In autumn 2007, the Communication Strategy on Euro-Atlantic Integration was adopted. This marked the start of official public advocacy for Montenegro’s membership in NATO.

At the same time, along with these formal steps, Montenegro achieved a lot in terms of psychology and perception: only a few months after the declaration of independence, it started the large-scale sale of weapons and military equipment inherited from the former Yugoslav People’s Army. Dozens of rusted ships, which had been rotting in the Boka Kotorska Bay, were sold to buyers in African and Asian countries; hundreds of tanks, cannons and trucks were sold or recycled in the steel factory in Nikšić. In late 2009 it was reported that the state had earned $15.3 million from this exercise, of which $9 million had been collected.

One „Una“ type submarine was donated to Slovenia, which has announced its plans to put it on show at its Technical Museum in Pivka. Montenegro has officially promised to donate one such submarine to Croatia and Serbia each. Montenegro also granted Serbia the right to use its flight simulator for the aircraft Super G4 free of charge. While Serbia is still claiming a few G4 aircrafts which remained at the airport in Golubovci after Podgorica after the proclamation of independence, the two countries are trying to negotiate an exchange based on reciprocity. The process of destroying old ammunition is still in progress: since 2006, Montenegro has destroyed around 3,000 tons of ammunition and explosives, and is planning to destroy twice as much in the future.

There was little debate related to these moves: some opposition politicians argued that Montenegro would be defenseless without weapons, and when attacked, would have no one to protect it. The only negative public reaction worth noting were the demonstrations held by the villagers of Prag near Nikšić, where the military regularly detonated its explosives in order to destroy them. This isolated case, as it turned out, was an attempt by the villagers to get financial compensation from the military rather than an expression of their opposition to the destruction of ammunition.

Not diminishing the importance of the speed, quality, and most of all, the efficiency of the formal part
of Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic integration process, the key reason for increased public support for NATO membership can be found in the day-to-day politics. The governing coalition — comprising the Democratic Party of Socialists of Milo Đukanović, the Social-Democratic Party of Ranko Krivokapić, and the three minority parties representing Albanians, Bosniaks and Croats — is constantly and completely backing the argument that the only guarantee of security for a country as small as Montenegro is in full NATO membership. Montenegro has no pending issues and is not perceived as a threat by any of its neighbors. In fact, its policy towards all countries in the region is not only formally, but also practically, that of good neighborly cooperation. However, what Montenegro has been experiencing since 2006 are constant attempts by Belgrade to destabilize the country. In the first years of independence this was not very noticeable, since the economic boom clouded the sight of ordinary people, and, consequently, this issue was not publicly talked about. However, as time passed, and especially since problems within the EU and the global economic crisis set in and significantly slowed down the process, Podgorica started claiming, first unofficially, and then officially, that Serbia is behind numerous political developments in Montenegro. The opposition protests of October 13, 2008 in Podgorica, after Montenegro and Macedonia decided to recognize Kosovo, were accompanied by Serbian media rants: this is when, for the first time, it was said that the process had been steered by Belgrade. Belgrade soon started announcing the creation of a unified cultural space for Serbs in the region, and the establishment of „a board for regional Serbs which would implement a national strategy and politics towards all Serbs living in the former Yugoslavia region.” A little over six months later, there was new media and political furor triggered by the „Knežević case,” in which Ratko Knežević, a former Montenegrin government official, repeatedly spoke to the Belgrade and Montenegro opposition press of the involvement of senior Montenegrin leaders in organized crime. When Belgrade filed a request to open three consulates in Montenegro in 2009, Podgorica declined: a formal explanation has never been offered, but a number of Montenegrin officials unofficially said that Serbia’s main goal was to use its consulates as meeting points for opponents of Montenegrin independence. Already this year, the “Sarić affair” – the case of a Montenegro-born Serb accused of drug smuggling, which Belgrade passed on to Podgorica – led senior Montenegrin officials and politicians to openly speak of Belgrade acting deliberately to destabilize Montenegro, halt its Euro-Atlantic integration and „subvert its order.”

Podgorica’s attitude towards Belgrade has for years been characterized by efforts not only to avoid a confrontation, but not to allow itself to be provoked: in any argument with Serbia, Montenegro, as the weaker party, would not end up the winner, especially since the Montenegrin opposition – and not only the party representing the Serbian minority – has been completely instrumentalized to serve the needs of Belgrade. Such a situation increasingly influenced by the wider public and the supporters of the ruling coalition as unnecessary appeasement. The Montenegrin public is looking out for any Serbian moves to destabilize Montenegrin security, and in a setting where it seems the government is not doing enough, a logical safe haven is found in the concept of a wider security integration.

However, this is not the only reason for NATO’s increased popularity in Montenegro: the maturing of society and, surprisingly, of the opposition, i.e. of the parties and political groups opposing Montenegro’s membership in NATO, are contributing to the increased popularity of NATO in Montenegro more than any efforts of the Montenegrin government.

* * *

The Socialist People’s Party, the leading opposition party after the spring 2009 elections, accepted NATO integration as a necessity in the autumn of 2009. The party, headed by pragmatic technocrat Srđan Milić, has left the Great Serbia rhetoric behind and shifted its focus to social issues, corruption and organized crime. Looking for its place in the sun, the Socialist People’s Party has, practically, recognized Montenegro’s national symbols as well – party officials are standing when the national anthem is played – although it still formally asks for alteration of the verses „authored by the traitor Sekula Drljača” and for the reintroduction of the Serbian tricolor. The biggest step was made in the first tentative but later open acceptance of Montenegro’s future in NATO, and the questions this party is now asking primarily concern the price of Montenegro’s membership.

The Movement for Changes, headed by Nebojša Medojević, is still looking for its political signature. The party – its support halved in the last electoral cycle — has been living off the criticism of everything the government does, but it has not yet raised its voice...
against Euro-Atlantic integration. Both formally and intrinsically, the Movement for Changes supports the integration of Montenegro into the EU and NATO as soon as possible, but in practice it is often counte-

The pro-gressive democratic world will reject us, and NATO will keep us hostages... to their aggressive and imperialist remapping of the world.24

Parliamentary election results could take us directly into NATO. Becoming a NATO member, Montenegro would only on paper still have its right as a sovereign state to decide on a key issue: war and peace.25

In the absence of another export product, Montenegró would – under the paradigm that „it is in our blood to deal with global and big issues“ – export its armed citizens; it could also be claimed that waging wars around the world contributes to a lower un-

The key arguments of those opposing Montenegro’s membership in NATO can be summarized as follows:

1. People should vote on membership in a referen-

2. Membership in NATO is expensive

3. By joining NATO, Montenegro is losing part of its sovereignty

4. Montenegro’s military is neither trained nor profes-

5. Montenegro’s military is far too small to be a pa-

6. Citizens will not benefit from this membership at all.

It is clear that erstwhile “typical” big issues – the global relations of NATO, Russia, China, the position of ne-

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The strongest bilateral cooperation in the sphere of defense and security has been established with the U.S. State of Maine, with the Maine Army National Guard Commander visiting Montenegro, and the Montenegrin Minister of Defense returning the visit.

The Unit for Peace Missions was established in August 2008, comprised of 5 officers, 32 non-commissioned officers and 36 contracted soldiers. In October 2008, the parliament passed the Law on the involvement of the military personnel, Civil Protection Service, police and public administration employees in peace missions and other activities abroad, and in 2009 it followed up with three decisions on the deployment of Montenegrin troops in peace missions in Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia.

The first Montenegrin officers were sent to Afghanistan in early February 2010, tasked with securing the contingent of Hungary, „the contact-state” for Montenegro. Montenegrin officers were trained in Hungary and Hungary is the country completing all practical tasks in Montenegro related to the admission into NATO.

The military has identified the following as future reform priorities:

- Continuation of work on the strategic defense survey
- Implementation of partnership goals
- Elimination of the surplus of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives, and other moveables
- Further modernization of weapons and equipment in line with NATO standards, with focus on IT and telecommunication equipment, combat motor vehicles and night-vision optics for special units
- Continuation of cooperation with NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries, and education of military staff in NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries
- Measures for further improvement of the living standards of members of the military, primarily regarding housing issues.

* * *

In both its EU and NATO integration process, Montenegro wants its case for membership to be treated on its own merit, and Montenegrin officials emphasize they see no realistic obstacles in Montenegro itself, except for possible problems in administrative capacities. However, in spite of the positive atmosphere in NATO, and the present strong determination of the Montenegrin government not to organize a referendum, full membership should not be expected before mid 2011 or early 2012.

Until this happens, Montenegro will put maximum efforts into NATO integration, with Podgorica sending its toughest player from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – political director Vesko Garčević — to the NATO mission in Brussels. At the same time, there has been an unofficial announcement of thorough changes in the team working on the Communication Strategy. The general impression is that European integration has fully taken hold and is on the right track, and now the focus should be shifted onto NATO. Finally, the vocabulary used by officials changed in 2009, with the term „European integration” carefully replaced by the term „Euro-Atlantic integration”.

**NOTES**

2. Ibid.
5. Ibid.


Monitor, July 24, 2009.

Vijesti, August 30, 2009.

Vijesti, August 11, 2009.


Ibid.

Ibid.
Serbia’s political move for the ‘preservation’ of Kosovo, which, to a large extent, have relied on Russian support, have resulted in the increase in Russia’s influence over Serbia. Two years after it was labeled “one of the pillars of Serbian foreign policy” Russia today influences the identification of Serbia’s priorities, as well as the general situation in the country. The policies aimed at establishing closer relations with Russia in order to assure its support in the prevention of Kosovo’s formal recognition, have in fact presented the conservative and nationalist forces in the country to use Russia as an alternative to the EU and thereby halt Serbia’s integration into the EU. In building strong relations with Russia, the pro-Western forces in Serbia managed to draw closer and temporarily bind Russia’s official policies to the pro-Western option in Serbia. In spite of this, in refusing to realistically analyze Russia and its interests and priorities in international relations and insisting on the short-term benefits this alliance offers, Serbia has put itself in a position where Russia can influence public opinion, and even the identification of Serbia’s priorities in foreign politics. This is best reflected in the issue of Serbia’s membership in NATO: using the “Kosovo ticket”, Russia is trying to prevent the NATO entry of a country with which it has building special ‘strategic’ relations.

* * *

Since 2001, Serbia’s foreign policy has been focused on European integration and regional cooperation, while it has been trying to maintain „balanced politics” with Russia. Since 2005, i.e. since the moment it became clear that the issue of the status of Kosovo was soon to be solved in a way which would damage the territorial integrity of Serbia, Serbian officials have put all their effort into strengthening the shaky relations with Russia. From that moment on, Russia has been perceived in Serbia as a country which could greatly contribute to Serbia’s efforts to prevent Kosovo’s independence. This has resulted in an increase in Serbian efforts to strengthen relations with Russia.

After Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008, Serbia started looking for the best way to react to its recognition by most countries in Trans-Atlantic community. The government, established in July 2008...
after a minor political crisis and special parliamentary elections, aspired to diminish, as much as possible, the negative effects of this independence declaration on its internal politics, which were polarized to the extreme. The pressure created by conservative and nationalistic forces was such that not responding to the situation would be interpreted as the betrayal of Kosovo. On the other hand, any disproportional response threatened to endanger relations with the countries of the European Union, which Serbia is seeking to join, and cost pro-European forces the support Belgrade needed to implement to Brussels and Washington, an enhanced role both in its political course and the mid-term future of the country. The reaction to Kosovo’s declaration was reflected in diplomatic action — downgrading diplomatic ties with countries that recognized Kosovo —, in the transfer of the issue to the legal terrain and in firm disapproval of any recognition of Kosovo in bilateral, and especially multilateral forums. The diplomatic action was Serbia’s unilateral move, but transferring the problem onto the legal terrain and blocking further recognitions required allies. The primary logical choice for Serbia was the Russian Federation, a country which did not like the precedent set by Kosovo and which needed to pursue its interests in the Western Balkans.

Between 2007 and 2009, Serbia’s foreign policy towards Russia shifted, with an open formulation of its plan to draw closer to Russia and simultaneously work on EU integration. Negotiations on the transit of the „South Stream” gas route through Serbia and the sale of NIS started in 2007, around the time when negotiations on the status of Kosovo under the auspices of the troika of representatives of the EU, the USA and Russia were coming to an end. Seeking to assure its support, Serbia offered Russia a lucrative privatization deal involving the sale of 51 percent privatization of the Serbian Oil Industry (NIS) to Russian interests, in exchange for Russia’s promise that a branch of „South Stream” would go through Serbia and that the underground gas storage facility „Banatski dvor” would be constructed. In both cases the ownership ratio would be 51% - 49% in favour of Russia.

After special parliamentary elections and the appointment of the new government in July 2008, the politics of relying on Russia, both regarding the status of Kosovo and other international issues, continued. Since January 2009, or more precisely, since the Ambassadors Conference in Belgrade, Moscow assumed a place next to Brussels and Washington, an enhanced role compared to the period before 2005. Aided by Russia, Serbia managed to secure the UN General Asse-

The convergence of Serbia’s interests in preserving its territorial integrity and Russia’s interests in preventing the legalization of the precedent set by Kosovo’s independence was further strengthened by concrete, practical convergence of the two countries. Besides the energy sector deals, a Moscow Bank branch office was opened, and there are plans for other major Russian banks, such as Gazprombank to open branches in the market, further improving conditions for the spread of Russian business in Serbia. There have been a few Russian commercial investments, and the list of products on which no or reduced duty is paid has been extended. Among other forms of military cooperation, Russian engineers have since April 2009 been removing unexploded bombs left over from the 1999 NATO bombing. When Russian president Medvedev visited Belgrade on October 20, 2009, an agreement was signed on Russian-Serbian cooperation in humanitarian and natural disasters and other emergency situations.

When the issue of Kosovo was transferred to the legal terrain, with the clear message that the institutions in which Russia has a veto right would not recognize Kosovo, and after the discussion before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the process of Serbian-Russian convergence was completed. Even though Serbia turned its foreign policy course towards the direction of the Euro-Atlantic community in late 2009 with an application for European Union membership, Russia’s influence in Serbia remained intact.

When in early 2010 Serbia’s Minister of Defense, Dragan Sutanovac, raised the issue of Serbia’s entry into NATO, his words elicited a tempestuous reaction. Leading opposition leaders asked for a referendum where the people would decide, a response based on both the emotional antagonism towards NATO for the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia, and the People’s Assembly Resolution 125/07 of December 2007, which proclaimed Serbia’s military neutral until a referendum on the issue was organized.

Russian officials stepped in loudly expressing their opinion, i.e. their opposition to Serbia’s membership in NATO; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, said he thought the majority of Serbia’s people were against their country joining NATO and the chairman of the
Duma Committee on International Affairs, Constantin Kosachev, said Serbia joining NATO would mean Serbian people accepted NATO’s intervention and the independence of Kosovo.9 Russia’s ambassador to NATO went even further when he said Russia would re-examine its attitude towards Kosovo in case Serbia joined NATO.10 The Russian maneuvering was effective, and both Serbia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremić11 and President Boris Tadić12 backtracked, issuing denials. It is unclear whether this turnaround resulted from the pressure exerted by Russia, or by a realistic assessment of the probability of Serbia’s entry in NATO seen in the context of the Kosovo issue.

