

*Author: Vladan Vlakovic*

*Title:*

# **Military Secret**

## **Part I**

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*Article 133, FRY Constitution*

*“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the Army which defends its sovereignty, territory, independence and constitutional order...”*

*“Accused Aca Tomic, Mikelic Borislav and Vujić Dragan,*

*in the course of 2002, in Belgrade, have become involved in a conspiracy hatched by late Dusan Spasojevic and Milorad Lukovic Legija, described in item I of the indictment, through the accused Aco Tomic's contacts established on several occasions with late Spasojevic and Lukovic, both in the headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, security service in the Knez Milosa Street and in his apartment where, in addition to discussions on current political situation, he disclosed to them information gathered through "wiretapping measures"; he argued that after the arrest of general Perisic on suspicion of espionage, whose deputy immunity was not suspended by the Parliament, the entire government should be put behind bars which would be then followed a coup d'état; that they should maintain consistent political views with respect to the authorities, otherwise the country will end up in the hands of traitors; that the Yugoslav Army, VJ, special units "Cobras" would not interfere and confront the Special Operations Unit, JSO, as well as suggesting that Ljiljana Buha, who was under Spasojevic's protection in New Belgrade, should be transferred to another, more secure place. Also, during one of their meetings in the Yugoslav Army, VJ, security service headquarters, Aco Tomic received a Nokia cellular phone with a camera as a gift from late Spasojevic, while the accused Mikelic was a point of contact, setting up appointments with Tomic for Lukovic and Spasojevic; on several occasions he went to meet Spasojevic and Lukovic in Silerova Street or received them in his own apartment to convey the information as to whether Carla del Ponte had brought indictments against Legija and Seselj, whose arrest, as he put it, was supposed to be spectacular. The*

*accused Vuicic was conveying information about Spasojevic and Lukovic which he collected through his contacts with the people in the government as well as a piece of information that the Special Operations Unit, JSO, members would be handed over to The Hague. Through Mikelic, Vuicic also arranged for meetings between the defendant Lukovic and late Spasojevic on one hand, and the defendant Aco Tomic on the other.”*

*An excerpt from the indictment against general Aco Tomic, former Yugoslav Army, VJ, security service chief*

*NOTE:*

*Original documents were written in Cyrillic alphabet which the author of the book did not want to correct notwithstanding many typing errors. The text of the author are in Latin alphabet.*

*I dedicate this book to my tragically deceased brother Goran Vlajkovic Viraga, born on August 14, 1966, died on December 28, 2002.*

## ***INTRODUCTION***

*"History is a mere list of crimes and misfortunes"*  
Voltaire

**If history teaches us what life is all about, and this is true, then books are testimonies assisting history to show to the next generations where we are and why we have made mistakes instructing us not to stumble twice upon the same obstacle. "Military Secret" is a testimony which came to existence by a concurrence of peculiar circumstances and thanks to my own aspiration to expose entirely and at any cost the position and the role of the top military brass in preservation of an insane regime, alien to both the Serbs and the Montenegrins, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Having been drawn into the games of big security services, dragged out of anonymity and motivated by my personal hardships and suffering, but also thanks to good people from the military and the police, I was in a position, amongst other things, owing to kindness of other people, to influence, perhaps, certain currents of history in, judging by everything, now former Yugoslavia. I am aware of the fact that the state is grateful to an individual only while it needs him/her. Hence, devoid of an urge to revenge and without any repentance in relation to what I have done, I shall try to present in the pages that follow my own story about the persecution by the regime as well as authentic evidence on the abuse of public office and the actions**

undertaken by politicians and generals to the detriment of the people to which they belong. The book is not dealing with the evil inflicted upon other nations but primarily suicidal instincts at the national level induced in the minds of generals whose badges of rank acquired by destroying all the distinguishing features of Serb and Montenegrin soldiers – their honour and bravery. With all due respect to some generals, only a few of them, I shall try depict closely for the reader in the most authentic manner the places, the people, the events and the decisions which pushed this nation to the verge of an abyss – the point from which you cannot escape easily. By portraying collective madness of army generals embodied in quotations from excerpts of the minutes of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, Chief of Staff cabinet meetings, without even correcting grammatical and spelling mistakes, I shall endeavour to shed some light on the darker side of our recent history and expose the crimes committed against their own people stamped with "Military Secret" label. This book was born in the aftermath of the prime minister Zoran Djindjic's assassination as an expression of outrage and despair at the fact that the people from the Milosevic's era had been kept in their high-ranking positions which was why we became their hostages torn between Scylla of the dying nationalism and Charybdis of imposed cosmopolitanism.

Had the lustration of the Milosevic's oligarchy been effected, had there been no assassination of premier Djindjic, had the immoral ones kept silent and the wise ones spoken up, this book would have never been written. I would have kept it to myself even if every sensible person had been showing evidence about the most shameful days in the history of the Serbia-Montenegro's army. For the sake of giving a chance to the people who inherited a chaos in the state and embraced responsibility for the future of the nation; for the sake of a possibility that mistakes were made with the best intentions, I kept quiet even when I should not have kept my silence. Had I written what I am writing now, perhaps, someone would have woken from his deep sleep, and perhaps, premier Djindjic would have still been here today with his son Luka and his daughter Jovana. Given that the situation is directly opposite to the common sense, hopes and expectations of the normal people, I opted for the most radical form of presenting the evidence to the public so that it can make its judgement, but hopefully this applies to courts of the state of Serbia, in which I believe, as well. Gentlemen from the patriotic bloc wasted fifteen years of each and every citizen of this country, which would amount to eternity if we were to measure it by the number of this

country's citizens. Unfortunately, they also took the lives of many of our citizens.

In addition to my personal knowledge and the testimonies of individuals, the authenticity of the document is further corroborated by our harsh reality in the past couple of years.

The book encompasses the period immediately before the bombing of our country in 1999 to date. Therefore, dear reader, here is another warning. As you open this book, you are about to enter the world of "Military Secret" which kept under a veil of secrecy the crimes committed. For this, the Military Court may sentence you to up to 5 years' imprisonment. Hence, be cautious and do not tell anyone what you have read.

Author

*Individuals and their posts mentioned in the book*

*Yugoslav Army General Staff, GS VJ; Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, NGS VJ*

<i>No.</i>	<i>Org.unit.GS VJ</i>	<i>Rank, name and surname</i>
1.	<i>FRY President</i>	<i>Mr. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC</i>
2.	<i>Federal defence minister</i>	<i>Army general DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC</i>
3.	<i>GS VJ Chief of staff</i>	<i>colonel general NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC</i>
4.	<i>Deputy NGS VJ</i>	<i>colonel general SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC</i>
5.	<i>PNGS for OSP</i>	<i>colonel general MIODRAG SIMIC</i>
6.	<i>PNGS for KoV</i>	<i>colonel general LJUBISA</i>

		<b>STOIMIROVIC</b>
7.	<i>PNGS for RV and PVO</i>	colonel general <b>BRANISLAV PETROVIC</b>
8.	<i>PNGS for RM</i>	rear admiral <b>VLADE NONKOVIC</b>
9.	<i>PNGS for PM and SP</i>	colonel general <b>STAMENKO NIKOLIC</b>
10.	<i>PNGS for SONID</i>	colonel general <b>ZLATOJE TERZIC</b>
11.	<i>PNGS for VI and ED</i>	colonel general <b>GRUJICA USKOKOVIC</b>
12.	<i>PNGS for LOGISTICS</i>	colonel general <b>BRANISLAV OBRADOVIC</b>
13.	<i>VJ inspector general</i>	lieutenant general <b>NINOSLAV KRSTIC</b>
14.	<i>Military security service</i>	lieutenant general <b>MILAN DJAKOVIC</b>
15.	<i>GS VJ military intelligence department</i>	lieutenant general <b>BRANKO KRGA</b>
16.	<i>Departmnet for I and M GS VJ</i>	lieutenant general <b>MILEN SIMIC</b>
17.	<i>1. department of GSVJ</i>	lieutenant general <b>DJORDJE CURCIN</b>
18.	<i>Head of NGS VJ cabinet</i>	lieutenant general <b>DRAGAN ZIVANOVIC</b>
19.	<i>Head of 5. department</i>	lieutenant general <b>ZIVORAD VUJCIC</b>
20.	<i>1<sup>st</sup> Army commander</i>	colonel general <b>SRBOLJUB TRAJKOVIC</b>
21.	<i>2<sup>nd</sup> Army commander</i>	colonel general <b>MILORAD OBRADOVIC</b>

22.	3 <sup>rd</sup> Army commander	lieutenant general <b>VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC</b>
23.	RV (air force) and PVO (antiaircraft defence) commander	colonel general <b>SPASOJE SMILJANIC</b>
24.	RM (navy) commander	admiral <b>MILAN ZEC</b>
25.	head of the FRY president's army cabinet	colonel general dr. <b>SLAVOLJUB SUSIC</b>

**Other individuals**

<b>Name and surname</b>	<b>Position</b>
<b>Goran Matic</b>	<i>FRY federal information minister</i>
<b>Vlajko Stoiljkovic</b>	<i>Serbian interior minister</i>
<b>Rade Markovic</b>	<i>Serbian security service chief</i>
<b>Filipovic Dragan</b>	<i>special operations department chief</i>
<b>Momčilo Perišić</b>	<i>former VJ chief of staff and Serbian deputy prime minister</i>
<b>Aca Dimitrijevic</b>	<i>former military security service chief</i>
<b>Budimir Scepanovic</b>	<i>special advisor for national security to Vukasin Maras and former acting director of Montenegrin security service</i>
<b>Vukasin Maras</b>	<i>former Montenegrin interior minister and deputy defence minister</i>
<b>Dragan Lestarić</b>	<i>former member of Serbian security service</i>
<b>Zivadin Jovanovic</b>	<i>former FR Yugoslavia's foreign affairs minister</i>
<b>Nikola Sainovic</b>	<i>former federal deputy prime minister</i>
<b>Miroslav Filipovic</b>	<i>Belgrade daily Danas journalist</i>
<b>Wesley Clark</b>	<i>NATO commander for Europe</i>
<b>Ahtissari</b>	<i>UN secretary general special envoy</i>
<b>Chernomyrdin</b>	<i>UN secretary general special envoy</i>
<b>Nebojsa Vujovic</b>	<i>Yugoslav diplomat</i>

<i><b>Borislav Milosevic</b></i>	<i>former Yugoslav ambassador to Russia and brother of Slobodan Milosevic</i>
<i><b>Geza Farkas</b></i>	<i>former military security service chief</i>
<i><b>Sekulic Miodrag</b></i>	<i>analyst at the Yugoslav Army chief of staff cabinet</i>

## ***SERBIAN STATE SECURITY SERVICE, SDB, WIRETAPPING THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, VJ***

*"A thief starts out with saying the lie resembles the truth, but ends with saying the truth resembles the lie".*  
Balzac

**On the eve of who-knows-which war in a row in the Balkans, a diplomatic initiative and all sorts of various initiatives aimed at helping reason overcome chaos and vanity were approaching their final stages. In a geographically small area in Europe, a.k.a. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, various interests and influences were intersecting and overlapping, but also converging on a single direction, and this was the ultimate conclusion, or for some, ultimate confusion, where the main actors ran away to shelter themselves in the bunkers while the extras stayed to wait for the bombs which will also be the most influential critics of the theatre production called war. After a short break lasting only two years during which Slobodan did not manage to find another enemy and start a final battle in which each and every citizen in his Suffer Suffer Land<sup>1</sup> would end up dead and buried, the armed conflict in Kosovo erupted. In the place where his rise to power had originally begun, his political and military suicide and, subsequent burial, was to take place. Into this abyss he dragged his people and the country which gave him birth and placed him on the throne of the ultimate leader riding on a wave of nationalism, unseen even in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This was the kind of throne he would hardly leave without much pain, suffering and blood spilt. As a philosopher once said:: «Stupidity is a disease which does not kill the patient but the people around him ».**

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<sup>1</sup> Stradija, the title (and the name of the imaginary land) of a satirical short story by the 19<sup>th</sup> century Serbian writer Radoje Domanovic.

Several years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and temporary break, in late 1997 and early 1998, what was left of the degraded (in terms of personnel) army with outdated equipment became a part of the overture which would push us to the edge, on the brink of the abyss of no return. Slobodan Milosevic sacked the Yugoslav Army chief of staff colonel general Momcilo Perisic and replaced him with intellectually and militarily far inferior general Dragoljub Ojdanic. The appointment of an inferior officer to the top commanding post was the first sign that Milosevic wanted to have an army which would entirely be under his control, while the Supreme Defence Council, VSO, was meant to retain the control in name only.

Before Perisic, Jovica Stanisic, the then Serbian security service, SDB, chief, had been sacked and replaced by Rade Markovic. Personnel management in the state was taken over by a political party without voters – the Yugoslav United Left, JUL. Therefore, a political mutant took over the finances, the army, SDB, as well as media. With such a disastrous personnel policy, the only thing one may expect is unconditional and catastrophic submissiveness which would only bring misfortune to this people that has not been seen ever since World War II. During the short period of time under the Milosevic's rule, they managed to turn our allies into our enemies, to reduce economy to the level of a collective farm in the country, to reduce intelligentsia to a bunch of the deaf and dumb, while the army was reduced to a social welfare institution consisting of people torn between their ideals and their desire to have a state citizenship.

The decision to sack general Perisic was made at the Supreme Council session held on November 24, 1998, in Belgrade. FRY president Slobodan Milosevic chaired the meeting. Serbian and Montenegrin presidents, Milan Milutinovic and Milo Djukanovic respectively, attended the meeting. The official record of the proceedings at the meeting reads as follows:

\* \* \*

*Having opened the discussion on personnel issues in the Yugoslav Army, VJ, president Slobodan Milosevic pointed to the necessity to change the army's chief of staff, given that colonel general Momcilo Perisic had already been for too long at that post. President then said there were several candidates for the position among the generals:*

- *the first is colonel general Ljubisa Velickovic, but he has already been appointed federal defence deputy minister;*
- *the second is colonel general Dragoljub Ojdanic, now the deputy of the chief of the VJ general staff. He has been discharging several important duties in the army so far.*

*The current chief of staff colonel general Momcilo Perisic would be appointed the defence advisor to the federal government.*

*President Milosevic also presented his view that in the future it should be taken into account that the army's chief of staff should not be for too long at that position where three generals had been changed in the past five years.*

*In relation to the personnel issues in the army, President Djukanovic presented his view:*

- *firstly, he is in favour of reorganising and optimising the general staff and the federal ministry of defence, SMO, as it is in other countries. This deserves to be dealt with and it should be restructured conceptually.*
- *secondly, he is not in favour of replacing the current VJ chief of staff general Perisic, irrespective of the fact that he has been for a long time in that position; according to president Djukanovic, general Perisic is a proven authority; he has enormous experience, he preserved his authority and the constitutional position of the Yugoslav Army; his is what he has done not only in the country but abroad as well.*

*General Perisic has good cooperation with the Montenegrin leadership. He was in positions where he had to defend the interests and the reputation of the Yugoslav Army at the international level. According to president Djukanovic, general Perisic is better prepared and more capable than other candidates.*

*Concerning the change of the chief of staff, president Milan Milutinovic had a different view, although he did not dispute what president Djukanovic had said. He pointed out that we needed a chief of staff who was an excellent at the operative level. General Perisic was acting at the international level in accordance with political instructions of the legal bodies of political authorities in this country. This was, undoubtedly, successful. However, he had been for a long time at that post and a*

*change should be made. We now have parallel institutions in general staff and the federal defence ministry, i.e., we have overlapping of certain activities, which is irrational and expensive.*

*Regarding the good reception of general Perisic had at the international level, we should be reserved about it and we should not pay much attention to it. We will solve our internal problems in the manner we think would be best for us, and not in line with their interests.*

*General Ojdanic, perhaps, is not well known in public, but his no less capable in comparison to the current chief of staff.*

*President Djukanovic reiterated the decisive element for him was that general Perisic had been working as the army's chief of staff for a long time and that he had been doing his job well; that this was the only reason why he was not in favour of general Perisic's dismissal from the post.*

*Addressing Djukanovic, president Milosevic said he was not that well acquainted with general Ojdanic pointing out, amongst other things, that general Ojdanic, when he was the commander of the First Army, conducted an anonymous survey among his subordinate officers who filled in a questionnaire. The questionnaire had 36 questions and the results showed Ojdanic enjoyed very high authority among the subordinate officers in many elements. He had M.Sc. degree in military science. This is a very honourable and good general. President Milosevic acknowledges the suggestions made by president Djukanovic, but believes general Ojdanic should be the VJ chief of staff. This is a natural change in the army.*

*President Milo Djukanovic replies to this that he Supreme Defence Council operates the way it operates. If you are in favour of this, then it will be so. I am against it. Please, I want this to go on record. As a Montenegrin member of the Supreme Defence Council, I am against the dismissal of the army's chief of staff general Perisic. This is not only my view, I am presenting here the view of the entire republic's leadership.*

*President Slobodan Milosevic, among other things, expressed his belief that the position of the Montenegrin president was not aimed against the new candidate but that president Djukanovic was only in favour of retaining the current chief of staff at his post.*

*In reply, president Djukanovic reiterates it must be stated in the official record of the meeting that Montenegrin president has a negative view with respect to the dismissal of the VJ chief of staff Momcilo Perisic. He went on to say the regulations concerning the powers in relation to the army were clear, but that this was not a good thing to abandon the earlier practice in the work and the decision-making process in the Supreme Defence Council.*

*President of the Republic issued a decree appointing colonel general Dragoljub Ojdanic to the post of the VJ chief of staff and colonel general Momcilo Perisic as defence advisor to the federal government.*

\* \* \*

**The assessment of the VJ security department chief, colonel general Aca Dimitrijevic, was very realistic and very rational. All the more so given that it had been made on the eve of the bombing in Kosovo when the importance of that assessment was to measured in thousands of human lives and billions of dollars in possible damages to the country. Having found out that the VJ units on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija were used without the knowledge and approval of the VJ general staff, the then chief of staff colonel general Momcilo Perisic addressed a letter to the president Milosevic with a warning that such a practice might ruin whatever was left of the once reputable army. This letter also contributed to his dismissal from his post of the chief of staff. General Perisic demanded from Milosevic that the army units should not be deployed without prior introduction of the state of emergency in Kosovo and Metohija, as this would help avoid the misuse of the army's Pristina Corps. This was contrary to the policy conducted by the establishment. Namely, the policy was not to acknowledge the existence of problems in Kosovo, including the armed rebellion and flourishing separatist movement, which could, at any given moment, set Serbia and the Balkans ablaze. The people in the West saw what the master from the Boulevard of Peace could not see...**

**Milosevic did not like bad news, but general Aca Dimitrijevic was not the man willing to pursue his career by ingratiating himself with "the boss" and passing only the news "the boss" wanted to hear. At the collegium session held in January 1999, general Dimitrijevic, the VJ security department chief, presented the following assessment on the possible chain of events:**

\* \* \*

*colonel general*

**ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC**

*Mr. General, regarding the security situation in the country, including the army, in comparison to the previous collegium, there are no any substantial changes and I would not have anything more to say on this either, but I would like to say something about the main issue for today's collegium session.*

*Above all, I'd like to say and I believe that, at this moment, for this country, the best solution would be to accept the offer made by the Contact Group and start negotiations. Any other solution would not be a good solution, and that would be against this country. Last time I acquainted the collegium with operative information collected by the service about what the Contact Group had been preparing, and unfortunately, it was all confirmed. According to the information we have, if we do not accept negotiations, the offer of the Contact Group, the same sources say, air strikes would start immediately, on February 20<sup>th</sup> already, against all the army's facilities, while the UN Security Council would declare Kosovo a territory under control of the Security Council, or to put it in another way – a protectorate, and this would be an option where we definitely lose Kosovo. Therefore, this option with accepting the proposal, i.e., the Contact Group's demand, I think is the best at this moment because it would allow the possibility to arrange some things differently through smart policy and intelligent work in the next three or four years – regardless of how this might be defined – in order to have the West "work for us" instead of this situation where we constantly poke the West in the eyes with our fingers.*

*I'm afraid none of us is familiar with this document, except for those things published in the press, which is the basis of the forthcoming talks. Therefore, the basis is some modified version of the Hill's plan<sup>2</sup>, and the state, the highest state organs know what's written in it. What's important for us, and what is important in terms of the territorial integrity of FRY, is that the issue to be discussed in the talks is not the army - nor defence, borders, customs, currency... all those elements which make up a state.*

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<sup>2</sup> Hill's plan was rejected by both the Albanians and the Serbs in early 1998. Its author is Christopher Hill, an American diplomat. The Albanians expected independence, while the Serbs expected centralised authority; the options which were not envisaged in the plan.

*Given all this I have the right to say and to reiterate again that the option is to accept the talks where we could, at this moment, achieve the maximum through wise negotiating, which means to create conditions because the Contact Group either did not suggest anything that would refer to a third federal unit, or a republic, or a separation, or secession, i.e., the change of FRY borders. I think these are the important elements of this offer.*

*When it comes to sovereignty, I wouldn't agree with general Marjanovic. This is what political leaders might say for internal political use in the country that our sovereignty was seriously undermined the moment this state signed the agreement with OSCE<sup>3</sup>, when those so-called 2,000 civilians entered the country to do what they are now doing. When the verification from the air was accepted, the minimal price for where we were in October.*

*Therefore, I think, about this – whether we should say that this or that would mean the loss of sovereignty... I think I've already said here and we've discussed it already that there is no absolute sovereignty, that every state is ceding a part of its sovereignty to the community. Therefore, I am not advocating here the deployment of the troops in Kosovo, but this means that sovereignty, as a notion, is relative, and I think we can say even at this moment that it's been undermined by the presence of the OSCE verification mission and the verification mission from the air.*

*In fact, this is about the Russians. Some are wondering how Russia has changed its position. Please, according to our information, during the Albright's<sup>4</sup> visit to Moscow and talks with Primakov<sup>5</sup>, Russia had its 380-billion debt reprogrammed for the next 20-year period. Hopefully, we're all smart enough to see what that means to Russia, and if someone really expects that Russia would take up arms and fight the war for us... I think this shouldn't be even criticised.*

\* \* \*

**The price for bombing Serbia had already been set and approved, it was like a carte blanche. The final preparations had been done for what would push Serbia down to the lowest level in the past two centuries, ever since it had come into existence. That was why the negotiators from the West were so confident that Russia would not intervene or interfere in any other way with possible bombing of FRY. This was why the efforts of the military and political leadership**

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<sup>3</sup> Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

<sup>4</sup> Madeline Albright, US state secretary.

<sup>5</sup> Yevgeny Primakov, Russian prime minister.

to motivate the brothers from the Ural Mountains to help in any way during the bombing of FRY failed.

I'd like to point out that, at the same time, the Albanian lobby has not only been active in Washington but in Moscow as well. Perhaps, less aggressively so in Moscow, but equally efficiently. These activities in Russia were subtler and less straightforward because of the specific presidential system there. I think this went in two directions. The first was through controversial Albanian businessman, who is also one of the main financier of Albanian paramilitary groups on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, Bexhet Pazolli, ex-husband of Italian pop star Anna Oxa. At the time, he was on friendly terms with Boris Yeltsin, Russian president. Pazolli was also under investigation conducted by the then chief state prosecutor of Switzerland and current chief prosecutor of The Hague tribunal, Carla del Ponte, because of some financial malversations with the Russian president. Their friendship and business interests, of course, were stronger than Yeltsin's love for the Slavs.

The second direction for the lobbying activities was Albanian mafia, which had good contacts with its Russian counterparts, and the Russian mafia had in Yeltsin's time an enormous influence on Kremlin. Of course, what played into their hands was also the old age of Yeltsin which affected his ability to make decisions, and this was indeed under a big question mark.

As the war was looming large, becoming almost imminent, the replacement of "disobedient" generals was also becoming inevitable. Of course, general Dimitrijevic was the first on the black list. General Ojdanic took part and did his best to help dismiss general Dimitrijevic. Ojdanic did it more so because he estimated well what "the boss" wanted since he was not capable enough of coming forward with such a proposal on his own. Given that general Aca Dimitrijevic was a well-informed person, sincere and straightforward, he presented his report on the personnel policy and prospects stemming from such a policy at the collegium session held in February 1999.

\* \* \*

*colonel general*

**ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC**

*Talking of the Pristina Corps and the cooperation we had yesterday, I'd like to point to an important fact. Namely, security organs found out these days that the entire command of the Pristina Corps was practically under the control of the state security service. This means that the state security service are wiretapping 34 telephone lines at the Pristina Corps command. I want to ask a question: is someone issuing orders to control the army? what's the purpose of this? Is the goal here to see what the army is doing or tomorrow this will be the aim – to see what the army has been doing, and who's doing what in the army individually?*

*For these reasons, and bearing in mind that the scope, the room, for my work has been significantly reduced recently, given that some illegal activities aimed at my dismissal and the appointment of a new head of the department, are under way, the activities in which You, unfortunately, are taking part or it's some manipulation with Your name, I demand to have an appointment with the FRY president.*

*colonel general*

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*Are there any questions, or disagreements with what general Dimitrijevic has said? No. Do you have some evidence for such claims that the entire Pristina Corps command is being wiretapped?*

*colonel general*

**ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC**

*Absolutely. For every word I've said.*

\* \* \*

**Terrorism which began taking roots in Kosovo, and which in its initial phase didn't have strong support of the Albanian people, had a huge advantage thanks to flexibility of the terrorist groups and secrecy which was made possible by Albanian traditionalism and conservatism. Due to lack of political dialogue and reluctance to acknowledge the existence of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija on the part of the ruling elite in Belgrade, popularity of all sorts of Jasharis rose among the Albanians to the level myth and legend. In such a sensitive situation, when we couldn't count on support from the West, and even less so – from the East, the regime decided to crack down on terrorist groups in a rather inadequate manner which**

was detrimental to our own interests. Namely, the orders to deploy the army units were increasingly more frequently bypassing the VJ general staff and the regular chain of command, and instead relying on generals loyal to the party, above all, general Pavkovic, whose promotion had been earlier disputed by general Perisic. Pavkovic's swift advance in his career, began in the Pristina Corps, but was to end in scandalous affairs and prison cells. On the eve of the bombing of FRY, general Aca Dimitrijevic was also dismissed from his post as the head of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, security department, better known in public as KOS (Counterintelligence Service), as the last general, together with lieutenant general Blagoje Grahovac, who had also opposed such a policy. At the collegium session held on March 18, 1999, seven days before the bombing, general Ojdanic informed those present about his conversation and the offers made by general Wesley Clark, NATO forces commander in chief.

\* \* \*

*colonel general*

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*OK, as Panic has already done this, let me acquaint you with the details of my half-hour conversation with general Clark. General Krga was also there.*

*Clark pointed out he was sorry I hadn't come last week to the NATO headquarters. He said he wanted to explain to me the implementation of the agreement on Kosovo and Metohija from the military aspect. According to his information, so this was the day before yesterday, he said today the Albanians should sign the entire agreement in Paris.*

*After that, Clark said he wanted to tell me about a serious problem, which was that the Yugoslav Army would be destroyed if it opposed NATO. If the NATO was ordered to do that, it would destroy the warehouses, the barracks and the forces of the Yugoslav Army.*

*He emphasised he wanted to make himself clear. If this were to happen, the Yugoslav Army would lose within a couple of days everything it had been investing in during the past fifty years. He went on to say VJ wouldn't recover from this.*

*Please, do not manipulate with these talks. Anyway, it's well known they are only threatening and trying to frighten us. He added they wanted me to convince the state leadership not to make a mistake which would make NATO to use force. He asked whether I would do that.*

*I said I would convey these views to the authorised state leadership and that the further actions would take place in accordance with the mood of the people to defend its inalienable part of territory – Kosovo and Metohija. I stressed I didn't believe that a decision could be made to use force against the Army, particularly so as it couldn't be justified because the Yugoslav Army, VJ, wasn't doing anything contrary to the Constitution.*

*I went on to say we warned there were still terrorist actions in Kosovo and Metohija with, in my view, two objectives: to discredit negotiating process in Paris because some Shqiptars believe all their aspirations won't be fulfilled, and secondly, to provoke the Yugoslav Army to retaliate in response to their actions, and thus win over NATO to act in support of the Shqiptar terrorists.*

*In realisation of those objectives there was a note – the Shqiptars are inflicting casualties to their own people just like the Muslims did in Sarajevo. It's indicative that they're trying to involve the NATO forces in Macedonia, that the Shqiptar terrorists are intensifying their activities in the border area, near that republic, aimed at dragging NATO into the conflict.*

*The tasks of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, are well known, so I reiterated to them these were the security of the state border, military facilities, communications, deployment, and in some cases when there was an attack near the Yugoslav Army units.*

*All our actions have been a reaction to provocations and we can't see what the reason is to make a decision which, as general Clark put it, will have such consequences for the Yugoslav Army, this country and this people. The way out of this situation lies solely in a peaceful solution in accordance with the principles laid down by the Contact Group and supported by our state delegation.*

*To this, he replied the following. The Yugoslav Army was breaking the promises given by president Milosevic in October and general Ojdanic in December last year. He demanded that the Yugoslav Army forces return to their original positions, except for three companies in the field which would be allowed to stay, and that the measures be undertaken to take away from the Ministry of Interior heavy artillery and antiaircraft systems supplied by the Yugoslav Army. He added military forces can't defeat the so-called UCK and that there were not such military operations which would lead to its destruction. The use of the Yugoslav Army in conventional military operations only resulted in the destruction of Kosovo and Metohija and the lives of the people. This was why he emphasised the need to accept the proposals of the Contact Group on the*

*deployment of NATO troops which would help all the forces in Kosovo and Metohija. He claimed they had no intention to undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.*

*I asked him whether general Clark was demanding something from the so-called UCK<sup>6</sup>? To this question, Clark replied they had to respect the agreement, and that demilitarisation should take place, that they should hand over the weapons, stop wearing uniforms, and generally be disbanded. He asked me if I had the opportunity to read the military part of the agreement, To this I replied that I'm partially acquainted with the document.*

*Clark went on to say that the military part of the agreement was in our interest. You will all have to read it, so look up this page to see what it says there. It's horror what the document says there; we don't have the state, we don't have anything. I beg you to read this carefully, we have to do it because of the contacts with these people, but I won't accept any telephone calls anymore. You can't have such serious talks on the phone; you always miss something, and secondly, it's exhausting. If you sit here like this, then it's something else.*

*Clark then said the military part of the agreement was in our interest because it allowed the Yugoslav Army to stay in the border areas, and you see yourselves that we should protect the borders meaning I'm protecting the Shqiptars, while they do whatever they like there. In this country, they're doing whatever they want, the state above the state – the way it's envisaged in that political agreement, that draft – to stay in the border areas and in command posts inside the country. You don't have this in annex 7. There is no withdrawal, and this is exactly the deadline, here's the 170-day deadline for the chief of staff to present a detailed plan for withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army units within 30 days.*

*He particularly emphasised that the members of the so-called UCK wouldn't exist in such a situation, if this were to be accepted, that it would look like Serbia won the day, and instead of our forces foreign troops would be in charge of the implementation of the agreement, while the Yugoslav Army could continue with modernisation, establish cooperation with the NATO, solve the problems with salaries, pensions, etc. This would cost NATO about one billion deutschemarks while Yugoslavia wouldn't have to pay any money. He called me once again to come to their Command and discuss this all.*

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<sup>6</sup> UCK in Albanian; Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, a terrorist organisation which operated on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija which the FRY forces were fighting against from its formation until the 1999 withdrawal from the province.

*I thanked for the invitation and asked him to have understanding for the fact that it cannot be implemented now, and that I can't go to Brussels for the time being, so I suggested he should come to Yugoslavia.*

*I added I'd acquaint the top state leadership in the country with views and assessment of general Clark. This is what I have already done. He's in Macedonia now, it wouldn't hurt him to come here – and I wouldn't be sitting here alone, and he wouldn't be alone – to discuss our arguments.*

*In his reply, general Clark stressed it was a bad idea for him to visit Yugoslavia because this could be perceived as if he came to threaten, and that wasn't his intention. He probably heard some discussions after our first meeting. He added he didn't invite general Ojdanic to the NATO headquarters to threaten him, but to explain to him the purpose of the proposed agreement. He wanted me to understand that if NATO were to use force, it would destroy the Yugoslav Army; the Yugoslav Army wouldn't survive, that's a fact. He asked that this be passed on to the highest state leadership. Clark emphasised he wanted to be sincere and pointed out that a new army would be born after the bombing, but not with the current VJ chief of staff, and that there wouldn't be any facilities now used by the Yugoslav Army.*

*Commanders of the new army will be asking why the bombing hasn't been prevented. He particularly pointed out that he was asking me to help protect the Yugoslav Army, that everything should be done with the state leadership of the FRY to avoid making a mistake and avoid the bombing.*

*That was the essence of the talks between the NATO forces commander Clark and myself, general Krga was present there and an interpreter. If you're satisfied with what Krga said and this that you've heard now, we'll move on. General Aca.*

\* \* \*

**Since the generals were straining their ears to hear what the couple from Dedinje was thinking in order to put forth proposals and make their assessments accordingly, it could not have been expected that Ojdanic would clearly and unambiguously tell Milosevic, even in the form of ultimatum, that we could not allow ourselves to get involved in an adventure of waging war with the most powerful countries in the world. After Milosevic had come to power, and perhaps even earlier, perfidious games were being played as to which security service would ingratiate itself to a larger extent with the boss. Silent war between the military and civilian security services was being**

waged with the ultimate objective that the winner impose itself as a supervisor over the loser for the imminent chain of events that was to take place in these parts. The Serbian state security service, SDB, was always closer to the boss because its financing and personnel matters allowed Slobodan to abuse them. The estimates were that the war would take place, but that it would not last too long as well as that some issues like the Albanian one would be solved as part of the same necessary evil called war. Hence, everything was ready for the beginning of the end but no one dared or wanted to forcibly remove the evil that would rule the day in these parts for over ten years, and thus spare the army and the citizens of humiliation and suffering.

Slobodan knew he was losing his last ace up his sleeve in the form of Russia and that he would not be able to control the situation in the country. US state secretary Madeleine Albright clearly stated during one of her pre-war visit to the FRY that Russia would limit itself to mere rhetoric in terms of protection of the then Serb interests. In fact, the biggest damage to us was inflicted by the Russians. Slobodan saw in them an older brother who would help us, but the Russians saw in us a chance to solve their internal problems, i.e., the conflict in Chechnya, by letting Serbia go down the drain. Our tragedy was that our leaders were short-sighted politicians who could not see anything beyond their own noses. Intense courting by their advisors and generals to which they were exposed did not allow them to see the threatening reality looming large on the Serbia's horizon. General Aca Dimitrijevic had presented the following facts at the collegium session immediately before the bombing started:

\* \* \*

*colonel general*

**ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC**

*General, when it comes to the security situation, we may say there haven't been substantial changes with respect to the previous week in terms of the current situation on the territory. However, despite the fact that this is not under jurisdiction of the Security Department, I'd like to speak about what's been happening externally, at the international level, which is directly related to the situation on the territory.*

*Namely, the security service possesses certain operative information leading to the conclusion that the issue of Kosovo and Metohija is definitely brought to the stage immediately before the ultimate*

*dénouement. Unfortunately, it's what we warned against much earlier – we're approaching the stage where we would have take-or-leave-it option, and this isn't much a choice.*

*Namely, all these activities unfolding in the past few days at the international level, in my view, should be a strong indication for all of us that the decision is near. This could only be a misconception of some that Russia and some other factors would play a more substantial role, but we were constantly warning we shouldn't rely on them and that the Kosovo issue for them, in fact, is instrumental in solving their own much more serious problems.*

## ***WHY HAVE I BEEN ARRESTED?***

*"The state has all the rights, and the man has not,  
instead of vice versa"*

*Antun Gustav*

**On March 24, 1999, as predicted by the more sensible but smaller part of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, general staff, the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, started. All sorts of bombs were falling almost incessantly on military, commercial but often civilian targets as well. Everything that had been previously declared as possible targets was destroyed. Military infrastructure, bridges, traffic arteries, airports, plants and telecommunications centres was being targeted constantly almost until the end of June 1999.**

**We were at war for over 70 days, the people was almost driven mad, the economy was on the verge of collapse, power stations were knocked out of the electrical grid... There were rebellions in the VJ units in south Serbia.**

**In such a situation there was precious little time for a more serious political manoeuvre. Slobodan was wasting the lives of other people's children while opposing the western civilisation. Everything was in vain. A land invasion of the FRY was in preparation. Only irresponsible people could have believed it would be possible to defeat by conventional means the nineteen economically most powerful countries on the planet. Slobodan was certainly one of them. The army was investing superhuman efforts not to win but the**

protect itself from total annihilation. We did not have the resources for a victory, let alone material reserves.

At the time, I was assisting the garrison commander colonel Radoslav Stamenkovic both in terms of material resources and information I had to go through it with as few casualties as possible. Encouraging news were coming through the media from Belgrade that an agreement to stop the bombing might be reached. At the moment, people were awaiting only that sort of relief. Slobodan's mistake was that over 300,000 people, who, he thought, shared his views and ideology, actively took part in defending the homeland. However, these people were just defending their homeland but did not share the views of the Belgrade regime. Rebellions in some army units clearly corroborated this. We were all ready and prepared to defend our country, but I also expected the final showdown with the regime would ensue in the first days of the ceasefire, which, unfortunately, did not happen until the assassination of the prime minister, but even then, it was only partial.

Sometime in early 1998, I had a conflict with some local leaders of the Yugoslav United Left, JUL, municipal branch in Obrenovac. My conflict with the people from JUL, i.e., Dusan Bratic, lawyer Ljubomir Dragacevac and Boban Filimonovic from Obrenovac, started with the construction of a building on the land owned by the army in the centre of the town, and reached its climax with my arrest on the last day of the war. The location where my company began constructing the building was very attractive, while the benefit that the Obrenovac's branch of JUL and its "cashiers" could derive from it was "zero". In a clear conflict of interests, and without my willingness to cooperate financially with this party, they resorted to that good, old method of intimidation and blackmailing. They first sent a memo to Danilo Pantovic, the head of Vljako Stojiljkovic's cabinet and a member of the JUL main board (look up appendix 1, at the end of the book), in which they informed him of my "evil intentions" with respect to them. Soon after, "comrade" Danilo Pantovic forwarded the memo to the Obrenovac local police which summons me for a questioning. The interview at the Obrenovac police station was conducted by lieutenant Jordan (I do not know his surname), an honest and decent man, who had a strictly formal approach to the matter because he was aware what was behind it. On that occasion, he informed me what was actually going on, and he even copied a document for me where you could see who had suggested this interview should take place. I am grateful to him for that. With that document in my possession, I brought charges against

these "secret service correspondents" – comrades Bratic, Filimonovic and Dragacevac. The Obrenovac municipal court fined both Bratic as the signatory to the document and myself. He was to pay 3,000-dinar fine, while I had to pay 5,000. This only irritated these comrades so they persisted in completing the party assignment they had been given. In the course of the judicial proceedings, I requested that JUL issue an official statement about the activities of the "comrades" mentioned above. JUL indeed responded to this by "apologising to myself and my family" which probably made me the only citizen who had an official apology from JUL dated February 17, 1999 (look up the appendix 2 at the end of the book). After you receive an apology from such a political party, arrest is what is in store for you. Since the regular police had refused to arrest me before the NATO bombing of FRY started, even though they had received a note from Danilo Pantovic ordering them to do so, "the comrades" turned to a much more disciplined institution – the Yugoslav Army, VJ. Instead of the civilian police force, the tasks was done by the Yugoslav Army security department. At the same time, the military police also arrested the garrison commander colonel Radoslav Stamenkovic, security chief for the Obrenovac garrison lieutenant colonel Milovan Jankovic and myself – the author of this book. After the search of my house in Obrenovac and a brief interrogation, they handed to me a decision on my 30-day detention signed by colonel Srpkovic Djokic.

They took me in a patrol wagon to the Central Prison in Bacvanska Street. I was arrested because I had a legally licensed pistol which I presented to them during the search of my house as they had not found it. Captain Dzudic, who was acting decently and was not aware of what it was all about, was involved in the search. The irony of it was that on the first day of the NATO bombing, I gave my car to the army, bought satellite equipment so that they could follow what was going on and allowed them to use the building which was in the first place the main reason for my arrest "by JUL". The Obrenovac garrison command was located in that building during the whole war. I took the risk that it might be bombed just like other military facilities. My reward for it was the arrest by the same institution which I was helping to survive in the garrison where we had families.

As I was entering the Central Prison in the military police patrol wagon, I heard the creaking sound of the heavy gate which blocked the light of the June early evening leaving my freedom on the other side of the walls. After a detailed search, as if I was the worst kind of criminal, I was taken to the solitary confinement cell on the ground

floor. I think the cell's number was 16. With my hand behind my back, looking ahead of me, as the house rules prescribe, I was taken to a dark small cell. This was June 9, 1999.

My cell was a tiny room 2x3m, without windows. The walls were done in oil paint - half of the height to the ceiling. There was a military-style bed, a small table, rusty latrine in the corner above which there was a leaking tap. On the table there was a plastic bowl and a glass for tea or water. I did not have any cleaning substance to wash the dishes, nor did I have hot water. Light from the corridor was timidly penetrating almost opaque glass pane above the metal entrance door with a tiny slit for passing the food to prisoners. There was no window or natural light in the cell.

The moment I crossed the threshold of the prison, there was only one thing on my mind – how to get out of this place and how to take part in the most effective manner in a radical change of the government. I must admit, from that moment onwards, this was my personal conflict with "political monsters" a.k.a. "the JUL people". October 5 proved there were at least one million people who shared my views. It was terribly cold in my new "home". I was killing time by reading the messages on the wall, whenever there would some light from the corridor, inscribed by former inmates or by counting my steps while walking back and forth across the room. When the light in the corridor was turned off, this was a sign for the last post.

My first morning in prison broke at 5 a.m. – that's the time for getting up. The sign for waking up was a bang with a baton on the metal door. When I woke up, I was not sure whether this was a nightmare or reality. A prison guard brought me back to reality when he barked the order to make my bed. The army, which was guarding us, were at the time dressed in the uniforms of the Central Prison civilian guards because they feared they might be bombed as the state of war was still in effect.

Soon, a lid over the slit on the metal cell door opened, which was a sign the breakfast was coming. The breakfast was a bowl of tea without sugar, and they put some butter in the glass. In addition, I received 400 grams of stale bread, as black as farmer's furrow. I decided to throw it away except for the bread which I broke in two halves, though with great difficulties. My biggest problem was how to clean the greasy glass with cold water. No one came in the morning or asked any questions. Around noon, they ordered us to take the mattresses and blankets out into the corridor, and then they took us outside where trucks were waiting for us. We loaded everything we

brought out of our cells onto the trucks. Then, they pushed us into patrol wagons and transported us to the Military Prison in Ustanicka Street. There were captured Shqiptars and a bloke, conscientious objector, who refused to take up the arms, together with me in that patrol wagon. He told me he had been kept in prison for the past three months. When we were going out of the patrol wagon inside the Military Prison, we heard insults hurled at us by the guards and the prison staff. Obviously, we all received the same treatment – smugglers, terrorists and political dissenters.

Military Prison was in much better shape than the civilian one. After I had been taken there, captain Dzodic and another two lieutenant colonels began interrogating me. Interrogations were conducted in a kindergarten near the Revolution Boulevard. First, the captain would interview me, and then tomorrow, another lieutenant colonel, and yet another lieutenant colonel on the third day. The interrogation process was conducted decently, without any physical or psychological harassment, and these lasted about two hours. They were the most interested in the construction of the building which made it clear to me what the source of all problems was. After the questioning, captain Dzodic allowed me to phone my wife Verica and tell her I would be back home tomorrow so she should not send me any food or clothes. This was the day before the weekend, I think – Friday. On Saturday and Sunday, no one came to see me or release me from prison. The captain told me he would suggest I should be released from custody as there was no reason for detention. I believe he really meant it. However, colonel Djokic, the top security officer at the supreme command, thought otherwise.

Days were passing horribly slowly in the Military Prison. At the beginning, I was had a special treatment – without the right to newspapers or some other form of "entertainment". I had to wake up very early, make my bed, wait for breakfast, and then I just did not know what to do with myself. The worst thing of all was that they did not allow me to lie in the bed, instead I was walking in the cell the whole day. The guard would light cigarettes for those wanted a smoke, and that was all. Before lunch we would have an half-hour walk on the prison grounds where you can see only sky, but from the cell you see nothing. The prison was circular in shape. The central part, surrounded by tall buildings, there was prison ground where the detainees were walking. This area was divided in four parts, and it was encircled by a high wall so that prisoners could not make contact amongst themselves if they were in prison because of the same offence. At the time, there were different groups and

individuals from various countries there. Some were accused of espionage – I think these were Australians, others were accused of atrocities committed in Kosovo – I believe they were Russian volunteers. There were also many reservists accused of war profiteering, thefts of petrol in their units, etc. There were a lot of Shqiptars who were captured and transferred to the Military Prison from Kosovo.

After the walk with hands behind our backs, looking in front of ourselves, we would go back to our cells. The walk presented a unique opportunity for guards, especially for one of them who was by origin from our coast, to harass the Shqiptars. He would often slap the prisoners who did not understand the language, and certainly did not know why he was being beaten. They forced them to sing Serb Chetnik songs. There was, among us, a Shqiptar with a metal implant for his thighbone who would most often fall down after the first slap on his face.

I was always wondering at those "brave" military policemen who were watching this with sadistic delight or taking part in harassment of powerless prisoners from Kosovo. This is not something that distinguishes a Serb soldier. In their stupidity, those guys did not even think about what would be in store for the Kosovo Serbs when these people return to their homes. On my release from prison, I informed about this judge major Spasojevic, and later colonel Trifunovic, president of the Military Court, who compiled an official note on this. As far as I know, no measures have been taken against the people who were beating prisoners without any reason, and thus tarnished the good name of the army which they belonged to. I could not find excuse, but to some degree I could understand when someone on the front lines violates the code of conduct with respect to the enemy. I cannot accept, though, that someone who spends the whole war enjoying himself in Belgrade, is allowed to do those repugnant things. Probably, psychiatrists would have some explanation for such actions.

The warden would sometimes make a tour of the cells with detainees but there would be always one of the guards accompanying him so that no one would dare complain about anything.

After a couple of days, they shaved our heads and beards so that this all looked more like a prison camp in the mid-forties than a military prison at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I did not know myself why they did it. If they wanted to humiliate us, then they chose the wrong

place because someone's pride was not in his hair or beard, irrespective of how it looked like to them.

Days in the military detention were passing slowly in monotony and reflection, and I was gradually getting used to life in prison. I have an innate adaptation system which has always helped me in situations like that one. I thought to myself, "What if I had some car crash? What if I was lying here with my limbs in plaster?" This was better, after all. I expected they would soon allow me to receive the newspapers which would help me a lot. They denied me the right to talk to my lawyer but also the contact with my family and friends, which, in the beginning, was a huge problem for me. I had already spent over twenty days in detention, and no one had asked me a single serious question. Meanwhile, they were bringing in some wretched people who had not received a notice to report for military duty or refused to accept it. Some of them would stay one night, in the morning they would be interrogated and then they would let them go or put them on trial immediately. Our people working and living abroad, the gastarbeiters, had the worst treatment. One of them was brought to my cell. This man was on vacation in his native village, near Pozarevac. He had been living for years in France. He was married to a French woman, and they had a little baby. On his way back to France from Yugoslavia, he was arrested at the border crossing with Hungary and transported back to Belgrade. His wife remained in their car in Subotica. This man had a confirmation issued by our embassy in Paris that there had been no notices to report for military duty sent to his address as well as that there was no arrest warrant on these grounds. He was crying almost the whole afternoon. They took away his passport. He did not know what had happened to his wife and eight-month-old baby who had been left at the border crossing. They took him for interrogation and told him he had been sentenced in absentia to six years' imprisonment for dodging his military duty. The trial had taken place in Kragujevac, without anyone, including himself, knowing anything about it.

On the twenty-eighth day of my detention, the president of the Military Court, colonel Trifunovic (I think he was lieutenant colonel back then), came to visit me. He asked me:

- Why are you here?
- I'm in that group from Obrenovac – I replied.
- Have you given the statement to the investigative judge? – he asked me again.
- No – I said.

- You'll give the statement tomorrow. Do you need anything?
- No, thank you.

Tomorrow, investigative judge major Zeljko Ivanic summoned me to his office.

Our conversation was very brief. Had there been no typing of the minutes of the proceedings, the interview would have probably lasted only a couple of minutes. Then I met for the first time my lawyer Slobodan Bozic, a friend of mine to this day. My wife Verica was with him.

After judge Ivanic had finished with interrogation, I asked him:

- Isn't there anything else?
- Should I ask something more? – he said, smiling.
- No, but did I have to wait for so long to say two sentences?
- Go to your cell and pack yourself, you're going home. – Instead of an answer, I received an order.

Escorted by the guard, I returned to my cell delighted that I would finally breathe in again some fresh air. The guard appeared no sooner than tomorrow morning bringing the judge's decision which I was supposed to sign. When I signed the paper, I saw this did not refer to my release from prison but it said that my detention was extended to another thirty days. There is an adequate popular term for such a behaviour of this judge, but those words are not for this book.

I was finally set free on the basis of the Decision No. KI 153/99 after 32 days in detention.

All the while, deep underground, in the shelter of the Supreme Command headquarters, which was well befitting the future national hero, Slobodan Milosevic was in secret talks with Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin on how to sign the capitulation and relinquish a part of the country, and yet present it in public as a glorious victory.

## ***NEGOTIATIONS ON SUSPENSION OF BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRY***

The war, it is a massacre of people who do not know each other, to the profit of people who know each other but do not massacre themselves."

Eisenhower<sup>7</sup>

***Belgrade, June, 1999***

***Ambassador***

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*General, I've just talked to Chernomyrdin<sup>8</sup>, and he said Albright sent him a message several minutes ago. She knows the talks have started, she says she's got direct communication and she's told him – when You make a deal with your American interlocutors, that is, the NATO people, and when that document is signed, when its implementation starts – the same moment the bombing will come to a halt, and the request is that I pass on the message.*

*I'm telling this to You, I should pass on the message to Jovanovic<sup>9</sup> and others, but OK now, as we've been in touch about all this, he's asked me to convey this and that's what I do. He calls his ambassador to Belgrade to tell him, he doesn't know whether he's received the order... this lieutenant general of theirs... (inaudible).*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*C'mon, come, I'll be waiting for you (inaudible). Last night Vujovic sent it with original text so that the other thing is increasingly less important. But will they succeed to get the plan approved – the action plan for withdrawal, not something else.*

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC<sup>10</sup>***

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<sup>7</sup> The author, Vladan Vljakovic, is wrong. This is Paul Valéry, a French poet (1871-1945), not Dwight Eisenhower.

<sup>8</sup> Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, Russian diplomat, United Nations Secretary General envoy for the talks with Milosevic.

<sup>9</sup> Zivorad Jovanovic, FRY foreign affairs minister.

<sup>10</sup> Colonel Negovan Jovanovic, official interpreter - Serbian into English.

*Thanks. General Ojdanic is here. What's the problem?*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*The problem is that general Ojdanic should instruct your delegation how to proceed with negotiations and to work on the entire agreement. They are refusing to discuss anything except for the article 2.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*General, general Ojdanic cannot see what the problem is because this morning the agreement was reached to have the teams work on the action plan for withdrawal of the army units, and we agreed on this.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*No, we didn't. Obviously, we didn't agree. I also thought we'd reached the agreement. The entire document should be discussed because there's nothing in that document which is political in its nature. It contains only what's been previously agreed. This is what your parliament approved of, what your president accepted.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*You see, general, the document also contains instructions on the mandate and the structure of the forces, and the United Nations Security Council is absolutely the competent organ to define this.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*This is not true. This has already been agreed at the political level, and I want you to give the instructions to your team to accept that mandate. We've talked about that, but it'll be discussed today. This had been demanded before reaching the agreement on withdrawal.*

**colonel**

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIĆ**

*Yes, Sir, if we agree that the mandate and the structure of the security forces are under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, why should we discuss this issue now?*

**general**

**WESLEY CLARK**

*Because the way it should be done technically is that the Security Council endorse what we've accepted. To approve it, this is the way to do it.*

**colonel**

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIĆ**

*Sir, you see, we do not perceive the mandate as a technical issue. This is absolutely something about which the Security Council should make a decision, and we're authorised to discuss the action plan for the military forces, or to be more precise, to set the date for the beginning of the units' withdrawal whose goal is to stop the bombing.*

**general**

**WESLEY CLARK**

*The date for the beginning of the withdrawal cannot be determined until after the mandate of the forces is defined. When we suspend the bombing, you'll have to withdraw, and when you withdraw, we'll have to arrive afterwards. And the agreement on this must be reached today.*

**colonel**

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIĆ**

*General, you see, as soon as the Security Council specifies the mandate and the structure of the forces, it will be possible for those forces to enter the territory of Kosovo.*

**general**

**WESLEY CLARK**

*But this is what will not happen because you will work today, together with us, to define the mandate and the structure of the forces, and then we'll submit this to the Security Council to endorse it. We won't allow that the Security Council do that because, if this were the case, we wouldn't be able to stop the bombing.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Sir, referring to the agreement again, there's nothing in it about the mandate and the structure of the forces. The beginning of the withdrawal is what will lead to the suspension of the bombing. Let's please work then on specifying the moment when our first units should start pulling out, how this could be verified, and you ----*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*--- allow to complete the withdrawal, and you may pull out if you want, but we'll continue bombing until the structure of those forces is determined, and we won't be able to stop the bombing until after that document is adopted.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Sir, finally I'd say something about the principles which have been agreed and accepted. Nothing's been said about the structure of the forces and their mandate. I've only been told the bombing will stop with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army units, and then –*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*General, we should also agree to adopt the five principles because if you want to define the mandate and the structure of the forces, then he must adopt the principles concerning the presence of the international security forces, and he hasn't done that, and therefore, we cannot stop the bombing ---*

**colonel**

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIĆ**

*But, Sir, the decision on the presence of the international security forces should be made by the Security Council.*

**general**

**WESLEY CLARK**

*No, this isn't so. This is only under the auspices of the Security Council; it doesn't have the powers to do it. There's nothing in the agreement saying that. The agreement reads that this should be under the auspices of the UN, and it's up to us to make a decision on this. That's just the same as we did in Dayton.*

**colonel**

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIĆ**

*General, what we want to suggest now is that the boys in the field, the group working on this, in order to save time, to let them work on the withdrawal plan. We'll discuss all other aspects afterwards with you and other individuals.*

**general**

**WESLEY CLARK**

*We must discuss it now, immediately, because we cannot finish it today. We want the bombing to stop now, just like you. We must agree on the structure so that we can proceed. Therefore, the mandate and the structure, which we should accept today, it doesn't matter whether it'll be done in person now, on the phone or whether these people down there, in the field, will do it, it's probably easier because they can do it in stages, but the agreement on this must be reached today so that we can continue working on the suspension of the bombing, and then this could go to the Security Council.*

**colonel**

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIĆ**

*General, the latest instructions are... could you pass on the message to your team, and the message, i.e., the order will be issued to our team also*

*– to continue working on these principles which we've accepted. We'll call you later on in connection to the issue of the mandate and the structure of the forces.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*When will you call me?*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*I don't know. Wait please. General, we'll get back to you in about two hours.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*All right. I'll tell the team to continue working, but I want to make myself clear that we, either down there – in the field, or now – on the phone, must adopt the remaining part of the document so that we could, then, work on the verification of the starting point for the withdrawal in order to suspend the bombing. We all want the same, we just need to cooperate and work on this together.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*All right, general, we'll be working on this and we'll call you again.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*Alright, I'll be waiting for your call. Thank you.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Thank you.*

\* \* \*

In Kosovo and Metohija, special political headquarters had been established that was practically commanding the army and the police in the province. The headquarters chief was Nikola Sainovic, nicknamed Patton, probably after American general. Milosevic's longstanding associate and friend was advocating the concept according to which the problems did not exist if they did not appear in the press. Such a concept was also embraced by the Serbian government and its prime minister Mirko Marjanovic. The internationalisation of the problem was not what the Serbian regime wanted, and this was one the reasons for the conflict between Belgrade and Washington. Terrorists saw their chance in this and fully took the advantage of the opportunity.

This organ had effectively commanded the operations conducted by the security forces in Kosovo and Metohija before the bombing started. During the very NATO aggression on FRY, Milosevic pulled another loser he had up his sleeve. Given his age and the roles he had played in the Milosevic's era, this individual would better be amateur chess player in the Kalemegdan park with other pensioners than a general. Of course, we refer here to Aleksandar Bakocevic. Slobodan rewarded him with the rank of lieutenant general and appointed him the head of the morale and information department. Hence, this was the department which conducted the propaganda war against the aggressor.

Advocating the above-mentioned thesis that the problems do not exist, if the media do not see them, this general was in favour of strengthening the morale through informing the public in the following vein – "keep on battering us, we can't feel a thing". And while the Shqiptars were producing refugees where there were not actually any, and while we were hiding ours even in places where there were some, enraptured crowds were shown dancing with usual suspects – female singers. Militarily, we could not defeat the stronger enemy, while we lost the propaganda war the moment it was formed. Sympathies of average western citizens were targeted, but instead of seeing on their TV sets deserted Serbian cities, queues for food, candles instead of lights, they actually saw enraptured crowds which turned the other cheek after being slapped once. I often wondered what the purpose of that was. You could make no one cry with that in London or New York.

**Nikola Sainovic, the then federal deputy prime minister, was Milosevic's right hand and as such he was present at almost all the talks on Kosovo crisis.**

\* \* \*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*There are new moments here. Clark has just called to say he's got a problem with our team because they want to discuss only the issues under the article 2, that's the withdrawal plan, and he says it's totally unacceptable, and that everything must be accepted, and we said that was out of the question, that it wasn't defined, etc. And he said: "I know the Security Council hasn't adopted it, we have to adopt it", and the Security Council would endorse it.*

*We told him three times our team was authorised to discuss the withdrawal plan, and that no time should be wasted, that he should work with our people on the withdrawal plan and there's nothing else we've got to discuss now. He says yes, but then I have no powers to stop the bombing.*

*We told him this was our position, and our next conversation is in two hours.*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*This is our position, we should come up with (inaudible)*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*I have two proposals. The first is to try to re-formulate, to discard from this text everything that's not for this text... to try because it means our people said these general provisions and general things shouldn't be discussed. Now we could put it in a preamble, one sentence that Yugoslavia will accept the forces which the UN Security Council in accordance with the Charter or the way it says in that paper... He says the structure must be known, well, it must be known the way the Security Council defines it, and Clark says this should be specified today, otherwise if it isn't specified today, there would be no suspension of the bombing tomorrow.*

***minister JOVANOVIĆ***

*We should say we've got no authorisation to specify the structure.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIĆ***

*We've already said to him, and he absolutely understands we're right, but he's got other orders. Meaning, we've got to organise ourselves immediately to deal with it. He's got orders to go public and say Yugoslavia hasn't accepted the first paper from this document, and that's the withdrawal of forces, and they point to the withdrawal as the crucial thing in this document, and says... We told Clark, our people who have the powers down there to work on the withdrawal plan. Please give orders to your people to do it as well; the fact that you've got additional questions, this shouldn't slow down the work on the withdrawal plan.*

***minister JOVANOVIĆ***

*Let our people draft a proposal in writing...*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIĆ***

*But we can't do it, it isn't realistic to burden the people down there, that's what we should do here, because they were fighting until this morning, until now, and they've come this far. This means we still don't know what's been specified, and the withdrawal plan and the withdrawal of the first contingent has been determined, not with that, but their condition is that we adopt the structure of the troops, the forces which the UN don't mention, where NATO command is the political leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance and the rest, it's known what's written there, and that's scandalous distorting of the agreement.*

***minister JOVANOVIĆ***

*It's a deal.*

\* \* \*

***general MILOVANOVIĆ***

*(inaudible)*

***colonel general***

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*This should unfold under the auspices of the UN, and they won't accept that only the withdrawal plan is to be made, but they encroach on the competencies of the UN Security Council and the UN aren't mentioned anywhere in the text.*

**general MILOVANOVIC**

*(inaudible).*

\* \* \*

**FRY president**

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Hello general, do you have any news from above?*

**colonel general**

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*We've got news, first Clark called and he continues to dispute that we have to accept the complete plan, or so to speak, the proposed plan, and to sign it and to start pulling out, until that moment there is no suspension of the bombing.*

**FRY president**

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*That plan is being drafted bilaterally, not unilaterally.*

**colonel general**

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*He was told again about this article 1 where there's no mention of the UN Security Council, but which stems from these principles we adopted or attached to the deployment of the troops under the auspices of the UN.*

**FRY president**

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, our forces will be deployed under the auspices of the UN, this means – until the UN do not establish those forces, how could they be deployed?*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*We told him that in the first conversation and in the second conversation we reiterated that. However, he says the things have ground to a halt down there because this group is only discussing the article 2, which is what we authorised them to do – to draft this plan for the withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and Metohija.*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*The UN should give them the mandate, not us.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*That's what we and deputy prime minister Sainovic pointed out, but he wasn't satisfied with that so we agreed to talk again in two hours, and that this work continues exclusively on this document regulating the withdrawal of our forces.*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Of course, regarding their powers, their must be empowered by the Security Council, and not ourselves – we're part of the agreement. I'd suggest to You to call – just like you've talked to this one – to call Sergeyev and talk to him, to see why their people are not participating in this as promised... Chernomyrdin said in front of Ahtissari, the Finnish and the entire delegation, that the deal was made, and they take part, and simply to have a talk with him to say it's a very serious handicap because they took part in the talks which they brought to us as the result, they participated ... in the presence of... and now they aren't participating in the talks. That's a big handicap, it was even announced yesterday they were coming from Moscow, but they didn't come.*

*Therefore, call him, have a conversation with him, insist that they come and participate down there. You don't need only military envoy, it may be*

*military envoy, but those generals who took part in talks with them in Moscow and Bonn and everywhere should be there – those people who can do their job. Have a conversation with them. Draft the theses together with Nikola and explain to them what it's all about, above all, in terms of the agreement reached with them, and finally, you've made an agreement with them, and I did it afterwards with Chernomyrdin, and he even talked about it with Talbot, and informed us – both us and Ahtissari, and his people and our people, you were there, I was there, I even talked to Talbot – he was suggesting some Finnish bloke if they wanted, and they said for the time being they couldn't, but they agree totally this should go, they should be the ones. Accordingly, the doors are open for them, and taking into account the tripartite agreement and the need for us to be there. We cannot explain why they aren't here.*

*In this respect, draft some theses and tell them what this man insists on, etc., and you should insist that they join in so that the best solution could be found. Make sure you have that conversation.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*We suggest – before our next call for Clark – to have the concept for our proposal. I'd call it preamble to this text of the agreement which would include what we're insisting on all the time, and that's to have this and that done under the auspices of the UN.*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*That mandate should be determined by the UN, and not us to propose this to them. This issue of the mandate and their presence is not in the hands of Yugoslavia or NATO but it's in the hands of the UN. This isn't something you do by reaching an agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO. Through the agreement we adopted – brought by Chernomyrdin and Ahtissari – we accepted the international forces under the auspices of the UN. This means the UN must first establish those forces, declare it in a decision, and the representative of those forces, which are effectively under the UN ... with the representatives of those forces – those could be all that people who are there, but, of course, others as well because we're talking here about the forces under the UN auspices... he would discuss these other details, and we assumed the obligation only to negotiate this*