The reason behind Russia’s rigid opposition to Serbia’s NATO membership lies in the principle relationship between Russia and NATO. Unlike the military doctrine of the Russian Federation from 2000, where NATO was not mentioned, but only a vague formulation of external threat seen in „the spread of military blocks at the expense of the Russian Federation“13, in Russia’s new military doctrine, NATO was explicitly mentioned as a „military danger“ (but not military threat).14 It is, therefore, logical to expect Russia’s increased efforts in opposing the accession into NATO of friendly countries such as Serbia. Russia is aware of Serbia’s position and its environment, but it is also aware of the fact that Serbia’s membership in NATO would present a setback for several important interests in the Western Balkans. In its present situation of „military neutrality“ Serbia is developing a „strategic partnership“ with Russia in the field of energy, and showing interest in Russia’s initiative for a new Pact on Security in Europe15 — it is less likely to do so as a NATO member, because in that case Serbia’s bonds with the USA would be far stronger than they are now. Providing arguments in favour of a new Pact on Security in Europe, Russian officials have often said that the existing security architecture was not good enough because there are countries in Europe which are not, and do not intend to become NATO members — alluding, among others, to Serbia.16

Immediately upon the start of the Kosovo status talks, Russia informed the world it was not supporting the independence of the province: it has not changed this attitude, although a big part of the Euro-Atlantic community hoped it would. Its reasons stem from its perception of Kosovo’s independence as a dangerous precedent that threatens to have negative effects on Russia’s territorial integrity, as well as the integrity of neighboring countries. This is, most certainly, one of the reasons why the countries such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova have not recognized Kosovo. Furthermore, protection of international law is the cornerstone of Russian foreign politics22 and one of the few, but still available weapons Russia is using in order to maintain the status quo in international relations, where it plays a key role in spite of its actual significance in the world. Russia’s legal conservatism aims at retaining some form of control over realpolitik processes in the world, a control endangered by the bombing of Yugoslavia (1999), the intervention in Iraq (2003), as well as „the coloured revolutions“ in post-Soviet territories (2003 – 2005). The conservative protection of international law enables Russia to come up with solid arguments, based on international law, against the spread of NATO, against the placing of military infrastructure in Eastern Europe, against interventions, and especially against USA unilaterality. Excluding the limited bombings of Serb positions in Bosnia in 1994,23 NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 was the first intervention since the founding of this alliance, and it showed that Russian opinions will be ignored if contrary to essential interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. This shows there is a serious realpolitik value in the question of the status of Kosovo, as expressed by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin when he drew a parallel between the situation in Kosovo and that in the renegade Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia:24

From the moral and ethical point of view, the comparison of Kosovo, the precedent set by Kosovan, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia is completely grounded. They do not differ at all. There were ethnic conflicts both here and there, as well as violations of law.25

The question of the status of Kosovo is both a practical and a usable question in contemporary international relations. Russia uses this question to point to the NATO-centric system of security in Europe, because NATO bombed Kosovo without a UN Security Council decision, which led to Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. Russia sees the recognition of Kosovo by most NATO members as a move contrary to the principle of territorial integrity of countries and a direct consequence of the bombing of Serbia.26 On the other hand, intervening in Kosovo, NATO emphasized its (supra-)legal arguments that values had priority over realpolitik, and that protecting a great number of possible victims was more important that some global-level consensus with countries such as Russia, which did not share the same value systems and priorities with NATO states.

However, the situation changed in 2008, both for NATO and Russia. NATO could not secure the nece-
necessary support to Kosovo’s independence even among its own member states, since four out of 28 member states refused to recognize Kosovo. NATO was faced with the limitations of its own possibilities to violate international law. The violation of the existing norm with the aim of protecting possible victims from mass violations of human rights, both quantitatively and qualitatively differs from violation of the existing norm in the international law for the purposes of stability – because the conflicting parties are unable to agree on the status. On the other hand, the recognition of the unilateral proclamation of the independence of Kosovo has changed the political climate in Russia as well. Immediately after the proclamation of independence of Kosovo, Russian leaders said this would set a precedent, which would have consequences in Georgia. Relations with de facto regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been formalized in Georgia. The attack of Georgian forces on Chinhali in South Ossetia gave Russia a reason to respond to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, and Russia recognized these two provinces on August 26, 2008. Justifying its own violation of the international law, Russia used, mutatis mutandis, the arguments presented by the Euro-Atlantic community in the case of Kosovo (mass violations of human rights resulting from the attack, lack of possibilities to otherwise maintain security). Faced with accusations it was inconsistent in its interpretation and application of international law, since it had completely different attitude in the case of Kosovo, Russia said it was true that the cases of Kosovo and Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not be compared, because Serbia had not attacked Kosovo as Georgia had attacked South Ossetia, which was why the case of South Ossetia was the sui generis case, and the case of Kosovo was not.

The focus on the status of Kosovo and the shaping of politics around this issue has, to an extent, stabilized the internal political situation in Serbia, providing the country with the possibility to continue with reforms on its European path. The countries of the Euro-Atlantic community have not been exerting much pressure on the government in Belgrade, sensing the delicate situation it is in. However, through its insistence on strengthening ties and building a „strategic partnership“ with Russia, without a realistic insight into Serbia’s and its own interests and priorities in international relations, and by insisting on the short-term benefits this alliance offers, Serbia has put itself in a position where Russia can objectively influence public opinion, and even the setting of Serbia’s priorities in foreign politics. This has additionally limited the space for foreign-policy maneuvering, regardless of the issue of Kosovo.

The question of Kosovo remains open for Russia, although it is aware that its influence on the final decision on its status is limited to preventing the legalization of Kosovo’s status in those bodies in which it has the right to veto. Having withdrawn its troops by August 2003, Russia’s involvement in the issue has been reduced to discussions on the principles and international law, and it has freed itself from any responsibility to influence the final decision. The daily paper „Kurir“ reported that President Medvedev, while visiting Serbia, asked President Tadić not to change Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. Regardless of the accuracy of this information, the fact remains that Kosovo is Serbia’s priority in relations between Russia and Serbia, as well as a part of the platform on which Russia is building its opposition to the politics of the Euro-Atlantic community.

The realpolitik effect is, however, completely different in these two cases. Kosovo was recognized by 65 countries, including most countries from the Euro-Atlantic community, while only four (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru) recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Regardless of the results of a legal analysis on the status of these provinces, this fact best depicts the reach of their argumentation, as well as the actual influence that Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community have in international relations.

Serbia has to realistically analyse the extent to which its short-term decisions, regardless of how important the issues they pertain to are, will lead to a double negative effect: the increased Russian influence on Serbia’s internal affairs, which the Euro-Atlantic community will not tolerate for long and which will halt Serbia’s further integration, and the failure of the efforts aimed at defending the country’s territorial integrity.
NOTES

1 Tadić, „EU is the most important objective“ January 12, 2009, available at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=01&dd=12&nav_id=409279

2 Statement by the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanović at the SRF Federal Assembly, http://www.mfa.rs/Srpski/Forsvar/forburo.h

3 When the independence of Kosovo was proclaimed, a part of the then leading coalition failed to react even when protesters were burning the flags of the countries perceived as the culprits for „the stealing of Kosovo“.

4 These accusations were presented on October 26, 2008, Vojislav Kostunica, To recognize EULEX is to recognize independence, http://www.arts.rs/page/stories/story/9/?brija=24840/7 riznanje=Euleksa+je+priznanje+nezavisnosti.html


7 http://www.msp.gov.rs/Srpski/Bilteni/Srpski/b120109_s.html


10 According to the Russian Ministry for Emergencies’ data, from April 6 to August 12, members of the Ministry’s Center for High-Risk Rescue Operations cleared 539, 413m2 of land, and additional 418, 000 will be cleared in the future. 177 explosive devices were found. Available in Russian at http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/story/9/?brija=16740&vest=168804&title_add=Lavrov%3A%20NATO%20ne%20tika
dan/171951/Grupa-od-200-Intelektualaca-za-referendum-o-NATO-

gli/1795/Grupa-od-200-Intelektualaca-za-referendum-o-NATO-

12 The commentary was made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative on the 10th anniversary since the beginning of the bombing of Yugoslavia, (Commentary of the official representative of the Russian Federation (Комментарий внешней политики Российс

13 The decision on NATO should not be made behind people’s back, January 12, 2010, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Poli
gli/1795/Grupa-od-200-Intelektualaca-za-referendum-o-NATO-

14 Novosti, January 22, 2010, Lavrov: NATO is not bringing a solu-
tion, http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigace.php?%3Bstatus=jo


18 The transcript of statements and answers to questions of media provided by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov at joint press-conference on results of negotiations with the Ser-


cie_ENG.pdf

21 The rule of law in international relations is the second priority of the Russian Federation, see: Foreign politics of the Russian Federation (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации) , July 12, 2008 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/ dic08/07/24/040908.shtml


23/dnevnik/sojgu-za-rusiju-cena-nis-a-gotova-stvar/833240

24 It was later explained that this statement did not mean Russia was planning to recognize Kosovo. ITAR TASS, the meeting of the Russian president Putin and the S. Ossietia president Kokoity, was planning to recognize Kosovo, ITAR TASS, the meeting of the Russian president Putin and the S. Ossietia president Kokoity, also http://news.mail.ru/polit

25 See the RTS news, available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/story/9/?brija=116723/Putin+o+Kosovu+i+Abhaziji.html

26 The commentary was made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives on the 10th anniversary since the beginning of the bombing of Yugoslavia, (Комментарий внешней политики Российской Федерации (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации) , July 12, 2008 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/dic08/07/24/040908.shtml

27 Sergej Lavrov, Face to Face with America: Between Non-con-


29 @arko Petrović, Russian-Serbian Strategic Partnership: Content and Reach, available at: http://www.iasc-fund.org/hr/publikacija.php

30 For “the stealing of Kosovo”.

cie_ENG.pdf

32 The rule of law in international relations is the second priority of the Russian Federation, see: Foreign politics of the Russian Federation (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации) , July 12, 2008 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/dic08/07/24/040908.shtml


34 It was later explained that this statement did not mean Russia was planning to recognize Kosovo. ITAR TASS, the meeting of the Russian president Putin and the S. Ossietia president Kokoity, was planning to recognize Kosovo, ITAR TASS, the meeting of the Russian president Putin and the S. Ossietia president Kokoity, also http://news.mail.ru/polit

35 See the RTS news, available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/story/9/?brija=116723/Putin+o+Kosovu+i+Abhaziji.html

36 The commentary was made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives on the 10th anniversary since the beginning of the bombing of Yugoslavia, (Комментарий внешней политики Российской Федерации (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации) , July 12, 2008 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/dic08/07/24/040908.shtml

37 Sergej Lavrov, Face to Face with America: Between Non-con-


39 @arko Petrović, Russian-Serbian Strategic Partnership: Content and Reach, available at: http://www.iasc-fund.org/hr/publikacija.php
Since the beginning of the 1990s, all Kosovar Albanian leaders have continuously expressed their enchantment with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and dreamt of the day when Kosovo would join the Western Alliance’s rank and file. For Kosovo, becoming part of NATO as well as of the European Union, was part of a political and security vision indispensable for building a West-oriented and democratic society in a country where the overwhelming majority of the two million population are ethnic Albanian, most of them secular Muslims. From Kosovo’s historical leader and first President, Ibrahim Rugova, to the current head of state Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, all have explicitly and without any doubts on many occasions stated that becoming part of NATO is not only Kosovo’s aim, but also its destiny.

With Kosovo declaring independence on February 17th 2008, the dream of joining NATO and other Western structures became a realistic political aim. It is seen as feasible within a few years, especially since NATO itself has a permanent presence in Kosovo and, since June 1999, its KFOR mission serves as Kosovo’s de facto army. The government’s NATO aspirations — echoed frequently by leaders such as President Sejdiu who recently declared NATO membership to be part of Kosovo’s vision for the future — also enjoy great support among the absolute majority of people in Kosovo. While most Kosovo Albanians continue to be deeply suspicious of the EU due to what they see as its repeated historical failure to help them in their quest for freedom and independence, the absolute majority has very warm feelings towards NATO, regardless of the fact that many of the NATO countries are at the same time EU members, and NATO’s policy toward independent Kosovo is as “status neutral” as that of the EU.

It is not at all difficult to understand why NATO has such high standing among Albanians in Kosovo: after all, this Alliance did enter its first war in defense of Kosovo and its people. In 1999, in what was later dubbed as a “humanitarian intervention”, NATO fought a 78-day long air war against Serbia — named “Operation Allied Force” — because of Belgrade’s continuous and
extreme misrule over Kosovo, and eventually its attempt to ethnically cleanse the territory of Albanians. The driving force behind the intervention was the US administration under President Bill Clinton, guided by his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. 2

NATO’s war over Kosovo turned out to be a rather complicated affair, causing internal disagreements even among NATO members, and a deep rift with Russia, culminating with open hostility at a time of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance. 3

The air campaign ended in June 1999, with Serbia signing a full and effectively unconditional withdrawal from Kosovo in the Macedonian town of Kumanovo, close to border of Kosovo. The Military Technical Agreement – widely known as the Kumanovo Agreement – opened the doors for NATO troops to enter Kosovo, where they were welcomed as liberators in what was an unprecedented show of people’s affection for foreign uniforms - something not seen in Europe since the end of World War Two. In his book “Waging Modern War”, apart from giving a detailed day-to-day account of “Operation Allied Force”, then NATO SACEUR General Wesley K. Clark, also notes the gratitude and deep emotions of Kosovar Albanians for the American soldiers entering the town of Ferizaj after the Serbian withdrawal. 4

To this day, the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, KFOR, continues to score the highest public approval rates, not only compared to international missions like the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) or the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), but also compared to local institutions. In the last opinion poll conducted by Gallup last autumn, Kosovo Albanians put NATO on top of the list of institutions in which they had confidence, with 90 percent, trusting it more than even religious institutions (86 percent), EU institutions (78 percent) or their own government (66 percent). This level of trust in NATO is the highest in the region, with most other nations rating NATO under 50 percent, and Serbs tellingly having the least trust towards NATO with 15 percent. 5

When speaking of Kosovo and NATO, one should not put aside one factor which makes this relationship even closer than expected: the United States of America.