*withdrawal plan, the beginning of the entire story, and when it starts, to stop this to give a chance to the UN to issue a resolution.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*All of that, we've just told him.*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*We're there really in good... in the basic document we adopted it says the forces would be deployed under the UN auspices. Therefore, this part now which is discussed with them – these aren't the forces under the UN auspices but NATO, so that, regarding the mandate, it's their right, etc. This isn't the issue for our agreement with them but for the UN mandate which we will influence with our suggestions aimed at UN, and not some agreement between us and NATO. These are elementary things. If such a preamble suits you, you may put it in writing, but that's only an explanation.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*That's only an explanation to make them assume the obligation so that they understand what's instructed...*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Of that plan which envisages the deployment of troops under the UN auspices we expect that the UN make a decision to establish such forces, and only after these forces come into existence after the approval of the UN Security Council, they can conduct talks on their mandate and the preparations for the deployment plan. If it says the troops under the UN auspices would be deployed, then these troops must first exist, you can't do anything with the forces which are not under the UN auspices. That's clear, and you talk but keep amongst ourselves and them, those that we battle with over the pattern of withdrawal and the model for the beginning when they make here this plan.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*Everything you've said is absolutely clear... (inaudible).*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Good, our obligations entail that we accept the forces under the UN auspices. We cannot go beyond the obligation which has been accepted. Accordingly, what he demands is more than what the agreement says. If that is so, we really cannot exceed the limits laid down in the agreement, and this should be clear to him. Our organs, the parliament and the government, have accepted such a formulation under the UN auspices. Therefore, we may talk about these forces, those forces will exist; a child can't get a job before it's born. The forces will be (... foreign language). Insist on this paragraph. Do insist you are to stick to that paragraph and that you're not having any new demands, while he puts forth a demand which is not covered by that paragraph, but because of that, let Ojdanic speak to Sergeyev and let Ojdanic present this to Sergeyev, but he should insist these people should come. First, these forces must be established, and we can't talk about their mandate before they're established. This isn't our job, this is something UN has to do, they should be given their mandate by the UN, not us. We're taking part in this.*

*This should be explained to Clark and his interest is to make a deal on these principles, which needn't be at all in accordance with his model, but this normal, realistic model, and his interest is to have a break as soon as possible because this would allow that UN resolution be drafted. And since they know they've got the biggest influence on the Security Council, they also want this resolution to be adopted. Therefore, before you establish those principles and put on paper what's been achieved so far, what all the sides agreed on, you should dictate when the withdrawal would start, impose that the beginning of the withdrawal be then demonstrated and that it be clear and visible, etc. They can announce the break, but you should meanwhile continue with the talks, while the Security Council would have an open door to draft the resolution. The resolution may then be finished in two, three days.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*(inaudible).*

*FRY president*

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*The point is not whether someone from here empowered our delegation, for example, I or I don't know who, but the thing is that this text of the document has been adopted in our parliament, and it clearly states – the forces under the UN auspices, and you can't go beyond that.*

*deputy prime minister SAINOVIC*

*(inaudible)*

\* \* \*

**The war had to be stopped and it could have been stopped. Western analysts had thought Milosevic would have succumbed under the bombs after a couple of days. And he also had thought the war would have come to an end under the pressure exerted by the public in western countries at the time. This was the conflict of two stubborn opponents, at loggerheads with each other, and one of them was, so to speak, just an infant. Horrible days were passing by wasted in these efforts to outwit the adversary and the efforts to conceal and hide. Actually, negotiations were never put on hold at all. At the beginning, we could have stopped the war in a situation that was much more favourable for us, and more importantly, with considerably fewer casualties. As the time passed, there were increasingly more initiatives coming from all quarters, from reputable people involved in global politics all over the world. The destruction was increasingly more devastating. There were threats the death toll, the cost in human lives, would be much higher. All the while, while other people's children were dying in Kosovo's wasteland, but in the Belgrade boulevards as well, the son of the "supreme commander" was surrounded by bodyguards from the state security service, SDB, put on display his military skills in Pozarevac and its surroundings, and, at times, in Belgrade itself. Marko was in love with firearms, cars and women, just like any other spoilt brat would be. He was given loads of weapons even though he hadn't served the army. All that did not stop him from strutting around in his newly found role. His mother praised him in public saying she was proud of her "soldier without a day of military training", and probably, at the same time, she was very happy that he did not have to be in the**

**border area, in Kosare, Kosovo, where death was a privilege and life pure hell.**

\* \* \*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*I talked to Milosevic. He'll immediately talk to Ivanov and he knows what the problem is, what's the heart of the matter here. He'll suggest Ivanov should talk to Albright. There's no ministerial meeting, that is, Russia and Ivanov won't attend the G8 summit tomorrow. The things are getting more complicated on the Russian political scene.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*(inaudible) Russians expect of us to ease up a bit....*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*Alright, that's OK, and we can say, based on the principles which have been adopted, we're ready to talk and reach an agreement on the cost of the withdrawal and technical issues related to this pursuant to the provision contained in the 10<sup>th</sup> principle, and nothing of this that we aren't ready, what's the Security Council, what's this, what's that – I wouldn't even mention it.*

*Regarding the issue of the Security Council, that should be separated.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*Mandate, structure, dynamics, numbers, and everything else should be determined by the Security Council in a resolution and the authorised.... and we're ready.... (inaudible).*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*Send me a car so that I can go there.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*Done.*

\* \* \*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*I've got a car, I'll come, I'll come in my car.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Good.*

\* \* \*

*(inaudible)*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*Blagoje<sup>11</sup>, we'll do two things. The first is to work with all the participants to ensure in all possible ways the authenticity of the Ahtissari/Cernomyrdin agreement. Already this first article on this paper is trying to change this radically. Therefore, that the agreement has been reached on this without my knowledge, that Ahtissari has talked to Zika Jovanovic, this is simply not true, the former or the latter, that's not true. This only shows what they're prepared to resort to.*

*Secondly, you should go on like this, which means that your position and when they come out.... you're there to continue working on the agreement to withdraw the forces. You must not accept that it's suspended. Try to get it. Clark and Ojdanic agreed that the fact that there are some contentious issues shouldn't stop the work on reaching the agreement on the withdrawal. Therefore, this Clark-Ojdanic agreement exists.*

*Clark and Ojdanic will talk again, but you should now work on what you've already been empowered to do. That's number one.*

*Number two, Zika is preparing something to send to you. He'll send it by fax, some of these general issues which are not related to the withdrawal, but the UN forces and the rest. So, anyway, you've got to say you're in consultations with Belgrade over other issues, but you should work with them on those things for which you've been authorised. As soon as we put it together, we'll send it to you. We're working on this, and we'll try to do it as quickly as possible. You've got the text, I think Vujovic has the text of*

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<sup>11</sup> This is probably retired general Blagoje Kovacevic, who was asked to help out the army when the 1999 bombing started. He was involved in the talks in relation to the Kumanovo agreement.

*the Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin agreement, and it's item 3 where it says these forces are to be under the UN auspices, etc., and the whole text which was adopted in its entirety by the Serbian parliament and the federal government, and no one can write now something else. You'll get the formulations. We're working on this to include others, and you should stick to the task at hand, say it to them well, so that we wouldn't waste time, let's at least work on this....*

.....

*They should compile a list of the destruction, according to some information, there are about 2,000 injured, and in another paper it was 1,500, and then in another we had 6,500, and we also have 10,000 in one the documents. Which figure should we take?*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*Regarding the casualties, put down thousands of murdered civilians, and speaking of the injured, say, it's over 6,000, over 6,000, seriously wounded civilians.*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*President, Ahtissari called through my office. He wanted to speak to You and he left the phone number: 993589661133.*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*When did he ask for it?*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*Five minutes ago.*

***FRY president***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Ok, bye.*

## ***PREPARATIONS FOR SIGNING THE KUMANOVO AGREEMENT***

"Once you hear the details about the victory, it is hard to distinguish it from a defeat."  
Jean-Paul Sartre

### ***President of FRY***

#### ***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Ever since the moment Zika called me until now I've talked to Ahtissari and he told me they're collaborating splendidly, that their spirit is exceptional, that there is some general, whom he informed that they were working professionally, but that the problem was that they weren't authorised to sign some things. He asked me to authorise them so that they can finish the work. I told him they're totally authorised to stick to the document, but this isn't the authorisation in question; the issue is that something more than the document is demanded, and that provision and the basic principle of the document were the forces under the UN auspices and that the decisions on them are made on the basis of the UN Charter, all of which is written in that provision.*

*Accordingly, before these forces are established, and only the Security Council is authorised to set up these forces, we cannot discuss the mandate of the non-existing forces, and then I explained this all to him, and I told him as a politician – as you remember, we said in the conclusion of our assembly that the main qualities of this plan were: first, the fact that it guarantees sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secondly, that this plan emphasises the role of UN and shifts the whole affair into the hands of the UN.*

*This is what we've told our people, this is how we explained it to them, this is the most sensitive issue, and now You explain as a politician to generals that the UN should make the decision on KFOR<sup>12</sup>, which before the UN "establishes" it, as he himself put it, does not exist on the basis of the UN Charter. Accordingly, we cannot discuss the mandate of non-existing forces. He understood it, he'll talk to the generals, he proposed we should be in contact because it is very important to finish this all, in order to announce the break. I told him that there'll be a session of the*

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<sup>12</sup> Acronym for foreign troops deployed in Kosovo under the UN auspices.

*Security Council, that this isn't in our hands, but your hands, but both them and I believe that they negotiating very well and very professionally about the withdrawal plan. Yes, he says, its absolutely clear there must be no vacuum, yes, I said too, this is what's written here and the assumption is the main and the only objective is the safe environment for all the inhabitants of Kosovo.*

*Therefore, I'm glad they've reached an agreement on this main objective, and that they will work accordingly, but they can do what is a part of the document you've brought, not us, and which our parliament adopted. Explain to the generals that I cannot go beyond the limits set by this document, and in this respect, we had a long conversation, and it was perfectly decent. He said he'd be in touch with them; finally, he'd been UN undersecretary for all those years so that he should be able to explain to them what I said. I told him a child cannot get employed before it's born. They want to employ KFOR which hasn't even been established by the Security Council; when it's established it won't bother us to have those same people, personnelwise, the same representatives, but they must be authorised by the Security Council, which is to make a decision on establishing KFOR, and that's the only crucial issue, and since this is one of the two essential elements of the document and of two crucial conclusions of the Serbian parliament, then this element must not be neglected.*

*Therefore, the issue is not whether I authorise someone more or less but what's in the document. In the document, which he understands very well is this, and he reiterated it several times although he knew KFOR would be established, KFOR will be established by the Security Council, and I said – exactly, just what you've said, only when it's established, then we'll decide what its mandate should be. This is the issue for the Security Council, and not a bilateral agreement between us and NATO. In the agreement which you and Chernomyrdin brought we have as the forces under the UN auspices, and when the Security Council sets them up, then this will be an issue to talk with them about. I think I explained to them the whole story, much better than I've just explained to you, because you know everything so I don't have to go back, but he understands as well and I've asked him to explain to the generals political dimension and political sensitivity of this issue, and that this isn't something that can be neglected. This is one of the two crucial elements of the agreement which both Chernomyrdin and himself highlighted as an element.*

*Well, that's all. He says they're working fine, they should keep on working like that in order to speed up the suspension of the bombing. I said I was in favour of this, but if the sequence of further steps is in some confusion, either before or after – this isn't in our hands – the fact that you made as*

*a plan to have a Security Council session isn't in our hands, but actually in your hands, so here you go – solve the problems in your hands now. We'll bona fide, that is in good faith discharge our obligations, but don't make us go beyond what the document contains, the one which you and Chernomyrdin have brought, and it says, I had the original document in my bag, and I quoted it, and he said it was so, now I'll call the generals and we'll see what they will pressure him into... I mean Clark and the rest, but I think that he should be able to explain this to them as a professional from the UN and a politician who is aware of the sensitivity of the issue.*

*Do you have something for me?*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*I just want to tell you well receive it by fax. Kovacevic called and said he was relatively satisfied and also said the other party was OK in this military part, and it's almost completed, that they've made certain concessions in relation to what's been predetermined and offered previously.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*It's important they've understood there must be no vacuum, and that's perfectly all right, while KFOR is not there, it doesn't exist; and NATO is not the one to achieve this, but KFOR, and KFOR will come into existence when the Security Council establishes it.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*We've got an agreement to talk to Clark again. May I refer to your conversation?*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*You may say the president talked to president Ahtissari; president Ahtissari called president Milosevic and they completely understood each other. This issue is one of the two most important elements because*

*president Ahtissari publicly mentioned here one element that was important – the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, the second element which was important being that this is to be under the UN auspices, and this element mustn't be neglected, and in this respect this is the main argument presented to the public and we're hoping president Ahtissari will explain this to you.*

*Say president Ahtissari called president Milosevic and they had a complete understanding regarding these crucial elements. These are on the paper, and there's no difference between them. I think Zika and Saja<sup>13</sup> would understand this very well.*

***colonel general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Well, they're listening to it, and at 8 p.m. they'll be at home, they'll have telephone at home Sergejev, and I'll have the conversation you've ordered.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*President, we've received a Russian recommendation which has two items. It says the Yugoslav leadership should give a statement about its readiness to start withdrawing its forces from Kosovo in accordance with the timetable and along the roads that have been suggested, or now we can already say harmonised with NATO but under the condition of simultaneous suspension of the bombing.*

*Two. All the other issues related to the solution of the Balkan crisis, as envisaged by the Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin plan, must be solved through decisions made by the Security Council.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*This isn't bad, but this should be checked once again, and with these people down there, if such a statement would satisfy them as well, and particularly we should check out what they agreed, not in terms of specific days but the quality – what's been done – to avoid the vacuum.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

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<sup>13</sup> Zivorad Jovanovic and Nikola Sainovic, foreign minister and deputy prime minister respectively.

*Of course, we'll get it now, and probably they mean if the talks do not succeed there, then such a statement should be given.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I think it'll work. I hope so because I explained it to Ahtissari in crystal clear terms how sensitive this political issue is. It's impossible that he won't be able to explain this to the generals.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*That's clear. If it's totally clear to Clark, then it's clear to everyone.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*What they've told you, you can tell them, I mean those two points.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*We've been thinking about it in case this isn't closed, or if we have a problem, to prepare some statement.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*No, not that statement. They can give it to them down there, and then they could say they've stated it, to say that everything down there is agreed and ready to start with, and that other issues are for the Security Council, but they can tell them this as well.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*They can give it to them as our final position.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*As one position, never say 'final'.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*As a position, but this could subsequently presented to the public.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*First see how they agree. I hope everything will be all right because we really have no reason not to look someone in the eye because we'll meet all our obligations sincerely, this isn't a contentious issue and I think the army people will find mutual common ground perfectly.*

*We talked about this, about the fact that one must hand over, while the other must accept.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*Since this reached Ahtissari with so many details, then they reached an agreement with even more details. Otherwise, how come he should know what we talked about here.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*They're, as you might say, common-sense people, why should they cause any troubles for themselves? Now that someone be killed because there's no concern in place to effect the transfer in a timely manner so that some are coming in, while others are leaving. Good.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*You think this is a misunderstanding.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Yes.*

***general***

**WESLEY CLARK**

*I don't think so. But, listen, will you be here for some time.*

*colonel*

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Yes.*

*general*

**WESLEY CLARK**

*Alright, we'll call you back right away. Is there anything else you'd like to tell me?*

*colonel*

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*No, sir. May I call you in 10 minutes. I'm not in my office.*

*general*

**WESLEY CLARK**

*Alright. Call me in 10 minutes. Would you like to tell me something more in relation to this?*

*colonel*

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*OK.*

*general*

**WESLEY CLARK**

*Wait, what I don't understand is what you're telling me, what you've told me that Ahtissari and Milosevic agreed on.*

*colonel*

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*About all the objections we've talked to you about previously, about the proposed Agreement.<sup>14</sup>*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*In other words, you don't agree with respect to the mandate and structure.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*This is the problem that should be considered.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*And Ahtissari, you say, said this should be done after the passage of the United Nations Security Council resolution.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*I haven't told you that. I don't know if you're aware of the details of that conversation, but generally speaking, he accepted what we suggested, our objections.*

***general***

***WESLEY CLARK***

*Here's what's my problem. We can't stop the bombing until after this document is accepted, and this is why this document must be accepted.*

***colonel***

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*We understand what's your problem. May we suggest you to talk to Ahtissari first, and then we'll call you in 10 minutes.*

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<sup>14</sup> The reference is the Kumanovo Agreement which provided for the cease-fire in June 1999.

*general*

**WESLEY CLARK**

*Alright, we'll call Ahtissari.*

*colonel*

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Please, do it. And then, I'll call you in 10 minutes.*

*general*

**WESLEY CLARK**

*Alright, thank you.*

*colonel*

**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Thank you, sir.*

\* \* \*

All of our diplomacy, or to put it better – what was left of it, was working frantically in those days. The war had to be stopped at any cost because this was a unique chance to survive and stay in power. There was a serious danger that Slobodan Milosevic might disappear from the political scene after a possible rebellion in the army or a miners' strike, it was all the same. The situation was in every respect extremely unfavourable for the regime and the slightest incident could bring about the Romanian option in terms of toppling the current government. The West appointed Ahtissari, while the East selected Chernomyrdin as their special representatives and envoys respectively, who conducted political, not military, negotiations on behalf of the UN. NATO generals were in charge of military talks. Milosevic saw a way out for himself in foreign troops in Kosovo but under the UN auspices. At the time, he could not care less which army was arriving – it might have well been the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, if they were under the banner of the UN. Mere formalism which left Milosevic enough room to manoeuvre so that he

could present the defeat as the victory of the UN principles in which he never believed, or should I say, in which he believed only when it suited him.

*Ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*There will be talks with those people there in about twenty minutes, and it's important to stop this, not to allow it to continue. I think it's unacceptable what's going on down there. They will go public now; they've asked me to agree to that – whether they should call the representative of the embassy, and then to insist that this would mean the usurping of the Security Council role.*

*I'll contact you later. If there's need to write it all down, I'll do it afterwards, but that's disputable. This is it essentially, they'll have now... this colleague of yours... he'll speak with those people there at half past ten, my local time, and then there goes this main news which would be something like – according to the information from the embassy representative in Moscow... and then political commentary on this, condemnation, etc.*

*Everybody knows everything and that paper which had been submitted was accepted.*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*With what they would like to go public – this also depends on the outcome of their talks.*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*They also know that.*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*They should say the talks which are being conducted, which have started, should focus on technical issues and the withdrawal plan, while the talks between military experts cannot deal with the issue of the mandate, the structure of the forces or their chain of command because these forces will have a mandate, this should be under the UN auspices, and look... it's no good, they needn't use us to cover this. They shouldn't mention us,*

*they know – this is no secret, that's the document, they don't have to mention the Yugoslav embassy, or the Yugoslav side in this. Instead they should state the talks being conducted now should focus on technical issues related to the implementation of the peace plan, and this means – the plan and the timetable for withdrawal.*

*Regarding the mandate, the structure and leadership...*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*Ok, I know that. The question is now whether this commentary will like that the way they plan it, or will it be different. I can say they shouldn't mention us. They've asked me whether they could say the representative of the embassy informed them...*

*minister JOVANOVIC*

*No need. Don't give it to them.*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*I haven't given them anything. I gave them what you said.*

*minister JOVANOVIC*

*There should be no mention of the Yugoslav embassy, the talks are under way, they're not suspended. We should talk, and we mustn't now make it more difficult. Don't let them quote you, this would mean we're complaining to the Russians. They are there where we're heading, etc. If we wanted, we would have it from Belgrade. We didn't want it, nor we want it now. We're still waiting for the final moment to squeeze something out... if it cannot be done, it's never too late for that.*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*First, he said there's an agreement that in two hours your statement will be released in Belgrade, that it's agreed.*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*I haven't agreed on anything with anyone, nothing's been agreed. I'm in the headquarters, Bora, I have no one to make an agreement. No statements are agreed with the head of the state, and all others are here.*

***ambassador***

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*Good, Zika, I asked him to stop it, and he said he would blow a whistle now, but it's not certain whether it'll be so... Well, is it so essential?*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*Well, it is essential. It's crucial that the talks continue. We're constantly in contact with Brussels, with Macedonia where our people are. We're working on this, we're struggling, we don't know what'll come out of it... we're talking with Ahtissari, we're talking to this one and that one. Everything's in motion, nothing's completed.*

*What's know to them as a state, it's that text, and they shouldn't pretend they don't know anything about it – they've got the text.*

***ambassador***

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*They say they're not acquainted with this, the Russians. They don't have it. Where from could they get the text?*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*We gave it to them. We didn't give to ITARTAS<sup>15</sup> but their ministry and the government.*

***ambassador***

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*I understand it all.*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

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<sup>15</sup> Russian news agency.

*OK, well then... bye.*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*The man tells me he tried to stop it and now their man will call me to see how to word it, or I should, if it can't be done like that, remove that news, but they think it's much better not to keep silent but to see what's there, not like to vacillate about it, but to attack it clearly. He spoke like that, these are his words.*

*Now a man should get in touch with me.....*

*minister JOVANOVIC*

*They should only remove the source.*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*They can't publish it then.*

*minister JOVANOVIC*

*Well, if they can't, I can't do anything about it.*

*ambassador*

***BORA MILOSEVIC***

*There's nothing else I can do but to wait for that man.*

*minister JOVANOVIC*

*Well, OK now, if it's gone, then it's gone. Well then, bye.*

*colonel*

***NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*General and for the minister... says they are... the talks and in agreement that our senior political representative will arrive tomorrow down there*

*and the talks this issue are continuing, and now he says – while the talks are under way, the bombing won't be stopped.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*This is why I think it's totally adequate... due to the fact that those basic elements were presented at the beginning of the Document, technical modalities are something else. If they make an agreement on total withdrawal, we may say the Agreement on Withdrawal has been reached and we're prepared to continue with the withdrawal, and other problems should be resolved at the level of the Security Council. This is what's logical and normal. We can't now talk about the KFOR mandate and the agreement on this cannot be reached because, and you know it better than me, this is totally in the hands of the Security Council, it's not up to us. Besides, KFOR, as you agreed on this an hour ago during our conversation, will be established by the Security Council. If this is so, and please, bear in mind the political sensitivity of this issue, the idea to cancel anything of this wouldn't even cross our minds, and we've no reason for something like that. If we accept your plan, what does it mean to us if within some period of time there's a delay of two or three days. Nothing. We are, therefore, ready, and we're doing everything we can with the best of intentions, without any problems.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*What you're telling me is that you oppose any detailed outline in the preamble of the technical agreement.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I must tell you I've no agreement in front of myself. I was only informed today at noon what the problem is.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*May I try, because we must, I think both of us want this whole thing to be resolved. Let's see how we can proceed from here to reach the position that this issue is under the UN auspices, as you yourself have said, that*

*this military agreement must be adopted by the United Nations Security Council.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*But this is different from what we agreed on yesterday. Please, president Ahtissari, we were not expected to take over the powers vested in the Security Council or to reach an agreement with NATO. The agreement could be, say, negotiated between KFOR and ourselves, due to the fact that only KFOR ....*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*But, please, how can you withdraw under the NATO bombs if you haven't reached any agreement with them.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*We've agreed on the plan, as you've mentioned while we were talking, the agreement on the withdrawal plan, and then we we'd start pulling out. They would be able to see it from the air, to see if we were really withdrawing so that it would be satisfy them, so that they could say OK, we can stop it now.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*A moment, please, I think both sides should demand .... I'm trying to say how we can avoid what your officers are also concerned about, that there is no security vacuum.*

***President SRJ***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*That there's no security vacuum.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*Yes, while your people are withdrawing, others should come in.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Yes, but president Ahtissari, who is expected to arrive? KFOR. KFOR may only arrive after the Security Council gives its approval for KFOR to come in.... In item 3 it's clearly stated – I haven't got this in front of myself – but I'll try -----*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*President Milosevic, allow me to try to explain it to you. I think, if I've been listening to your carefully, I've just received the Military Technical Agreement, I've got it here. What you're talking about is that the KFOR activity should not be defined in a manner in which it's been done in the Military Technical Agreement, that the agreement should focus on withdrawal.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Yes, but..*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*Because the military-technical agreement must exist. Otherwise, we can't have NATO stop the bombing.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Why can't they stop, please, president Ahtissari. If there's a clear agreement on the withdrawal plan, and if its implementation starts ....*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*Yes, but president Milosevic, this is what military officials are trying to do, to get the details on the withdrawal. I see you object to the fact that*

*the Military Technical Agreement contains things that should be, in fact, resolved by the Security Council.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I'm only referring to the item 3 in our document, which you and Chernomyrdin presented to us, where it's clearly stated: deployment of civilian structures of security forces in Kosovo shall be under the UN auspices, and this shall be decided pursuant to the UN Charter; so we explained to our citizens that the main reason for their accepting this was that these troops, which are to be present in Kosovo, would be under the UN auspices. This is indeed an important element, president Ahtissari, you can't avoid it.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*Yes, this is undisputable, but you're well aware of the sequence of events. Above all, we've got to reach an agreement on how to effect the withdrawal, because – if this is not verified, bombing will not be stopped.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Yes, but they can verify from the air.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*That's true, but the agreement must be reached on how you're going to do it, and I think this military technical agreement contains details in this respect.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I'll read the Military Technical Agreement to you, and I don't know what's the problem now, given the simple fact that we'll pull out. Therefore, there are no.....*

**President  
AHTISSARI**

*No, no. Before the withdrawal, suspension of bombing may be manipulated, this is why we need to sign the Military Technical Agreement with you and your forces and NATO. After the suspension, this will lead to adoption and approval of the Agreement by the Security Council as well as creating the possibility to establish KFOR troops, and KFOR will soon after arrive in order to avoid security vacuum.*

**President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*This is what I've assumed, that we won't create any sort of security vacuum.*

**President  
AHTISSARI**

*The Security Council session cannot be held until after the bombing is stopped.*

**President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*I understand, but this is not in our power – to plan all those steps, it's up to you.*

**President  
AHTISSARI**

*No, no, this is not even in my power. I'm not a representative of the Security Council, I'm not even a member, there you have only permanent members. But this is the way the things go, and we must try to follow it.*

**President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, but president Ahtissari, wouldn't it be enough if - I don't know yet, but I'll check it out; I suppose the military representatives have reached an agreement on withdrawal plans. If the plan for pulling out was accepted by both sides, and if we started pulling out - and they can see it from the air and prove it – then they could simply say - it's verified that*

*the withdrawal started, we'll stop the bombing now, and all other issues will be solved by the Security Council. And we can say we agree with the withdrawal, we'll start pulling out as agreed, while the Security Council will be authorised to solve all other problems. This is not our problem, these are the problems under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, which also relate to ourselves as well.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*But Mr. Milosevic, we also have to work in a way which will not lead us to an impasse in the Security Council, which in turn will result in a renewed bombing.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Why?*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Because I'm very concerned that this Military Technical Agreement could be such that it wouldn't allow the suspension of the bombing to be manipulated; I'd love to see the Security Council giving its approval for that Agreement, and very soon, after the approval of this agreement, that this enables the establishment of the KFOR troops. KFOR will then come, so that we'll avoid this ---*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*As soon as the Security Council establishes the KFOR troops, KFOR will be able to come, given the fact that it's envisaged in the agreement you've given to us. Therefore, the only problem is that the forces enter the province under the UN auspices, not in some other capacity, but only under the UN auspices. These will be the same forces, these will be the same people, everything's the same, but we need this political element to be clear – under the UN auspices, this is what we've explained to our people. Sorry, please ...*

***President***

**AHTISSARI**

*Yes, this is indeed the sort of operation we had in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The decision-making process at the level of the Security Council will be the same.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*This is up to the Security Council. I've no objections to what the Security Council will be deciding. The only objection I have is related to the fact which is stated in your document that the arriving troops will be under the UN auspices, and nothing more. That's, you know, what we explained to the people in political terms, and nothing more. I realise that this issue is essentially no different, but symbolically – there's a great difference.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Mr. Milosevic, as I've already told you, these are not traditional peacekeeping forces, as I've already said it to you.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Whichever decision the Security Council makes, we're under obligation to accept it, president Ahtissari, because this what we have in the documents. But the only problem – you know we were not pleased with your document – but even now we're not objecting to it; we believe Chernomyrdin and yourself when you said this was the best you could achieve. We replied to this that it's alright, and then we suggested to our parliament to accept it, which it did. And there were only two elements, which were valid arguments to accept the document. These are the following: the first, that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country are confirmed; and secondly, that those forces will be under the UN auspices. This is what we have in the parliament's decision, and this, as you may see, is not particularly strong argumentation – only these two arguments were presented to the people. Now, concerning this second argument, we cannot simply tell the people it is not so important whether it is so or not. We cannot simply explain to the citizens that there's a*

*difference between our agreement and reality. Therefore, if you may get the Security Council resolution today, I won't have any objections.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*I've told I can't do it because there are Council members which are in favour of the suspension of bombing, and it may not happen, as I already told you, Mr. Milosevic, in Belgrade before the signing of the Military Technical Agreement. Please, look up the Military Technical Agreement.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*But let's have the Military Technical Agreement implemented only in part concerning the withdrawal plan and the timetable for pulling out – not the things which are under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. This isn't our job.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*I'll try to talk to them and see --- because I've just seen this for the first time, in person, because we've got to have this Military Technical Agreement verified, to have the bombing stopped, I think, if that Military Technical Agreement is signed, it would be the most convenient that both sides request that the UN approves of this Agreement, and that it will have the powers to establish the KFOR forces.*

\* \* \*

**These were painstaking and exhausting negotiations which no one enjoyed. The West wanted to stop the war, which lasted much longer than planned and cost much more than they thought it would. It was increasingly more difficult to explain to the allies and their public the notion of the collateral damage, which increased the death toll as the bombing was intensifying. Of course, Milosevic was in an incomparably worse situation because the bombs threatened to undermine his prospects for strengthening his position in the aftermath of the bombing campaign and ahead of the forthcoming**

elections. Slobodan expected to achieve more with the UN special envoys. There was no mention of the pre-war referendum in which the "people" said no foreign troops should be allowed to enter Kosovo. Principles did not matter to anyone anymore. Everyone just wanted the war to come to an end. NATO almost accomplished what it wanted – to come to Kosovo and Metohija. Though, their first neighbour will be the Milosevic's regime in Serbia, but they found a solution to this by way of imposing a ban on the flights of our fighter aircrafts within the 25-kilometer-wide zone around Kosovo as well as establishing the safety border zone which was to be 5 kilometres wide.

The army managed to preserve its resources for the most part although the destruction and damages were enormous. Almost everything stationary was destroyed, like radio relay hubs and facilities, army barracks, depots... Air force and anti-aircraft defence, RVPVO, suffered the most in terms of losses and casualties during the air strikes. Bearing in mind our outdated technical equipment, which almost did not allow to strike back at the enemy which was pounding our forces from the safe distance – but even in situations where we could strike back, we dared not do anything because even larger-scale destruction and strikes at our forces would ensue. Hence, there was only thing that the army could do. The army spent the whole war camouflaging its units in an attempt to prevent further destruction.

Rocket systems like "Luna", ground-to-ground or coast-to-sea rockets, which had the biggest range, were inaccurate and obsolete so that the risk of using these was much greater than the possible benefits. Rocket systems of the anti-aircraft defence also had poor range in comparison to the altitude at which the enemy fighter planes and bombers were operating.

\* \* \*

*President of FRY*  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*President Ahtissari, they have been bombing us for 72 days, and they continue to drop bombs, they drop bombs even today, they did it yesterday, they do that everyday, and we accepted your document, and there are only two arguments for our citizens, we cannot leave aside neither one of those two arguments. We want to see ---*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*No, no, I do not ask anything from you, I am explaining to you the mechanism that we use to achieve what we all want.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, I understand that, but we cannot say to the citizens that there is a mechanism, and that the mechanism is not completely adequate to what we said to you, and we said only the things that were written in the document – assignation in Kosovo under the auspices of UN, and nothing more.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Yes, but before the assignation comes in to effect you have to withdraw your forces.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, we shall start with withdrawal.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*And we need a military agreement for that, which is also set down in the document.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*A military agreement as a necessary precondition for ceasefire can be shorter, focused only on the pattern of withdrawal, which is, as far as you told me, was OK, and that agreement contains the plan for withdrawal and we start withdrawing, and that will be enough. There is no need for us to deal with other elements in relation to the mandate, to who is authorized to use force in case of a problem. We are going to withdraw now. There is no need to use force, to humiliate people by doing that,*

*please. We shall withdraw and that will be visible, and starting with the moment of our withdrawal, you can stop bombing us, the Security Council can hold a meeting, you, as a deputy of Secretary General, can tell him to start with that, to use forces that they planned to use, that would be a symbolic move, that could be done under the auspices of the UN, and then all the forces that come to Kosovo will come under the auspices of the UN will be OK for us, and that all is in your hands, not ours, please, don't ---*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*I do not take sides, as I already told you*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Yes, but you are in a better position, don't tell me that we have to do more than we already accepted to do, please.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*You don't have, but you have to realise that, I have been listening to what you said about the plan for withdrawal.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*That is enough, you know, President Ahtissari, if there is good will, that will be enough for the beginning... and when we start, you can then start drafting a Resolution by the Security Council, and you can have it in, say, in two days, I suppose, I don't know, you are better informed about those things better than me.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*But we cannot reach that phase before the bombing stops, and it cannot stop ----*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Why can't it stop, we have accepted the plan, and there is a plan that has been accepted and when the withdrawal begins.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*No, but I have already told you that we need a military agreement.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*That is a military agreement. The withdrawal plan is a military agreement.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Perfect. But we are now discussing the details of the document more than anything else.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I was not informed about the details of the document, I do not take part in negotiations.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Neither do I. I am looking at them for the first time now, and I will consider them in greater detail, if you don't mind, we may speak on the telephone in the morning.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*All right, no problem, as far as I am concerned there is no problem, as you can see ----*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*I think that it is very important that we go further.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*All right, President Ahtissari, as you can see, I will call you in a few minutes at the latest.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*All right. You are very good at meeting my demands. You know, I am in my office, too.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I have to tell you, President Ahtissari, that as far as we are concerned, you can be completely safe. Whatever we accepted, and you can check that with your old friend Richard Holbrook (15) any time, we fulfilled to the latest detail. Thus, we are not the side with ---- please*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*I counted on that.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Yes, that's right. No one can accuse of not fulfilling our obligations. You know, I used to work as a president of a bank for 8 years, as the president of the biggest national bank. There is no banker in the whole world that can tell you that Milosevic was late in fulfilling his obligations, not for a second, for 8 years.*

*Our obligations are clear, and our arguments, which we presented to the people were fairly weak, you have to admit that. There are only those two arguments, and that is why I kindly ask you to do your best in order that both the arguments remain unchanged and that we are able to carry out what we signed.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*But, Mister Milosevic, you have to understand something, we cannot have a Resolution by the Security Council before we reach a military agreement, regardless of its content, we have to verify withdrawal that will lead to discontinuation of bombing, and only after the bombing ceases and has been established, the Council will meet and adopt the Resolution and establish the KFOR forces.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*As you have just said, the content of the agreement is critical. If the content of the agreement makes the technical plan for withdrawal that was approved by both sides, then it is very easy to achieve that and start withdrawing. If the technical agreement has ----*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Because, --- I somehow received a fax message that your people are under impression that you do not need any agreement at all. That is why -  
---*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Who told you that?*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*No, no, someone among my officers was told by your people that ----*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*What did my people tell them?*

**President**

**AHTISSARI**

*That you would not need any agreement at all, that must have been a complete misunderstanding.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Please, we are all serious people. I do not believe that anybody could have said something like that.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Yes, that is resolved. Let's concentrate on the meeting scheduled for tomorrow. If need arises, can I call you again? Is there a phone number to reach you, or should I do through your Ambassador, as I always do?*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*You can, I do not know this number, excuse my, I will check 3616170.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

3616170

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, that is the number in Belgrade, 3616170.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*There must be a country code to dial.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*I am sorry, yes, the country code is 381*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*And then I dial 3616170*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, that is the number in Belgrade, and the country code is 381. If you dial your international code and then 381 11 and then 3616170, that will be*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Will you please be kind and repeat the number to me so that I can write it down again 381 and then 161 --*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*No, no, 381 11, and then 3616170*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*(Repeats the numbers). I have put it down now. Thank you very much.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Could you please read it out to me again? ( President Ahtissari reads out the numbers) That is correct.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Thank you very much.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Well I wish you a good night, Mister Ahtissari.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Thank you, good bye.*

## ***ARRIVAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN KOSOVO***

*"In peace sons bury fathers,  
but war violates the order of nature,  
and fathers bury sons."  
Herodotus*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Vujovic, we have authorised you to negotiate in accordance with the paper which Chernomyrdin and Ahtissari had brought. Therefore, you may negotiate with them everything, and that document says (foreign language). So, we... when we... and they, actually Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, were explaining their plan and said the two crucial elements which we presented to our citizens as the only arguments to accept the plan, which was theirs and it contained these two elements.*

*One argument is sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and the other argument is that the international forces will be under the UN auspices. Therefore, we can't now ignore this second argument because this is (foreign language). It doesn't matter at all to us now whether those will be these same forces they're referring to. The only thing that matters to us is this symbolism because we've already told our people so, and we said it so because they presented it to us so; and in this item 3 it says those elements ... that those forces are coming (foreign language). Before the Security Council passes a decision (foreign language), those forces do not exist, they're set up by the Security Council.*

*Therefore, how can we negotiate powers at this moment of the non-existing forces, how can a child get employed before it's born. KFOR will be born the moment (foreign language), and consequently – that's so clear, I don't know if there's anything clearer, and particularly so given that this is a politically extremely sensitive issue. We indeed negotiate bona fide, we really don't want to avoid anything. We'll meet all our obligations and withdraw all the forces, and that's not an issue at all. The only thing is that their forces cannot enter Kosovo until those forces are (foreign language). What's written in the document delivered by Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin is that we can't give it up because it's a crucial and essential issue. We had only two arguments for this – the first one is sovereignty, and the second one is that these are the forces under the UN auspices - we can't deprive ourselves of this argument in any of the phases.*

*Therefore, this is clear. I talked twice with Ahtissari, he called me twice, I explained it all and then he said "yes, it's all true", but, he said, this should be a technical agreement which should be adopted and agreed, which is a prerequisite to start pulling out, and the start of withdrawal and the existence of the agreement are prerequisites for a break – that's clear, and, in fact, the content of this agreement is contentious. The content should encompass what's related to our total withdrawal and the beginning, which is to be verifiable, and they can verify this from the air easily enough, and they'll be told exactly at what time, when, from which place, etc., this would start, and then, they can have a break because making a decision on these forces (foreign language) is in the hands of the Security Council, not ours. The decision on which powers these forces will have is also in the hands of the Security Council and the timing for those decisions is also in their hands, not ours.*

*Therefore, here there's only one thing in question which is that they bring in any soldier they want, of their own choosing, but they can't do it until after the UN empowers them because we've said these forces will come (foreign language). This is the only way there is, totally clear.*

***ambassador  
NEBOJŠA VUJOVIC***

*I think they aren't – for sure... things could get out of control in the UN Security Council for them, and they're trying to predetermine the outcome.*

***President of FRY***

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*They cannot impose on us, throw into our feeble hands the issues which the Security Council is to decide. We'll sketch this now and we'll see. You'll nicely say something like that – that you agreed on the withdrawal plan, that our side is ready to start pulling out – that's the document. Other issues are under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The remaining issues are neither in our or their jurisdictions. They haven't been authorised by the Security Council to exercise the function for those forces (foreign language).... when the Security Council empowers them, let them hold a Security Council session to authorise them to do it, that it's alright, but no forces may simply come to Kosovo if they aren't (foreign language). This is, as I'd put it, the crucial element of the agreement, one of the two essential arguments which our parliament had before taking its decision.*

*Ahtissari tells me they're not empowered to accept these other things. I've told him our people are empowered to accept absolutely anything which is in line with what you've brought to us. What's in keeping with the paper they've brought to us is that the forces entering the province may only be (foreign language).*

**ambassador**

**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*They reacted to this argument of ours at one point, and that paper, which was agreed, with ten items .... that political paper has more power and is stronger than this paper on which we've worked today.*

**President of FRY**

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*No, please, I'm a lawyer and I know the legal rule well (foreign language). Therefore, there could be a general document which is stronger, but the one derived from that and concluded – this is the one implemented, and I think, if they brought to us such an agreement, and we accepted it, they cannot now deny this argument, particularly when you should tell them – I'm sorry, but what are you getting is one or two days, and which is our motive to buy some time – one or two days, if we accepted the crucial thing.*

*We really don't have – not even in the backs of our minds – an intention to deceive them. We'll honestly implement that; we'll pull out everything – and that's not an issue – and if you agreed on the withdrawal plan – that's the content of that technical paper. The content of the technical paper cannot be the assumption of powers from the Security Council. That's it – elementary.*

*ambassador*

**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*In the beginning, they allegedly were less interested in talks, but as the time was passing by, they were increasingly more into it and they accepted a number of our arguments, and made some changes. They reduced this safety zone from 25 kilometres to 5 kilometres.*

*President of FRY*

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*OK, that's probably what they had in their minds, they're soldiers – they know everything, they're professionals, just like these ours are professionals – that's nothing abnormal, that's totally normal. They now.... you've got the plan, the complete agreement may start being implemented; when it begins to be implemented, they announce they've made a break, and this – everything else is up to the powers vested in the Security Council.*

*KFOR doesn't exist unless the Security Council sets it up, and they cannot assume the powers of the Security Council in advance. They're negotiating with us that we cease our fire, to draft a joint plan to pull out and to start implementing the plan, and they should verify it; and now, we can't have this .... the mandate they need so that the Security Council should be the issue for bilateral agreement between us and what's in that paper – there's no mention of the one mentioned in the paper as an entity which is to negotiate this with us.*

*ambassador*

**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*That's what we've told them. They react.... they say, this isn't to your advantage because this doesn't stop our military operations, and we reacted that we've got to settle the things in principle, and that they shouldn't be splitting hairs over a day or two until the Security Council resolution is adopted.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Of course, in two, three days, there will be a Security Council resolution, and what's wrong with that; we can't now appear before the people and say – here, we've accepted to do this even without the Security Council. This has exclusively political and symbolical importance because Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin told us so, and this is what's in their document, and this is how we explained it to the people. Therefore, we can't now say – people, we lied to you, this what Chernomyrdin and Ahtissari said was not true; what's in the document – it doesn't matter, what matters is that we made an agreement with NATO. They announce that the UN representatives and our people are negotiating in Djeneral Jankovic<sup>16</sup>.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*I think there's been a lack of communication in their ranks today. Mostly the British have been running the show, and my instinct tells me the Americans will come tomorrow because they've been non-stop in contact with Clark and his people, and even requested instructions as to whether they could accept the meeting at a different place. This means – they're doing everything on orders.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Where's the other place in which you have the meeting?*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*In Tabanovci.*

***President***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

---

<sup>16</sup> Djeneral Jankovic – border crossing into the Republic of Macedonia.

*Good, once in their place, the next time here – it's alright.*

***ambassador***

***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*That's in Macedonia. There are 60 of them in the team. Today there were 60 of them, in the afternoon 45 – against five of us. The one in charge of the talks is their general – the head of the team, and then he passes it on to his expert associates – they were mostly British, and this Ahtissari's admiral, who'd visited us, was also there.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I explained everything to Ahtissari and asked him to explain it, as a politician, to the generals that this has substantial political weight for us because we had explained it so to our people. We can't now turn out to be liars and traitors, that we did something which we hadn't explained to the people. That's what it's all about. Therefore, the issue is not what you're empowered to do, you're empowered to do that what's in this document, and this paper says (foreign language).*

***ambassador***

***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*Can we make them tomorrow to put (foreign language) into the second paragraph of that document they've offered to us, and to attach ourselves directly to the paper with ten items.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*No, but we can't negotiate at all about the mandate. The Security Council resolution isn't in our hands, and it doesn't say here that our obligation is to take over the job of the Security Council. They're simply blackmailing us – it's like we won't stop the bombing until you accept more than you've already accepted. We've agreed to a maximum. We're the weaker side here – it's not them, and they now want to take away this second argument of the two we've been dealing with and make us real liars.*

*You just stick to the paper which Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin have brought. The way it says in that document. And that paper says (foreign language). You should negotiate a bilateral agreement... about the mandate which is entirely under the jurisdiction of the Security Council – well, that's not fair, nothing like that is requested. If we publish it and if we say what they're asking from us, and over which issue they're splitting hairs, the whole world will condemn them. If they give the mandate to NATO, how could I know to whom will the Security Council give the mandate... but that's the issue for the Security Council... we asked then which countries will participate? They replied – those which want to take part.*

*Therefore, the Security Council will probably say the member countries are invite to take part, etc., and then some will accept it, some won't. How could I know which ones will accept it; who's got the right and who hasn't got the right, etc., but this will be decided by the Security Council. We're not authorised here to say - from which countries... if we were authorised, we'd say – we don't want NATO, but we accepted it all. However, they shouldn't be asking from us more than what we've already accepted, and I don't see what they're getting. We accept it. You've made the whole withdrawal plan, meaning – all will pull out, we'll have the beginning and what now they want from us – that we close a deal in the name of the UN with NATO? Well, we're not negotiating with NATO over the mandate but the UN supposedly because they haven't got this valid legitimacy for that. The UN didn't empower them to do that, nor us.*

*I think that this is clear. C'mon, could you believe it - Ahtissari told me some of your people said we didn't want the agreement. Who could've said it – on the contrary, we want the agreement. It's probably something imputed because I don't believe that any fool might say something like that.*

***ambassador***

***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*They're saying you don't want it – for them, it's you don't want whenever their arguments are not good enough.*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I know, but they haven't got a single argument because, look, these are the fundamental principles in this paper, while the technical agreement is the withdrawal plan, monitoring the withdrawal, etc.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*We've managed to make them cover everything around that vacuum, not to allow for that vacuum...*

***President***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Well, it's logical because it wouldn't suit them either that someone murders people in the meantime. Please, these arguments are clean and clear, perhaps we'll still hear and see what's that – I haven't even seen that paper. By the way, Zika told me the document wasn't even translated well.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*I didn't use the translation but the original in English.*

***President***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Have you sent us the text you're working on?*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*We'll do it now, we'll send it right away.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Well, see you.*

***ambassador***  
***ZIVADIN JOVANOVIC***

*You send it like this. Where's Nebojsa? Do you have his phone number?*

.....

*I've got it. We'll find him on his mobile*

.....

*Go find him, and tell him to call me: 3616170.*

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*We've got one instruction – to send some fax in Serbian and in English, which you'd present to them tomorrow as our stance, and if they don't accept it, then we'd give it afterwards to the public. Here, we'll send the fax now.*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Can you give us some fax number where the minister might send this?*

***colonel general  
BLAGOJE KOVACEVIC***

*We haven't got the fax here. (Inaudible). They'll give us the fax number.*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

***Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*So, whatever they say, you just keep saying – let's see about this withdrawal plan, and this, and that, so that, on the face of it, it looks like it's agreed, even if they don't want to sign it, so that such an impression is indisputable. Well, what you get now, keep it with you and use it at the given moment as we've just said. Meanwhile, let's hear each other before it takes place.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Hello Vujovic, I just wanted to hear from you. Please, whatever you're thinking, don't get lost in details – stick to the substance and the main issue. That's there and it's clear, you've got an agreement which we adopted. That's the paper, which as we all know was drafted by Talbot, those two brought it and they must be behind that paper.*

*In that paper, it says (foreign language). Therefore, no agreement, be it technical or even strategic or whatever, cannot revoke that paper because this would, in fact, annul what they're asking for... this is what's written in that paper and that's a basic thing, and you discuss it a little bit with them afterwards, and about this military aspect – when this border... meaning when we pull out – how will they secure the border. They must use their troops from the Albanian and the Macedonian and our side so that unauthorised persons wouldn't cross... etc. All those issues are for the Security Council then.*

*Therefore, you haven't got anything in which you should be interested, and to consult about the things in that paper with 10 items. That's the basic thing, they're behind this paper, they brought it, we adopted it, and now no other agreement may supersede now this paper – and what they've suggested means that paper would be effectively cancelled, and that's clear, and I think it's totally clear.*

***ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*Clear. I think they had to withdraw the paper and now they're consulting with Washington and Finland and .... to come up with a different concept which would take into account our firm stance.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I know, this will be in the language, but not at the heart of the matter for the changes – as far as I know them. Therefore, you should be very careful there... because, in fact, if there's a signing of the agreement with their forces and our state, and if this establishing in keeping with the article 8 of the Charter... they wouldn't have even to hold the Security Council session. It would turn out Yugoslavia and NATO made an agreement, etc. These are the issues for the Security Council, not NATO.*

*Therefore, we're talking here about satisfying the condition under the item 2... that's our obligation, and the item 3 is that we accept them, the item 2 is that we pull out and we solve everything there; the item 3 is that we allow the forces in which are to be (foreign language). Therefore, in order for the forces to be.... they must first be..... and that's the heart of the matter. Therefore, in this – what you've got, the first item is clear; that's focusing on the withdrawal plan and the suspension of the bombing, all other issues are the issues for the Security Council, exclusively under its jurisdiction exactly in accordance with their paper which we accepted because this paper says in the item 3.... and then, it's all clear.*

***ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*..... but you're not born as far as we're concerned because there has been no a Security Council Resolution.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*When the Resolution is passed, then this will give the mandate to the forces – the forces which obtain the mandate through the Resolution – there's no problem there. Only then are we under the obligation to let them go, but bear in mind what the heart of the matter is, and you don't have now to.... whether they've given now this or that – you'll read it immediately and see. Of course, you say – we'll analyse the paper and during the break – one hour, two hours or three – to send it to us, though I think you don't even need those petty suggestions. You've got a clear platform. The platform is the paper with ten items. There you haven't got even in the 10<sup>th</sup> item an elaboration on this, there's no basis for this paper, especially the one which would practically cancel those basic principle from that paper.*

*Therefore, the position is very strong, and there's nothing there.... you should be relaxed, be calm... don't get upset about this, but here – gentlemen – this is what it says. Is this what this reads? What does it entail? This entails that the Security Council makes a decision, and that it's empowered you to go in and nothing else. Therefore, the Security Council is in your hands, not ours, so don't ask from us that we take over through this bilateral agreement the mandate of the Security Council –*

*we're not under the obligation to do it, nor will we do it. There it says.... and this entails preliminary actions which are to lead to this.*

*Always bear in mind this guiding star – that's your Bible, while the rest are trifles and embellishments which, regardless of how you discuss it, can't be good if it's not in keeping with the main thing. I think that's clear in your mind, don't get upset and don't be under some tensions – to ask them about each and every trifle – don't – because it'll turn out you're also negotiating the things which are not in the paper, and none of us is authorised to go beyond what this paper says. Therefore, no one can give you instructions to go beyond that paper, which the parliament adopted, and there it reads ..... period.*

*Vujovic, all the best and good luck.*

*\*\*\**

*You've received a short text both in English and in Serbian?*

*.....*

*Keep it for the future.  
Should I not use it?*

*.....*

*You can possibly meet some local interlocutor – they've suggested we should give them something like that.*

*.....*

*This confused me a bit because here it says – in accordance with the plan which has been agreed.*

*.....*

*Well, well, we don't know whether it's going to be preliminary. This is in case it happens, when it happens. The talks resume. These people we're talking to are preparing a new variant. They've admitted in principle that what they've offered is not the best, and they've accepted some objections. However, I think they're only trying to paint in different colours what's the heart of the matter here. Anyway, now we've got this break in the talks, they've announced they would prepare the new text, to give it to our people and so. Our focus – only calendar and technical issues. Therefore,*

*no politics, nothing regarding the mandate, organisation, make-up, command chain; with respect to the media, regarding the use of force. So, if you read the text, in many places there's mention of.... authorisation to use force, etc. This is something that only the Security Council may decide.*

*We, therefore, cannot repudiate a strategic initial document, which said – under the UN auspices, with a derived document that is technical in its character. We keep going back to that and their document, that is, first – their document and that they can't request it now. That's Talbot's document, and now the Americans and the British want to deny it so they're playing various .... We're negotiating in good faith, but only about technical details, not the withdrawal. The calendar, the directions, crossings, rhythm, etc., but nothing of those political issues or the issues related to the mandate or management. There are issues there which affect the relations among NATO, Russia, etc. We haven't got an authorisation for that.*

*They've also had this approach. They say – well, this should be accepted but under the condition that this is approved by the Security Council. What factor are we now – being so battered and destroyed – to discuss such political issues, it makes no sense.*

.....

*Have you negotiated this .....*

.....

*I have. I talked to him and he had this impression when it started that I'd asked to see him. Well, it doesn't matter anymore. He asked for me, but it's all the same.*

*I asked for him, but I was relying on my instructions.*

.....

*Well, he informed me he'd travel to take part in negotiations, the day after tomorrow – about the resolution in Germany, and he was interested in how the talks were progressing. I told him the basic things, informed him where those that are coming are coming from. I thanked him, informed him about the talks in relation to the resolution; I told him what*

*the main thing was – that the resolution should be under the chapter 6, not to accept the chapter 7.*

*He said... I think he didn't comment this, but said he'd inform me. Actually, he repeated he'd inform me about the outcome of the meeting.*

.....

*OK, there's that in the message as well; he saw the message. I thought he saw it, but all the same.... I took the advantage of the opportunity to reaffirm it. Perhaps, the conversation lasted about ten minutes or so.*

.....

*Have you published this?*

.....

*Should we publish it?*

.....

*Why not? Every conversation is published, and not this one.*

.....

*OK.*

.....

*Exchanged views and information.*

.....

*OK.*

*If there's something, you let us know.*

.....

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*You see how it is Nebojsa, I've had so far about half an hour of talks with Ahtissari. He read out this idea to me, and I told him we haven't got room to manoeuvre to let in any forces which are not (foreign language), and that for us is the most important political fact which he explained is a part of their document – which is what we explained to the people, and he understood this, as far as I could've seen, after ten or so repetitions and coercion that we need a break and that this should be signed.*

*I suggested to him – please, if it's realistic to sign it, then sign the withdrawal plan which our military representatives and yours agreed on, and we can start implementing this plan in the meantime. You can have that break in bombing and ensure the adoption of the resolution in the Security Council in a very short time because we're not the bosses in the Security Council but yourselves. Then, at the end now – and I shouldn't be too long – because we exchanged arguments a dozen of times, and I kept saying that this item 3 was a big political issue, and that this political issue couldn't be changed by the technical agreement or superseded by the technical agreement (foreign language), but that this must stay and I pleaded with him to understand it. And he said what if both sides address this in a joint letter – because they're afraid of delays in passing the resolution, which is something I don't understand really – who would delay the adoption of the resolution.*

*The resolution will be probably adopted... some already have... resolutions that both sides address the Security Council in a letter to ask the Security Council to pass the resolution on Kosovo as soon as possible, which will resolve the implementation of this document that they proposed, and we accepted it in the parliament, and this is where we parted but to get in touch again the next morning. I said I'd ask our people... he read out to me what it was.... I told him we couldn't accept (foreign language), but there won't be any problems... this is why a vacuum will be created, he said... and I asked why there would be a vacuum – we'll start pulling out, there's no threat of attack on your part if we agreed cease-fire, and meanwhile, you'll pass a resolution and the forces will enter (foreign language).*

*He then said we should seek a solution along these lines – as far as I understood him... of course, he didn't tell me explicitly that this could be along these lines, that this be a solution, that it be the way we've proposed it – to sign the technical agreement on withdrawal, which is your assignment, to have this withdrawal under way, that they make a break in bombing, and with this technical agreement we would jointly address the Security Council requesting that the resolution should be*

*adopted as soon as possible, which should enable this Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin document to be implemented through the Security Council resolution, that is to adopt the Security Council Resolution on Kosovo in its entirety.*

*ambassador*

**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*They said they agreed to send to China three .... from the most influential countries, to get at least the Chinese.... so that China wouldn't be against this because of this dirty trick they played on them when the Security Council votes on the resolution. They estimate they can't break the Russians without our consent under their pressure. This Russian who's arrived today was tough with them at the meeting.*

*President of FRY*

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*I heard about it and Ahtissari told me a Russian general made the things worse.*

*ambassador*

**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*He told them no political elements should be a part of the technical agreement – that's out of the question. They should stick to the agreement, he said.... they've got no rights to do it... Yugoslavia is a sovereign state. He was really tough with them. They responded immediately, they had it in the news here... there are hundreds of journalists here... the news was that a Russian general came and spoilt the deal, which wasn't true. Our delegation had this position from the very beginning. The Russian general only came and said this could not be done without the UN Security Council. We made a strong agreement... minister Ivanov, minister Sergeyev and president Yeltsin stood behind it and sidelined Chernomyrdin completely so that he wouldn't be in charge of these things – regular Russian state organs would take this over.*

*Their crucial interests are to come to these parts, and now they're trying, in this way, through the Ahtissari's formula for sell-out, and here they totally stifled this Ahtissari's military-political advisor with whom I talked today ten times.... because the one who was with Ahtissari in Belgrade –*

*he's also there and I told him.... that proposal is out of the question; we haven't got the mandate for that and this is all in line with your instructions.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*This isn't in keeping with my instructions, but the adopted document.*

***ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*Of course, but they're trying to stifle him here.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I understand that. However, you offer to them this proposal. We'll see what Ahtissari will do now. I told him that it was politically, symbolically important to us because we haven't got any illusions about that – that the forces which are designated to come – will come. But, the only thing important to us is that this item 3 is respected. We don't want that item 3 to be abolished by some special agreement. This means it could be (foreign language), and in order to be (foreign language), we will... if this plan for withdrawal is made and accepted and if it starts the way you agreed this with them - I suppose you've finally agreed on this - .... that its implementation begins, and then we have an open road towards the UN resolution. And we could say, together with them, that we agreed on this military-technical document, and since it's accepted... and since this document – I don't know if we should mention it separately – since this document .... not this document, but the document envisaging a role for the UN... that it's the mutual desire that the Security Council... and the request for the Security Council to pass the resolution on Kosovo as soon as possible so that we have it all done as soon as possible.*

***ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*This American also told me he should have taken the plane early in the morning to go .... that Clinton instructed him to do so – some agreement in Washington – but the last time he talked to Clinton, Clinton said he should pass on this message to us concerning this Ahtissari's middle-of-*

*the-road solution, and Clinton also told him they were ready to fight for it in the Group because, obviously, the Russians are causing serious troubles or hiding behind that... but the way this Russian reacted today here – this provided additional arguments that the Russians simply wouldn't have the draft in their hands. They tried to make the Russian take the draft which they'd prepared, and according to the original plan, it starts tomorrow.... Group 8, they wanted to prepare that resolution. Due to this six-hour time difference, they would like to go back to New York and to discuss it in New York tomorrow. The Russians responded and said they wouldn't even accept that paper to read it, and the Russian who came here confirmed this.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*They won't consider it before there's a suspension of bombing in place. I understood that. And they can suspend the bombing if they accept the plan which they've already accepted as a technical and military agreement, and when its implementation begins, there's the suspension of bombing. And then the Russians surely won't be refusing anymore to consider this resolution; and as soon as they consider the resolution, they'll adopt that it provides for (foreign language) in Kosovo (foreign language) and, then they can go in normally and effect the transfer of the zones of responsibility with our forces, and assume the responsibility for safety and security in Kosovo and Metohija.*

*Hence, this is so logical that it should go ahead, and its totally in keeping with this paper. Consequently, we wouldn't go beyond what's in that document because I've simply tried to explain it to him some twenty times so far. We accepted their document. We presented that document at a meeting of the heads of caucuses in the parliament, and we published it in its entirety in public. The whole document was released yesterday for public. For example, I read it in daily Novosti – in its entirety, the way it was presented in the parliament. Therefore, the whole of our public understands, and that was also the decision of the parliament based on what Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin said, and what's written in that document, which is that (foreign language). Therefore, these can't be the troops (foreign language) but these must be (foreign language), and the only thing we can contribute there is to jointly express our expectations that the Security Council will consider the Kosovo resolution as soon as possible and adopt it, without going into details because we're not in a situation to suggest to the Security Council what it should do. And in this way, in fact, if they were to enter before the Security Council (foreign*

*language) there wouldn't be any Security Council session on this. Then, we don't need a resolution, and we'd have two things. First, they would thus exclude the Security Council and they'd be able to do whatever they like, and secondly, this excludes... they're ruining it totally except if they are under the NATO command, which they've already said they don't want. Therefore, the things would exclusively boil down to (foreign language) and nothing else, and this is not what it says here. It says (foreign language).*

*Now this should be avoided – that you asked for a break to get instructions.*

***ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*I'm thinking whether I should go public and tell the journalists that it isn't so.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Go before the journalists and say, of course – it's not true we've asked for that; on the contrary, we have no demands whatsoever. Our only request is that the document presented to us by Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, the one drafted by Ahtissari, Chernomyrdin and Talbot, be respected. And we expect that all of them are behind that document. We haven't got any demands except that this document be respected. This document says (foreign language) and there are no other things here, and we're not asking for any break, on the contrary, we're interested in completing the technical agreement as soon as possible. I told him the technical agreement may not supersede the main political element of the document which you've brought to us, and if this were the case, this wouldn't be a technical agreement – this would mean the invalidation of the main political element. That's a political issue par excellence that this is (foreign language).*

**The negotiations on the arrival of foreign troops in Kosovo and Metohija were entering the final phase. Practically, everything was ready for the implementation of the agreement. Milosevic was concerned about the play on words so that he could tell his people we achieved what we wanted – and that is the Security Council**

**Resolution No. 1244, which stipulated the deployment of NATO troops. We allegedly were granted the possibility to solve the issue of non-Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija through the Security Council. The truth was totally different from what could be inferred from Milosevic's conversations where he was almost pleading with the envoys to allow him the possibility to explain it to the people that we were right to reject previous offers and initiatives to negotiate, and now we achieved a maximum – and that is the resolution which ensures our troops would remain in Kosovo. The truth was harsh. The Kumanovo Agreement was effectively a capitulation of both Milosevic's policy and the army in this part of the state territory. Everyone knew the return of the Albanian refugees and terrorist KLA organisation would cause an exodus of non-Albanian population. The NATO troops, which should arrive in Kosovo, would be protecting themselves engaging the most of its soldiers and resources to ensure their own safety – not the safety of the local population. The manoeuvre which Milosevic would subsequently try to make with the arrival of the Russian troops to Kosovo would only additionally aggravate the catastrophic position of the Serbian diplomacy and the Serb people in Kosovo and Metohija.**

**Later on in the text, I will enclose authentic transcripts of the telephone conversations between the representatives of the Yugoslav diplomacy and the NATO and UN officials.**

*ambassador*  
**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*I expect now when I get back there .... (inaudible) that they present it to us, their new stance, a new question whether we accept it or not. Of course, we'll act in accordance with the papers and the document and those ten items in the document, and we'll ask for a break.*

*President of FRY*  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Please tell them Ahtissari talked with me. Tell them we have no other demands – which is what I reiterated in my conversation with Ahtissari – except to respect the provisions contained in their document, which our*

*parliament adopted, and nothing else. Ahtissari then asked me to talk with me again tomorrow morning. He wanted to see which option to suggest. Here it is, and he thought whether, in addition to what I proposed, this technical document should be prepared which is to refer only to your withdrawal plan, which was agreed, and the beginning... and one joint letter addressed to the Security Council which should request that, due to the importance of the problem which is being solved and the settling of issues related to peace in Kosovo, the Security Council – both parties would request that – adopt that resolution as soon as possible. Of course, consult the Russian on this because he's allegedly someone who should agree to this. I think a letter like this... Ahtissari mentioned it as a possibility – that both sides send a letter to the Security Council so that the resolution could be adopted as soon as possible. For us, this doesn't mean we're deviating from the document because it shouldn't contain any references or mention anything which is under the jurisdiction of the Security Council.*