Historically, in Kosovo, NATO was seen as a sort of American military arm in Europe. In reality, from the Kosovar perspective at least, this assumption seems to be more than natural and obvious: the Washington administration under President Clinton and Secretary Albright was the driving force behind the 1999 peace negotiations held at the French Chateau Rambouillet and then in Paris, talks whose failure precipitated the NATO campaign. 6

The air campaign itself was led by then NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), American General Wesley Clark, who in his account describes the war to be “a victory for these Albanians, who were mistreated, attacked and deported in hundreds of thousands from their homes and their country” as well as a “more than a victory for NATO… it was a personal victory for all of us who worked to draw attention on Milosevic’s plans for Kosovo, and fought to stop, and finally to reverse the ethnic cleansing”. 7

America got deeply involved in Kosovo against Serbia, eventually turning to military power and warfare, in what was seen from at least some of President Clinton’s White House officials as the “gratest foreign policy crisis of his presidency” which ended up with “the first war fought by NATO forces in its fifty-year history”. In the face of opposition from all corners, within US and NATO and outside, the war over Kosovo turned out to be Clinton’s “ultimate international juggling act” while it would also test the Western Alliance he crafted with NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. 8

And, even today, under American leadership, NATO is playing a major role in state-building in Kosovo, contrary to what it’s “status neutral” declared policy might suggest; while it officially does not recognize the independence of Kosovo, NATO is responsible for supervising and supporting the establishment and training of a multi-ethnic, professional and civilian-controlled Kosovo Security Force, KSF. 9

KSF, although a small force of 2,500 active and 800 reserve troops, lightly armed and with no possession of heavy weapons such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability, is an institution of the independent Republic of Kosovo and is viewed as officials in Pristina as a military formation which is being trained to take over the military responsibilities from NATO, once the peacekeeping troops are completely withdrawn. This view of KSF as Kosovo’s future army was recently underlined by Kosovo’s prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, in an interview for the Associated Press. Commenting on the recent reduction of KFOR troops -- reduced to 10,000 as of January 2010, with reports suggesting further reductions in the future – expressed his confidence that KSF is increasingly well prepared to take over from NA-
TO, taking up the role “that every security force has in an independent country” and noted that “there must be no security and defense vacuum in Kosovo”. 10

On the other side, Belgrade has continuously been expressing doubts over NATO’s intentions and mission in Kosovo. On the very day that Kosovo declared independence, on February 17th 2008, virtually minutes after the parliament in Pristina voted in favor of the creation of the independent Republic of Kosovo, in Belgrade, then Prime Minister of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica, labeled Kosovo as “a fake state, created by NATO and America”. 11

This Serbian attitude has only reinforced the positive view among Kosovars towards NATO and the US, while the Bondsteel base, close to the town of Ferizaj, has become a symbol of this, so to speak, “American Connection” between NATO and Kosovo.

While the US is almost adored in Kosovo, that is not the case with the European Union, despite the fact that Pristina’s primary goal is said to be European integration and EU membership. The reasons are many and go beyond current problems, touching deep into the historically controversial involvement of big European powers in Kosovo and the region in the last 100 years; with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and World War I, peace conferences resulted with agreements that left Kosovo under Serbian rule, and Kosovar Albanians demands were ignored and disregarded. 12

This historical experience is today followed by further disillusionment with Europe, as the EU is continuing with its controversial and basically ineffective policy towards Kosovo, with the latest twist of defining itself as “status neutral”. Because five EU states do not recognize Kosovo, while a majority of 22 does, the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, which is supposed to assist and monitor Kosovo’s police, justice and customs systems, is having wide and long-lasting difficulties in deployment and operation. Even though EULEX is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and its mandate was agreed by EU Ministers on February 4th 2008, it took almost a year to deploy. Because of internal disagreements over Kosovo’s independence, EULEX only started its work on December 9th 2008, while in northern part of Kosovo, which is dominated by the Serbian minority population and effectively controlled by Belgrade-sponsored parallel institutions, the EU mission is still not fully deployed and operational. 13

Hence, more than two years of the EU deciding to send its mission to Kosovo, EULEX is yet to show Kosovars if it really means business and whether it is capable of doing what it ostensibly came to do.

Of course, the EU is a group of 27 countries, and Kosovo is not the only instance in which there is division among member states, resulting in compromises or even lack of any policy at all. Contrary to the United States, the European Union still does not have a fully-defined foreign policy, and the consensus-driven process of building common positions has sometimes put Brussels at serious risk of failing major tests, like the one it is currently facing in Kosovo.

The problems of EULEX are in more than one way symptomatic for the EU experience in Kosovo. Even during the UN administration, from 1999-2008, when the EU had a pillar within UNMIK and was in charge of rebuilding Kosovo’s economy, results were dramatically lacking; Today, Kosovo is still struggling with high unemployment estimated at 40 percent, extreme levels of poverty with almost 15 percent of people living on one euro per day, and high levels of corruption in the administration and public sector, which scares off mo-
foreign investments. The privatization process, once hailed by UN and EU officials as the cornerstone of economic development, has brought no improvements, while private business is quite weak, and the government is the biggest employer and investor in the country.

While not the whole of this grim picture has been painted by the EU alone, it is more than obvious that it left some major brush strokes of gray on the canvas. This mistrust towards European policies did not spare even KFOR forces, especially during the first years after the 1999 war. In the northern town of Mitrovica, the Albanian population frequently blamed French KFOR soldiers for the ethnic division of the city, while some went even further suggesting that it was a direct consequence of French government policy towards Kosovo and Serbia. At the time, there were media reports suggesting that links between Paris and Belgrade are influencing the behavior of French troops in the peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia. 14

Whatever the truth, perception of Europe as less trustworthy and less friendly compared to the US, remains deeply rooted among Kosovar Albanians. And, with the complicated situation in which Kosovo finds itself in relation to its EU accession perspective — being not only last in line for membership, but also feeling quite depressed and utterly betrayed at not being considered for even smaller European carrots, such as visa liberalization — no wonder it is turning for guidance across the Atlantic.

But, as most Kosovars already know, Euro-Atlantic integration for Pristina is not something that would be easy to achieve, even without the problem with the recognition of its independence. Kosovo still has a long way to go if it wants to get into NATO and the EU: as the European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo shows, there’s much to be done in fulfilling political and economic criteria, as well as achieving European standards. 15

On the other hand, even if Kosovo were able to fulfill the necessary criteria, the fact remains that the independence declared on February 17th 2008 is still not recognized enough to ensure Pristina’s smoother and faster integration into the international community, especially into transatlantic institutions. This, coupled with Serbian obstructionism, leaves Kosovo, as well as the whole region, still in the troubled waters of the past, with instability lurking behind each and every corner. 16

NOTES:
1: Department of Public Information and Communications, Office of the President of Republic of Kosovo, www.president-ksgov.net
5. Gallup Balkan Monitor, www.balkan-monitor.eu
6. M. Albright, Madam Secretary.
9: NATO’s Role in Kosovo, www.nato.int
More then twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia, the countries of Southeastern Europe are being gradually absorbed by a security system developed under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some countries in the region are already embedded in this system as full-fledged NATO members, while others are included in the NATO accession process at various stages or still weighing their options and considering possible alternative security concepts. Regardless of their current position and security choices, there were at least three major issues that all countries in the region had to carefully consider in their decision-making process on NATO: (1) their own national interest; (2) the overall geopolitical context, and (3) public opinion attitudes towards NATO integration.

In retrospect, it seems interesting and perhaps useful, to briefly examine the less-known details about political and security challenges that Josip Broz Tito’s Communist Yugoslavia had been faced with in the early stages of the Cold War. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the rapprochement with the capitalist West and NATO almost seemed like the only lifeline that could ensure the survival of the country, threatened by its former Communist brethren following the ideological and personal rift between Tito and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Almost 60 years ago, like today, national interest, the geopolitical context, and even closely-controlled public opinion were the key elements in Tito’s decision-making on whether or not to join NATO.

* * *

The United States and the United Kingdom had backed Josip Broz (1892-1980) during the closing years of World War Two, in spite of his Communist affiliation and his never-disguised intention of turning Yugoslavia into a Communist country. Tito’s Yugoslav opposition, Dragoljub “Drazza” Mihalovic (1893-1946), a Serbian colonel in the pre-war royalist regime, had decided that it was more important to oppose Tito’s Communist Partisans than to engage fully against the Germans. For the Allies, therefore, support for Tito
was a pragmatic response to the need to tie down German divisions in the Balkans while the invasion of France was being prepared.

The same pragmatism guided U.S. policy when Tito was expelled from the Cominform by Joseph Stalin in 1948. A number of factors fed into that split, although they coalesced essentially around the autonomous character of the Yugoslav revolution — which, unlike most of Eastern Europe, had not come under communist rule following Soviet victories in the war — and the reluctance of Yugoslav communists to follow Moscow’s direction.

Once the U.S. confirmed that the Yugoslav-Moscow dispute was genuine, it moved to fully support Tito, realizing that a Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination would be a very serious blow to the Soviet Union. A CIA report at the time concluded that “Tito’s defiance of the Cominform has precipitated the first major rift in the USSR’s satellite empire and has struck at the very core of the Stalinist concept of Soviet expansion through world Communism.” ¹

U.S. support, however, was founded on the cornerstone of its national interest: (1) to encourage socialist states to assert and maintain their independence from the USSR; (2) to encourage the advancement of alternative non-Soviet models of socialist development, and (3) to promote stability in this historically turbulent area.

The Truman administration decided to support the renegade Yugoslav Communist as a way to challenge Stalin, deprive the Soviets of a sphere of influence on the Adriatic, and ensure the survival of a possible magnet for further defections from the Soviet bloc.

Tito was able to restore Yugoslav unity but only through the imposition of Communist ideology and complicated mechanisms for doling out benefits. The country was organized as a strongly centralized federation with six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro) within their historic borders. In addition, the territory of Serbia also encompassed the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. ²

The regime survived in part thanks to U.S. military aid, U.S.-orchestrated economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and the restoration of trade relations with the West after August 1949. ³

The defense of Yugoslavia was never a formal commitment of the United States or of NATO. Still, there was calculated ambiguity in Washington’s impression as to how it might react if Moscow tried to reincorporate Yugoslavia or carve off its Orthodox areas — notably Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. While in 1968 the Soviets could move against Czechoslovakia in the near-certainty that there would be no U.S. military response, the same assurance could never be taken for granted with regard to Yugoslavia.

At the pinnacle of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, Washington warned the Soviets that the U.S. and the West would not sit by passively in the face of any attempted takeover. It may be argued that this warning to the Soviets played a key role in the Kremlin’s decision not to launch a war against Yugoslavia. The intimidation of the Yugoslavs was therefore reduced to hostile propaganda aimed at fostering internal discontent, additional diplomatic pressure, continuation of the economic blockade, an organized effort to infiltrate agents into the country, increased military maneuvers along the Yugoslav border, as well as repeated incidents along the Yugoslav border with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. However, there is evidence that early in the crisis, Stalin was trying to organize a satellite invasion of Yugoslavia from Hungary. As both Marshal Georgij A. Zhukov and General Bela Kiraly had stated in their memoirs, Stalin was considering the idea of an armored thrust and airborne assault on Bosnia. ⁴

Until Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Western defense plans, and particularly American and British defense plans, would have been to relinquish Europe all together and withdraw completely, had there been a Soviet invasion. It was General Montgomery, then the deputy SACEUR in the newly founded NATO, who tried to resist this because he thought that Europe could be defended within the continental area, along the Rhine or the Alps, if only Yugoslavia could be used to prop up the defenses of particularly Italy and parts of Austria, which then was still occupied by Western powers. This plan of putting the defense lines of NATO deep into the European continent, rather than letting it be on the coast of France and Belgium, depended and crucially revolved around this big revolution in the situation of Yugoslavia.

The general concept of operations for the defense of Western Europe in the early 1950s was based on the obstacle of the Rhine prolonged by the IJssel. The aim was to focus the forces of Western Europe on the defense of the Rhine, covered by delaying action further east. Bases in the United Kingdom were supposed to
be used in launching a strategic air offensive against Russia. However, "the successful adoption of a Rhine strategy in Western Europe is militarily impracticable because of the overall shortages of forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Countries will have insufficient forces to prevent Western Europe, excluding the United Kingdom, from being overrun. Therefore, there are clear advantages to be gained from holding the Italo-Austrian bridgehead in Southern Europe in order to retain a foothold for the subsequent counter-offensive and to contribute to the defense of the United Kingdom base." 5

It was believed in the West that the Ljubljana Gap - the valley in which the Slovenian capital lies - could have served for a rapid Soviet attack from Hungary into Italy, although this was never as much of a priority for NATO as the Central Front. At a minimum, therefore, to deny Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union was to make the defense of Italy and Austria easier.

American military representatives had warned the Yugoslav government that, in the case of war, the Russians would try to break through Slovenia into Italy and from Bulgaria to Albania, cutting Yugoslavia off from Greece. 6 Although the third-largest regular land force in Europe in 1948, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) could not withstand such a sustained assault. The Yugoslav authorities were told that their defensive capabilities would be considerably enhanced if Yugoslavia would be willing, in conjunction with the Allies, to consider Northeastern Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece as a single defense area. Forces and equipment were subsequently allocated to the defense of the Ljubljana Gap in the north and the Vardar valley approach to the Salonika area in the south. 7

U.S. assistance to Tito included the provision of aircraft and other military equipment, plus a continuing economic aid program that won Yugoslavia a unique and favored position among all Communist countries. The allocations of American military aid to Yugoslavia — in tanks, pieces of heavy artillery and jet planes — were used to equip the units of the JNA in the area of the Ljubljana Gap and were generally kept in that area. 8

Yugoslavia thus became an important, albeit secondary factor in Western defense planning and there was some discussion about the possibility of bringing it closer to NATO. That discussion continued into the mid-1950s as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union flirted with full reconciliation after Stalin’s death. However, this was never a likely prospect. Tito had repeatedly assured American and British representatives that Yugoslavia would come in immediately on the Western side in the event of an outbreak of war with the Soviet bloc in Europe. 9 Still, he was determined to avoid what might have been regarded as a “provocative” association with an “aggressive” alliance, and also to avoid the appearance of commitment to either bloc.10

Tito told the British government that the Yugoslav people “understood and approved” the steps taken by their government to improve relations with the West. However, Tito was convinced that joining NATO would not be understood by the Yugoslav public. “It was essential,” he said, “to proceed by stages in this way, carrying public opinion along. Yugoslavia would be more useful to the West as a united nation outside NATO, than in it and divided.” 11

Following his famous rapprochement with Khrushchev in 1955, Tito kept his relations in balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. He exploited Yugoslavia’s position in the Cold War, playing one side against the other with various benefits in trade and both financial and military assistance.
Yugoslavia’s independent character was also reinforced by Tito’s role in promoting the Non-Aligned Movement, in which he and Yugoslavia sought to be the leading force for socialist development in the developing world.

Independence from Moscow but adherence to an essentially Marxist-Leninist form of one-party rule left Yugoslavia with a pivotal position between East and West in the Cold War. Both sides at different times came closer to Yugoslavia, but for both the main objective was to prevent it falling into the other’s hands.

This geopolitical setting ended in a rather dramatic fashion by the implosion of the Soviet block and the end of the Cold War, as well as the beginning of the wars of Yugoslav succession at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Almost a decade later, with the post-conflict consolidation of Yugoslavia’s successor states and their gradual transition toward democracy and market economy, the time has come to again examine the issue of international security networks. Neither the Soviet Union, or the Cold War, or Yugoslavia for that matter, were part of equation any longer. Some sixty years after Tito’s mind games with NATO, the Western Alliance remained a rare invariant, with little or no security alternatives.

While some Europeans may still believe that the sole purpose of NATO’s existence has remained unchanged — namely “to keep the Americans in, Russians out and Germans down” — NATO today is not the same organizations it was a few decades ago. The role the Alliance played in ending wars in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the new challenges it has been faced with following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., have all introduced a measure of caution in decision-making on NATO accession. For countries in the region, opting for NATO is not an automatic choice, but requires careful and rational analysis of risks and benefits, with a clear vision of what scenario would best serve the vital national interests. As our little history reminder suggests, taking into account the public attitudes toward NATO accession should also be an important part of the process.

NOTES:


2 There was a saying among the foreign diplomats assigned to missions in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s that it was a country with seven neighbors, six republics, five nationalities, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one boss, or simply as ethnic divergence under Tito’s mantra. Walter A. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 5.


7 Ibid., 30 July 1952.

8 Ibid., 17 July 1952.

9 Ibid., 22 April 1952.

10 Ibid., 31 December 1951.

A Visit to the Training Center in Butmir – Reaching NATO Standards Through Top-Class Education

The Peace Support Operations Training Center in the military base in Butmir has two entrances, one from the ‘Federation’ side and one from the ‘Republika Srpska’ side – that is what we are told while going through a security checkup at a barb wired gate. This ‘neutral’, military environment did not at first look promising to the AI members who decided to spend a day in the Peace Support Operations Training Center, but the atmosphere changed dramatically when we got in to a modern white building that looks completely different from the barracks that otherwise dominate the base.

The Center is equipped with the latest technology: in a bright classroom we find a group of English language students, most of them from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also one female student from Novi Sad, Serbia. They greet us politely and immediately turn back to their work.

“We are trying to develop the spirit of positive competition here,” says Dr Kenan Dautović, director of the center. “They are all trying really hard to be as good as they can, but they also enjoy working together.”

Dr Dautović and his assistant Sladan Cvijanović tell us about the history of the Center. The original idea was to focus on young officers’ basic training for peace operations, as a field that was politically acceptable, and on a territory that was within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, allowing for the cooperation between sides that were at war not so long ago. The initial idea and the ensuing efforts to get support from Bosnian political structures came from Great Britain.

“The Center was officially established in 2003, it will maintain its multiethnic character for ten years, and Bosnian authorities will then take over” Dr Dautović says. “After opening, we were mulling over possible activities, but in the meantime, Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to participate in international peace operations, so we decided that this should be the main focus here.”

The Center and its training programs are part of an international project involving Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gre-
at Britain, Poland, Turkey, Austria, Germany, Hungary, US, Macedonia, Croatia, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands and France. The initial mission - to work on multinational cooperation in the BiH armed forces - was fulfilled relatively quickly, especially after the successful defense reform in 2006. Since then, the main mission has been to provide internationally recognized education and training for selected young BiH military officers.

In 2008, NATO upgraded the center into a Partnership for Peace (PfP) Center, one out of 15 in the world. “With the exception of the English Language School in Slovenia, this is the only PfP center in the region, the others are in Vienna, Geneva, California...” Dr Dautović explains.

The students are drawn mainly from BiH armed forces personnel, but also include the best students from Sarajevo University, staff from the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and young people from Serbia, Macedonia and other countries, a fact which clearly demonstrates the value of a certificate from the Center.

The students have the benefit of integrated IT courses, Internet access, smart boards, and the library, all absolutely, and with all courses and lectures taking place in English. The English requirement is at the STANAG 3333 level, and students can improve their language skills by attending parallel courses in the Center.

The basic education offered in the Center is conducted through six internationally recognized courses, but the Center often organizes additional programs, seminars, training sessions, and other events. The course for staff officers is one of the leading programs and its results have made the Center well-known around the region. Statistics speak for themselves: since 2006, 276 BiH officers attended a total of ten courses and as many as 73 foreign students received their certificates here, adding to the Center’s international reputation.

Peace mission training for junior officers - lieutenants, captains and majors - is an especially valuable part of the course. Since only the best get a chance to receive such an elite education, the Center administration has decided to form mobile teams who provide other members of the armed forces with an opportunity to improve their expertise without visiting the school.

“We have a team right now in the Sixth Brigade in Banja Luka,” Dr Dautović says proudly, adding that the
number of officers and NCOs who completed the training has grown to an impressive 1,000 since the Center introduced mobile teams.

“That means that quantitatively, around twenty percent of officers have passed our training in some form, but the quality of this training is actually much more important”, says Sladana Cvijanović.

The basic course for staff officers has two modules: a 21-week basic module for junior officers, with two semesters and daily classes. During the first semester, students learn how to read maps and follow decision-making process in the armed forces, while the second semester focuses on peace-keeping missions and practical exercises. In addition to this basic course, the Center offers a course on non-traditional threats, including terrorism, anti-rebel operations, and civilian support missions. Additional courses focus on international relations, international humanitarian rights, and the media in peace keeping operations.

“We insist on a comprehensive approach in our courses because in the modern world, the military is seen as the last resource of power.” Dr. Dautović says. “Current crises cannot be solved militarily and the military is not in focus anymore.” To illustrate this, he describes how students have mock blue-berser exercises where they play the roles of crisis advisors in realistic situations between a government and non-government organization.

“We create a scenario: for example, students are in an African state of Merango which has to deal with a refugee problem, or with a health crisis, or something like that. Students are expected to follow and understand the situation: in class, they follow the adoption of the UN resolution and the implementation of UN and military units’ decisions, just as real blue berets would do. This approach covers the whole process, from problem creation to problem solution, so the students get a comprehensive picture of different societal and state issues,” says Dr. Dautović.

The Center plans to develop new courses and seminars, not only for junior and senior officers, but also for the members of a wider security community, such as the ministries of defense and security, SIPA, OSA, and civilian defense. BiH Defense Minister Selmo Cikotić has been especial vocal in calling for the introduction of these new programs. The Center is also expected to introduce special modules exclusively for the BiH armed forces in their native language, while English modules would be reserved for foreign students. In addition, the Center is expected to receive ECTS points from the University and mi-
ght be even able to provide postgraduate education in the future.

The Center includes the Research and Development department with specialists for senior officers’ educational development and for doctrine development. The future of this institution clearly is in research: the Center has an impressive library with not a single book older than 2007. Says Sladana Cvijanović: “There are a total number of 47 employees at the center, and we function perfectly together, as a team.”

Another indicator of the high quality and the applicability of the education that students receive here is the fact that soldiers with this certificate are the most successful candidates for peace missions abroad, their grades from these classes sent straight to the BiH Ministry of Defense.

Dautović says the Center’s vision is to be active at three levels: global, regional, and international. At the global level, it is a PfP center which participates in forming a Partner working program with around 1,500 activities and 4,500 sub-activities. All international partners may contribute to the existing course quality and develop and offer their own programs, with project topics at the international level including integrity-building in the armed forces, and a US-sponsored project on women in defense structures.

At the regional level, after the signing of the Joint Statement of Ministers of Defense of the Adriatic Charter in November 2009, the PSOTC has become a regional centre for training together with the centers in Krusevac, Serbia and Skopje, Macedonia. That regional character is reflected in the centers’ cooperation in administration, finances, and staff, in the distribution of duties and in strategic planning. The BiH center plays the role of a regional cooperation hub, working on course catalog synchronization, and on developing the base of expert lecturers.

“At the national level, the Center represents a command center for transformation, like the one in NATO,” says Dr. Dautović. “There are few NATO member countries that can offer such level of expertise!”

Without trying to get ahead of political decisions, the Center provides top-class training and education for soldiers, preparing them for challenges in peace operations.

“Such a systematic approach to training is new for NATO as well. Adjusting ourselves to NATO standards and practices will make it easier for us to join NATO,” says Sladana Cvijanović.
Today, over fourteen years since the Dayton Accord brought an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country appears closer to renewed breakdown and crisis than at any time since the war ended. The underlying reason for this lies in the dysfunctional constitutional structure foisted upon Bosnia-Herzegovina by the US in 1995. Yet the reason why Bosnia-Herzegovina’s problems are coming to a head now, fourteen years after Dayton, must be sought in the international circumstances, which are far less favourable to the country than they were even in the middle of the last decade, when its recovery appeared to be most successful. To understand Bosnia-Herzegovina’s current crisis, it is necessary to examine the geopolitical factors that have revealed just how transient was this recovery, built as it was upon superficial reforms on the part of the international administration that failed to address the fundamental flaws in the structure of the post-1995 Bosnian state.

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s contemporary crisis is manifested above all in the aggressively separatist character of the regime of Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska – RS). Dodik openly talks of bringing about his entity’s secession; the RS’s recently passed law on referenda appears to have been designed with this aim in mind. Gone is the Bosnian Serb leadership’s rhetoric of a few years back, of reconciliation and moderation. Dodik now loudly engages in atrocity denial vis-à-vis Serb war-crimes, and recently gave a warm welcome to convicted war criminal Biljana Plavšić, following her early release from prison in Sweden. Meanwhile, all the indications are that the Bosniaks would respond to a declaration of independence on the part of the RS by going back to war. Such a conflict would not remain confined to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Outgoing Croatian president Stjepan Mesl recently threatened that Croatia would respond militarily to an attempt at secession by the RS.

The international community is beginning to wake up to the danger of renewed collapse in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet appears to be unable to respond decisively.
Talks last autumn on constitutional reform held at Butmir, near Sarajevo, convened by representatives of the EU and US, came to nothing. The Butmir package proposed merely some minor tinkering with the Bosnian constitutional structure; a structure that has proven unworkable. Thus Bosnia-Herzegovina, having been the great blemish on the record of the EU and US with regard to the formerly Communist part of Europe in the 1990s, is today the one country in the region for which the outlook appears bleak.

The Bosnian example stands against any facile model of absolute progress in European development in 1989, something that requires explanation. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state with an unworkable constitutional order, one that ensures that the state cannot function. Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided between two entities – the RS and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is a bi-national Bosniak and Croat entity. The central state is wholly emasculated, with most power devolving to the entities. Of these, it is the RS that is the most viable entity, owing to its unitary structure and national homogeneity. Yet this viability of the RS is bad for Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the stronger it is, the stronger is its ability to obstruct Bosnia-Herzegovina’s functioning. A stronger RS enables its leadership to pursue its goal of a de facto or de jure independent Bosnian Serb state.

Conversely, the Bosnian Federation is dominated by elements that support or accept a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Federation could in principle act as the nucleus of a revived Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the Federation is handicapped by the differences between Bosniaks and Croats, with the Croats feeling marginalised by the numerically dominant Bosniaks. Furthermore, the constitutional structure of the Federation is paralysed by its division between cantons – administrative entities which reduce the power of the federal government. The Bosnian state is therefore crippled by the division of competencies between multiple layers of bureaucracy and by the emasculation of those organs of the state which should in principle be acting as integrating factors – the central and Federal authorities. The Bosnian economy is crippled by the enormous cost of this bureaucracy, as well as by the huge corruption of the Bosnian political classes.

Meanwhile, the conflicting goals of Bosniak, Serb and Croat politicians ensure that the state cannot be reformed, since any steps that could promote a stronger and more functioning Bosnian state and which would enjoy the support of Bosnian elements that support integration – above all Bosniaks, also non-nationalist Serbs and Croats – would be opposed by RS politicians for the same reason. The reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina would therefore require measures to be imposed unilaterally in the face of Serb and possibly Croat opposition, and this is something the international community has not been willing to do.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, in fact, serves as an abject lesson that you cannot have a successful post-war recovery unless you end the war on the right basis and impose a settlement designed to work, something that may be illustrated through a comparison of the Dayton settlement with the settlement in Europe after World War II. The Allied powers set out to defeat Germany totally in World War II; Germany was forced to surrender unconditionally; the German regime responsible for causing the war was removed from power; leading German war criminals were tried and executed; Germany itself was cut down to size, territorially truncated and occupied. So, on this basis, a successful post-war recovery in Europe was possible. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the goals and policies of the international community could not have been more different (the “international community” here means the powers that impose the settlement).

In imposing a settlement on Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, the US and the democratic states of Europe were not aiming to defeat those responsible for the war and reverse their acts of conquest. On the contrary, the Dayton settlement was imposed in 1995 to prevent the defeat of Serbia and the Bosnian Serb rebels. This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis of the diplomatic background to the Dayton settlement, but in a nutshell: the dominant Western policy between the outbreak of the Bosnian war in 1992 until 1995 under British and French leadership, was not to defeat or even to identify the side guilty of causing the war, rather to pursue a negotiated settlement. This necessarily meant conceding at least some of the goals of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia and the Bosnian Serb rebels. These then had to be reconciled with the formal commitment to rejecting forcible changes of international borders. All Bosnian peace plans tried to wed the concept of Bosnian partition with the concept of Bosnian unity. These fundamentally irreconcilable principles meant that any settlement based upon them was going to be unworkable.

The Clinton Administration in the US saw no national interest in opposing this Anglo-French policy, and readily went along with it. But unlike the British and Fre-
nch, Clinton’s US was readier to put military pressure on the Serbs to force them to agree to a compromise settlement. Hence the Washington Agreement of March 1994 that established the Bosnian Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, creating one of the pillars of the subsequent Dayton settlement and swinging the military balance against the Serbs. More importantly, Clinton also came under intense domestic political pressure to take action against Serb aggression and in defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and following the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, resistance to this pressure became unsustainable. In August and September 1995, Clinton used NATO air strikes to help coerce the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a settlement. More importantly, he gave the green light to Croat military action against the Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that decisively turned the tide of the war. But fundamentally, the Dayton settlement, although it was achieved through the use of military force, was simply just a reworking of the old Anglo-French policy of appeasing the Serb rebels under the cover of a “compromise” settlement. It was a settlement that was not imposed with any principled vision of a post-war order in mind, but simply with the goal of ending the war, to satisfy Clinton’s domestic critics and put an end to a conflict that was causing intense strains in the US’s relations with its European allies.

We can compare the Dayton settlement with the post-war settlement in Europe after 1945. Far from being removed from power as the Nazi regime had been, the Milošević regime was Clinton’s partner in imposing a settlement on the Bosnian Serb rebels. Far from reversing Serb conquests, as German conquests had been reversed after 1945, Dayton legitimised Serb possession of nearly half of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Serbs comprised 31% of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s pre-war population, yet the RS was awarded 49% of Bosnian territory. Whereas Hitler’s victims – the states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria – emerged restored from World War II and arguably stronger than they had been before, the Dayton settlement did not restore Bosnia-Herzegovina, which emerged wholly emasculated – since the concessions to the principle of partition were greater than the concessions to the principle of unity. In other words, the Bosnia-Herzegovina that emerged from Dayton was a state that was designed not to function, since Dayton rested upon the acquiescence of elements – the Bosnian Serb nationalists and the regime in Belgrade – that had a vested interest in ensuring that it would not function.

There are those who argue that given Bosnia-Herzegovina’s fractured national composition, Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state is inherently unworkable. Yet while it would be wrong to dismiss this argument wholly, it is clearly insufficient. We have two cases in the Balkans that demonstrate that after a war, a nationally fractured population can be made to coexist within a viable state where there is a workable constitutional order. The first is the case of the Bosnian Federation itself. There, the Bosnian Croat entity has been dismantled. Although some Bosnian Croat nationalist elements continue to favour secession, they have been deprived of all institutional elements through which they could carry out this secession. The second case of relatively successful national reintegration is Macedonia, where following the armed conflict in 2001 between the Macedonian state and Albanian rebels, a successful model of multinational coexistence within a unitary state was negotiated in the form of the Ohrid Agreement. Again, this has been helped by the fact that Albania, as the national matrix of the Macedonian Albanians, has pursued a responsible regional policy, eschewing irredentism. By contrast, by legitimising the RS, the Dayton Agreement provided the institutional basis on which Bosnian Serb separatism could build, while Serbia, even after the fall of Milošević in October 2000, has never reversed its anti-Bosnian policy, as Croatia did after Tujman’s death.