***ambassador***

***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*(inaudible).*

***President of FRY***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*No, but you there... both parties... the option that you take as (foreign language) only this part concerning the plan for withdrawal, and this plan may start being implemented. And bearing in mind the importance of establishing peace as soon as possible and in order to have the resolution adopted, both sides should ask the Security Council... which means the representatives who are negotiating should approach it with a request that the Security Council resolution be drafted as soon as possible. This is a plea to have the resolution adopted as soon as possible. The swift adoption of the resolution suits us as well, and if you are to draft this letter, you should consult Zivadin. I'll inform him about this .... or with me, it doesn't matter, and perhaps we'll be able to find that option. You must explain to them one thing. Our delegation, that is, you haven't made any demands and you're not impeding the process for seeking out the solution. The only thing we want is that you do it in keeping with the document, which our parliament adopted and nothing else, so that we cannot receive any troops and .... because simply the troops which are (foreign language) don't exist. I don't know if this is clear to you?*

*ambassador*  
**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*It's totally clear to me.*

*President of FRY*  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*That's one thing, but if they're energetic and smart enough, they'll have the resolution in two days. Therefore, the withdrawal of our troops starts, this will fall into the third part or the last quarter of this business we've got to do when we get the resolution, and then they can start coming in. It's important for our people that they (foreign language) because we told the people - we cannot lie to the people. We can't tell the people - we have it in writing they'll come under the UN auspices, but now we've agreed they may come without the UN. If they come without the UN, they won't have the Security Council meeting. Rubin's already said - if you've read it in today's Novosti - that the Security Council needn't get involved in this.*

*You have it in today's Novosti - we don't need the Security Council and we don't need the Russians. If they want to negotiate with us later and take part - they can do it, but this should be known - who's in command, etc. We don't need the Security Council at all - that's what he said. However, we need the Security Council because we based this whole thing on the Security Council. Whatever he decides... ultimately I reminded him - please, haven't you told us we'll have a resolution, we'll have the right to present our objections, and then the Security Council will be the judge of that - but we'll accept any decision made by the Security Council. Therefore, we haven't got any illusions about this - that this decision won't be brilliant for us just like this isn't brilliant for us. But one thing seems clear - all the obligations we assume we'll be met dutifully. We aren't liars or something like that.*

*ambassador*  
**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*Should I wait to see how this will pass, and then to give a statement for the press or should I go before the journalists right away? (inaudible).*

*President of FRY*  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Tell them – regarding this position, Ahtissari spoke to the president. The president and we have no other approach to this except for the approach laid out in the document, and the approach outlined in the document is that the troops may enter under the UN auspices and nothing else... and you should repeat once again our instructions so that we have identical approaches there – instructions for you as the delegation to negotiate everything and find your solutions. The powers vested in you are derived from the document, which has been adopted by the parliament. We have no other (foreign language) ... we haven't got here anything to ask from them, nor we have some additional demands. They do have additional demands because if it says (foreign language) ... this is what's in the document, and we're only insisting on the document and nothing else.... and that Ahtissari now is considering the idea that we go for some technical agreement, which is entirely in keeping with the document. Therefore, we cannot accept the troops which are not under (foreign language) because we've explained this to the whole people.*

*I told him also we have no political room to manoeuvre here because the document says (foreign language) ... politically, we haven't got that room to manoeuvre, and he says a politician should understand that... but he said he'd think about it – that bilaterally that is to say both delegations go for that option, the option he's now examining – to go for this technical agreement, which is not disputable for you, of course, if you agreed to it.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*We reached the agreement on the technical part but they constantly add politics on top of this.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Well, you cannot reach political solution through a technical agreement, this should be done by the Security Council.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*They keep throwing in .... (inaudible)*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Concerning the Ahtissari's proposal, I explained to him that to the extent the proposal allows for ... without (foreign language) the forces to come effectively amounts to the invalidation of this document, the most significant political element of the document, and he then said – ok, I'll consider the idea for both sides to address the council when you complete that technical document so that you'd have a letter, for example, for the Security Council urging it to pass as soon as possible the Kosovo resolution, bearing in mind the necessity to establish peace as soon as possible.*

**ambassador**  
**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*I warned German general that they .... of the document... that they shouldn't shove in politics which is not agreed in the document.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Now you can .... just tell the press that the news we're listening to isn't true because we haven't asked for any consultations. On the contrary, they're the ones asking for some breaks all the time, and we haven't got any other view on this except that the document should be implemented – the document which Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin brought, which they made together with Talbot, which we want largely to realise and that's all, without going into specific details, but this is needed because of our own public here...*

**ambassador**  
**NEBOJSA VUJOVIC**

*....since there are representatives from Skoplje ... (inaudible)*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*OK, but it's because of our public, I mean... because both here and on television word has it that we're asking for some time-outs, and the people are nervous thinking - why do our people now cause some trouble? – and our people are not causing any problems, they are the*

*only ones creating problems. And Ahtissari said to talk again the next morning. Now he'll start some consultations and see how... I've explained this again to him. Please tell him we have no political room for manoeuvre to go back on the crucial political element from your proposal, which we've adopted, and this is (foreign language). Therefore, this is the only thing we haven't got. We cannot... the president can't, you should say, go beyond what the parliament adopted at their proposal. Consequently, what's their problem? Their problem probably is that they think it might take quite some time before the resolution is adopted. Well, they've been bombing us for 75 days; I've told Ahtissari – so we've waited for this to happen – to reach some peaceful solution, so now, please, adopt the resolution quickly, not slowly. The Security Council is not in our hands – it's in yours, so pass this resolution immediately. As far as we're concerned, we're not an obstacle to this, but for us – it's important that we've agreed on the document which you, that is Talbot, Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, offered to us to (foreign language), and we can't go beyond that because we presented it to the people as the main political argument which made us accept the document.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*It's all clear to me.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*So, this isn't about our inflexibility. It's about our request... I said I was surprised – you're head of state; you came to us and proposed this document. So I expect of you to stick to your document – not to suggest changes through some technical agreement (foreign language). Do you understand? This is a political element par excellence, which cannot be changed by the technical agreement. I think we've made ourselves clear enough on this, and give this to journalists and tell them, please... because it's always like we're demanding something... we haven't asked for any delays. We've been ready all along.*

*Secondly, we have no demands except for the logical and normal request that everything we do should be based on the document drafted by Talbot, Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, and brought to Belgrade by Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, and we expect that everybody observes this document –*

*nothing else. We haven't got absolutely no demands beyond the document. Nothing else. I think you may do fine with this.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*Alright.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Off you go.... this guy told me that this... don't tell the journalist – Ahtissari and Milosevic talked, etc. Instead, when you meet these people, tell them Ahtissari said he'd call tomorrow. You don't have to explain what I've talked to him about.... that he'll call president Milosevic tomorrow morning... that he said he was considering a possibility that we jointly request from the Security Council this because he obviously understands the necessity to observe this item 3 (foreign language), so that we could ask the Security Council together to pass the resolution as soon as possible, but this letter should contain no solution which would predetermine the Security Council's solution – but only a plea to go about its business as quickly as possible. I think you understand this distinction because we cannot now put into this letter the other thing – that what we can't accept in this.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*May I call you tomorrow morning?*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Well call any time, whenever it's necessary, but please take care of this so that it doesn't turn out we're the ones calling time-outs. You can do it even before you go to start the talks. Please say – I see newspapers report we're constantly asking for some breaks; that's not true – we haven't asked for a single one. Secondly, we have no demands. We're totally willing to finish this. We're only adhering to the document drafted by Talbot, Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin in Bonn and we expect this document to be respected. These are the only two things – nothing else. Bye Nebojsa.*

\* \* \*

**Mr. Zoran Lilic confirmed in his testimony in The Hague that the cease-fire, i.e., peace with NATO could have been negotiated as far back as May 1999, but what was lacking at the time was the political will to do so on the part of Slobodan Milosevic. One need not be too smart to put two and two together and realise how many human lives would have been saved had the agreement been reached then. We actually suffered the most in terms of the massive destruction and losses in the later phase of the war.**

**Intensive negotiations on ending the conflict began as late as June 1999. Interestingly enough, communication and contacts with the West were not disrupted even during the bombing. This time round, faced with horrific destruction and a warning that we might well suffer enormous losses which would be inflicted by aerosol bombs, Slobodan started the final stage of the negotiations:**

\* \* \*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Well call any time, whenever it's necessary, but please take care of this so that it doesn't turn out we're the ones calling time-outs. You can do it even before you go to start the talks. Please say – I see newspapers report we're constantly asking for some breaks; that's not true – we haven't asked for a single one. Secondly, we have no demands. We're totally willing to finish this. We're only adhering to the document drafted by Talbot, Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin in Bonn and we expect this document to be respected. These are the only two things – nothing else. Bye Nebojsa.*

***ambassador***  
***NEBOJSA VUJOVIC***

*Thanks very much. Bye.*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

*Hi Pavke. Well, it's good what I think... you're not going to that rally. And Minic and Gorica<sup>17</sup> have been there to date. We should urge them not to hold any rallies but to work. First, it's the air raid. There might be casualties on the last day and that simply shouldn't be allowed, but you know what they're like... instead of defending in a different way, different from political speeches at the rallies – but of responsible people... so that the people wouldn't dodge their responsibilities and have civilians, women and children at the rallies.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*There was a contact with Washington regarding, above all, this item under article 2, item 2, where it says... this sentence that the delay in the arrival of the international forces cannot be the reason for a delay of our withdrawal. We believe they're giving themselves the right to be late, and therefore, this sentence is supposed to look like... and these people in Washington agree with that. Because it says here the arrival of the international forces, KFOR, in Kosovo will be synchronised as well as possible with the withdrawal of the FRY forces in phases in order to eliminate any sort of a security vacuum. We insist that it shouldn't be synchronised as much as possible but that it be totally synchronised, and this is what it says in the Security Council resolution. If he reserves this for himself – in case they're late, and if we're under obligation not to wait for them, we must take the whole of the population - the Albanians, and the Serbs, and the Turks and everyone because they'll first kill all those Albanians because they haven't been obeying them. So explain this, and in this respect, you should say we've had contact with Washington and they agree that there must be a better wording for that. That's one thing.*

*Under paragraph a) where it says that this new thing that was added this morning that the suspension will continue while the obligations are being discharged and until the Security Council adopts the resolution within twenty-four hours. We can't accept it because this would mean we agree that they continue bombing us. They want to use this to exert pressure on the Russians and the Chinese. However, it's their affair. We agree that they continue bombing us even though this isn't under jurisdiction, even though it doesn't apply to our obligations, and here you should say this isn't in accordance with the Belgrade Agreement, nor G-8, nor the Resolution because there's no gradual suspension. And now, please, go*

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<sup>17</sup> Milomir Minic and Gorica Gajevic, senior officials of the Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS.

*back to article 1, but also on the same page – the last item b). General, we'll call you again. Why Vujovic isn't here?*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Vujovic, I've just had a long conversation with Ahtissari. Before that, Bojan talked to Purdue. Purdue said this had to stay in order to accelerate it on the other side, to speed up the Security Council process. We decided not to accept it because then it would appear we agree that they continue bombing after 24 hours if the Security Council doesn't pass... but we solved this with Ahtissari and he suggested the wording and he'll notify them about it. Regarding.... let's go one by one... First, regarding this item 2... here this sentence... " the arrival of the international security forces will be synchronised entirely (interpretation of the agreement) in foreign language (translated).*

*These two things which we said were agreed, just insert them and you may sign it.*

***ambassador VUJOVIC***

***\*\*\****

***BOJAN BUGARCIC***

*I talked with him twice. The only thing he said was that he'd probably call again, that he shifted everything to a higher, the highest level, which meant they were considering this and that they would come up with a new text.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I've just made an agreement with Ahtissari now. Since he realised this was insane he suggested – not even these eleven days that we have – that they could continue bombing 24 hours later if there was no resolution, and Ahtissari suggested it and I accepted it. That's all.*

***BOJAN BUGARCIC***

*We understood it was a sentence you suggested. This must be reinforced, there must be a hermetically closed border, not only control. He said he'd offer a new proposal.*

\* \* \*

*ambassador*  
**BORA MILOSEVIC**

*Marshal Sergeyev said the Russian contingent would be somewhere between 3,000 and 10,000 men strong, and Stepashin mentioned 5,000 and that the sum needed from their budget would be about 150 million dollars.*

*minister*  
**ZIVORAD JOVANOVIC**

*This means that this is the value of the Russian interests in the Balkans. We're hoping we've changed it for the better, but we've changed it on our own. We leave it to them. They haven't asked us a thing ... what they did in Bonn and then in Cologne. They didn't tell us, they didn't even deign to inform their brothers about this minimum – what they've achieved regarding the fate of Serbia. If they informed you, then you're to blame because you didn't let us know. I'll hold you accountable for not passing on faithfully the Russian views. And then, if they don't call you – don't be worried – to inform you what they did for Yugoslavia and their brothers in Cologne and in Germany. For your information, I talked to Mr. Ivanov before the talks on the new resolution, but he didn't deign even to inform me about the result. He hasn't informed me about it to this very moment. I don't know what sort of way is this of advocating for our interests and our common interests. We're stupid a little bit. We haven't been so often in contact with America to be enlightened, but what it means when he promises a Yugoslav minister that he will inform him about the result, but instead leave us to our own devices – in the mess he cooked up with the Americans, or perhaps he forgot what he said. We're so small – do you understand – but it would be really bad for us if we were bigger for America than for Russia.*

*I'm talking to you, as my fellow soldier from Bileca, like this... don't get me wrong as I'm so opened. We have indestructible friendship. The fact that they blackmailed us and that the Russians left us in the lurch, that NATO blackmailed us – that's not a plus for history. Specific timetable was agreed in Cologne, six steps and in addition some sequence of events*

*was agreed. This means imposing another new step which hasn't been negotiated, etc., and Russia keeps silent about it, but they know very well what it's all about, and they want to see what we might win for ourselves on our own. Listen Bora, you know that unlike you, I sort of ended up by chance in diplomacy... that this isn't my place – in diplomacy. But Russia is writing a dark page in its history having behaved like this with respect to the Serbian interests. That's very dark, gloomy page. They've forgotten the enemy has been killing our people for two and a half months. And Russia is cooperating in justifying this murder through such a resolution. We're in trouble, Bora. We know what and how, but we're too small to do it without anyone's help, without anyone's support.*

## ***NEGOTIATIONS WITH AHTISSARI***

*"No sacrifice made by others  
is too much  
for the cause of peace."  
Karel Capek*

**The conversation between our minister Zivorad Jovanovic with ambassador Borislav Milosevic in Moscow is a typical example on how you should not pursue your policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Such a speech should be read out to every novice in diplomacy with an explanation that emotions must be excluded from diplomatic affairs. We were not the ones to define what the Russian interests should be and how much they cost, and it is indeed a big question whether Russia could do that for itself at that moment. We expected something even though it was clear to everyone we will not get it. I had an impression that the Yugoslav United Left, YUL, clique was hoping for a third world war over the conflict of interests between the East and the West. Our diplomats did not wake up to reality after Tito's death. They were dozing in the belief the virus of cold war would spread like an epidemic throughout the world. This virus was on the rampage only in the minds of our diplomats entertaining their illusion that we mattered and that the world would wage a war because of our being lost in between reality and utopia.**

**BOJAN BUGARCIC**

*I called him twice about this Ahtissari's proposal... that his bosses negotiate the wording of it with Ahtissari. Concerning this issue of border control, he suggests our delegation should propose a draft when the talks start again.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Regarding this ( security vacuum and avoiding this), we agreed this with Ahtissari. Thank you Bojan.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*Now the process is in fact approaching its end. I hope we'll be able to achieve the results. I understand our partners in the negotiating process have accepted something, but not all of what you have suggested.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*I don't know what they cannot accept of what we have proposed.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*If I understood it well – they want the wording of the article 2, item 2 to remain intact. I think they should explain why they want it like that. They are ready to act within 24 hours to avoid this security vacuum.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, it is your text.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*That's what I have suggested. On the other hand, my admiral told me they insisted on two things in relation to this. I mean – I'll be totally honest – they're concerned that if the delays are not accepted or left out, they would face one day a situation in which you might stop pulling out.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Yes, but president Ahtissari, bear in mind one simple fact. When they want to come – it's entirely up to them. Therefore, if they're late, that's not our mistake. They must assume the responsibility for the speed of deployment of their troops. We can't be responsible for their delays.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*I think we shouldn't be blaming anyone here. We have to be practical, Mr. Milosevic. My question is... the Germans informed me if this document were signed urgently – today, they would have a meeting this evening because we are ahead 7 hours with respect to New York, where right now it's 10.30. We'll have the UN Security Council decision, which is, I hope, what you want too. I think we shouldn't be discussing the text anymore but focus on the main problems.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*You want to say they insist to adhere strictly to the wording according to which their arrival in Kosovo and Metohija would be synchronised with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army as much as possible. They do not want, therefore, say "entirely synchronised" or "synchronised in its entirety".*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Because this would cost ----. Well, you know, then you'll constantly have discussions over what "in its entirety" and what "in part" meant.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*"In its entirety" means their arrival, assuming responsibility in the zone of the responsibility and the withdrawal of our forces... But no one, therefore, will be killing civilians. The item 3 of the Security Council resolution draft, which was proposed by the Group 7, says – as I've already told you – I'm reading the text: " with which the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised". My suggestion, the last proposal for you, would be: let them insert the text of the UN Security Council resolution draft where it says "the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo will be synchronised". This is the wording – you may check this out, you've got the resolution in front of you. Let them use the language from the resolution – without "synchronised entirely", without "the minimum of this or that" – let them just put in what's in the resolution. "... with which the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised". This is the item 3 in the Security Council resolution. Let them, therefore, use the same text. If G8<sup>18</sup> acts like that, let generals then acknowledge the language of G8.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*What item are you referring to?*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*The item 3 in the resolution, Have a look at the resolution. That's (reading the text) ... the text is blurred, you know, it was sent by fax... (he keeps reading the item 3 in the resolution and reaches the place where it says at the end of the item 3: with which the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised). The wording in the resolution is clear. I'm not adding to this a single letter. I want the wording in the military technical agreement to be as precise as possible, which is normal. The technical agreement must be more precise, but even that would be better than "synchronised as much as possible". There's no such a thing in the resolution. And that "delays will not slow down the withdrawal"... it says "synchronised". That's the text of the resolution, and that's what G8 has accepted.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

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<sup>18</sup> G8 is the name of the political organisation of eight the most developed countries in the world which had a decisive influence on the global politics and the solution to the Kosovo crisis in general.

*But you're concerned about the manner in which they're solving the problem they have, you must also take into account their concern so that if there are any delays, you wouldn't say you wouldn't pull out.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*President Ahtissari, what could it mean to us if we waited several hours or one day more; what is that in comparison to the lives of the citizens living there who will – if no one's coming, and we're retreating – simply leave with the army and the police, they'll go. Why should we cause such troubles for the people living there for centuries? Is this the principal reason or not?*

*What's the main purpose of the resolution and all the activities undertaken to protect the civilians in Kosovo regardless of their ethnic background. That's the main objective. That's the reason why I simply don't seek the ways to play some tricks, there are not tricks. What sort of a trick may help us if we are present there several hours more waiting for, say, a brigade coming to take over the responsibility in the zone of responsibility. It's only because we want to make sure local villagers will be safe. We know the international forces, KFOR, will protect every local and that they won't allow murders of local residents. This is the only thing we want to achieve, nothing more. The UN resolution drafted by G8 clearly says "with which the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised", nothing more.... please. It's only logical and honest on my part to talk like this, and even more than that, that's absolutely vital for the safety of the people. Why should we pay the price in human lives? This may also compromise your operation, if someone gets killed or murdered because of the security vacuum.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*As far as I understood my admiral, your representative of the foreign affairs ministry, the deputy minister, is on his way to Belgrade to meet you.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I'm not acquainted with this.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*This will take another six hours.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*There's no need for him to come to Belgrade to meet me.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*But they cancelled the meeting at 9.00 tomorrow. Could your people, please, get in touch with your generals from the negotiating team so that this bloody agreement could be signed and the decision made?*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*But president Ahtissari, please, could you only suggest that they use the same wording from the resolution?*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*I'll try, but as I've said I'm not taking part in the negotiations between NATO and you.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Yes, but you're the representative of the international community so your responsibility for the lives of the people cannot be ignored.*

**President**  
**AHTISSARI**

*I passed on to them one suggestion, and it was accepted, but the other one wasn't. Let me try. But do authorise your people to sign the bloody thing. Because we can finish it this evening.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Alright. Let's finish it tonight and tell them simply that instead of that wording ("synchronised as much as possible"), which is, as you know, the wording of the discussion, not the wording of the agreement... This is why the resolution clearly states: " with which the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised". It is so clearly stated in the resolution. Why wouldn't they simply use the wording of the resolution with respect to this text, and thus entirely harmonise the text of the resolution with the text of the military technical agreement?*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*You see, I understand you completely, and it's clear to me, but I'm not one of those negotiating. I'll pass this further regardless of whether this might have an effect, but on your part do everything you can to finish this so that they can come, so that we don't wait for another day. This is what we can do.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Let's not wait for tomorrow, let's reach the agreement now and sign the agreement. I don't believe the deputy minister of foreign affairs will come here before announcing his visit, without a telephone call or something.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Could you please check it out?*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I'll check it immediately, but please let's have an understanding as men. Do you accept that its totally logical to use the wording of the resolution, which is so clear....*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*But this is not the problem – what I think is logical or not. You've proposed something, and I'll present the proposal to those who are negotiating.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Alright.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*But I'd like you to be a little bit more flexible because the other side seems to be in a position - not to accept this 24-hour request, which you didn't like. You've made no concessions in this respect.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Don't, president please... how many concessions have we made so far? You know that better than anyone in the world. We've done every possible concession in the interest of peace.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Let's not talk about what you've done and what you haven't done. Please give instructions to your people to continue negotiating so that this bloody military technical agreement could be signed and the Security Council made a decision this evening.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I'll do it right away, but as far as I understand you've accepted the obligation to propose the same wording from the Security Council resolution?*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Yes, I have, but ...*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Alright.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*They must reply whether they'll be able to accept it or not. I'm not authorised for that. In this case I'm only a mediator. But thank you.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Well, Mr. Ahtissari. You're head of state, you the highest representative – you're not a mediator. You're politician number one in charge of this case.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Let's not waste time. We may continue our conversation at some point during the week. Let's try have this process take its own course.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Alright.*

***President  
AHTISSARI***

*Thank you for accepting my telephone call.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*If you have any news, good news as you've said, give me a call.*

***President***  
***AHTISSARI***

*Thank you.*

***colonel general***  
***SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC<sup>19</sup>***

*When we talked with you, we discussed for about an hour down there those two issues. We convinced them it was necessary for us and explained what 24 hours meant to us.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Ahtissari said they accepted it. Ahtissari now informed me they accepted this with 24 hours the way the two of us agreed on this – instead of having it within 24 hours from the suspension – to have so quickly that the security vacuum could be avoided. Is it true Vujovic's heading for Belgrade?*

\* \* \*

***colonel general***  
***SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC***

*No, he's sitting next to me.*

***President of FRY***

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<sup>19</sup> Svetozar Marjanovic (nickname Marjan), Yugoslav Army colonel general, the signatory to the Kumanovo Agreement, deputy chief of staff. Involved in a scandalous affair over having been given a luxury villa in the Uzicka Street, in the elite residential suburb of Dedinje, after the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement.

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*I suggested to Ahtissari, and he agreed to propose this... if they don't want to accept that this should be entirely synchronised to eliminate any sort of (security vacuum). Here we realised we had a very good argument – to propose instead of this what they don't want to accept, but to avoid what it says in their document – and it says they give themselves the right to be late so the people would go with the army and the police, or they would let them slaughter us there. Well, since they want to have this right, we proposed in the conversation with Ahtissari to insert instead of that the sentence from the resolution draft item 3. And it says our withdrawal and the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo will be synchronised. Marjan, you must explain it to them how many houses will be burnt, how many civilians will go. I'm afraid they might be planning to unleash the KLA to do some massacre. So, they've accepted this and that's alright.*

*(inaudible)*

*Here's the solution. Take the text from the resolution, item 3. The resolution states this clearly. The resolution may be more accurate than the agreement. They must accept this wording. If they don't, you tell them we'll go public with this. In order to have the civilians protected, there must not be a security vacuum. The resolution envisages in its item 3 the same in order to prevent that. We can say to the world – we agreed everything, but they're now avoiding to assume the strict responsibility that their arrival and the process of taking over responsibility for the safety of the civilians be synchronised. At issue here are the lives of the civilians only. I made an agreement to continue the talks immediately and to suggest we find some compromise so that the exact wording from the resolution would be adopted. This is a new proposal I've just presented to Ahtissari. Here, you should say, this proposal is a compromise which we accepted instead of this text. This is what Madeleine Albright G-8 wrote. They can't have some principled excuse to say they don't agree because they were the ones to propose it in the first place. Otherwise, this point in the resolution would be sidelined, then probably G-8.... Like this... G-8 states it clearly – verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces in accordance with swift .... with which the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo will be synchronised. So this is clear. And Ahtissari told me the meeting should resume tomorrow at 9.00 because "your deputy foreign minister is going to Belgrade for consultations". So I propose, Ahtissari said, to resume negotiations immediately and make this more precise, and I'll call the*

*Americans to urge them to use such wording from the resolution – which is much better for us than what it says here. This is where the compromise lies. And they can't have a principled excuse to reject the wording from the resolution because how they would then implement the resolution? Safety of the civilians is the main reason to adopt the resolution and for your presence in Kosovo. We only want that you synchronise your arrival with our withdrawal because thus we're protecting the lives of the people and their property. We don't want any houses burning, murders – and this is, I presume, our common objective – to avoid it. Therefore, our honour is intact – the only thing we insist on is that they arrive on time, and they want the right to be late.*

*You know, I used to work in a bank – when you take on the obligation having done all you can, or when you take on an obligation in writing to discharge it – this is an obligation in writing which must be discharged. If it says it'll be synchronised, they you can't have – as much as possible, but it'll be synchronised just like the resolution says. So two things – the first is essential, and the second is organisational in its nature. This essential one refers to the language we're talking about – hence, these sentences and the right to be late, and the second organisational one – that Ahtissari urges us to resume the talks immediately so that this thing could be agreed on the basis of this proposal of mine, which Ahtissari and I agreed on, so that this could be signed and so that the Security Council session could be held today already. It's 17.30 local time, and in New York it's 10.30. So if you sign this in 2-3 hours, they can have it in the Security Council to finish it. This was why he suggested this shouldn't be delayed until tomorrow. You tell them through your liaison officer that Ahtissari called and suggested the talks should resume immediately... that we have a compromise solution and that we're ready to resume the negotiations on the basis of this compromise solution. Go back there and insert the sentence from the resolution which suits us entirely. Has Vujovic returned with the text of the resolution? Let me talk to him.*

*Have you found the item 3? So there's no relativisation in terms of 'as much as...' that's like in banking, if you sign (meaning you have an obligation). When you signed it, then you've got an obligation. Is the strategy clear? They can't possibly shun the text of the resolution. You should say – we can't accept the blame for that now. We'll go public and we'll tell them. This is an important issue on which safety of the civilian population depends. That's the main reason for passing the resolution and for your presence there. You don't want to accept even what the resolution stipulates that your arrival must be synchronised with our withdrawal so that the people would be safe, so that no one burns their*

*houses or kills civilians. Our conscience will be clear, but you should then explain to the international public why you don't want to accept the obligation to be synchronised. Well, Albright wrote the resolution, and they don't want to accept her wording. That's the wording of G-8 which became a part of the resolution, and we would then normally go public with this. No one could hold it against us.*

*Therefore, they should accept it. And regarding this organisational aspect, regardless of whether you agreed to meet at 9.00, say Ahtissari called and we have a compromise solution. Ahtissari suggested we should resolve this immediately so that the Security Council could hold a session in the afternoon. It's 11.30 now there. If you finish this in the next three hours, this means the Security Council could meet at 5,6,7, but they'll have a signed agreement. He's probably talking with them, and this is why he had this request for me – let's do it on the basis of that compromise solution and have what you suggested... what the resolution says... you should tell him – we have a compromise proposal which we discussed with Ahtissari, and he said we shouldn't postpone this tomorrow for 9 because of the possibility that the Security Council holds its session in the afternoon, New York time, and we have a compromise solution which we may agree on .... and go there and include in the right way the text from the resolution. But then their right to be late must be left out. Here's Ojdanic to give some suggestion.*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Nebojsa, since it's quite normal that this sentence related to delays in deployment must be deleted... then in the context of this previous sentence, which is taken from the resolution... I believe the following sentence may stay: "Delay in deployment of the international forces entails the same delay in the withdrawal of the FRY troops with respect to the plan. This is more precise – what this synchronisation means. Here... president says this shouldn't be added.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Look, Nebojsa, I think it's clearer and it would be easier to defend this with arguments if we only have the text of the resolution, and then they can't refuse it. But, of course, this... their right to delay should be deleted. Therefore, before this right to delay... this text from the resolution... the*

*sentence about the delay should be deleted, and then we have that it's synchronised.*

\* \* \*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*All the consultations and convincing are over so this team should finish it all and sign this agreement during the night. I think they shouldn't fail, not these – ours, but those with whom we had all those talks, agreements .... exchanged arguments... who presented some unacceptable things which were on the table later.*

\* \* \*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*General, what's new?*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*I watched a segment of the central news show. They won't take even one square metre until the UN concludes the deal, and then it's up to us... I saw these people at the university and those in the party, etc. ... that's good... what they've done. This secretary told me they had a break, and returned down there at 6.00h.*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Believe me, I haven't even asked him. I he said like this, then it's like this.*

\* \* \*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*And now Obrad Stevanovic joins them. They had a break from 5 to 6, and at 6.00 they went to Kumanovo again... they probably...*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Now there's not a single reason not to finish this tonight, this evening.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Do we have any reports? These people on television said there were some fierce strikes in Kosovo. I haven't got that impression, judging by those reports.*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*No, let me tell you how it's been down there. There was some action on four occasions against that village 0549, for the 76<sup>th</sup> time, then near the village of Kosovica strikes on the positions of that same brigade, my former brigade. Then two missiles in Dragas and Plajnik, 5 missiles in the Dragas municipality – it's because it's a little isolated, and the population in Dragas is friendly to us, Gorani people are those. Actually, only 4 times with 4 strikes. Mostly, these were units deployed there. Consequences – unknown... possibly if it's individual... The boys are hanging in well...*

\* \* \*

***minister JOVANOVIC***

*May we meet each other?*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*No way, but I've got a request. You've received a request 3.A, one request in relation to the sending of these competent experts for system-related and status issues. Representatives from the legal department, and the construction and personnel departments would join in to consider all these issue because this must be done immediately, and they must go tomorrow so please... I'll coordinate this – who should general Matovic call, to determine the time of departure and to regulate all other issues... they are to go down there, to be at the disposal to analyse all those problems... to come up with solutions and immediately to solve those. We have to start pulling out quickly.*

*We announced a competition for some members of the interior ministry who said they would rather join the army... so we set up a special battalion of the military police and we offer to them approximately the same conditions they had there... so we're expecting some influx of people from the interior ministry, MUP... they expressed their wish to leave MUP if someone guarantees a similar status in the army, and after that... what's relevant now... they could return to MUP, and there would be no problems. Since they did it by resorting to fraud, they did what they did... the law protects us there. The moment they're discharged from the police, they should be assigned their combat positions, and I believe there are people who left, but have their combat positions in the army.*

\* \* \*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Zivadin's just called to say Vujovic called from their territory using his mobile. And they're going now so that Marjanovic will hold this press conference, and I said let Vujovic say something after Marjanovic in relation to this foreign affairs aspect, if needed. But Marjan, of course, will deliver the main speech and that's it. Well, I just wanted to let you know – now Jovanovic's called me. So if they signed it, this means Marjan would not sign this if they didn't include that provision. So this means they've accepted our position.*

\* \* \*

***colonel general***  
***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*Hello general.*

***colonel general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*It's been signed. They've struggled the whole day. What they could change, they've changed. The army will be controlling border crossings together with the customs and other organs, and the border... but it's not in writing...*

***Serbian president***  
***MILAN MILUTINOVIC***

*What's going on?*

*colonel general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*It's signed. I congratulate you on this victory.*

*President of FRY*  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*General, let Pavkovic tell you when they're planning to start pulling out because we shouldn't do anything in a hurry.*

*The agreement has been signed. At least 24 hours we need to see and prepare ourselves. I wouldn't make haste too much. Let them plan this in detail and they should let you know when they would like to start... they should agree on some timetable when our people should start to withdraw the units from the zone 3... when they'll announce the bombing has been suspended...*

*colonel general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*We can't leave zone 3... we can't because the Russians are supposed to arrive there. They haven't prepared themselves. They haven't even made a decision on this, let alone arrived.*

*President of FRY*  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*They could come. Now Sergeyev said somewhere between 2.000 and 10.000... Shame on him, shame on him.... what can I do? Let them come. Let Krga get in touch with them. Let him contact them. They should say if they're ready to come now. You should issue orders to check out when they're coming. You see... let's consult on this... how they planned it? Will they start it tomorrow and whether it's going to be OK? I mean let's see what the dynamics is. I just want to draw your attention to this – don't do it in a hurry so that we can get out of the harm's way... but pay full attention to the people, resources.... everything in accordance with the plan and solidly so... nothing in a haste.*

*colonel general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*I'm convinced... what I've estimated that they're not ready for those deadlines they've given us ... that they can go in ... in sync.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Perhaps, our people managed to improve these deadlines. We'll see. When you're on the secure line with Pavkovic, then you should see what and how... We don't have to hurry with the beginning now that everything's signed. I think no one's so crazy to bomb us, but we'll see... to start gathering for the D-day... it must be used to the full. And we shouldn't say tomorrow's a D-day, and on D-day+1 – meaning the day after tomorrow – and the zone 3 is empty... but then the day after tomorrow is D-day... it must be that the D-day starts with nice and clear weather... and starting in the morning, they could then verify this during the day and say this is done. Then we're sure of it completely. We should bear all this in mind. I think Marjan will give some good statement. I'll pop by at your place.*

\* \* \*

***deputy prime minister SAINOVIC***

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Mr. deputy prime minister, you'll owe me a drink after I tell you the agreement has been signed. Have they accepted anything of this? It's he – with the powers he's got.*

***colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Have a good night sleep tonight. Cheers.*

\* \* \*

***colonel general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

***colonel general***

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*We proposed this to the Russians, you see... they still have to make a decision on this... the question is whether the Security Council will accept it so easily... so they'll have a session tonight as far as I understand. And they can't go in since synchronisation... we were fighting for this all the while, and not a single NATO soldier could enter the territory of FRY until the Security Council passes the resolution... this is the resolution draft which passed through G-8. So the president suggested we shouldn't do anything in a hurry, but there's one real obstacle there... because if the Russians take the part north of Pristina, Podujevo... and what we had here, according to the analyses... the most acceptable... they're not ready... the only option is to fly some of the forces there; they may land in Surcin, Belgrade, and let them take the first zone so that we could start. If the plan is already prepared, who knows when these... my people will come now. We still don't know anything about who's coming... we won't pull out until after their arrival. That's the task No. 1. This is a complex task... we're not like MUP (ministry of interior – the police)... they stop, then get on the bus and finish the job. OK, Nesa. Like Laza<sup>20</sup>... say... he's younger than us... don't let him fuck up. Listen, would he prefer a medal than that...but the medal... those are Clinton's candies. I'll admit to that when you taste it. Say hello... where's Laza.*

**colonel general**

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*Hi Laza. I congratulate you for making them sign such an acceptable solution. We couldn't have got any better solution. I like this... that you say... we go on... thanks to our stoic endurance – we endured. Good, Laza. Have a drink with the boss. Cheers.*

**colonel general**

**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*... that we achieved a significant result in military-technical terms, that this was an absolutely unjustified aggression.*

**President of FRY**

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<sup>20</sup> Laza – colonel general Vladimir Lazarevic, Pristina Corps commander promoted to the position of the NG VJ assistant. Indicted for war crimes in Kosovo and Metohija by The Hague tribunal.

**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Fantastic. That's the most important thing – that it turned out well, and now tell me please: Have they accepted our stuff? Everything. Excellent. So there will be no vacuum anywhere. Can they keep up the pace during these eleven days.*

*They say they can have this dynamics – 11 days. So we got everything we asked for.*

*You're smart, but I noticed you were tired. Have you specified when we should begin pulling out? What? Less than 24 hours? By the way, we received the news from Cologne that G-8 decided the bombing should stop and passed it on to the Security Council. And what date did general Marjanovic specify... when we're supposed to start pulling out. And when is the D-day when the withdrawal from the zone 3 should start?*

*..... It should begin tomorrow.*

*I see. Do you have any other piece of information for me?*

**colonel general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*These two will go – the American guy and Ahtissari's general – to Russia because they've hear the Russians want to send 10.000 strong troops.*

**President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Tomorrow is D-day. Tomorrow the withdrawal should start. Good, Nebojsa, so if they're late we... OK, alright Nebojsa. I just want to say now we chucked in the provision... we didn't to move you... the provision that if they're late tomorrow, and if tomorrow is D-day+1... when the withdrawal begins... we included the provision that after three hours... that the termination is on the 11<sup>th</sup> day. Our perseverance has paid off. Well, there you go. What's going on... shooting... Well, don't allow anyone to get killed.*

## ***WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMY AND PEOPLE FROM KOSOVO AND METOHIJA***

*"Never does a man get as far  
as when he does not know  
where he is going"  
Bismarck*

\*\*\*

***lieutenant general  
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC***

*General, Marjanovic is on the line.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*Hi Marjan, congratulations. Anything new? Blasko should stay here. Fine. No, no, we have the concept of our orders. He should only refer to the Plan based on the army commander's decision. All the other questions can be defined here. I have the concept of our orders. Since we have to leave tomorrow, I can send it tonight. Fine. According to the plan you drew up together. I accept Blasko, he can stay. You first get a good night's sleep, and then leave.*

\*\*\*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC,***

*Was it difficult for them to accept this? But, they accepted all of it. The important thing is that you did an excellent job. I congratulate you, general.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*You heard the president's words of congratulations, and I support them.*

*Blasko, I congratulate you. And now off to new victories. Act according to the agreement. I will now call Curcin and we'll work. It will be*

*delivered in the course of the night. Here's Marjan on TV, so the president wants to hear him.*

\*\*\*

***lieutenant general***  
***SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC***

***lieutenant general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*We will send it immediately to all units. This rules out any kind of conflict with... Did you discuss this, just so there is no... Only two battalions. One division and one battalion. I understood you. Good luck and have a rest.*

\*\*\*

***Major General***  
***SLOBODAN LAZAREVIC***

*Yes, general?*

***lieutenant general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*Laza, listen. Please, by the command line, do your best to have any kind of expressions of sentiments, the opening of fire immediately stop. You will receive orders, so that fire is not opened and does not challenge these fools. But, I presume there is a lot of it down there as well. Officers should get up on their feet to visit the units and tell them that an agreement has been signed and that the withdrawal starts tomorrow. Tonight, only the air force will carry out raids, but it will not act, and the official termination will take place three hours, 2-3 hours after the start of the withdrawal of the first parts of the forces. I will send it officially.*

\*\*\*

***lieutenant general***  
***SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC***

*Clark called now, some ten minutes ago, and he said that, since the agreement had been signed, all activities were suspended, but we also expect from you the same kind of suspension of activities towards the*

*KLA, because the world is watching what is happening and you already know its story. He asked us to convey this message to you too.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*We issued such an order the moment the Agreement was signed. We have already forwarded the order to all the units, except if they attack us. So, the bombing has been suspended. Tell him that.*

***General  
WESLEY CLARK***

*Good morning, this is General Clark speaking.*

***Colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Good morning, this is Colonel Jovanovic from the cabinet of the chief-of-staff, General Ojdanic. You wanted him to call you this morning.*

***General  
WESLEY CLARK***

*Yes, I did. I have an important message for him. His soldiers must immediately start withdrawing and a cease-fire must be established along the Albanian border so that NATO could suspend its air strike. Alright?*

***Colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Yes, alright.*

***General  
WESLEY CLARK***

*When can the movement of VJ units be expected the soonest?*

***Colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*The movement of the units will start this afternoon, in accordance with the plan.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*You have to start earlier, before noon, so that this can be verified.*

**Colonel**  
**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*We will do everything in our power to have them start as soon as possible. However, according to the existing plan, this was to be around noon, but we will do everything we can.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*Fine. And when will a cease-fire be established in the western part of Kosovo and Metohija?*

**Colonel**  
**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Sir, as far as we are concerned, General Ojdanic has confirmed that last night, immediately after the Agreement was signed, he issued all the necessary orders to our units to halt all activities. Just a moment, please. At the same time, we received promises from you that you will bring influence to bear on the Albanian side, and on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as well, to cease carrying out provocative actions against our units.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*Yes, that is precisely what we are doing.*

**Colonel**  
**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Alright. Wait a moment. We are especially concerned about the units stationed along the border with Albania, so we call upon you to use all your authority to put a stop to such activities.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*Alright, I will do it right now. But you must use your authority to halt activities by the special police.*

**Colonel**  
**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Yes sir, we understand.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*I will call you from time to time. I would like to be able to learn at that time how your units are progressing in their withdrawal. I will make the first call at 10 o'clock.*

**Colonel**  
**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*Yes, sir. We agree, but General Ojdanic says that, at that time, we will be in the phase of preparations.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*Fine. Do everything you can and as fast as you can, or else the bombardment will continue.*

**Colonel**  
**NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC**

*General Ojdanic says that we will strictly abide by the signed Agreement, and that everything planned according to the Agreement will be carried out today.*

**General**  
**WESLEY CLARK**

*Alright. We will also abide by the signed Agreement.*

***Colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*OK, sir. Just a moment, please. The general would like to ask that the arrival of your forces be synchronized.*

***General  
WESLEY CLARK***

*It will be.*

***Colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*That would be all. Thank you, sir.*

***General  
WESLEY CLARK***

*We will call you at 10 o'clock to get the latest information about your preparations. Goodbye.*

***Colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC***

*Goodbye.*

**The VJ was faced with a serious operation – its withdrawal from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Over a hundred thousand men in uniform with materiel and equipment were to withdraw from part of their territory within the several following days. Leaving with them were also enormous columns of civilians fleeing in the face of the oncoming, revengeful KLA which no one was controlling this time. Rivers of people and materiel were pouring in towards central Serbia. Officers were moving their families from the garrisons in which they were serving. Some of them were experiencing the same Golgotha for the third time. The patriots who played war drums before the war, and the price for whose music was paid in blood, were now withdrawing together with the long-suffering people who did not know who and what to believe. Leaders of the ruling parties from the territory of Kosovo had made provisions for themselves in**

time, and this was perhaps a unique opportunity for them to justify the fact that they had secured livelihood for themselves in Belgrade. The withdrawing operation passed more or less successfully. The “supreme commander” had an opportunity, together with the VJ chief-of-staff, to come out from his mouse-hole into the fresh air and to start presenting decorations and stripes to the once again deceived and wretched army. For the entire period of the war, none of the mentioned gentlemen found it necessary to go to the first front lines and visit those who were giving their lives in the belief that they were doing the right thing.

*lieutenant general*  
**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*lieutenant general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Here is how things stand. As regards this cessation of activities, this was ordered immediately and was ensured in all the units. Then I told him you had promised to see to it that the other side does the same. Therefore, whenever there is any activity from there, we call him. He said he would personally take measures to ensure it. Please, since those at the time consider this to be certain, I want your men to inform me exactly how things stand. He will call me again around 10 o'clock and I will tell him that the forming is under way, that units are in the phase of withdrawal from the existing positions and that a ..... order was being formed, and at 12 o'clock we will inform him that it had started, that he can check it out and officially ... It should be said that the conditions of a state of war will not be suspended for us until we pull out of there. So, if we have to, we should even be a bit tough and arrest someone. Here, Colonel Jovanovic is sending his greetings.*

\*\*\*

**VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC**

*lieutenant general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Here, let me tell you that Clark called me this morning. He is insisting on the suspension of all activities. I already issued the order the moment the agreement was signed. This, of course, also applies to your part. We have to show restraint, unless we are attacked. We cannot deviate from this,*

*because they will hit us again. He insists, asks when we will be ready to withdraw. I said today by noon and he said - the sooner the better. We cannot make it earlier, at 12 o'clock the first column will move. They will carry out an inspection and officially take it down. There was nothing last night. I told him – here, the promise has been made and you, for your part, see about the other side, because they have opened fire from the territory of Albania. And he personally will see to it to force that side not to provoke, to suspend activities in line with the Agreement. For us, the other side is the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), it is them. They had a correct attitude after the agreement was signed, not a single shot was fired. There are other problems as well – the Russians in Zone 3, which we will be leaving first. They are now intervening through them, because the plan is for the Russians to come. They have not even determined the composition of their forces, but they already have the version predicted by Clark and his company. And let 1-2 planes land through an intervention, so that at least a symbolic number of the Russian forces... I would like them to enter first, although they did not pass the test in any way. Shame on them. It is only now that they are taking the decision instead of having a pre-prepared solution. This means that they were not even preparing to participate on the territory of Yugoslavia with their forces.*

\*\*\*

*lieutenant general*  
**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*General, I don't know whether you have received it, but I sent you personally a document in which we are requesting that the ministry...*

*lieutenant general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*The team will be setting off today. I called last night, I called the minister since at no point did I (want him) to appoint this head of the Administration for status and systemic issues, the representatives of the Legal administration, human resources and civil engineers. They will all be disarmed, that will all be a civil administration. And find that Bojovic. Most important for you now is this with the army. Leave the civilian sector. Let us meet this deadline.*

\*\*\*

*lieutenant general*  
**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Pavke, I checked it out. General Ristic from the Defence Ministry is setting off with a competent team, so put pressure on them there to resolve everything to the extent to which it is possible.*

*\*\*\**

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*Good morning, general. Did you have a good sleep.*

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Clark woke me up. He wanted to hear whether activities had been suspended. I confirmed this, because it is so, except for the merrymaking and celebrating of the people and also in the units. Secondly, I told him that we could not guarantee for the other side, nor was this in our power or within our competencies. The other side promised to intercede with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), not to open fire from the territory of Albania. He said he would do everything in his power and I see that Clinton also made an address and said that ... and he was interested in the time when the withdrawal would begin. I told him that we were ready, in line with the agreement, and that the start of the withdrawal of the first echelon would be at 12 o'clock. I talked to Pavkovic 2-3 times and he confirmed that they were ready.*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*This issue of not opening fire on the regions where the forces are rallying for withdrawal is not even topical now, because the bombardment has been fully halted. It is important always to take all the measures.*

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*He called me again at 10 o'clock. He will now constantly keep nagging me to tell him how these preparations are going, in what phase they are,*

*and he says that when it starts at 12 o'clock, they will check it out from the air.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Then they need to declare that the bombardment has been officially suspended. They want to carry out their procedure, but there is no danger there. We will all abide by the agreement we made.*

***lieutenant general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*I intervened with these Russians, because we now have a problem which is creating a vacuum. You see that they are still debating, asking for the final decision of the Russians, of Yeltsin, and I said in that telegram that was sent that they should also talk to this envoy of ours and send at least two planes to land at Pristina airport so that the Russians are the first to come. That would be most important for us – to have the Russians be the first to enter that areas that we will leave first. Can you imagine, they did not count on this at all, but they are deciding now when the forces are to carry out the takeover. They could have had part of their forces at their airports on the alert and that would be that. The question is what Yeltsin will decide.*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*And then we will say what the Russians are, shame on them. They keep humiliating themselves day after day. If they do not send 10,000, they are really wretched. General, how many of our people have been killed in the war, ending with yesterday.*

***lieutenant general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*Ending today, a total of 462 men were killed. Fifty officers, 34 non-commissioned officers, that is 7%, then 37% of the soldiers, and 136 men or 29% of the reserve forces. There is something they did not manage... there are 71 left and that is 15% by the categories, so that it has not been categorized.*

*And the Albanian-terrorist forces mostly range somewhere up to 35% of this figure, while the rest is a smaller percentage, but let me not deal with figures which ....*

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I have information that 114 policemen and 462 soldiers were killed. Among our people, one per thousand was killed throughout the entire war. Because if we have 400,000 people, that is one per thousand, for the entire period of the war, over a period of 77 days. This should enter the annals of the military science. I do not know how much this is according to military standards, what do you say about 1%.*

***lieutenant general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*We have these extraordinary events - that goes separately, we register these losses separately. There are another 68 people. We register them as extraordinary events, but they were practically killed in the war. We have 68 fatalities. These unfortunate people have to have all the rights as all the others, because if they had not been there, they would not have been exposed to danger.*

*There is no special need for us to meet tomorrow regarding the symbols for the celebration of Army Day, regarding the decorations. It will be held at the National Theatre. The programme lasts an hour and 33 minutes. I was in favour of it being held at Topcider, but Sava Centre provides a higher level.*

***\*\*\****

***lieutenant general***  
***BLAGOJE KOVACEVIC***

*I am with my cronies. We got together this morning at 9 o'clock and this process is starting today, we are planning, organizing and monitoring. So, I am at the old place today. I will stay today, according to the agreement, with Marjan, to see them off. It is important to start moving. Everything will go according to plan. We will inform them in time, there is no need for them to rush us. We will do it according to plan. I will need 3-5 officers who know English. That will be our biggest problem.*

\*\*\*

**President of FRY**  
**SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

*General, these 462 Army members who were killed, do you have any idea about their ethnic composition. We have no such information. Because, there were also Hungarians there. I do not want to go into any... because I wanted to have an idea, since there are certain things that should be politically emphasized and some that should not. If someone has a list, that is not a big list for a certain period of time, how much time does he need. I will call you. Let him call Susic in an hour.*

\*\*\*

**Deputy Prime Minister**  
**SAINOVIC**

*Did our guys start the procedure. What is the information from the field? So, this plan, did they finally send the text? This means that the withdrawal is to begin at 12 o'clock. Do you expect any problems on your side?*

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*No. It is a bit specific, because we have envisaged that the Russians will come to that area, especially that part in the north, with a majority Serb population, and I intervened. There is still no final decision. Everything is hypothetical with them, from 2-10,000. Yeltsin needs to give the approval, which means that they had not planned to come at all, since they had not prepared forces to transfer them here at least in an aircraft. I suggested that they do so, since the airport down there can be used during the day, the Pristina airport can be used during the day. Let them bring in any number.*

\*\*\*

**lieutenant general**  
**RISTO MATOVIC**

*I told them to make a short review which will show that as well, since we have a number of people whose names we do not know and we would put them among the others. That is what I said, and I also said that we should*

*put an explanation below saying that this is how it will be determined, how the data will be determined.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*Call them down there at 12 o'clock and inquire about the movement, in case Clark needs to be informed or let them call, but it would be better to inform them. Call Pavkovic. Come here and maintain contacts from here, first with Pavkovic or Colonel Jovanovic.*

\*\*\*

***lieutenant general  
RISTO MATOVIC***

*General, I talked to Kovacevic, but he says that a plan was made to start the movement at 1 o'clock and he says that they were informed about that. They will send us that plan by fax, so we will have it. So, let things go according to plan, let's not have me and Jovanovic hurry it up, let it go according to that plan. Here, they are bringing in the plan now.*

**A problem for Slobodan was the political marketing itself that had to be carried out towards his own people. For him, the dead were just per thousands and ordinary figures. He expected much more from the Russians, but got almost nothing. He was extremely angry with them, but could say nothing. Since he did not understand his own position, as it was, it was illusory to expect him to understand the kind of difficulties Russia was facing at the time. At its helm was aging and ill Yeltsin. Indecisive and surrounded by people who paid more attention to their own interests than the interests of Russia. Yeltsin was unable to do anything that could improve Milosevic's position. That anarchy that was reigning in Russia at the time is best attested to by the fact that the decision on the arrival of their troops in Kosovo was taken totally rashly, chaotically and without the knowledge of all structures of power in Moscow. Noting else could be expected from a country that was facing bankruptcy, stuck in the mire of the conflicts in Chechnya and standing in line for receiving western financial assistance. It was just a pale copy of the one-time military and political machinery that was shaking Asia and a considerable part of the World. Due to its old glory, the Russophiles prevailing among our politicians and the hopeless situation we were in, all the eyes were turned to the east. Let us just recall a patriot by**

profession, as Milovan Bojic was, and the “nyet” he uttered from the staircase of a Belgrade building, before the bewildered people. That “nyet” also had its price which was paid in Swiss francs and stacked away on the “comrade’s” bank account thousands of kilometres from here.

## ***The Russians’ Arrival in Kosovo***

*June 12, 2000*

***Ambassador MILOSEVIC***

*Good evening. We have just started renewing the army. They tricked me into returning to this. I was well off in business, I had a few years of easier life, but now this again. The only thing is that you get good instructions, I listened to your conversation and I understood you very well.*

*I wanted to say the following: Here is my friend, your representative is still waiting, he called me now. I will probably have to participate in the signing of that military-technical agreement between us and them. And do you have any idea for this to be done in Belgrade, to make in faster. Between Yugoslavia and the Russians, if necessary. I would just like to ask the following - to have someone always on duty there, so that I would be able to contact someone who is responsible and so that we would be able, if necessary.....*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*On this telephone. I will see that a team is there always, non-stop, throughout the night, I have my assistants, and I will sleep there were I always sleep. What seems to be the problem now?*

***Ambassador MILOSEVIC***

*I don’t really know. According to some newspaper reports there, that Talbott came back here and they started some talks again. There are*

*some tough and less tough statements, like about the Russians' legitimate right to be present as well, but it seems that they are really eager to be there first. The press and these agencies are stirring up things even more. A column is coming, the Russians want to be the first, they want this zone, they want that zone. There cannot be a unified command. It cannot be unified, as far as the Russian side is concerned.*

*I heard the foreign minister saying 15 minutes ago that they will have to find a solution that will not bring stability into question*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Well, allegedly those down there set off from Macedonia and they encountered sniper fire from those NATO members. There they killed our captain when we were conducting negotiations. Feel free to call if there is any need for any kind of consultations.*

*\*\*\**

*..... (?)*

*Blair's representatives, there is information that they had ordered Jackson urgently, in the course of the night, to enter this area here and beat those from there to it. Simply to cause some kind of incident. If only they knew that the others wanted to enter before them. They are preparing to land before them in Pristina.*

***Lieutenant General  
SPASOJE SMILJANIC***

*I and General Grga are here at Surcin. For now, there is no movement from there, and if they do start moving, the earliest they can be here is in three hours' time. You probably know how things are progressing down there and who is coming from there. Those down there have reached the General Jankovic crossing, but some kind of conflict broke out and they stopped. They will allegedly continue moving at 00.01 hours. Will they really set off, I don't know. I suggest that we go to our rooms, while General Petrovic is at the observation centre, he is linked to the announcement and registration system and he will redirect them to go straight down. It is possible to land down there in night conditions and the time of the arrival of the data was absolutely no problem. They are not allowing them to use the air space, but if they do issue an approval,*

*Petrovic is on the line, I will be in the office and I suggest that Grga also goes to his office. He will call you if necessary.*

**On the scene then appeared Milosevic's tactfulness, which was always for single use and its visionary quality was measured by days, and not by years. He once again decided to set the East and the West against each other, neglecting the fact that Russia had already bought NATO boots and was only waiting for an opportunity to put them on. In private conversations, far from the Security Council which Slobodan had sworn by just a few days before, the issue of the arrival of Russian troops was raised. When one takes into account the fact that Russia is in Partnership for Peace, that it has enormous debts and that it too had a war on its territory, then the whole drama over the arrival of a handful of Russians in our territory could be described as Milosevic's imagination rather than a serious diplomatic action in which the Russians could play the main role after the war. President Yeltsin, torn between old glory and the years that had long since erased even the slightest possibility of his authority playing any major role in international relations, took a catastrophic decision for both himself and for us. He sent to Kosovo unprepared soldiers who, with a forced march and under the influence of alcohol, to the general surprise of the west and general joy of the Serbs, arrived from Bosnia at the border on the south of Serbia. World diplomacy did everything to prevent a conflict between NATO forces and Russian troops. Then came apologies from the Russian foreign minister to his western counterparts. All the time Milosevic knew that this was a small tactical move which would have no effect on the course of history in these areas in a few days' time. A master of turning a mouse into an elephant, Milosevic and his television maximally exploited the arrival of the few Russians in Pristina streets.**

***President of FRY***  
***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*General, please, there were some cases when certain units were moving – of course, is doing this excellently, I am very satisfied with the way he is doing that, but tell Laza to say that every commander of every unit should tell the population: “We are here, UN forces are arriving, we will not leave before they come”, because I saw that in Prizren the anti-aircraft defence had started moving and they said – we're leaving, and God help you, etc.*

*There is nothing for the anti-aircraft defence to do, there is no bombardment and there is no need for them to make such comments. Take some measures so that these people of ours, who truly did fight heroically, would not do some damage now.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Let me tell you that I already did so when I talked to Markovic.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Here, those politicians from down there are saying that the mayor, that small guy, had sold his apartment in the municipality for 650,000 and then fled. I cannot earn 65,000 German marks, and he sold it for 650,000 marks. It is important to order each commander to tell the population in every contact – your security is guaranteed, don't worry, everything will function under the UN. To prevent this, Markovic gave a very good interview. I watched him on TV. He spoke well, and so did Laza, and they were down there today. I sent Vujovic to talk to all of them and to explain, in general to the people at the green markets, that everything was functioning, working. But I think that a few of those local politicians, who had illegally acquired a lot of money, got the poor on the move in order to go in front of them, since they do not know how to flee Kosovo with that money they had stolen. They are letting the poor go in front of them, so you have the people moving, and they are moving with the people. Those are crooks. I told Vljako to bring back under guard any municipal official who had started leaving and not to let him move. So, let your security line also function, and let no one move from his job. Have the Russians arrived in Pristina? How much time do they need?*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Not yet. They passed Kursumlija because they were held up somewhere above Nis. They went slowly. While they poured fuel, drank at a café, they are somewhat intoxicated. They allegedly have problems at midnight, they cannot enter. There are big problems up there, they are not letting them carry out the flight. The Hungarians are not giving the Russians their approval either. They do not want to give their consent, the Bulgarians won't either and they have still not set off. We spent 9 hours with 15 buses and 10 trucks and with both police escorts in order to get*

*the column down there. Those who come off from the plane..., but we told them to go to the Pristina airport, it is functional and you can also land in Pristina in night conditions, and now they are there. I also talked to the ambassador. The relations are strained.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Why don't they fly, what do they care if they will not give them permission. Will the Bulgarians shoot at them?*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*We have a source in England which has reported that they somewhat unexpectedly lifted B2s which can possibly carry out some kind of an intervention if the Russians do what they do not want them to do, because they are now defeated by the fact that the Russians are the first to enter. They have already entered Kosovo. But quite honestly, that is a peace force, but ... Who knows what these lunatics can do. Once they had started carrying out their assignment, they should have completed their assignment.*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I have planned to meet with you tomorrow somewhere between 10 and 11 o'clock. Are you ready? Issue this order immediately.*

***\*\*\****

*..... (?)*

*General, hello once again. There, you see, Mihailo has returned from the Centre and he brought back a draft military-technical agreement between the defence ministry and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the import and stay of a special military contingent on the territory of Kosovo. It has four pages, the titles should not be changed. They are now waiting for us to give our opinion about it. I think that we should send it directly to you by fax. What do you say? This is, therefore, the agreement whose preamble says that it is in line with article 7 of the Resolution and that at issue is cooperation between the two sides on the import and stay of that special contingent, and then article 1 says that our government agrees, that it accepts and that state bodies agree to ensure the*

*deployment and the operative activities of these forces and that we will fulfil our obligations stemming from this agreement. Article 2 defines certain terms over which we all agree. There are three terms – sides, meaning the legal persons who had signed, then the special military contingent of the Russian Federation – they call it CVK. This means the military formation that is deployed on our territory, but it has its weaponry, military equipment and all the necessary reserves that cover a certain territory of a country, since the borders are defined. Then the third term is the forces of the sides in the conflict, all our military commanders, the military police, reserves and intelligence bodies, and equally all the formations of these Albanians, meaning the sides in the conflict. Article 3 says that the goal of that agreement is to establish a lasting cessation of hostile activities and control of the implementation of the Resolution. The control of the cease-fire, guaranteeing the realization and preventing the forces not envisaged by article 6, annex 2 of the Resolution, from returning to Kosovo. Then the disarming of all the illegal formations, including the KLA, the creation of security for refugees and displaced persons, then ensuring social security and order until responsibility for the performing of these tasks can be assumed by the international, civil... the supervision of the demining of the territory of the zone of responsibility. The realization, according to the needs, of the obligations regarding border control and the last securing of the protection and freedom of movement of their civil forces in the zone of responsibility. The zone is in the northern part.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*This is now good, there is no task of providing full security and safety for the citizens, belonging to all nations and religious communities. That must be the first task. The full security, personal and property safety, of citizens of all nationalities regardless of their religion and ethnicity. Do you agree?*

*.... (?)*

*Let me now read on. Article 5. The development of CVK will proceed in line with the local authorities of FR Yugoslavia. The start of the development of the middle CVK group will be synchronized with the start of the development of other contingents of the international military presence. The further development of CVK will take place according to the dynamics agreed on by the two sides, us and them. In order to ensure the landing of planes of the military-transport aviation, the Yugoslav side*

*is providing the airports in the areas of Belgrade and Slatina. For the purpose of the unloading and loading of weaponry, m/s, the Yugoslav side will provide railway stations in the places of deployment. Concrete stations will be defined in agreement with the local authorities. The Yugoslav side will provide assistance in supplying the contingents with electricity, food, drinking water, technical water at prices which the sides agree on. Article 6. In line with the obligations, the authorities of Yugoslavia understand and accept, they agree to have the contingent be deployed and to operate in the areas of the zone, having the authorization to take all the necessary measures to establish and support security for all the citizens of Kosovo. Article 7. The CVK and its members will bear no responsibility at the expense of state or private property that would be inflicted.... tasks in connection with the realization of the agreement, they will not fall under the responsibility of courts in FR Yugoslavia in any respect. Material damage that is inflicted on the Yugoslav side in the defeat of the CVK will be regulated. Article 8. Without bringing into doubt any of the stands, the sides have agreed to consider that the CVK commander that the authorization to request the transfer, withdrawal or - dislocation of certain forces of the sides in the conflict, materiel, weaponry, and also the termination of various measures which, according to the opinion of the CVK commander represent a potential danger and the realization of their tasks or the other side [incomprehensible!]. The sides in the conflict that do not fulfil the requests for transfer, i.e. the realization or dislocation or which have not suspended measures endangering or potentially endangering ... after receiving an adequate request from the CVK can be faced with the implementation of all the adequate measures, including the use of those necessary measures with the goal of ensuring the presented stands. Article 9. For ensuring the fulfilment of obligations towards FR Yugoslavia and cooperation with international bodies and with the authorization of the UN Security Council, the CVK commander is authorized to provide assistance to these bodies. Article 10. For the sake of the realization of this agreement, a joint commission will be formed after the deployment of a special military contingent in Kosovo according to the decision of the sides in the conflict. Article 11. The agreement will come into force on the day of its signing.*

***lieutenant general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Let me consult General Kovacevic. I believe, the two of us are of the opinion that all this is very correct and harmonized with them and that*

*wretched American side of theirs. Only if they accept it. You just send that. It is in our interest for this operation to proceed as soon as possible, and we have already compared it, since Kovacevic was at these talks. There is no deviation. On the contrary, certain things are more favourable, all the more so since it creates the possibility for the Russians to have their commander and it does not go into the issue of whether and to whom he is subordinated. He is not subordinated to NATO, but quite certainly to that representative authorized by the UN secretary general. In our opinion, there is nothing disputable there. If there is any need, we can send a fax or a telegram or something like that. We are eager to have this signed and to start with its realization. The zone is exactly as we insisted, absolutely acceptable.*

***lieutenant general***  
***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*The marshal is now with the president. You have received it, i.e. translated it.*

***lieutenant general***  
***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*The important thing is for them to get the zone they have marked. It's good. It would like it to include the patriarchate, Pec, but since the patriarchate will be protected by our forces according to this agreement, then everything is acceptable. Because, all those cultural and historical monuments will be secured by our forces, either the police (MUP) or the army. It is necessary to determine the exact criteria for establishing what they consider cultural and historical monuments to be, those recognized according to certain international criteria. It is important to keep the people there, to prevent a total erosion, withdrawal, because that would complicate everything, while these monsters who took a lot of money a long time ago have ensured for themselves a safe haven here in Serbia's interior and now, using the poor as a guise and under their protection they are practically moving at the head of the column with them. Those Serbs in Kosovo – I served 8 years in Kosovo, I know well what they are like. For 40 years we..., and now this generation of ours has to correct... we are losing Kosovo, and 50 years, that famous Constitution of 1974 that buried us.*

***lieutenant general***  
***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*I said on a TV channel: What do you know about that? Do you know that after the adoption of the Constitution the relations were such that the Serbian interior minister could not go to Kosovo without the written consent of the Interior Ministry (MUP). They kept silent.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*The responsibility for this lies with those Serbs and Montenegrins who held high positions and wanted to preserve them, so they toadied to the Albanians, and there was a possibility then, while Tito was still alive, for it to be resolved properly. We will be in touch.*

***lieutenant general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*There are no major problems, except the jammed roads. We are trying to do something about it. Here, it is only now that these MUP bodies are being engaged to regulate that traffic. The biggest problem is the delay in the arrival of these forces in Metohija. The Germans are late in arriving. It is only today that the Germans and the French might enter, and it is difficult to carry out the takeover later. This is the third day.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Nesa, this should be forwarded in written form and it should be said that we were unable to carry out the signed plan, the withdrawal, due to the belatedness. So that they cannot find an excuse in saying that we were late, instead of 13 days, that we...*

***lieutenant general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*We keep writing to them and they know that. These Russians (came) down there, you know, through Kosovo Polje, to the airport. There are certain indications that the English are preparing a stronger unit that would come and overpower them somewhat. But let them do whatever they want to. Secondly, as far as our units are concerned, everything is proceeding according to plan. We will discipline all that, that route in all the directions in these centres where they are coming. Meetings have been held with the heads and municipal officials and other structures. We have*

*received this, this request of yours. I don't know whether we can turn senior officials back and chase them there throughout Kosovo, but if we come across them, they will be sent back. The entire SPS executive board has come. They are coming to Baki and let them handle that. We are keeping our leading people in their positions so that no one would have any objections, and they, we will see what we can do. I believe that those who wanted to flee have already left, there is no dilemma about that. You know where they have houses. We will not allow any kind of withdrawal until they come.*

***Ambassador MILOSEVIC***

*General, we talked all night, and they will not allow it. They are demanding that the Russians leave, withdraw. This political move of ours...*

***President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*Let's stick to 10 o'clock. Someone will meet you to give you instructions. Here at Uzicka Street.*

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.... (?)