Consequently, the international community, in administering Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995, had to contend with the fact that the forces responsible for the war were not defeated; on the contrary, they were pillars of the new order. This was not a problem for the international administrators, since the purpose of the intervention was not to establish a viable Bosnian state or a just order, but merely to fulfil the minimalist goal of ensuring that the peace would hold, that the armed conflict that had proven so damaging to relations between the Western allies would not flare up again and that Bosnia-Herzegovina would stay off the front pages of the newspapers. This meant, for example, that leading war-criminals such as Ratko Mladić were not arrested by international forces in the immediate post-war period, since the administrators and the international
community did not want to take actions that would provoke the Serb authorities, or indeed other elements. Nevertheless, a number of factors militated in the following years in favour of a more interventionist policy on the part of the international community vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina's reconstruction.

Firstly, the Dayton settlement was the child of a Western policy that was already accredited and in a process of transformation at the time that the settlement was reached. The replacement of Francois Mitterrand with Jacques Chirac as French president in 1995 and of John Major with Tony Blair as British prime minister in 1997 meant that French and British policy was no longer in the hands of politicians who had strongly favoured appeasement of the Serbs, but rather of their successors who had seen the futility of the policy of appeasement and were determined not to suffer similar discrediting. Just as the Major and Mitterrand regime had deterred Clinton from stronger intervention to halt Serb atrocities, so Blair and Chirac stiffened Clinton's determination to confront Serbian troublemaking. When Milošević attempted to launch a new campaign of ethnic cleansing, against the Kosovo Albanians in the late 1990s, the NATO powers this time confronted him. The policy of Western appeasement of Milošević – one of the pillars of the Dayton Accord – definitely came to an end with the NATO airstrikes against Serbia in 1999, the indictment of Milošević by the Hague Tribunal and US assistance to the overthrow of Milošević in 2000. So there was a wider geopolitical context to the gradually more hands-on approach of the international administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995.

Secondly, there was an internal dynamic within the international administration towards a more activist approach. The guardianship of Bosnia-Herzegovina was placed in the hands of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), composed of UN members and international bodies. The PIC in turn administered Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Although the High Representative was envisaged above all as an overseer facilitating the recovery of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in practice, the imperative of ensuring stability and peace gradually pulled the OHR into a more interventionist role. The OHR gradually put down roots in the country and gained a real grip on it, creating a self-perpetuating institutional dynamic toward a stronger administration. In 1997, the PIC granted the OHR the so-called "Bohn Powers", allowing the High Representative to dismiss recalcitrant officials who obstructed its work. Consequently, two years later, in 1999, High Representative Carlos Westendorp used the Bohn Powers to dismiss the extreme-nationalist RS president, Nikola Poplasen. Two years after that, his successor, Wolfgang Petritsch, dismissed the hard-line Croat nationalist Ante Jelić from the Bosnian Presidency and seized the assets of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), the principal Bosnian Croat nationalist party. Thus, for nearly a decade from 1997, the OHR took on an increasingly strong role, chipping away from above at the national divisions and the power bases of the nationalist politicians.

This strengthening role of the OHR took on its greatest extent under Paddy Ashdown, who served as High Representative from 2002 to 2006. Ashdown served in an international atmosphere of rapid EU and NATO expansionism and a generally greater Western militancy following the 9/11 attacks and the run-up to, and outbreak of, the war in Iraq. In response to Bosnian Serb army trading with Saddam's Iraq, Ashdown organised the RS's Supreme Defence Council and removed all references to statehood in the RS's constitution. He then established a unified Bosnian military command and intelligence service. In 2000, international mediators ruled that the disputed town of BiH, which sits astride the so-called "northern corridor" linking the eastern and western parts of the RS, should become a neutral district separate from both entities, making an eventual secession of the RS that much more problematic. Later that year, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina ruled that all three of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constituent peoples should enjoy constituent status across its whole territory, striking a blow against the national divisions entrenched by Dayton. In 2003, legislation was adopted that enabled the entities’ separate customs administrations to be replaced by a state Indirect Taxation Authority. In 2004, Ashdown issued a decree for the reunification of the city of Mostar. Also in 2004, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina ruled that thirteen towns and municipalities in the RS, that had been given new Serb names or prefixes since 1992, should have their original, non-national names restored. In October 2005, the RS parliament was finally pressurised into passing an EU-demanded reform aimed at creating a unified Bosnian police force.

This increasing activism on the part of the OHR sent the hard-line nationalists into retreat. It created a dilemma for nationalist politicians, between recalcitrant opposition and collaborating with the international administration. This led to the fragmentation of forme-
rly homogenous nationalist blocs, most graphically highlighted when RS President Biljana Plavčić, a former hardliner who had turned toward collaboration, put down a revolt by supporters of Karadžić in Banja Luka in 1997. Bosnian politicians were made to see that if they did not survive politically, they had to tone down the hard-line rhetoric and abandon outright obstructionism. This was a lesson that the Croat nationalists in particular took on board, after repeated secessionist Croat moves were frustrated by tough action from the OHR, resulting in the fragmenting of the HDZ and the emergence of a more moderate Bosnian Croat current. Serbian politicians too, both in the RS and in Serbia itself, appeared to be gradually developing along more moderate lines. This development reached its high point, as far as the RS was concerned, in 2005, when the 10th commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre was attended by the presidents of both the RS and Serbia.10 This proved to be a false dawn, as no RS or Serbian official attended subsequent commemorations of the massacre.

There has been a regression since the seemingly optimistic times of the mid-2000s, when Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be beginning to work, to the current situation, with Bosnia-Herzegovina at its lowest point since the war. The failure of the reintegration process carried out by the OHR from above was that it did not alter the fundamental fact of the Dayton settlement. Instead, it papered over the cracks. The reintegration rested on the institution of the OHR, which was a transient institution. Whereas the Dayton settlement – the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between two entities that appropriated most of the power in the state – was lasting. As Bosnia-Herzegovina began to work better from the mid-2000s, so the international community has sought to move the country away from international administration toward true independence. This has meant winding up the OHR and reducing the number of international troops on the ground. Thus, the number of international troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina has gone down from 30,000 in 1997 to 2,500 in 1999. What the members of the international community – in particular, the EU and its member states – did not realise, was that it was only because of the OHR and those troops that Bosnia-Herzegovina was beginning to assume an appearance of normality.

Take away those props, and the whole edifice begins to collapse again. With the OHR increasingly toothless and lacking in international support, the very force that compelled the RS’s compliance with the Bosnian order has now lost its potency.

Milorad Dodik, the RS prime minister, today openly defies the High Representative, knowing full well that the High Representative lacks either the coercive power or the international support to remove him from office, as Westendorp removed Poplalen and as Petritsch removed Jelavić. Thus, at one level, the international regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a victim of its own apparent success. Yet this apparent success was also transient for another reason: it rested on exceptionally favourable international circumstances. In recent years, an additional factor has entered the equation that has accelerated the unravelling of the Bosnia-Herzegovina of the High Representatives – the emergence of a newly aggressive and revisionist Russia, with an agenda of upsetting NATO’s expansion eastward. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has galvanised the resistance of the RS to the Western order in the Balkans. Those Western nations most in favour of collaboration with Russia, above all France and Germany, are not willing to press the point in the Balkans. At the same time, with the replacement of George W. Bush with Barack Obama as US president, the US has become increasingly conciliatory towards Russia.

For all these reasons, Dodik’s separatist regime now holds the stronger hand in the Bosnian context. Paradoxically, this radicalisation of the RS’s politics has occurred despite the fact that Serbia itself has gradually moved away from the politics of anti-Western nationalism. The high-point of the latter in Serbia was in the period immediately following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, when this independence was recognised by most members of NATO and the EU. But following the victory of the pro-European parties in the parliamentary elections in Serbia of spring 2008, the pro-European current in Serbia has been dominant. This has not positively impacted upon Bosnia-Herzegovina, because even the pro-European wing of Serbia’s political classes accepts the Serb-nationalist paradigm with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was highlighted by Serbian president Boris Tadić’s
visit last year to the RS, bypassing the Bosnian state authorities to open, on Bosnian soil, a school bearing the name ‘Serbia’.

To sum up, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recovery after Dayton has been stilted because almost all the factors that could have underpinned such a recovery have been absent. There is no common Bosnian political elite that transcends the national division between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks; the Bosnian political classes are divided along national lines. There is no common national identity on the part of the Bosnian population; and with most Bosnian children now attending nationally segregated schools, young Bosnians are growing up without the shared Bosnian consciousness that their parents, at least, had. There are no common state structures that could serve to bring the nationally fractured population together as there are in the case of Macedonia. Consequently, there are no internal Bosnian factors militating toward unity and recovery. But the external factors are also weak or absent. The legalism and caution of the international community has made it unwilling to replace the Dayton order and reform the constitutional properly, without which there can be no genuine recovery of the country. The international protectorate over Bosnia has not been a genuine protectorate, as was the Austro-Hungarian protectorate of 1878-1918, but more of an overseer.

The reforms intended to reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina have been aimed entirely at the state level. On the ground, the international regime has failed to reverse the ethnic cleansing and bring about a meaningful return of refugees. Fourteen years after the end of the war, the population of the RS is still almost entirely Serb; the Bosniak and Croat refugees from the RS have not returned home. In fact, the international regime has consolidated the ethnic cleansing by facilitating the legal sale of Croat and Bosniak properties in the RS by their legal owners to Serb buyers. Meanwhile, the international administration has gradually lost the enthusiastic backing of the international community. The Western nations lack the will to take the radical measures necessary to reverse the disintegrative process, while other members of the international community, above all Serbia and Russia, are actively undermining Bosnian reintegration. Yet the consequences of the complacency on the part of the international community toward the crumbling of Bosnia-Herzegovina could be serious. If Bosnia-Herzegovina collapses, the entire order in the Western Balkans could collapse with it. This is a danger whose full consequences cannot be foreseen.

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The public confirmation of Turkey’s interests in the Balkans, manifested, among others, in the frequent visits by Turkish officials to the region, would come as a surprise only to those unfamiliar with the delicate post-Cold War realignment in the multilateral world. The Balkans in not the only region where Turkey’s influence is increasing: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s influence has also been growing in former Soviet republics with a Muslim majority, primarily due to their common history and culture, but also their common religious identity. Turkey has stabilized its relations with Iran, opened its borders with Syria and has generally intensified its diplomatic presence in the Middle East.

However, it would be very uncritical to claim that in establishing its strategic partnerships Turkey is oriented only towards Muslim countries. It seems that Western centers of power are more concerned about the pragmatic friendship of Russia and Turkey, and equally so about the personal friendship between the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. The source of this discomfort is, of course, not any suspicion regarding Turkey’s loyalty to the North Atlantic Alliance – which Turkey joined, in the first place, to deflect the Soviet threat – but because in the past decades, Turkey has, in a very steady pace, evolved from an “obeying” and “marginal” state into a very respectable power, which has decided to confirm this position through public diplomacy as well.

The changes in Turkish foreign policy are an additionally interesting ground for analysis because of the theoretical doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Davutoğlu has published two books in English: Alternative Paradigms (1993) and Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World (1994). In Alternative Paradigms, Davutoğlu offers an exceptional analysis of Islamic and Western political thoughts, taking into account methodological and philosophical contrasts. His third book Strategic Depth (2001), is especially important in the context of the ratio between theory and practice in international re-
lations, and because it seems that theoretical postulates presented in this book have, since 2003, been the basis of the Turkish foreign policymaking. Although Davutoğlu has been the Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs only since May 1, 2009, he had a pivotal role as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor already since 2003, when he was appointed ambassador. His diplomatic course has, in the past months, influenced Bosnia-Herzegovina’s internal political situation, as well as its relations with Serbia. These are all reasons enough for a paper which would take a comprehensive look into the theoretical postulates in Strategic Depth and the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy.

Davutoğlu’s book Strategic Depth (2001) is based on the four basic elements of Turkey’s future policy: zero problem policy with its neighbors; multidimensional foreign policy; a new diplomatic language and the transition to a rhythmic policy. However, although methodologically seemingly divided, these elements serve in defending a common postulate according to which it is time Turkey drew its strength from „strategic depths” – a unique geostrategic position, the control over Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and the rich imperial historic and cultural heritage in the former Ottoman Empire countries.

For years after the Second World War Turkey had an inferiority complex: although it had joined NATO and was an unconditional ally in the Cold War, its Ottoman past, intolerance towards minorities, the issues of freedom of speech and lack of civil control of the military kept Turkey at the doorstep of Europe.

Davutoğlu’s strategy recommends that Turkey develops good relations and abandons the longstanding assumption that it is surrounded by enemies. This premise implies improvement of relations with neighbors and, at the same time, internal democratization and minority rights: the solving of the Kurdish and Armenian problems and the issue of Cyprus. „The ‘zero problem’ approach to its neighbors” should, according to this strategy, accelerate Turkey’s EU accession. In summer 2009, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan announced he would give the 14 million Kurds in Turkey more cultural rights and initiate a more intense dialogue in order for the 25-year long conflict with PKK to end. According to the European Commission report from October 2009, Turkish efforts received very positive critiques.

Western political theory has for decades been influenced by Max Weber’s ideas, according to which there is something inherently anti-democratic in countries with an Islamic cultural tradition. More positive examples of Muslim-majority countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have usually been neglected for the purposes of creating a stereotype of radical Islam. The consequences of the usage of this stereotype in American propaganda after September 11, 2001, have recently been commented on by Brzezinski: „Washington’s arrogant unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Isla mo-phobic sloganeering weakened the unity of NATO and focused around Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally.”

The effects of September 11 and the threat of radical movements inspired by regressive interpretations of Islam have emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey, which has an ideal position to assert itself as a democratic model among Muslim-majority countries. However, Turkey’s task of implementing the „zero problem” policy towards its neighbors is, in fact, far more complicated than it might seem. In today’s very complex international relations, repairing relations with one neighbor might result in damaging those with another, which happened when Turkey opened its borders with Armenia, disrupting its relations with Azerbaijan. Relations with Armenia are still burdening Turkey on a wider international plan, because Ankara is denying its responsibility for genocide against Armenians in 1915. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, a standing committee of the United States House of Representatives, characterized this crime as genocide on March 4, despite appeals by the Obama administration prior to voting, against the passing of the resolution. This prompted Ankara to decide not to return its ambassador to Washington, thereby emphasizing the importance of this issue for Turkey. The same Committee passed similar resolution in 2007, but the Bush administration managed to prevent the vote in the House of Representatives. Connoisseurs of relations between America and Turkey believe this resolution will most probably have the same fate as the one in 2007, because the importance of Turkey and Armenia are incomparable in the context of American strategic interests.