*General, hello. An additional small piece of information. This Talbott, the deputy secretary of state is now flying to Macedonia with three generals and a certain Russian general will be there too. Also, in these talks he is referring to this agreement that we have concluded. We do not have that agreement, so order someone to send it to me. They say that Talbott has a political conclusion in that agreement, they have allegedly been authorized by Belgrade and so they can deny the Russians this or that. I have rejected this and said that there are no political conclusions in it, that it is just the military dynamics of the withdrawal, but I haven't seen it. Send it to me by fax, 9379555.*

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***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*You draw it up together and give me the exact concept of the organization of the protocol, the complete protocol. You cannot make it irrespective of*

*this that is at Sava Centre. Listen Nole, I ...nothing until I see it in concrete form and on paper, the plan, and checked out in practice. I see that when something is released with confidence that there are corrections in the plan, which were made by President Milosevic. I will come to show you, to correct it in time and to make this report the way that the army does it, on two pages, and not 10 pages – that way you have the form guaranteed, but no essence. Yes, and the things you have incorporated are disgraceful. That last night, if you had been here, I don't know, what I do not see... The one who did that plan for you must... At 1 p.m. and I will send this so that you can reach an agreement on the implementation of this plan, and I will write the speech. Unfortunately, I also have to do that message of congratulations. I have to rewrite the speech totally. So, I am sending you Vljakovic and his protocol manager. If necessary call Sava Centre to see who is in charge of the protocol to come to give me the full concept – how many people will be engaged, the engagement of the Interior Ministry (MUP) and the military police. And how will you regulate the issue of the people entering there, so that a person would know that he has the right to enter there, to go to that cocktail party. This reception will be held at 6 pm. 15. at the Federal Executive Council (government). A choir that will sign the anthem, after that the president will make an address, I will have to say a few words, let's see how you will ensure that Sava Centre is full. Apart from the official invitations, how will the rest be filled.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*I went to the president in regard to this Army Day and the regulation of all these issues. Here is how things stand, in short. There is no synchronization between that other side and the Russians. They held some kind of talks all night and all day and they reached absolutely no agreement. They will not give this sector that has been offered from the line of Istok, towards Istok to Pristina and towards Istok, southern Serbia. The Hungarians will not allow the flight over their territory. They are now awaiting the political decision of two American presidents. The English have announced that they are to come to Slatina, via Urosevac, during the day. How they will resolve this is their business. We really can have no influence on it, but as regards the time of our pullout, as much as they keep postponing their arrival and the takeover of the zone, we will have to keep postponing our plans as well. At 4 p.m. the Germans are to come to that Prizren part. At 7 o'clock this morning, these guys took over that part at the Dunavo watchtower and at the Glavocice gasoline station, while at 5 a.m. a small helicopter landing was carried out at the*

*Kacanik gorge, since they were not certain about the security of the communications, since the Albanian forces have already demonstrated activities. This is the current situation. All the Russians can do is move from there, they will make the arrangements for the sitting and they probably will not accept what we have proposed and what the Russians have accepted and for what they had fought.*

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**The state of emergency is still in force so that even the media in wretched Serbia were very cautious about giving assessments and conveying statements of both the opposition and the structures of power. Editors knew better than anyone in Serbia what had happened to their colleague Slavko Curuvija. There was no doubt that his murder had been ordered and carried out with the help of the secret services of Sloba's and Mira's regime. Thus, during those days, the Vreme magazine carried the statements of parties and their leaders showing that they were speaking differently about the whole thing, which was the first herald of the stormy year that lay ahead of us.**

### *Socialist Party of Serbia*

#### *The document preserves the integrity and sovereignty of FRY*

*The Socialist Party of Serbia has supported the plan for resolving the Kosovo crisis of the envoys of Russia and the European Union, Victor Chernomyrdin and Martti Ahtisaari, with the assessment that this document provided for "the establishment of peace and the halting of the criminal bombardment" and, that, at the same time, it preserved the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our state, while the resolution of problems in Kosovo and Metohija is being transferred to the UN, this confirming the role of this highest world organization, in line with its Charter", stated the SPS Executive Board. "With the unity of the people, the citizens, political parties, the leadership, with the heroic fighting of the army and police, we have managed to defend the freedom, dignity and honour of our people from the several times militarily, politically and technologically superior enemy, NATO, which carried out an aggression against our country with the goal of annulling the sovereignty and territorial integrity, contrary to all the standards of international law", says the statement.*

*The SPS stated that, "taking as the point of departure the fact that the greatest value is the protection of the people and the state", it*

*supported the document "that represented the basis for peace", and that it was on the basis of such orientations in favour of peace that a UN Security Council resolution will be adopted.*

*Miodrag Vukovic, advisor to Milo Djukanovic*

*Everything should be explained to the people*

*"It necessarily happened, it happened late, and someone must answer for that. It was necessary to establish peace, it was necessary to have the Kosovo problem resolved through negotiations, it was necessary to accept the international community as a partner and not to go to war with it, it was necessary to have a responsible attitude to the people and the state. Montenegro had asked for all these things. The policy in Belgrade first tore down the agreement on Yugoslavia, it created a patriotic Yugoslavia, it punished Montenegro and started charging towards the sky, but with the paupers in Serbia, while they moved themselves away from it all.*

*Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia, Kosovo will not be ruled by the Serbs, Serbia has lost its state integrity and all that should be explained to the people. Serbia will no longer be a unitary state. By decision of the Serbian parliament, it is being federalized, in the worst way for Serbia. The FRY practically no longer exists. There is a request for this space to continue to be one state, but that does not imply the present manner. Montenegro will never again (be) with this type of a regime in Serbia, be we hardly managed to save ourselves from having the authorities from Dedinje turn us into Hiroshima. Montenegro does want to be with Serbia, but a new and democratic one. We are apprehensive about the days that are coming and how Serbia will be able to cope with itself. With these authorities, Serbia will not be at war against the whole world, but it will not be with the world either.*

## ***REBELLION OF RESERVISTS IN SOUTH SERBIA***

*"When a man wants to murder a tiger, he calls it sport;  
when the tiger wants to murder him, he calls it  
ferocity."*

Bernard Shaw

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
**GEZA FARKAS,**

*Since I was determining this with the prosecutor's office, since I have when I flew in here, the new information that they are now not going down there with 37 and with buses etc. to return that, they confirmed by 24 [incomprehensible]. These prosecutors, the supreme judge, they say that, on the basis of this ultimatum, the signed document that was sent, we have the right to arrest them all.*

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*I am in favour of having them arrested, regardless of whether they had postponed... Who do they think they are blackmailing?*

**lieutenant general**  
**GEZA FARKAS,**

*Yes, I have. Here I have just come in, I was with the prosecutors and so on.*

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Is there anything especially interesting? I have read what you have sent.*

**Lieutenant General**  
**GEZA FARKAS,**

*I have just had consultations. They say, the chief prosecutor says that those who have sent such a petition and signed it with such a tone of an ultimatum which expires now at 2 p.m., that they should go get them back, that we have all the elements for an arrest. This means, together with the mayor.*

**lieutenant general**  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Of course, this is how it should be done.*

**Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,**

*We have seven plus eight signing it as an ultimatum ... by 2 p.m.... they are going to get them and the mayor has signed.*

**lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*Fine, and call me then. This evening we have with the president..., all the assistants here, it starts at 8 p.m. You come a few minutes earlier.*

**Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,**

*They had a meeting with Pavkovic. I don't know whether you have a report on this?*

**lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*No, not yet, but I know that Pavkovic is down there.*

**Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,**

*He has finished the meeting. The result of his meeting is that they have postponed it until the 24<sup>th</sup> if the issue of their return is not resolved, and then there is also an ultimatum. I had these consultations so as not to make a mistake there and not to have percentage-wise problems regarding certain issues and the fact is that we have firm arguments, we have their signatures and I... and the facsimile together with the mayor, and the mayor is SPS.*

**lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*That doesn't matter. He shouldn't have succumbed.*

**Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,**

*Therefore, I ask you now whether I should now issue the order for preparations to see and hear each other this evening and to do it in the morning.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*The president will be here this evening. I will tell him that, and have him confirm it, but I am absolutely for it. It has to be done sharply.*

***Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,***

*They have as an ultimatum 48 hours, there are all sorts of things written there.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*Send me by this guy of yours, send me these things.*

***Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,***

*I give my support to Aca down there, I have to support him from here, but since they are not going, if they were to set off now, we would do it now, and I think we have little time, little time to rest. We have to do that tomorrow, if you agree.*

***lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,***

*Yes, I do, but I think the sooner the better, just as much as you need to organize.*

***Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,***

*I will organize for this to be done, at alert tomorrow.*

*lieutenant general*  
**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,**

*This means that it is 15, plus the mayor – 16.*

*Lieutenant General*  
**GEZA FARKAS,**

*No, there are 7 from Baljevac and 8 from Raska and the signature of the mayor of Raska.*

Appearing here for the first time is also the name of journalist Miroslav Filipovic whom the military court sentenced to several years of imprisonment for alleged espionage. Mr. Filipovic was a journalist of the Danas newspaper and a correspondent of several foreign news agencies. His example clearly shows that whatever the service conceives the military judiciary carried out, while the Administration for Morale does the marketing and presents it to the public. The mentioned journalist experienced a real Golgotha without having a clue about who stood behind it and why. After October 5, instead of learning the truth, he was brought into an even bigger delusion because general Pavkovic, in order to conceal what was really happening, established contact with the mentioned gentleman, invited him over in an attempt to make up for what he had done to him. I myself had intended to visit Filipovic, to warn him about what was being prepared for him, but the value of the information I was receiving was more valuable than the risk of giving myself away in that manner. I have no knowledge of the Montenegrins having tried to warn him about what was being prepared for him. I believe that until this day and until reading this book, he himself did not know what was really happening to him.

At a session held on July 1, 1999, General Geza Farkas presented the following information regarding the mutiny in Yugoslav Army (VJ) units:

Correspondent of foreign media, especially our citizens, are intensively following the events concerning the protests of military conscripts and the measures being taken by the VJ for the purpose of resolving this problem. Especially characteristic is the conduct of Miroslav Filipovic, a journalist from Kraljevo, and a correspondent of Agence France Press, who, in contact with a security office, posed the following questions: how true is it that there is discontent in the

**VJ and that there is a group of people in the VJ ready to topple the present authorities by force. Is it true that the combat equipment of the 252<sup>nd</sup> armoured brigade had deliberately been left in Kursumlija so that it would not continue towards Belgrade in a combat formation.**

**Is it true that there was enough fuel in the tanks only to come to Kraljevo. Is it true that VJ members are realizing that the army has been sent on a plundering campaign to Kosovo?**

**Does he have correct information that there is discontent among higher officers, by which he means battalion commanders and higher, as well as an intention to topple the present authorities. At a rally in Cacak, this same journalist kept pushing the thesis that 23,000 military conscripts from Kraljevo had been compelled to resolve their justified requests with the force of arms.**

**Contrary to this, they are taking and planning further steps for the purpose of ensuring the broader support of the international community for acquiring a special status. From June 18 to 29 this year, an international conference for the democratic transformation of Yugoslavia was held in Vienna and organized by the Austrian Foreign Ministry.**

**The invited participants also included Branko Perovic, the foreign minister of the Republic of Montenegro, Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party, Nenad Canak, president of the Vojvodina Social Democrats, Vuk Obradovic, president of ..... and Rasim Ljaic. The president of the Sandzak coalition ... was to make the keynote speech on the political, economic and humanitarian situation in Sandzak, in the light of the resolution of the Kosovo crisis. However, he did not travel to Vienna because he did not receive a permit for leaving the country, so he sent his speech by fax.**

**Also, on June 28, a meeting was held in Ohrid of representatives of the Republic of Montenegro, Macedonia, the so-called Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Albania for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the creation of a joint union. The participants in the meeting discussed issues concerning the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations. They agreed at this meeting to continue on July 3 and 7 when they would thoroughly discuss and review the plans for the establishment of diplomatic relations.**

**During the war, permits for leaving the country were issued by one of the VJ administrations dealing with mobilization affairs. They were issued selectively and it did not take much wisdom to understand why the present minister, Mr Ljajic, did not go to Vienna and who**

prevented him from doing so. The military leadership was taking advantage of the state of emergency for a showdown with those who did not share Milosevic's views. Something similar was also happening in Montenegro, where special lists were being made of people whom the army called into its ranks during the war. Those were people from Milo's regime, and the lists could only have been made by Slobodan's coalition partner: there Milosevic had his political... in the form of the Socialist People's Party (SNP), a satellite which, on his behalf and on behalf of his policy, carried out the things Belgrade would conceive. The federal administration was under the strong influence of the SNP which was spending money of Serbian taxpayers for the purpose of destabilizing the situation in the mentioned Republic. Montenegro became an oasis of salvation for the Serbian opposition and the only opportunistic bloc in these areas that had the courage to oppose the tyranny from Dedinje. As such, it became the legitimate target of Milosevic's followers.

Slobodan had just rid himself of Kosovo, so that the only danger for him was small Montenegro. On the other hand, Montenegrin territory was a "political Normandy" in which ideas, money, agents and everything needed to start a war between services and interests was embarking. Milosevic knew that he could publicly act in Montenegro only through the VJ and its services. This was also sensed in time by the Montenegrin leadership so that a secret war started much before both sides were ready for it. The victory of one side automatically meant the defeat of the other. Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, President of FRY Slobodan Milosevic and the international community were all aware of this. The preparations for the elections in Montenegro were also attentively being followed by the VJ Security Administration even though this was not in its work description.

The speech of General Aca Vasiljevic, later a witness against his "supreme commander" in The Hague, literally went as follows:

*General, among the activities of the foreign factors during the previous week I consider it interesting to mention that further examination is focusing on the situation among professional VJ members in regard to the current political situation in the country, as well as the events which are yet to ensue. In contacts with certain VJ members, presented are theses about the existence of different stands and views on this situation between the generals and senior officers on the one hand, and junior officers, on the other, who are said to be dissatisfied and tense because of their own status and the situation in the country, with the assessment that here lies a potential nucleus for public discontent and rebellion, which*

*opposition forces are also counting on. In this regard, the headquarters of the opposition forces in the country are making different assessments and calculations according to which allegedly only 20% of the VJ members support the present authorities, that another 20% have a neutral attitude, while as many as 60% are for a change of power at any cost. At issue here are obviously arbitrary assessments and a desired state of affairs, so that we at the VJ do not have any more reliable indicators in this regard either. However, in view of the announced activities by the opposition forces and their active efforts to include VJ members in their plans and activities, special attention should be devoted to familiarization with the situation in the commands and units. In this regard, I have in mind certain quite reliable operative findings of ours about the plans of the Alliance for Change to hold on Transfiguration, August 19, in front of the Yugoslav Parliament in Belgrade, a large promotional rally at which they plan to gather over 150,000 citizens from all over Serbia. In that sense they have planned to transport citizens from the interior by 125 buses and trains, and for securing the rally they will engage the so-called association of reservists, activists of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party, as well as activists of independent trade unions. Planned for this gathering is the participation and appearance of a total of 22 speakers, headed by Dragoslav Avramovic<sup>21</sup>, and who will also allegedly include generals Vuk Obradovic and Momcilo Perisic. This rally would practically mark the beginning of the campaign for the elections being prepared for September 1, 2000. All this points to the need for us to take all measures, everyone within their competencies, so as not to experience any kind of surprise. In this sense, security officers have already been given the task of intensively monitoring and becoming familiar with the situation in their units and taking necessary preventive and counter-intelligence measures on the whole, and even individually.*

*The territory of Montenegro is still in the focus of the attention of foreign intelligence services. With the formation of various movements and organizations, and especially now with this latest thing that they did - it is a Montenegrin defence movement, with which, through propaganda, they want to emphasize the great danger of a possible intervention by the army for the purpose of toppling the current authorities in Montenegro.*

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<sup>21</sup> Dragoslav Avramovic, also known as Deka (Old Man), Socialist dissident, who managed to achieve stability of the inflationary dinar in 1994 and restore confidence in the economy. The then National Bank governor, Mr. Avramovic, became enormously popular, and as such, he was potential "target" for KOS (Counterintelligence Service) for fear that he could be Milosevic's rival in the elections.

*Characteristic of Montenegro and the composition of officers in Montenegro is the fact that we have a total of around 100 officers who are already members of MUP units. Around 17 officers have announced their departure from the VJ and the joining of MUP units. Around 40 officers are in a dilemma, and they will most probably leave the VJ. My proposal is for us informatively, i.e. to ensure our stronger presence down there on the territory of Montenegro, primarily because there is an absolute information blockade there, so that officers do not have information, only from that television there. We have made some tests and their television can be heard and seen all the way to Cacak.*

## ***TRACKING DOWN “INTERNAL ENEMY”***

One of the main tasks of the Counter Intelligence Service (KOS) after the air strikes in 1999 was to save the regime and, as part of this, their attention focused the “internal enemy”, i.e. the opposition in Serbia and the regime in Montenegro.

It was characteristic that the army was very interested in Niš, as the centre of Southern Serbia, and the then mayor of Niš, and the present prime minister, Zoran Živković.

They did everything in their power to discover what he was doing, whom he was in contact with, who was giving him instructions as so on. I had agreed with Buda to warn the opposition leaders, through Montenegro, about the intentions of the military leadership if it is assessed that some kind of operation against them could be carried out, and to warn them about it. In continuation I will present concrete examples.

Both the Collegiate Body of the Yugoslav Army’s (VJ) chief-of-staff and the “supreme commander” were regularly informed about the intentions of the Niš opposition. The situation was slowly becoming complicated and it required great skill to keep it under control. The fact that the unity of the opposition was feeble, while the vanity of its leaders was enormous, quite certainly played into the hands of the authorities. One such assessment of a future rally three days before the event itself was set out by General Gajić before the Collegiate Body of the chief-of-staff:

*Major General*

***BRANKO GAJIĆ***

*In regard to this rally announced for August 19, 1999. Its preparations are under way and they are under the direct influence and guidance of the foreign factor. There is no doubt that the rally will be held, but, according to the information we have, there will probably not be as many people as they estimate and as they present it to the public – 150-170,000. The number of people who will be present and the way in which it will all proceed largely depend on the conduct of the Serbian Renewal Movement’s (SPO) leadership. According to the current knowledge and to what is publicly being presented, the SPO and its leadership are for a more moderate manner, I would say - not to have any kind of escalation. However, we do not rule out the possibility of certain problems and even certain excess situations occurring, in view of the participants, the possible participants in that rally.*

*What is positive in a way, is the fact that there are differences and certain conflicts among the parties forming the Alliance for Change. Conflicts of interest, conflicts related to a power struggle, and there are also material*

*interests, certain financial means in question, and this can quite certainly have an effect on the rally and its results etc. I believe that we too at the VJ should take certain measures so as not to be taken by surprise. The possibility of individuals from the VJ participating in the rally, and perhaps even of the individuals whom we have identified causing certain excesses, are not to be ruled out.*

*As regards the situation in Montenegro, it is still registering a deteriorating trend. Two factors are very important. On the one hand, it is the things that are being done on the political scene – the endeavours that are being made at any cost and in every possible way, through practical conduct, to undercut and, I would say, annul or not recognize the laws of FRY.*

**I was at that rally. I had the estimate of the army and the estimate of the media that were inclined towards the opposition. That rally definitely showed that the SPO had exhausted its strength in the previous period and that it was not possible, unfortunately, at that moment to count on the SPO as someone who would be able to set the critical mass into motion and push it into a conflict with the regime. This was, at the same time, also the beginning of an open and final break between the rest of the opposition and the SPO. I must admit that General Gajić was right. There was no doubt that the VJ had its people in key positions in the parties who were providing it with information about the opposition's activities. On August 19, 1999, a meeting was held which was almost exclusively devoted to the opposition, its financing, surveillance... Today, three years after the toppling of the regime in Serbia, perhaps the answer to the question of why Milošević's generals are here even though he is in The Hague, could be found precisely in the fact that certain key personalities from the opposition of that time worked for the service.**

**The following speech clearly shows that the Security Administration infiltrated its people and that it possessed exact and verified information about the intentions of certain parties. This is being confirmed in practice three years after October 5.**

***Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAŠ***

*Extremists and other destructive forces are preparing to topple, outside parliament, the legitimate authorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia after the rally in Belgrade on August 19. They need to show their strength, ability to organize and resoluteness to cause unrest in the country in the upcoming period with unarmed, but armed means as well. Their activities have been systematically complicating the already difficult situation in the country. Especially their calculations regarding the constitutional role of the Yugoslav army. Regardless of the evident differences between the leaders of the Alliance for Change, they agree in principle that a change of power in the country is inevitable. It is*

*precisely on the basis of this that the foreign factor is trying to unite them, and it has made certain steps. Undoubtedly due to the estimate that a far smaller number of followers will attend the upcoming rally in Belgrade that announced – first a million, than half a million – the leaders of many parties will not appear at it, under various pretexts. Party leaders are declaratively in favour of the rally in Belgrade passing without incidents. It is being assessed that the authorities will take measures, primarily block the roads towards Belgrade, so that as few people as possible would attend the rally. In the SPO they do not expect the rally to achieve any major results as regards the requests for the dismissal of the current authorities. They believe that it is only in September that one can expect various forms of resistance and civil disobedience to kick into full swing. In this regard, radical elements in the SPO are saying that this party is preparing to topple the regime with more aggressive methods than ever before, while its leadership is advocating the stand that elections are inevitable as soon as possible and that they would win them. However, it is important to note that advocates of the violent toppling of the regime in the country, members of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, publicly advocated such methods on August 13, at the rally in Vršac. They are presenting in an increasingly conspicuous manner false insinuations about the VJ and they deliberately keep mentioning certain former VJ officers. Speaking at a rally of the Alliance for Change in Kosjerić on August 13 this year, Velimir Ilić, the mayor of Čačak, said he was familiar with the fact that allegedly only a small number of generals supported the president of Yugoslavia, while a majority of the members of VJ and the Interior Ministry (MUP) were against the current regime. Former General Momčilo Perišić informed those present, around 200 people in the town hall in Kragujevac, on August 10, that he had founded a new political party. As its members, he presented film director Predrag Bajčetić and composer Zoran Hristić, and as far as he himself was concerned, he said he had done everything to prevent such a crisis situation from arising, but that he did not succeed. After stepping down from his position in March this year, he maintained a reserved attitude during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, only to intimate in July, after having contacts with the leaders of certain parties, the leadership of Montenegro which he visited, and Patriarch Pavle, the formation of his own political party. The inaugural session of the Party for Democratic Change (PDS) was held on August 8 in Brusnica, near Čačak. It was attended by around 50 members. I have here that this gathering in Čačak was financed first by the Crown Council in London, the Serbian Orthodox Church of Gračanica of Windsor, the president of which is Jelena Jovanović, the daughter of Čeda Jovanović, an army general from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Canada, the Serbian People's Defence – a Chetnik organization in Toronto and Chicago, and the private banks of the Krstićs and Lazarevićs in Valjevo, they are members of the New Democracy. This inaugural gathering was presided over by Bishop Radović who proposed Perišić as the party president, which was accepted. Already on August 9, Perišić met with Patriarch Pavle and, on the occasion, the two of them decided not to participate in the rally in Belgrade. In a guest appearance on the local*

*TV network in Kragujevac on August 10, former colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinović set out a series of insinuations on account of the VJ, especially its security service, which he characterized as the darkest and the metastatic segment that was destroying the VJ. In the same show, Milivoje Glišić, the editor of the NIN weekly, said that Perišić could have resolved the issue of Kosovo and Metohija in a peaceful manner, but that he did not have the support of the state leadership for this. He claimed that there were few generals in the VJ who could match Perišić by his education, dignity and moral attitude. It is obvious that by predicting data on the number of the participants in the rally, with the demands that would be set to the current authorities in the form of an ultimatum, with announcements of excesses and so on, they were endeavouring to attract as large a number of participants as possible and, at the same time, to create a certain feeling of fear and insecurity among the ordinary population. The terror being carried out by the Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija... I now have here the scenario for today's gathering, related to this and in short... We received this information last night - Radoje Lazarević, as a representative of New Democracy (ND) in the organizational committee of the rally for changes, submitted a report to his party's representative council on the course of the preparations for the rally. In the report he intimated that the technical preparations for the placing of the stage would begin in the evening hours on the 18<sup>th</sup> this year, after the football match between Yugoslav and Croatia. They are already doing this in front of the Parliament building. The gathering of the participants in the rally with a musical program is envisaged to take place between 4 and 7 p.m. Predrag Đorđević is in charge of organizing the hosting of the program. The rally is to begin at 7 p.m. with the playing of the hymn "God Give us Justice", the reading of the letter from the Crown of Aleksandar Karađorđević and the offering of the Serbian Orthodox Church's blessing and support to the Alliance for Change by the Bishop of Vostanje Rakita. The plan is for the participants in the rally to be addressed by representatives of political parties who include: Mlađan Dinkić on behalf of the G-17 Group, Spasoje Krunić on behalf of the SPO, Zoran Đinđić representing the Democratic Party, Nebojša Čović from the Democratic Alternative (DA), Velimir Ilić representing the municipality of Čačak, but with the SPO contesting that appearance of his, Nenad Čanak on behalf of the League of Social Democrats (SDL), Vesna Pešić of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), Jožef Kasa, representing Hungarian democratic parties - Čanak was in favour of Žarko Korać speaking instead of him, Rebeka Srbinović as a representative of New Democracy (ND), Dragoljub Mićunović of the Democratic Centre (DC), Bakić gave up his intention to address the participants in the rally because speeches lasting 30 minutes, which he had insisted on, are not allowed. The end of the rally is to be announced by Predrag Marković, ideologist of the stability movement. It was agreed within the organization committee not to have any joint symbols on the stage, but only the Serbian flag, and below it the flags of the parties participating in the rally. While the participants can carry symbols of their choice. A place on the stage is planned only for those addressing the participants, while each party had*

received 5 passes for the space between the stage and the journalists. It was decided to have 300 people securing the rally. It was originally agreed to have the SPO and DS each designate and prepare 150 people for security duty, but Vuk Drašković refused to allow people from the SPO to be part of this. It was then subsequently agreed to have the security consist of 200 persons from the DS and 100 persons who would be provided by Nenad Čanak. The rally with cost 16,00 German marks, which will be paid by each participating party under equal conditions. As regards the rally, the organizer assess that it will be peaceful with a relatively high level of participation and the unity of the parties, but with an insufficient number of those attending it. The estimates range between 50 and 80 thousand participants in the rally. Mild manifestations of disunity among the participants are expected in the rally through the inappropriate reactions of SPO members when DS representative address the participants and so on. After the report of Radivoje Lazarević, the ND presidential council predominantly reviewed the following issues. First of all, what should the contents of Rebeka Srbinović's speech be. Secondly, what is the goal of the ND in this event, and thirdly, what is the request of the gathering on the whole. As the political goal of the ND, first emphasized was the formation of a transitional government, secondly, the holding of early elections - Ratomir Tadić was against this saying that these two goals were mutually opposed and that one ruled out the other. Žarko Jokanović is not of that opinion, but believes that a transitional government should ensure the conditions and create the presuppositions for the holding of early elections. He believes that, first of all, this will not be an academic gathering, but rather a street rally for which short and strong messages will be suitable. Secondly, that the rally will be attended only by people who support the opposition and who will find acceptable only the things in connection with the change of the regime. Thirdly, that Rebeka must address the young since she is close to their age. Goran Mitić, chairman of the ND board in Niš insists on the replacement of President Milošević. Ratomir Tanić is against this and he is in favour of a request that can be achieved, while the request for the resignation of President Milošević cannot pass at this moment, according to his opinion. He is also in favour of Rebeka appearing with a cautious speech and a moderate political message. Rebeka, however, does not want to appear under such guidelines, stressing that, during her speech, she will follow her feelings and speak in a manner that is dictated at that moment by the situation and atmosphere at the rally. At the end of the discussion Dušan Mihajlović took the floor and reminded those present that the rally was not the idea of Zoran Đinđić, but of Mlađan Dinkić, and that it was afterwards accepted by Vuk Drašković. He also stressed that Vuk Drašković would not be participating in the rally and that he was doing everything behind the scenes for the rally and Zoran Đinđić to fail. He said that he had talked to Matija Bečković last night, who told him that the rally was like blowing a pierced balloon. At the end, Mihajlović drew a conclusion. First of all, there will not be as large a number of people at the rally as the organizers had hoped. Secondly, the idea about a transitional government could not pass. Thirdly, Vuk Drašković considerably compromised

*himself towards the West during the war, while he was now compromising himself also among the opposition in the country. And his goal is not clear to anyone. Fourthly, the rally is very risky and possible are intentional provocations which would have unwanted consequences and which the authorities could take advantage of for a showdown with the opposition. Fifthly, he explained, he had refused to speak at the rally, even though he had surprised many with this, because he was aware of the fact that he was a poor speaker, and also because it was not clear what he should say. Sixthly, he set out the thesis that the ND must ensure for itself a specific and recognizable image. Seven, he believes it is good that Rebeka will be speaking so that they can show that they are not a leader's party, but a democratic party, and eight, the participation of the ND in the rally is the price for its inclusion in the opposition.*

**This information that was set out at the meeting of the collegiate body could not be found on the Internet or in the media. It is obvious that the counter-intelligence service of the VJ and of the Intelligence Administration were very much interested in how the opposition functioned, how it was financed and what its intentions were. The above mentioned shows that the information about the activities of the opposition had been gathered "from the inside". The informers who forwarded such information to Slobodan's service had to be inside the very leadership of the opposition parties. Today, three years after October 5, it will probably be very difficult to find out who had played a double game. It is here that one should also seek the explanation for how Milošević's generals "survived" even after October 5. If the opening of these files were to be approached in a sincere manner, many people would recognize their "tags", those who accompanied them, kept company with them, bought their children birthday presents... I leave it up to the reader to assess whether it is possible to acquire such information about parties, individuals, rallies unless you have someone in the leadership of these organizations. The files that were kept and are kept by the VJ security service are full of informers who did not spy to the benefit of the country, but to the benefit of an ideology and the regime. It has been like this since 1945. Over the past sixty years, many innocent people were destroyed because the powerful people in these services wanted it. I hope the late prime minister Đinđić was the last victim behind which members of communist and neo-communist secret services directly or indirectly stood. During Tito's time, the Counter-intelligence Service (KOS) of the Yugoslav People's Army was the backbone of the ideological state so that those archives were full of interesting information which would not jeopardize the security of the state if they were to be opened now. We owe it to the innocent victims to open them.**

Through these transcripts I am conveying only part of the atmosphere from the Collegiate Body of the Yugoslav Army's chief-of-staff, paying attention not to publish information that could endanger the main purpose of the service, of course in accordance with the Constitution. Therefore, a paradox was the fact that the citizens of this state spent billions of dinars, scrimping and saving, only for this money to be returned to them through the worst type of destruction. The Montenegrins at least did not pay a tax on their own ruin.