Very similar to this is the situation with Israel and Iran. Israel and Turkey have traditionally had good relations, a fact which often damaged Turkey’s cooperation with Middle Eastern Muslim countries. Nine years ago, Henry Kissinger analyzed the significance of Turkey not only through its geographic position, but also through
tic for reign policy is daunting for Turkey, and Turkey could be “a model country” for most Muslim countries seems obvious that, in order to realize Davutoğlu’s idea, it seems, Turkey could be “a model country” for most Muslim countries, the close friendship with Israel was a serious obstacle. It can therefore be concluded that the Israeli-Turkish diplomatic crisis has, in fact, contributed to the development of Turkey’s new image as a leader and the increase in trust among Islamic countries. It seems obvious that, in order to realize Davutoğlu’s idea, one of the above mentioned four key theoretical elements has to be sacrificed from time to time on the path of reaching the final goal of “strategic depth”.

* * *

The second element of “strategic depth” is “multidimensional foreign policy”. Davutoğlu believes that static foreign policy is damaging for Turkey, and Turkey could assert itself as a mediator in the region through a policy which would introduce more parameters. Besides a leading role in the Middle East, this would also provide new strategic relations with the European Union, and further development of the partnership with Russia. When the Cold War ended, the distrust between Russia and Turkey did not vanish overnight. However, the possible reason for their reconciliation—which, as numerous authors have pointed out, could also be the reason for Western concern—is the fact that both Russia and Turkey, as two peripheral Euro-Asian powers, seem to have common grievances with Europe, which could be a factor that converges their interests. In terms of the overall cooperation, according to the latest indicators, Russia has become Turkey’s biggest economic partner—replacing Germany.

Many interpret Turkey’s rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors and Russia as the result of the shared disappointment alongside the leadership of the AKP with the EU’s decision to accept Cyprus into membership in 2004: within Turkish foreign policy circles, it is believed that this was a deliberate move by EU leaders reluctant to accept Turkey as a member. However, for the time being, Turkey has been successfully balancing between its interests in the West and its partnership with Russia. On March 4, 2010, the Turkish parliament completed the process of ratifying a treaty enabling the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, run by a consortium of European companies. Nabucco circumvents Russian territory, thus decreasing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Analysts, therefore, claim that Turkey has the potential to become “the Silk Road of the 21st century”—and is realizing that potential by becoming the nexus of multiple important pipeline projects.

An opportunity for new European-Turkish relations was the opening of negotiations with Turkey in Luxembourg in 2005. The final decision on admission of Turkey into the EU will have to do with the minority rights issue and civil control of the military. And while Turkey is on a relatively good path to solve the Kurdish question, and the freedom of speech issues, European circles believe that the key to democratization of a country lies, in fact, in civil control of the military.

Taçuğlu used the central-periphery framework to explain the functioning of Turkey’s political life: the national secular state elite is in the center, juxtaposed with the periphery where there are ethnic groups devoted to traditional life and religious values. Keyman claims that in the absence of an aristocracy which would fill the “center” from the previous model, the substitute was the central elite composed of military and bureaucratic officials. This relationship between periphery and center, although largely obsolete as time passed, provided a strong foundation for the protection of Turkish secularism. Candar believes that Turkish secularism differs from the Anglo-Saxon tradition characterized by religious pluralism and tolerance: in his opinion, Turkish secularism is overly atheist and not democratic as it comes across to some Westerners, and Turkish Islam is not as fundamentalist as portrayed.
The latest developments related to the detention of Turkish officers and generals, charged with preparing a military coup, is the ground for testing the relationship between the center and the periphery, as well as for solving the issue related to civil control of the military. However, according to some, the detention of these officers and generals is a threat to the country’s secularism, and this worry deepened when Turkish authorities arrested the state prosecutor who had investigated Islamic networks. The New York Times reports that the critics of Prime Minister Erdogan are concerned because with these actions Erdogan has silenced the opposition, and now has control over most of the levers of power, including the judiciary. Erdogan’s critics are very worried that the judiciary “will soon fall to his Islamic supporters.” Commenting on the latest developments, Professor Soli Ozel from Bilkent University says, “The old ideology is bankrupt, that much we know”, and carefully adds that Erdogan’s party is “a democratizing force, but not necessarily a democratic one.”

Baskin Oran, international relations professor at Ankara University, dismisses those fears. In his opinion, Erdogan’s party, which once relied on working class and Islamists, has gone through a transformation. “It has become bourgeois,” Mr. Oran said, adding: “They will always be Muslims, but they won’t be Islamists.”

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The third and fourth elements in Davutoglu’s “strategic depth”, “a new diplomatic language” and “transition to a rhythmic policy”, dominate the rhetoric of Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ruling AKP has accepted “strategic depth”, among other reasons, because of the fact that Davutoglu’s “new diplomatic language” forms a new/old identity through stronger ties with countries Turkey shares a history with. It can be said that this position is a compromise between conservative and liberal circles in Turkey, but also that this tuned “rhythm” in foreign policy contributes to an internal democratization necessary for full membership in the European Union. On the other hand, relying on the Ottoman identity implies the demise of Turkey’s status as a “vassal” state in relations to the USA, which would provide significant compensation for the “Europeanization” of Turkey to the traditional, peripheral circles.

“Transition to a rhythmic policy” requires frequent visits to leaders in the region, and this premise has been tested with several visits of Turkish officials to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in 2009. In spite of the best of intentions, the visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina was not very successful from the public diplomacy perspective. This visit required more thorough preparations and more moderation in statements, and in the absence of such preparations, and bearing in mind the relations among Bosnian leaders and parties, controversial reactions to Turkey’s diplomatic activities were foreseeable.

Davutoglu’s statements that „Sarajevo is ours” and “we shall create the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of the global politics”, were interpreted by BH Presidency member Nebojša Radmanović as „a classical example of interference into the internal issues of a country”, and he concluded that Davutoglu „showed imperialistic intentions towards the Balkans”.

Due to a more moderate approach, Turkish diplomacy was far more successful in Serbia. Serbian President Boris Tadić sees Turkey’s diplomatic activities completely differently than Radmanović: during Turkish President Abdullah Gül’s visit, Tadić said that relations between Serbia and Turkey „were at the highest level in history”. This is, of course, due to the intensifying of economic cooperation and the announcement of Turkey’s investments in Serbia. It, therefore, seems that a Turkish public diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasizing the new strategic friendship with Serbia and Russia would result in far better effects that a diplomacy referencing the Ottoman Empire. Although new Western theories concede that of all empires throughout history the Ottoman had the best model of multicultural tolerance, in Serbian national culture the Ottoman era is seen as the darkest, most detested period of foreign rule.

The extent to which myths can influence decisions which should be made on a pragmatic level is also illustrated by the discussion of which NATO contingent in Afghanistan should Bosnia-Herzegovina send its troops to. The best offers came from Turkey, Denmark and the Great Britain, and the mission offered by Turkey is located in the safest area in Afghanistan and has the least risk for Bosnian soldiers. Dušanka Mijkić, deputy chairwoman in the House of Representatives in the BH Parliament, is the only one who publicly reacted to Turkey’s offer but according to unofficial reactions, for a significant number of Parliament members representing Serbian nationalist parties, Turkey is unacceptable because of historic prejudice.

Western diplomatic circles in Sarajevo deemed such at-
titudes unacceptable as Turkey is a full NATO member and is treated as such by its allies and besides, risking the lives of soldiers because of historic prejudice is completely incomprehensible. This dilemma emerged in the worst moment, since Brussels’ latest refusal in December 2009 to give Bosnian a Membership Action Plan opened a discussion on the possibility of a referendum on NATO membership in Republika Srpska. To send Bosnian soldiers to a Turkish mission would strengthen the arguments of nationalists in Republika Srpska who are lobbying for the referendum.

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Davutoglu’s theory recommends the involvement of the academic community and the public in the process of diplomatic decision-making. Interestingly, his recommendations are in line with a wider discussion on NATO’s new strategic concept, which involves both academic communities and the public in member countries.

According to Brzezinski, a politically acceptable outcome of NATO’s deepening engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the engagement of Russia in a binding and mutually beneficial relationship with Europe and the wider North Atlantic community, are some of the main security dilemmas of NATO’s new strategic concept.24

Davutoglu is, obviously, also a visionary. With “strategic depth” and its current partnerships, Turkey has an ideal position for finding the most optimal solutions to new global challenges. And while, from the global perspective, the application of the theory developed in his book “Strategic Depth” carries huge positive potential, for success in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would unfortunately require a new, revised edition.

NOTES
1 See: Russian Ambassador Lebedev’s account in International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relation 20, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p. 1-8
3 See: Ahmet Davutoglu, Strengthening Turkey’s Strategic Depth (Istanbul, Kure Yayıncılar, 2001). Unfortunately, this book has not yet been translated into English, but it has had 30 editions in Turkish and was sold in 300,000 copies. For a detailed survey in English, see: Alexander Morrison, „The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, November 2006; and for an excellent analysis in Bosnian, see: Hajrudin Somun, “Šta i korist neo-ottomanizma” (“Damage and Benefits Brought by Neo-ottomanism”), Dai, no. 651, December 4, 2009
5 European Commission “Turkey 2009 progress report”, October 2009
7 For more, see: Joshua A.Walker, „Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine” in Insight Turkey, July 2007
8 Henry Kissinger, „Does America Need a Foreign Policy.” (Simon &Schuster, 2001) p. 163
9 Walker, „Learning strategic...”
10 Mehmet Ogoto, „Rivals become partners!”,
11 Emreli Akcan, „Ahmet Davutoglu: The Man Behind Turkey’s Assertive Foreign Policy”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 37
13 Ogoto, „Rivals...”
16 Cengiz Candar, „Ataturk’s Ambitious Legacy”, The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn, 2000
18 Ibid
19 Ibid
20 Somun, „Šta i ...”, („Damage and...”) —
21 Politika, October 27, 2009
22 For positive evaluation of the Turkish imperial multicultural model, see: Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). For the analysis on perception of “neo-ottomanism” in some Serbian religious and intellectual circles, see the text by Vuk Bašičević „Sa vjerom u Boga i srpskost” (“With Faith in God and Serbian-ness”); Dai, No.660, February 5, 2010
23 Dušanka Majčić, „Mnemonik Cakotiska Torska i na početak i na kraj” (“Turkey is the Beginning and the End for Minister Cikotić”); Nezavisne novine, February 26, 2010
24 Brzezinski, „An Agenda for...”
For all those who follow the situation in the Middle East, Yemen has for years been a textbook example of a failed state, and, most certainly, one of the direst regional problems. Until recently, one of the specific characteristics of this Middle East hotspot was the fact that all the suffering of the Yemeni population was happening far from the eyes of the world, and even from the eye of the Arab public. This is a state which has, in the past few decades, been hit by more civil wars than any other in this shaky part of the world. For over a year, its Sada province has been torn by a raging war between government troops and Shiite rebels known as Houthis. Although the rebels and the government have signed truces on multiple occasions, — the last one signed on February 19, 2010 still being in force at the moment — both warring sides have, in fact, used the truce periods for tactical regrouping and rearming. Dissatisfaction engulfing the southern part of Yemen, where the civil war was barely contained a few years ago, is increasing, and nobody would be surprised by a new escalation of unrest. In this mayhem, just like numerous times before, Al Qaeda, or, to be precise, its branch on the Arab peninsula, or, to be even more precise, Al Qaeda sympathizers for whom it is difficult to establish a degree of operational relationship with that system, has decided to use the vacuum created by dysfunctional states as an opportunity to continue with its global Jihad operations. This has, once again, shown the accuracy of the conclusion which was in 2002 incorporated into the 2002 document known as the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, according to which „America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones”.\(^1\)

The same applies to global security, which can be clearly seen from the example of Yemen, but also by the cases of Afghanistan and Somalia. Until now, it had rarely happened that someone warned of the demographic ticking bomb: yet the country is one of the poorest in the world and among those with the highest illiteracy rates, with 77% of Yemeni women being illiterate according to UNICEF. Nobody paid attention to IMF reports pointing to the fact that 75% of Yemeni people under the age of 25 are near complete
destitution, which would lead to the emergence of an entire army of the unemployed. The country’s water table is nearly depleted from years of agricultural mispractice, and its oil reserves are rapidly dwindling. Nobody paid any attention to countless social problems either, starting with the almost unlimited consumption of the drug “khaad”, which is not prohibited by the law, to one of the worst records of human rights abuses world wide, as shown by any of several U.S. State Department reports from previous years.

As so many times before, all these accumulated problems failed to attract the world’s attention until they spilled over and directly threatened a Western country. That happened when, this Christmas, a young Nigerian tried to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear on a flight en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. The man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a student from London who had for some time been suspected of connections to terrorists, was linked by intelligence services to the branch of Al Qaeda operating in Yemen. He admitted to having been trained in Yemen, in one of numerous camps in the province of Shabwa. Only then did Yemen reach the front pages of the world’s media, but again only in the context of fighting Al Qaeda and the threat it represents. Again, as so many times before, nobody was interested in the causes and the real context of the problem.

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American right-wing politicians started lobbying for another intervention, similar to those in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the Obama administration, at least in this phase, showed it had learnt something from the adventurism of Bush’s neo-conservatives. All the experts on Obama’s team (unlike the 69% of correspondents interviewed by Fox News, who opted for military involvement) advised him that a direct American intervention in Yemen against Al Qaeda would only weaken America’s position and open another front in which Al Qaeda would gain more sympathizers than American troops would, probably with great losses, manage to “eliminate”.

It seems that Washington is aware of the fact than an open American intervention in Yemen could easily become a gift for Al Qaeda and its branches. Even now Al Qaeda’s propagandists are busy with pointing to the civil victims of the air raids in December. In case of a direct intervention, they would develop a very clear discourse on „a far enemy” who has turned against Islam in fighting yet another Muslim state.

This might be why US president Barack Obama and the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown have decided to support the fight against Al Qaeda in Yemen only financially, through consulting and arming, but without direct involvement. The two are jointly financing an anti-terrorist unit within Yemeni forces, with Obama asking Congress to earmark $63 million for Yemen in 2010.

However, the biggest portion of help and a significant portion of the joint operations of American and Yemeni security forces, especially those dealing with intelligence, are hidden from the public. According to Fox News, Americans even have troops on Yemeni soil, and special units, intelligence organizations and unmanned aircrafts have, for some time, been waging a war against Al Qaeda far from the public eye, with the approval of the government in Sana.

The present American administration has publicly opted for strong financial, military and expert help to the regime of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in order not to additionally irritate the strongly anti-American Yemeni public. Although presently not supporting Al Qaeda, if forced to choose between America and Al Qaeda, the Yemeni people would likely pick Al Qaeda, as in a lot of other Arab nations. It seems that this estimate is shared by numerous US and international analysts, such as Steven Erlanger from the New York Times, who concluded that „for the success of a fight against terror in Yemen, it is of key importance to strike a balance between conservative Islam and an increased American involvement”.

In order to be a step ahead, 150 Islamic scholars (aliims and sheiks) signed a fatwa which prescribes that, in case American troops intervene in Yemen, Jihad would be the obligation of every Muslim. The initiator and first signatory of this fatwa was Sheikh Abdul-Majeed al-Zindani, who said he did not want to see „the return of colonialism in Yemen” under the false pretenses of a fight against Al Qaeda.

What made many other alims and intellectuals, both in Yemen and in the neighboring Saudi Arabia and the Muslim world, denounce this fatwa was a part in which it condemns attacks against members of Al Qaeda for whom „there is no valid Sharia judgment” and who, according to the fatwa’s authors „must not be killed before taken to a legitimate court”. Most critics have interpreted this as support to Al Qaeda, because it does not condemn attacks against civilians, but only the attacks executed with American unmanned aircrafts.
and the one in which Yemeni forces killed the military leader of Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula Qassem Al-Rimi and his five closest allies. In spite of all this, the message has been sent — any military operation by foreign armed forces on Yemeni soil will be met with strong resistance by, maybe not all, but a significant number of Muslims, both in Yemen and worldwide.

Paul Rogers reminded the public at the Open Democracy Portal that Barack Obama might have delivered an impressive speech in Cairo in June 2009 on relations with Islamic world, but this can easily be turned into an attempt at deceit: there is a realistic possibility that in case America intervenes in Yemen, Obama will be portrayed as a crusader, an enemy who has occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, has been steering the Pakistani government, arming and supporting the Zionist troops which are repressing Palestinians, and is now killing Muslims in yet another state. This is a strong and dangerous discourse with vast potential to influence public opinion.

In Yemen, Americans have fallen into the same trap in which they fell so many times in Arab countries — once again they had to support a dictatorship regime unpopular among Americans, in order to fight against a direct terrorist threat, which might lead to their winning a battle, but definitely not the war. To complicate things further, the role of the ruling Yemeni regime, together with president Ali Abdullah Saleh — in his own words „the protector of democracy“ — in strengthening Al Qaeda’s position should not be ignored.

It is an open secret in Islamic military circles that Yemen was, for a long time, a base in which militants were trained and sent to radical high-schools and universities, from where they went to jihadi battlefields from Afghanistan to Algeria. All this was made possible by the tacit endorsement of the ruling regime which used militant fundamentalists to restrain the discontent of the Shiite population. Yemen’s population are 53% Sunni and 47% Shiite but the lion’s share of political power and money is in the hands of the Sunni — a reason why the Houthi rebels, with support from Iran, started their fight against a coalition of Yemeni government troops and Saudi military forces. Ali Abdullah Saleh, ruler of the Yemeni political scene for over 31 years, often used militant Islamists for proxy wars in buffer zones, while Yemen became one of the last harbors for Al Qaeda’s ideologists and militants, especially after they were banished from Saudi Arabia.

The historical bonds between the Yemeni government and Al Qaeda or similar organizations are emphasized by numerous international experts and analysts who have been searching for the roots of Al Qaeda’s influence in Yemen. In a January story for the International Relations and Security Network’s “Security Watch”, reporter Domenic Moran says „there is serious evidence that the government used to make deals with groups like Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula”. In his New York Times story on Al Emran university — founded and managed by the initiator of the recent Nevada, Sheik Abdul Majid al-Zindani — Steven Erlanger points to close relations between Sheik al-Zindani and one of Abdullah Saleh’s closest allies, general Ali Mohsen. Ali Mohsen, together with financiers from Saudi Arabia, is considered to be one of the major supporters of al-Zindani and his projects.

„Mr. Mohsen, a general who is currently leading the war against a Houthi rebellion in the north, also recruited thousands of Yemenis to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. His brigades returned victorious, and Mr. Saleh has used them since to help defeat the south in the 1994 civil war, and against the Houthis. Some fighters, of course, have migrated to Al Qaeda.

When north and south Yemen were united in 1990, Sheik Zindani accepted Mr. Saleh’s rule and was granted this huge area of government land on the western edge of Sana for the university — adjoining a large military base, which is Mr. Mohsen’s headquarters.”

With all these complicated alliances in which Al Qaeda sympathizers feel at home, it should not be forgotten that Yemen is a tribal society in which tribal alliances and loyalty to tribal community by far outweigh loyalty towards the state and its laws. The government in Sana should bear this in mind every time it enters any form of open fight against individuals belonging to Al Qaeda.

There is a significant number of people who, without any supporting evidence, believe that the failed attack of the Nigerian on the American flight was welcomed by both the Yemeni army and its political leadership, which received highly needed financial and military support exactly at the moment it became obvious? they were not winning the war against the increasingly better armed rebels. It will probably never be possible to prove how much Yemeni intelligence services knew
and whether they could have prevented the unsuccessful attack, or whether they wished for it to happen. It would not have been the first time that despotic regimes, which themselves created Al Qaeda, would be getting a lot of financial, military and political support from America for fighting it.

What remains undeniable is that even today, when Yemen finally got some of the world’s attention, nobody is dealing with the reasons of the conflict, but rather only with the consequences. This deprives us of hope that the problem of Al Qaeda’s militancy will be solved any time soon.

NOTES


7 On doctrine of “a close and a far enemy” used by Al Qaeda, and what it means today, see: Thomas Hegghammer, “The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 9, November 18, 2009.


13 Official statement by the Yemeni Ministry of Internal Affairs of January 15, 2010, which confirms the killing of Al-Rimi and which contains the names of photographs of the killed can be seen at the Ministry’s web site http://www.moi.gov.ye.


Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has entered 2010 in anticipation of the October general elections results; of course several associated issues will continue to affect the citizens and other residents of the State throughout this year, including risks to security, the environment and to human safety posed by the storage of military arms, munitions and explosives (AME): most of the munitions and explosives are considered unsafe and unstable due to age, conditions of manufacture and storage.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) offers provisions to assist the process of creating safer conditions for all the people in BiH. Importantly, the International Community in BiH shares a common goal for this issue: to see BiH shed this harmful inheritance from a by-gone era by destroying the surplus AME.

Following a decade of balancing the concerns and priorities of two armies, the authorities of BiH (State and the entities) agreed that the best way forward would be to put full faith and trust in a State-controlled defense sector. A new Defense Law entered into force in BiH in January 2006, establishing the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH), nullifying the entities’ armies and defense ministries and acknowledging the State Ministry of Defense as the only authorized defense ministry. This defense reform also called for an assessment of the AFBiH’s real defense requirements, using Euro-Atlantic norms and principles and guidelines for developing a democratic controlled, professional military. Consequently, many staffing posts and tens of thousands of weapons and tons of ammunition would be considered surplus to the needs of the AFBiH.

The most urgent issue after this re-organizing was to secure all the AMEs, both what was needed (perspective) and what was considered surplus (non-perspective) to ensure that these items would only be used for BiH’s defense purposes, or disposed of by the State using internationally agreed disposal methods. Because these items were culled from the entities’ stockpiles, the State and the entities passed a special trilateral Transfer of Ownership Agreement according to which the ownership of all movable defense property (including AME) shall be transferred from the entities’ authorities to the State, under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of BiH.1

Prior to the defense reform, in 2004, the State Ministry of De-
On June 2009, the BiH Presidency decided to start with the disposal process, BiH succeeded in getting rid of most of its surplus weapons (381,900 pieces exported and about 90,000 pieces destroyed), but only a small part of the surplus ammunition (1,648 tons).

Six years later, the Ministry of Defense considers that it now holds around 95,000 surplus weapons and some 25,000 tons of surplus ammunition. AFBiH experts have identified approximately 5,000 tons of these surplus ammunition stores as being unsafe, but the International Community has a different opinion. According to specialists of EUFOR, NATO, OSCE and UNDP, using internationally acknowledged criteria and information from the U.S. Government’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), all 25,000 tons of the surplus ammunition is unsafe. Some pieces and lots of ammunition are obviously in poor condition, making them unsafe to use and, in some instances, to handle. Also, the dates of manufacture indicate that they are now over-aged, which leads to the break down of chemical components and casings, making the items volatile. Furthermore, a lack of records on the complete storage history of each lot, combined with knowledge of poor storage conditions have led to a lack of confidence in using the items for their initial, intended military purpose.

In 2009, political authorities placed a great deal of pressure on the BiH MoD to propose a surplus AME disposal plan that would suit various political interests. Several drafts had been blocked inside the MoD for reasons that included making sales the preferred method of disposal. This increased the amount of time required to develop and forward the MOD’s final proposal to the BiH Presidency. On 10 June 2009, the BiH Presidency decided to start with the removal of these surpluses, with disposal through sales and donation as the primary means. This Decision was contrary to the recommendations and urgings of the International Community, which implored the BiH Presidency to decide on destruction as the preferred method of disposal, as per the State’s OSCE politico-military documents. Moreover, the BiH Presidency failed to fix a deadline for completing eventual export contracts, despite warnings by the International Community that this lack of fixed deadline will increase the risks to the environment and populace caused by stockpiling these dangerous items.

When adding all military and civilian BiH capacities, the BiH authorities and the International Community consider that as much as 3,000 tons of ammunition can be destroyed by BiH facilities in one year. Through a simple calculation, it will take eight years, working at full pace, to destroy such surplus items. In addition, during the same period, the current perspective ammunition will reach their expiry date of safe use, thus adding three additional years to the total ammunition destruction process i.e., 11 years.

However capable BiH may be of acting on its own, political and technical obstacles are preventing full utilization. For example, in 2009, less than 1,200 tons of ammunition (one third of the capacity) were destroyed and so far in 2010 there is little demonstration of willingness to increase this amount.

What are the obstacles? Some individuals and political groups continue to think that BiH, its entities and possibly certain companies can make significant financial profits from selling the surplus weapons and selected lots of surplus ammunition. To this aim, they are questioning the legality of the tri-lateral Transfer Agreement, referred to earlier. Their goal is to delay the destruction process until the other signatories agree to start new political negotiations. It is clear that their priority is not the safety of their citizens but financial interests. The position of the International Community is that significant profits are unlikely because there is no legal market for these items and the risk to the environment and the population resulting from an accident, or an incident of self-ignition is increasing.

These same political influences are challenging a provision of the Transfer of Ownership Agreement which describes the sharing of any profits from the sales of scrap material which results from destruction. This dispute has significantly hampered the destruction levels at the two main demonstration sites.
Irritiation facilities because the facility managers must store the scrap materials until the matter is resolved, thereby not allowing adequate space to store the items that are already awaiting destruction.

Despite several alarming internal reports about the requirement for removal of the scrap materials, as well as reports on the need for maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities, the MoD has yet to demonstrate that it sees these issues as a priority. All of these issues are contributing to further delays in the destruction process.

The International Community stands ready to provide financial, project management and technical assistance should BiH request it.

For instance, in 2009, the UNDP Small Arms Control and Reduction Project (through its donors) and the Government of the United States of America offered nearly 5.8 million BAM (in separate projects) to assist BiH in its efforts to increase the pace of destroying its surplus military armaments. To ensure that BiH would not incur additional costs (e.g., payment for labor), the U.S.A.’s donation also included the payment for specialized technicians to conduct a portion of the destruction process. Additionally, the U.S.A. is willing to destroy what it originally donated to BiH and also selected items that the BiH facilities do not have the technical capacity to destroy.

As of February 2010, BiH authorities have not yet decided to fully accept either offer.

Currently, AFBiH is maintaining 19 ammunition storage sites, of which 14 have been declared non-perspective, or surplus to the State’s defense needs. The condition of all of these sites is poor, but of the non-perspective more so. There is simply less interest in paying for the renovations of buildings and fences that may be torn down once their contents have been removed; in spite of the fact that the poor condition of the storage locations contribute to the degradation of the ammunition and increase the risks posed it.

However poor the conditions of the storage sites and their contents may be, all must be secured. According to the MoD, in 2009 the AFBiH spent approximately BAM 2.9 million and allocated nearly 200 personnel to guard and maintain these non-perspective facilities. Of course, guarding all of these sites also takes soldiers away from other tasks; for example, technicians are often put on guard duty, thereby decreasing the amount of items that can be destroyed.

BiH is one of 56 partners that have agreed on a set of common principles, including helping one another to improve the quality of security for their respective populations. Through the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, the OSCE has established mechanisms for assisting participating States in solving their surplus problems.

...excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons...pose a threat and a challenge to peace, and undermine efforts to ensure an indivisible and comprehensive security. As a result, the participating States have agreed to strengthen confidence and security among them through comprehensive cooperation in addressing the above risks by formulating norms, principles and measures that cover all the aspects of the problem. Through these norms and measures, the destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms, light weapons and associated ammunition is prevented.

Each OSCE participating State may freely assess its security needs and decide whether its holdings of small arms include a surplus. Once a surplus is declared, the surplus items must be properly managed to prevent loss through theft, neglect and corruption, all of which pose risks to the local population. The aim of this principle is to strengthen national capacity to deal with such problems. Since unstable ammunition is dangerous, and guarding and maintaining surplus arms presents burdensome costs and because the participating States would not like to see such items showing up in more troubled parts of the world, they agreed that the preferred method of the disposal of such arms is destruction; i.e., actions which render the items both permanently disabled and physically damaged.
Should a participating State require assistance in eliminating surplus weapons or upgrading storage facilities, it may send a request for assistance to the OSCE, for the consideration of the other participating States that may be in a position to meet the requirements. Participating States may provide assistance to one another voluntarily by making expert assessment of the sites with the information provided by the requesting party. After the OSCE initiates a response to the request, the Chairperson of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), in close cooperation with the FSC Troika and the Chairmanship-in-Office, begins consultations on whether assistance should be provided or not.  

The OSCE has already successfully assisted several of its partners, among others Belarus, Ukraine and Tajikistan, in destroying surplus weapons and ammunition and also in upgrading the security of storage facilities. BiH could receive similar assistance if that this assistance is requested.

The OSCE Mission to BiH, through its Department of Security Co-operation, will continue to encourage the State and Entity-level authorities to remove the environmental and public safety risks and to encourage the State to make use of OSCE provisions by requesting, if necessary, assistance with destroying surplus military arms, munitions and explosives and also to manage and improve the security of the Armed Force’s stockpiles.

We will also encourage authorities to request assistance to improve law enforcement agencies’ capacities to store items that have been seized or confiscated during law enforcement proceedings (e.g. evidence) or voluntarily surrendered by concerned members of the public. This can be done by possibly upgrading some non-perspective storage sites and turning them over to relevant law enforcement agencies. But first, the BiH authorities need to make a priority of resolving these matters.

NOTES

1 The Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force in January 2006. Official Gazette of BiH # 88/05
2 Agreement on “Final Disposal of All Rights and Obligations Over Movable Property That Will Continue to Serve Defence Purposes” was signed on 27 March 2008 by the Entity Prime-Ministers and the Chairman of the BiH Council of Ministers
3 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Determining the Surplus of Weapons, Munitions and Mine-explosive ordnance for the AFBiH and principles of their Solving; 58th Session file # 01-01 1-1599-31/09.
4 UNDP developed the Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in BiH (SACBiH) in January 2005 to provide for coordinated international effort to establish proper SALW controls and a safe and effective logistic ammunition disposal system.
6 In 2010 the FSC Troika consists of representatives of Greece, Hungary and Ireland.
After it joined NATO as a full-flagged member last year, the Republic of Croatia joined the NATO-led peace-keeping Kosovo Force (KFOR) on July 2, 2009. On January 20, 2010, the third Croatian military contingent (HRVCON), led by Major Marijan Skorija, replaced its colleagues from the second four-month rotation in the young Republic of Kosovo.

The contingent, stationed in the Bondsteel base near Uroševac/Ferizaj, consists of the helicopter division, with two Russian-manufactured transport helicopters Mil Mi-171 S Hip from the Multipurpose Helicopter Squadron (EVH) of the Croatian Air Force and Anti Aircraft Defense of Lucko heliport.

There are 20 people in the contingent: 12 pilots, five technicians, and one signalman, and for the first time, the contingent includes one female pilot, and one female technician. The Croatian team can independently service and maintain helicopters as part of the regular checkup after 100 flying hours, when the helicopters must be serviced by the Air Force Technical Battalion of the 91st Air Base in Zagreb.

A couple of days before the first rotation was completed, members of the first HRVCON were our hosts in the Bondsteel base. Sharing their time on the ground with UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters from the US Alaska National Guard, the crews flew over Dubrovnik, Montenegro and Albania to Kosovo.

The basic mission of the Croatian contingent is to transport people and cargo, something that is part of their regular duties in Croatia. The commander of the first HRVCON, 37-year old Major Michael Krizanec, also the commander of the Multipurpose Helicopter Squadron, was very happy with how the mission is going: there were no incidents or technical failures, neither for the first or second contingent.

HRVCON is directly subordinate to the KFOR commander who commands the tactical reserve forces — currently German lieutenant general Markus Bentler who is based in Pristina. This means that Croatian helicopters are often engaged in rapid deployment exe-
rioses and the pullout of anti-riot forces. The 24-seater Mi-171 helicopters – the successor to an older model commonly used across most ex-Yugoslav states – beat all other KFOR aircrafts.

“We are flying all over Kosovo, day or night, regardless of weather conditions, and we spend the same amount of time in the air as we used to in Croatia,” says Krizanec. “Everyone who we worked with in KFOR is absolutely happy with the capacities and capabilities of these helicopters. They are also very satisfied with our approach to missions and work. There was not a single complaint related to procedures, training standards or possible security violations. There is nothing new or difficult for us in flying over Kosovo, which proves that we are well-prepared.”

Based on its war experience and the NATO exercises it has attended since 2002, the Croatian Air Force decided to establish permanent helicopter crews and fo-

**Visiting Croats from Kosovo**

Due to the nature of their mission, Croatian airmen in Kosovo do not have a lot of contact with the local population. All KFOR bases employ local staff, mainly Serbs, Albanians, Croats and Bosnians, and interaction in the bases is regular and smooth. “People do their jobs and are not interested in the flags on our uniforms”, says Krizanec. Around 500 Croats live in the village of Janjevo, where members of HRVCON often go for the Sunday mass. There are only 50 Croats left in Letnica, and Croatian airmen went for a pilgrimage there for the Holy Mary holiday, where the so-called Black Holy Mary is traditionally celebrated.
cuss on training in individual and group flying, as well as in flying areas similar to Kosovo. There are very few pilots left in the squadron who used to fly in the former Yugoslav National Army. Those who flew over Kosovo, did so in light Gazelle helicopters.

Although the Croatian Air Force has two Mi-8 MTV-1 helicopters, which were equipped to NATO standards couple of years ago with help from the US, it was the new Mi-171S helicopters that were selected for the mission in Kosovo. Croatia got a total of 10 helicopters from Russia in 2007 and 2008 as part of a debt settlement deal.

“The new Mi-171S helicopters were selected because we always try to ease the planning for maintenance, supply, spare parts, testing and measuring equipment,” says Križanec. “According to our statistics, we could have expected to have more flight cancellations and mechanical failures with helicopters that have already been through a repair. That would have required more spare parts.”

Križanec notes that the Croatian Mi-171S fully complies and even exceeds International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) norms when it comes to instrument-based flights according to civilian rules (IFR). He emphasizes that this chopper’s ‘black box’ records more parameters than that in a civilian Airbus airplane which is about to get off the production line. Although the helicopters still do not have the ‘friend or foe’ identification devices (IFF) which will be required in more complex NATO operation, KFOR’s requirements for identification equipment are a little lower.

“The transponder itself or IFF is not so important in this environment, because there are no aircrafts which could play different roles”, Križanec adds.

In addition to helicopters, the Croats are equipped with Russian Z-5-7VN helmets and with night vision (NVG), and crews are trained to use them while flying. A rear ramp in the Mi-171S proved to be excellent, because the crews in older Mi-8 helicopter had to turn off the rotor to open the old-fashioned double doors.

**Bondsteel Camp**

A regular work day in the Bondsteel base starts with a 6 a.m. wake-up call. Around 7 a.m. people have breakfast, and regular daily activities start around 7.30 a.m. Planned daily activities start with the weather report, and pilots usually keep an eye on it during the day. Technicians do the maintenance work in the mornings and in the evenings, but when there are flights scheduled, there are additional pre-flight, inter-flight, and post-flight checkups. The sound of the American trumpet marks the end of the work day at 5 p.m., and staff go to bed at 10 p.m., although operational staff work hours are generally determined by their tasks.
While preparing for this mission, we learned from the experiences of our colleagues from Slovenia and Macedonia. We have very good relations with them, both formal and informal. In addition, we analyzed Czech Mi-17, but most of them were not good for the Croatian Air Force, because the Czech unit has a different concept and applied an entirely different maintenance system. Their helicopters were engaged in the missions for longer periods of time and the regular maintenance was more complex,” says Krizanec.

The first Croatian contingent stayed in Kosovo for only three months because a longer mission would have required conducting some parts of the training in Kosovo. But the second contingent, led by Major Andreas Duvnjak, decided to stay for four months, the same period earmarked for the third contingent.

After being deployed in Kosovo, each pilot needs to fly 2.5 hours of orientation flights, something usually completed in a couple of days. The flights are affected by the microclimate: two vast Kosovo plains, Kosovo-Polje and Metohija, are divided in the middle by slightly hilly terrain, so there are always places to cross from one valley to another. The hills on the north and east, and the Sar Mountain on south are not a geographic obstacle, so the flight profile and velocity can easily be adjusted to present conditions.

Says Krizanec: “We flew at altitudes of 2,000 and 2,500 meters near Sar Mountain, south of Prizren. These helicopters have exceptional hot-and-high features which enable them to fly amid high temperatures and altitudes. But the winds are important too, and that is when we make good use of our training, such as our annual training in Velebit and other high elevation places in Croatia.”

The Mi-171S has the same TV3-117VM engines as the older Mi-8MTV version, but it is between 500 and 600 kilograms heavier due to additional equipment. The crews however can always calculate maximal weight and the quantity of fuel needed for a mission, so this difference can be annulled.

“According to the risk assessment, it was not necessary to arm the helicopters, because no threat against KFOR was expected. Over the last nine years, there was no incidents, but we are always ready to react if need be”, says Krizanec.
Conservative vs. Progressive Geopolitics

The discussion on the history of (classical) geopolitics is the discussion of its misuse, of imperialism and “territorial deviation”. Swedish political scientist Rudolph Kjellen (1864 – 1922) is considered to be the father of geopolitics, which he situated as one of the courses in the science of the state, defining its subject of research as “the state as a territory”, but it is the Brit Halford John Mackinder, the greatest imperialist amongst geopoliticians, who is considered to be a true theoretical shaper of classical geopolitics.

The presentation of his text “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904) to the Royal Geographical Society was marked by modern political scientists and historians as a “defining moment in the history of geopolitics” and a work of “iconoclastic value”. When speaking about the “geographical causality of history”, Mackinder developed his Eurasian strategy or the theory of the Heartland (the heart of the world being the territory covering Russia, West Siberia, Kazakhstan, Sinkiang and Mongolia) as the key to domination of the world. (pp. 151 – 159). For him the whole world is a closed stage, in a post-Columbian era in which events on one side of the world are reflected to the rest of the globe (pp. 131-137). In such a context, although Mackinder avoids using this term, geopolitics is an analytical tool for studying the race of great powers on the closed stage. Adding to his theory of Heartland in his 1919 book “Democratic Ideals and Reality”, he defined his famous triptych

„Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland, commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island, controls the world “

a dictum which he hoped “a flaunting angel” would whisper to British officials while they were talking to the defeated Germans after the First World War. (Mackinder (1919) 2009)

The analysis of Mackinder’s theory and its influence on modern geopolitics is the subject of the book „Geopolitics and Empire. The Legacy of Halford Mackinder“ by author Gerry Kearns, professor of government and international affairs and director of the School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, USA.
Kearns thinks that Mackinder’s geopolitical idea made a permanent mark on international affairs, although his ideas, especially those of biopolitical imperialism, prevention of and alliance between Russia and Germany, and the idea of a trade war to preserve the imperial position of Great Britain did not significantly influence the foreign policy doctrine of the UK. (O’Toole, Dalby, Routledge, 2007)

Still, according to the confession of Karl Hausrofer, author of German geopolitics, Mackinder’s geopolitical postulates had a significant impact on the development of key principles of German Nazi geopolitics, primarily, the principle of advantage of ground forces in relation to naval forces (p. 16). Also, according to Kearns, in the period after the Second World War, when geopolitics became taboo and discredited as a pseudoscience, the ideas of Halford Mackinder continued to shape the foreign policy of the great powers, and especially of the United States.

The creators of US international policy in the period of Cold War, George Kennan, Colin Gray and others, developed a strategy of containment of the Soviet Union on the postulates of Nicholas Spykman based on Mackinder’s teaching, and the British imperialist was proclaimed “the greatest theorician of geopolitics” (pp. 24 – 25).

Neither did the end of the Cold War epoch prevent the spirit of Mackinderism to persist within discourses of the new world order promoted by conservative geopolitical circles. Kearns thinks that Mackinder’s geopolitical discourse is a formational discourse of US geopolitics of the 21st century, as well as of Russian nationalistic geopolitics with continental ambitions (p. 16).

The ideas connecting Mackinder and recent considerations of geopolitics within the conservative intellectual elite of the United States are found by Kearns in the works of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Thomas Friedmann, Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Philip Bobbitt, Thomas Barnett, Richard Kaplan, John Mearsheimer and others. According to the author’s opinion, they interpret and construct reality in categories of permanent conflict between the West and the others, the danger of a closed world, the need for increasing power as a primary task of international affairs subjects, as well as the hegemonic benevolence of the USA which should justify a “New Great Game” shaped in the form of a “global war on terrorism” as a “new round of colonial imperialism through which the United States are trying to ensure access to cheap oil for the next few decades” (p. 256)

As an alternative to such conservative consideration of geopolitics in terms of force and power, Kearns offers progressive geopolitics which reject coercion as a “natural” way of spreading capitalism. This form of geopolitics, in the author’s opinion, recognises “… that the most effective ways of solving global problems without using force lie within multilateral institutions…” (p.266), because “... legality and negotiation (...) are available in more cases than often acknowledged” (p. 280). Kearns thinks that progressive geopolitics should offer an alternative to advancing “shock doctrines” of neoliberal, economic and colonial imperialism considering “occupation as accumulation of capital” (pp. 285 – 288). The solution is, the author concludes, that in global political state relations, also non-state actors take responsibility and articulate the value of nonviolence as a framework for creating better world. (p. 295).

Kearns’ book “Geopolitics and Empire. The Legacy of Halford Mackinder”, according to its methodological structure, belongs to the domain of so-called critical geopolitical literature which, by using its discourse approach, reconsider and deconstructs conservative geopolitical ideas. In this context, through deconstructing the Eurasian strategy of Halford Mackinder and by removing the layers from his imperial geopolitics, the author shows with brilliant simplicity that the practice of imperialism still exists in the geostrategic agendas of great powers. Reading of this book with the subconscious question “is it smart to be geopolitical” will definitely lead you to accept the answer of Klaus Dodds that it is “not only smart, but it is also important to be geopolitical.”
For almost two decades, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a country characterized by political turmoil, economic and social chaos and confusion. In such conditions, declarative democracy transforms into its opposite - kakistocracy. Kakistocracy by itself is a black hole in democracy which opens a door to another, parallel world, in which organized crime appears as one of the key figures that threatens to destruct an already fragile state completely.

The fact that organized crime is not a threat only in former communist and socialist states hit by a failed transition into market democracy, or in developing countries hit by wars and constant internal political conflicts, can also be supported by the definition of this phenomenon in strategic documents of the EU and USA as one of the key threats. According to the latest Eurobarometer research, the citizens of EU countries perceive organized crime as the biggest threat after unemployment and economic situation, yet in the absence of the global financial crisis, the ranking would probably be different in favour of organized crime, as shown by research from 2001.

However, even with all the similarities that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a country in transition, and the developed countries of the Western hemisphere experience in threats, there is one important difference. While even a cursory review of printed and electronic media will show that the phrase “organized crime” is one of the most frequently used in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s public discourse, a search on the regional Cooperative Online Bibliographic System & Services (COBISS) library platform reveals that there was only one book published in Bosnia comprehensively dealing with the matter. On the other hand, in the USA and in EU countries there are dozens of expert and science magazines dealing with the question of organized crime, and in the world’s biggest online bookstore you will find some 2,000 works on the issue in English alone. Therefore, although security threats are the same, the ability to deal with them in professional scientific circles and develop adequate countermeasures and reaction strategies is very different.
The general, professional and scientific public interested in the contemporary security challenges facing Bosnia-Herzegovina will find plenty to cover this gap in the publication of “Organized Crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Transitional dilemmas”, by Mirza Smajić, Senior Assistant on the Faculty of Political Science. In four chapters, Smajić’s book – an adapted version of his 2009 Masters thesis – delivers a scientific analysis of organized crime starting with the ambivalent definition, necessary distinction and differentiation of organized crime terms such as corruption, terrorism and the mafia, and contextualizes different forms of organized crime in the Bosnian state and society.

In his theoretical analysis, which serves as the foundation to the empirical research in the last chapter of the book, the author starts with an examination of the broken security system of Bosnia and Herzegovina which, to a great extent, contributes to development of organized crime, and is the result of, as the country’s “undefined political and social system, reform process and transitional position, and half-proteectorate international political subjectivity” (p. 194). Besides the economic-social factors that influence the development of organized crime, the author recognizes “the problem of corruption of the executive, legislative and judicial bodies” (p. 194), a conclusion which explains, in our view, the fact that legislation targeting organized crime was introduced only in 2001 in the Federation of BiH, in 2003 on the state level, and in 2006 in Republika Srpska.

The key part of the book is, certainly, the last chapter in which the author presents his empirical research into forms of organized crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2003 until mid-2008, delving into human trafficking, people smuggling, money laundering, corruption and bribery, drug trafficking, fictive commerce, etc. Drawing on figures from the State Court and the Prosecutor’s Office, the author shows that all forms of organized crime show a mild, continued rise, while detecting and highlighting multiple problems, starting with material and personnel shortages, uncritical adoption of foreign practices without regard for the local social context and the excessive number and institutional organization of police forces. (p. 174-175)

A key obstacle to the resolution of these problems was recognized by the author in the “localized approach to security and the fight against organized crime”, an approach which undermines the development of a depoliticized and de-ideologized security framework as a key precondition for the successful fight against organized crime.

In explaining a very complex subject with succinct and engaging writing, Smajić allows his book to appeal beyond narrow academic circles and become obligatory reading for anti-crime practitioners, as well as for journalists and analysts interested in contemporary security challenges.