## ***MILOSEVIC'S "VICTORY" OVER NATO***

*"We should weep for men at their birth,  
not at their death."*

*Charles De Montesquieu*

***March 15, 2000***

***SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC***

*I do not want that the tasks, which you set out objectively and very professionally, on the basis of your professional work in the army, in all elements ranging from combat readiness to chain of command, mobilisation, security, rear, etc. .... However, I want to say that everything is absolutely clear and it is obvious – what is the result stemming from the Yugoslav Army conduct in the past year, and particularly during the aggression by NATO, which need not be emphasised because it is irrelevant for this gathering...*

*The army managed to defend the country – that's number one – and, above all, to justify the reason for its existence, and to defend the country from incomparably stronger and indeed incredible adversary in the aggression on a small sovereign country like ours. Secondly, the army succeeded in defending the country suffering minimal losses, which in this respect is an excellent parameter. These are mostly those two important parameters – that it fulfilled its task well in terms of survival of both the state and the army itself. And these are those two important parameters because of which the whole world gave full credit to our army, including our foes, though reluctantly so and sometimes only implicitly, but it is clear the army has been given full marks.*

*I would not like to go into professional evaluation and measurement of all these elements of combat readiness, but they are surely necessary to make some progress and further improve our defence. From the point of view held by our state, our people and state leadership, I think we may give full credit to our army for what it did last year under those conditions and under such*

*circumstances. It turned out those who often use that military abbreviation – with whom and with what... then those who were spreading defeatism explaining we have not enough troops, we have no strength and we have no resources, and in the end it turns out the defence is possible. It turned out that the army managed to find the answer to the question – with whom: with all those people who cared about the freedom of their homeland. With what – with whatever you have at your disposal, regardless of the fact that the resources were quite modest in comparison to the force which exerted pressure and attacked. They are defeated, we have defended ourselves.*

*I will tell you what I think and what I deeply believe in although this may seem exaggerated to you, but I do believe NATO died in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was supposed to be a test model for a future attitude of the greatest military power in the world towards the new world order, and for NATO – this was a fiasco. It is true that this is a model for the future positioning of the greatest power with respect to the rearranging of the world order, but this is a negative example in the world which became imbalanced after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact when a new kind of balance of power started to emerge. The contribution of our state and, above all, its army is enormous for tipping the new balance of power in favour of freedom-loving countries resisting to the policy of hegemony and dictate. Our contribution far outweighs what could have been expected of a country of this size and weight. The example set by our country stepped up radical, significant changes of the geopolitical scene of the modern world, the geopolitical scene of our planet. China, as the biggest country, has entirely changed its military doctrine and explicitly condemned the US policy of hegemony, and radically changed its attitude towards the development of its defensive capabilities. For the first time in its history, China declared it could not rule out the use of military means to achieve its goals. At the same time, China, Russia and India began interconnecting, forging mutual bonds, and the awareness of the necessity to resist to the new hegemonist keen on subjugating the whole world has been raised. I have based my view on this and many other elements which may be used to analyse my claim that NATO died in Yugoslavia.*

*Today, at an anti-NATO gathering in Great Britain, delegates.... several days ago of 201 delegates 199 voted – this was not anti-NATO rally but a peace convention – for the dissolution of NATO... not for condemnation of NATO but its dissolution. This is happening in the West. This is not happening in Iraq or in Libya, but in the West, in the heart of London, not to mention other elements. Therefore, I believe any other appraisal except for excellent marks for what the army achieved in the past year would not be objective. For your practical work all these evaluations apply and I accept them entirely, but I think we should all be aware of the genuine proportions of the results our defence achieved, not only in our country but abroad as well.*

*I would not dwell for too long on the situation in the country, but I would like to say a couple of things. Current Montenegrin leadership, in our view, cannot bring about the secession of Montenegro as the people there do not share the*

*leadership's views. Politically we have to work a lot in order to expose all the aspects of their treacherous behaviour, but today it is clear they have on their side only Albanians, small numbers of Muslims who are in favour of secession... and they have that Catholic enclave hoping to take over Boka Kotorska Bay. The West is interested in Montenegro only in terms of destabilisation of Yugoslavia. The moment Montenegro secedes... if such a scenario were to unfold, the West would lose its interest. And the moment the Albanians in Montenegro – who do not call themselves KLA, but essentially there is no distinction between them, and they do not like Montenegrins in Montenegro more than the Albanians in Kosovo like them – take whatever they could seize – and that is Ulcinj and Bar and all the way up north to Podgorica...*

*Secession of Montenegro would historically coincide with an end to the existence of Montenegro. Montenegro would be reduced to Katun District which existed in the Ottoman era – this would spell its collapse. We have it recorded from 1991... We were together at a conference in The Hague – presidents of former Yugoslav republics – when Kiro Gligorov told me they should affirm their statehood. Kiro, I told him, you will sooner lose your state than gain it. This has turned out to be true. Today, Macedonia practically exists no more. There is no a single Macedonian official – ranging from the president of the republic, minister of defence to prime minister – who actually knows how many foreign soldiers and troops are deployed on the Macedonian territory, and which army this is... and there is no one to whom that army is accountable – what numbers, which resources would be brought into the country; what will they bring; what will they take, what will they leave and where will they go... I think no one is actually informed about what this army will do in relation to all these things.*

*It was clear to us that the main political task of the Albanian element in Macedonia was to bring about the constitutional changes in the republic. They have only one demand – that Macedonia be defined in the Constitution ... not as the state of the Macedonian people and others who live in Macedonia, but as a state of two equal nations – the Macedonians and the Albanians. They are willing to cooperate inside Macedonia only to this effect. The moment the Constitution changes, the moment Macedonia is defined as the state of Macedonian and Albanian nations, the Albanians will say they have a right to self-determination because they are "constructive" people. They take the western part of Skoplje and further westward to the Albanian border and then declare they have seceded from Macedonia. The same will happen to Montenegro, but a much worse option is in store for their leadership because from that moment onwards a municipal prosecutor from Italy will issue an arrest warrant so that they will be arrested as smugglers, criminals, mafiosi, and no one will be protecting them anymore.*

*This is a usual practice in those countries which even applies to both senior and junior officials. Noriega was arrested when they did not need him anymore, and they were the ones who had created him and raised him, but*

*forget about Noriega. Just look at these people arrested during the Spider operation ("Pauk"). All of them were wanted people at the international level, but they all had Schengen visas in their passports and travelled freely throughout Europe because secret services of NATO countries needed them to do dirty jobs.... whether to kidnap that unfortunate bloke on the Mount Tara, or to kill Drljaca while he was fishing, or to slaughter someone else in some other place and arrest people and take them to The Hague. They all had Schengen visas valid for the next several years, and no one was stopping them at border crossings while they were useful, but the moment no needs them anymore – everyone knows where and how they would end up. In principle, the same applies to these people I have mentioned above as well.*

*Therefore I think we should insist on our principled position that the Montenegrin people has the right to decide its own destiny, that no one has the right to deny it, but also – no one has the right to impose something, disregarding people's views, something that the people did not decide for themselves, and we will stick to this.*

*Secondly, I believe it is important regarding the situation in the country... that is the opposition which is not an opposition but a fifth-column type of creation which now... well, I want to tell you now so that you can come to this conclusion yourselves and think about it... not a comparison but it is identical bearing in mind who their sponsors are and the creators of the policy for destruction of Yugoslavia. What is this identical with? Our fifth-columnist opposition in Yugoslavia has the same role which the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, had in Kosovo – to feign some conflict and to create the situation in which someone could intervene taking their side allegedly in the interest of democracy. Their role is no different from the role assigned to KLA which had been set up in the first place to play that role, and KLA was supported because of that role and the attempt to allegedly provoke a civil war... and the way they called it – "liberators, rebels" and the rest... so that they would have someone to side with, and those, who abolished UN and all the norms established after World War II, had to go back to the Security Council and vote for the resolution which said the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was guaranteed, and they had to recognise – through their actions – the leading role of the world organisation and its supremacy despite their efforts to revoke this... They had to do it. And who made them go back to the UN? We did. And who restored the reputation of the UN? We did. And now they are trying to degrade it further by their actions – you all know this very well – but life does not follow a straight line.... there are oscillations, fluctuations of certain tendencies.*

*However, one thing is clear – everything is moving towards multipolar structure and a new balance of power which was lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, we have contributed to accelerate this process, to shorten the time needed. That is an enormous contribution which our country has given for the world peace and the establishment of fair relations among free states of the whole world, and all*

*your individually and our army should be proud of that as well as our people which practically took upon itself, to defend on its own from the aggression.*

*I just want to say a couple of things more. That is this material aspect, and it has its external and internal components. I ... for this gathering here... because we are talking about very important and confidential information on the defence of the country. I want to tell you we have today the financial backing of China amounting to 560 million dollars. So this is one billion and one hundred million deutschemarks. All these states – members of the Stability Pact, and our neighbours – Bulgaria, Hungary, Bosnia and Croatia have not received together this amount of money from their foreign sponsors, and they say we are isolated, and they are the ones cooperating with the world... plus 150-million credit from Russia, plus some very good arrangements with friendly countries related to oil shipments and the payments of some old debts. Talking of this external aspect, we believe it will further be advanced and strengthened.*

*When it comes to this internal aspect, you can see we have opted for New-Deal type of approach to the recovery of economy by way of undertaking large investments employing large numbers of people, which in turn result in a proliferation of economic activities. Now we are launching this package of construction works, which should also have positive effects on the whole of economy because the construction of housing blocks is the most complex reflection of all other types of construction. At issue here is not only the production of the construction materials like glass, lumber, equipment, then sanitary engineering equipment, etc., but also the fact that no one would live in an empty apartment so you would have to buy everything – glasses, forks, plates, bad sheets, textiles, furniture, etc. The construction of housing blocks provides a complex impetus to the economic growth, and we will kill several birds with one stone in this way because we will drastically step up the process of solving the problem of housing for the army officers and soldiers. You need about 16,000 flats, and I reckon we can build these 16,000 flats in the next three years. I hope this year the army will have first 5,000 flats so that the people could move in. That is the current dynamics we are working on right now.*

*Therefore, the fundamental issue at this moment for our country is neither this treacherous opposition – the people saw through it – and we are not much upset about it... we have to be cautious in terms of this security aspect so that they do not pull off some dirty trick because of their bosses, etc., but they are not a problem as a political factor. Our real problem is the social welfare situation and our primary task is to step up the economic development. Under the circumstances marked by constraints, blockades, restrictions and freezing our assets in bank accounts, this is happening more slowly than it otherwise would have, but still this is unfolding at a satisfactory pace and this will be a priority for us.*

*And now, in all this – the position of the army. This we have to change in terms of relations... because it is only logical that for decades the people have been saying the army shares the fate of all other entities in the society. This seems to*

*be fair and it is fair, but this is not smart for a country which has been recently exposed to pressure and aggression. Therefore, we are now changing this relationship in favour of the army. The army must be given certain privileges with respect to the distribution of GDP. We started with this in this fiscal year since only the army's budget has been realistically increased, while other budgets for public expenditures have been decreased, but we will pursue this further because we have to ensure the full functionality of the new organisation of the army – the way we would like to modernise it... and we cannot effect changes overnight, but we must implement our economic policy and internal distribution in this direction.*

*This is mostly everything I wanted to say in relation to these – how should I put it – external and internal political issues, but bearing in mind that you're all very well informed, and now let me say a couple of words about this analysis. I would like to appraise the analysis. I think analysis is very good. It has been done with due diligence. We also take into account the previous analysis of strategic groups; in the analysis of strategic groups, analyses of subordinated units, commands and institutions preceded this.... so my general impression is that it has been done rather well and what I have noticed in the presentations of the assistant to the chief of staff and the presentations of the commanders of strategic groups is that the problems are very well defined and ... very well defined proposals.*

*Now the task would be... for those proposals... we have defined the problems in order to see what is to be done... to transform those proposals into immediate tasks ... to draft realistic and dynamic plan, to implement these proposals given in the presentations of the strategic groups commanders, to draft a plan and determine dynamics for the implementation of these proposals, which, of course, we have to apply... the possibilities about which general Ojdanic was speaking, but we should endeavour to have the dynamics strained to the maximum because... if we took theoretically a pure logic construction... if we were to realise those proposals, we would then have an ideal situation because the proposals you have given in the conclusions of your presentations have practically compensated all the shortcomings and set the course we should take to solve these problems, and there – you have to be indeed versatile. General Smiljanic said four components... if one component was broken, then the question is whether the remaining three use their full capacities and how they connected and linked.*

*Of course, everything else I take as a metaphor, for example, not as some individual case or instruction. Therefore, to make an implementation programme for the proposals presented in this analysis and the proposals which are derived from it to translate into action which should further enhance the level of combat readiness of our army.*

*Let me, finally, particularly thank the general staff for cooperation i.e. the supreme command headquarters, chief of staff general Ojdanic. We have collaborated perfectly while he was in this position. I believe we will be collaborating equally successfully when he assumes the responsibility for his*

*new position. General Ojdanic has proved his excellent capabilities, a very high level of patriotism and – I would say something which is very important for a good commander – a high level of optimism because those who cause you headaches, who keep asking with whom and with what to do – nothing of them; if we defended as they thought we should have, we would not have ever defended ourselves, we would not have ever carried out mobilisation, we would not have done anything and they would have thought we had an excuse – great power, and we were little. And we answered to this: everyone who cares about this homeland with whatever he/she has... we showed there are no circumstances which may serve as an excuse not to defend your homeland. This excuse is not an excuse but a surrender, regardless of capabilities and material resources.*

*I would like to thank general Ojdanic for his cooperation while he was in this position, and bearing in mind everything he knows about the army and how close to his heart the army is, I would like to wish for him to give an even bigger contribution and help further development of the army and our state in general.*

*At the same time, I wish a lot of success to general Pavkovic with whom I also had direct cooperation ever since the time he was the commander of the Pristina Corps... whose capabilities, patriotism and willingness to invest all his efforts into his job I very much appreciate and I wish him a lot of success in his new position as the chief of staff and wish you all a lot of success in your work. Thank you.*

***lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*Mr. president, to mark your presence at this analysis – for remembrance, for a memory, for history, we decided to give you the book 'With Truth against Aggression'. This is a war edition of the magazine Vojska [Army] which was published and this book – the Yugoslav Army as a special publication for your family.*

*We have presented this to minister general Ojdanic, to thank him because he contributed the most to such high marks for combat readiness of the army in 1999... because he directly took part in its work. The analysis is finished and now we can have a short break.*

**Milosevic has not always been allergic to The Hague. This depended on his daily political needs. At the time when he was "a peacemaker" for the West, he was cooperating with The Hague tribunal. Thus, Erdemovic was arrested, former member of the 10<sup>th</sup> sabotage detachment where some**

members of the Spider group [Pauk] also were and another Yugoslav Army lieutenant – because they first spoke publicly about Srebrenica and the crimes committed there in the summer of 1995. They had been arrested the night before they intended to leave the country. Erdemovic told "an American female journalist" he had personally killed 120 people and that he could not go on like this anymore. I had an opportunity to have a look at the tape where Erdemovic was interviewed by the American journalist. Our state security service arrested them and seized this video tape, kept for some time in isolation, and then transferred to The Hague by a special plane. He was one of the key witnesses to the Srebrenica crime. Slobodan easily decided to take this step because he had political benefit from this. Milosevic decided he did not like The Hague so much the moment it turned out he might become one of its "guests".

In early 2000, a change took place in the Yugoslav Army, VJ, general staff. A little bit earlier, defence minister Pavle Bulatovic had been assassinated. Pavle Bulatovic had become too friendly and close to a non-commissioned officer who had been his bodyguard so that this had been more like a relationship between two close friends than between a minister and a sergeant first class. I knew this man was devastated by the violent death of Bulatovic. Besides, Pavle Bulatovic used to pop by to see the head of the Bled restaurant and word had it the personnel policy at the federal defence ministry was actually being created there. But let us go back to the Pavkovic's appointment. Pavkovic was an intelligent, hawkish man who could easily guess what his boss expected of him. This was a rather radical turning point and the first sign that Milosevic wanted to get rid of the opposition and to enthrone himself once and for all. It all started with a little bigger budget for the army and big promises. Slobodan seriously counted on the assistance of the military leadership, and undoubtedly, he could count on such assistance. The only thing he could not count on were the troops. He was not aware of this at the time. The more the military top brass were getting closer to the boss, the more the army itself was going in the opposite direction. One could assume they would soon be generals without the army.

## ***YUGOSLAV ARMY ESTIMATES ON POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF A CIVIL WAR IN MONTENEGRO***

***Major general***

***GEZA FARKAS***

*General Sir, I would like to immediately add something to the scenario that Branko has presented, because we found and obtained by means of our operational activities the draft operational plan for receiving refugees from FRY, which was made by regional office of UHCR for Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first half of September 1999. The plan was made on the basis of UNHCR estimate that in case of a violent or agreed secession of Montenegro a civil war could break out between the Montenegrin separatists and Yugoslav Army, VJ.*

*They estimate that conflicts may arise even under some inauspicious methodological conditions towards the end of 1999 and in the beginning of 2000 already. In the beginning of November 1999, the UHCR representatives asked the President of Municipality of Trebinje to perform all the necessary preparation activities for accommodation for some five to six thousands of refugees from Montenegro within two to three months. They expect the arrival of some 2,500 refugees from two main directions, Niksic, Trebinje and Niksic Bilece and two alternative directions, Herceg Novi Trebinje and Niksic Gacko. They estimate that out of that number some 15,000 Serbs would be able to find provisional accommodation in the eastern part of RS and some 10,000 should be received by the regional office of UHCR for Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of which some 1,000 to 2,000 of Muslims would need accommodation in the BiH Federation. They consider that the geographical characteristics of the border between Yugoslavia and Republic of Srpska and Montenegro do not allow establishing of wider migratory and accommodation capacities, but also that it is a very good thing that SFOR covers the border crossings in all the four routes.*

*They estimate that the daily influx will depend on the development of situation in Montenegro and on the nature of the problem, that is, that several thousands of refugees can be expected daily, in case of larger conflicts between the forces supporting the Montenegrin government and Yugoslav Army, VJ. It was envisaged that the UHCR team are quickly placed on the main enter points and that the Red Cross, SFOR and*

*international police and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as the local governments in the Republic of Srpska and BiH Federation send their previously agreed aid from the border crossings and deeper in the territory. The local agencies of RS promised their full support in case of an influx of Serbian and Montenegrin population, and that the Muslim population would be enabled to go over their territory to the BiH Federation, which was planned to take place along the routes of Trebinje, Stolac, Mostar, Bilece, Berkovici, Stolac Mostar Gacko, Nevesinje Mostar. It was envisaged that with the support of the local agencies of RS Serbs and Montenegrins are accommodated in people's homes, in privately owned houses or in provisional collective centres, for which several sites were already designated, for some 10,000 refugees.*

*The Muslims would be directed toward Mostar as quickly as possible, and their accommodation has already been prepared in Salakovac near Mostar. Anyway, the Regional Office for Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina has general plans to set up four refugees' camps in RS, and those would be as follows: two in BiH Federation. They will endeavour to provide accommodation for 5,000 persons in every site in permanent objects like factories, schools, and other buildings that could easily be refurbished for living in them. However, that can be done only in Bradina for 700 persons, and in the tourists' camp near Trebinje for 400 persons and in the prefabricated houses' camp in Salakovac near Mostar for 800 persons, due to which they also planned to accommodate refugees in tents in six sites. First of all, Salakovac for 800 persons and in 20 prefabricated houses. Secondly, Bradina near Konjic for 1,000 persons, 700 in buildings and 300 in tents. Thirdly, Old Persons' Home in Trebinje for 364 tents for 2,000 persons. Fourthly, in Tourists' Camp in Trebinje for 700 persons, 400 of them in the existing building and 300 in tents. Fifthly, in the northern camp Trebinje 1,000 persons in seven tents. The sixth site, in the deserted SFOR camp in Nevesinje 4,500 persons. Among the Serbs and Montenegrins that will in case of unrests and large scale riots in Montenegro take refuge in RS they expect people who had previously fled from the BiH Federation to Montenegro, like the Serbs that previously fled from Croatia, that is from the former RS Krajina. They think that the Muslims from the Raska area and area along the Lim River and Montenegro will go to KiM, where they will seek protection from KFOR, as well as to Albania, and one group of them to BiH, primarily to Gorazde via Srebrenica. The area under the jurisdiction of the field office of UHCR for the Eastern BiH in Sarajevo.*

*A smaller group of 1,000 to 2,000 refugees is expected to come in the area under the jurisdiction of the regional office of UHCR for Southern BiH. Mainly women, children and elderly persons are expected to go*

*there, because VJ or Montenegrin government will, according to their estimates, forbid the grown up men who are subjects to military conscription to leave Montenegro. It was planned to pay special attention to identify cases with special needs for "additional oath", like the victims of violence, prominent political cases, deserters and ethnically mixed families. Forms made according to the UHCR standards were given to all the participants in refugees' identification, and they were also given adequate instructions so that the final registration of refugees can be done once they have been accommodated in refugees' centres.*

*They undertook responsibility for food distribution, which will in the beginning be done in transit centres and refugees' camps, until the necessary conditions for each family to prepare their own food are created. A joint kitchen will be set up in the Old People's Home in Trebinje, in which the cooking and serving of food will be organized by the Red Cross, and the dishes and cutlery will be acquired in UHCR. It was envisaged that food for some 10,000 refugees from Montenegro would be provided. The plan pertains to the southern part of RS only, but it is evident that there are similar plan for other parts of border areas of RS. And especially so for the route that goes from FRY to Srbinje and Gorazde, it was envisaged that most of the refugees take that route and that most of them would be Serbs, that is opponents to the separatist policy of Montenegrin leadership.*

*I have read this, General, because I think that it is important to stress the details that the plan envisages and all the estimates, because we had a similar situation immediately before the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis and since they organized things in a same manner in the territories of Albania and Macedonia, this all adds to the seriousness of this scheme and the situation that was presented by General Branko.*

*Besides that, the Parliament is in session in Montenegro, and the discussion about the Property Act is in progress, in which the members of the Liberal Party of Montenegro explicitly ask that all the property, immovable property of VJ in the territory of Montenegro become subject to this Act, which means that the state of Montenegro becomes the owner. We obtained information that the staff there continues to leave the service. Last week five officers of VJ asked to leave the service because they were accepted by the MUP, and those were one first class captain, Bojicic Perica, captain Ivanovic Sasa, lieutenant Milasinovic Miodrag and captain Slavoljub Dragan, and a person that was not identified. During the interview in the MUP Vuk Boskovic, assistant to the Minister of Interior of Montenegro, and Ilic Radomir, senior inspector, former lieutenant colonel of VJ, were present.*

During the conversation with Mister Maras and Buda a sincere concern for the abovementioned estimates was shown. The international community seriously considered the potential for the outbreak of civil war in FRY. Montenegrins got similar estimates from their colleagues in secret services of neighbouring countries, and from the Western countries, too. All that inspired additional anxiety. There were many reasons for concern. Objectively speaking, MUP in Montenegro was not capable to stand up to Milosevic's intention to subjugate this disobedient part of his emirate. That fact added to the responsibility of Mister Maras and Buda, as well as the need for skilfulness in commanding the MUP. Slobodan didn't need to deploy army from Serbia. We all agreed in that respect. He had enough forces on his side in the conservative part of Montenegrin public. He skilfully used the fact that links among Serbia and Montenegro were stronger than the links between certain parts of Serbia. He had an ace up his sleeve.

The international community invested a lot of money and good will in efforts to change a regime that was a generator of all sorts of problems and wars from the first moment of their rule, and that used such a behaviour as their modus operandi and a reliable solution for short term extension of their entrenched rule and for long term suffering of their own people. This time, the herald of political changes was the fear felt among the members of the military leadership that the "domestic traitors and foreign hirelings" could definitely and forever replace the patriots.

*November 18, 1999*

*Army general*

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*Based on the estimate that VJ and SMP<sup>22</sup> are enemies to the ruling coalition in the Republic of Montenegro, the State Security Service and Montenegrin Ministry of Interior have introduced an operational campaign Coup d'etat to assess the situation in VJ and an operational campaign Thorn to assess the activities of SMPR. The focus of attention has been put on the units that, according to their estimates, could be used*

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*for Coup d'etat. In order to obtain a complete insight into the state of affairs among the members of MUP, in case that situation becomes more complex, all the previously unassigned members will immediately be assigned to different centres, and thus will have complete control over those. The State Security Service plans to establish a detective agency with retired members of State Security that would continue to carry out the jobs of State Security.*

### ***Major general***

#### ***ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC***

*On the occasion of opposition meeting in Budapest that you followed, it was noted that they would appear united in the elections. To that end the message by Momcilo Perisic that the opposition forces should unite was sent. As a necessary precondition for free and fair elections he demands the change of the current government in Serbia, and "Glas" noted that another eleven parties had joined Coalition for Change and that government of Dragoslav Avramovic would soon be revealed.*

*"Danas" published an interview with Aleksandar Karadjordjevic<sup>23</sup> in which democratization of Serbia was advocated together with the change of present government. This underlines his opinion that we are at the moment on the road to even stronger isolation from the rest of the world. These are shared attitudes of the man who is unfortunately still a general, Perisic.*

*General Momcilo Perisic gave an interview for "Dejpas"<sup>24</sup>, in which he, among other things, spoke about the political mood among the Army members. So, he assessed the situation, and I quote here the words of General Perisic: "the majority of Army officers are against the Government in Belgrade". Simic, I will immediately correct what I said, yesterday I made an assignment, I refuse to do that, I do not want to speak with him. This General Staff, it would be an insult for us to talk with him, and we have some arguments, we have the survey carried out in the darkest of times in this country, what sort of results we got from survey and opinion poll and relationship between the Army, Army members and here I do not think of the officers only, but of the reserve officers and of 330,000 men at that, the arguments are there, but he knows something more than we all do. He explained his removal from the position of VJ chief of staff with President Milosevic's fear of potential*

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<sup>23</sup>

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*behaviour of the Army. President of FRY, quote, "have brought people who are loyal to him to the military leadership". Who will bring people who are not loyal to them, so what of that if they are loyal, even he was allegedly loyal to him, and you can see for yourselves how loyal he proved to be, why didn't he --- and he said there of all the places, and after that he could have said --- gentlemen, it is not in the soldierly spirit do to that, but from this moment I am not ready any more to be VJ chief of staff since my opinions differ from yours, and he could leave in an honourable and fair manner. And in spite of that, they are all "entirely against Milosevic". "The President of FRY brought people who are loyal to him in the military leadership, in spite of the fact that VJ is entirely against Milosevic". I still think that we have scientific indicators obtained by using scientific methods, and not some subjective beliefs, because he is to blame for the wrong role that the Army had in the old Yugoslavia and for its inappropriate deployment during the last war. That same general Perisic was present at the meeting of the Supreme Defence Council, I said that to Mister Vujanovic, too, in which a clear general attitude was reached together with the conclusion by the Supreme Defence Council according to which the future command over the Army was based on the directions from the President of FRY. That means that we had a general opinion based on individual attitudes, which in case of Albanian terrorist forces appeared in Kosovo and Metohia et cetera. Perisic also explained and added that financial situation of VJ contributes to the overall unfavourable conditions, general attitude of its members towards the government.*

*Look here: "VJ officers are aware of the danger looming over them, and especially of the abuses by Milosevic, and it is not highly probable that the President of FRY would deploy Army in case of a civil war. VJ officers are serving the people, and not to the ruling parties, despite the fact that certain generals make their public appearances in the role of **SPS** and **JUL** spokesmen."*

*When the journalist asked him whether it was the patriotic task of VJ to finally say to the President that he should step down from the position of president of the country, General Perisic answered: "Who would say that, and how?"*

*The plot of this all, and this is only an excerpt from that interview of his, he said a lot more, and I will once again return to the task that we spoke about yesterday, Simic. It is really degrading for us to communicate in any way with such people, he is a man, and if he is not in the right that should be said, and that should be done in good time if he cannot agree, he does not agree and he should say that publicly and act with dignity*

*like a man. We were reprimanded for all sorts of things, and you can see for yourselves what happened after that.*

*One of our next conclusions could be that continuous entangling of the hopeless political situation in FRY and lowering of military standards had negative effects on the security situation in it. That is what we ascertained jointly and what we publicly stated in our joint staff meeting, too, in the office of the President of FRY. The financial situation of a large number of professional members of staff, as we ascertained, is on such a low level that it jeopardizes, I would say, not only the very entity of VJ, but also calls into question the performance of specific purpose tasks of certain units, and as you know, this problem has been especially prominent with the VJ units in Montenegro, which calls for our concrete activities and concrete measures.*

*In relation to this, measures that we have undertaken or that we shall undertake in the foreseeable future, have been accepted with complete approval, and you were informed about that in our last meeting of staff, and about the support by the President of FRY, and those will be further developed next week, in the next joint meeting of competent representatives of the Federal Government and of the General Staff under the immediate guidance of President Milosevic. I am personally convinced that we have successfully started to untie the Gordian knot, and that we shall be determined and successful in that respect in line with the full potentials of this state, with a note saying that all of us in their individual specific area, and that has to be a unanimously performed task that I shall set in the end, has to do the part of the job of the General Staff while being extremely demanding and we achieved that towards SMO, and that means that the Federal Government should do everything in their legal authority.*

*In the following conversation I had with Buda his sincere concern over the state of affairs in the state and in the VJ was evident, as well as over the possibility that Milosevic may incite a civil war in Montenegro. He was perfectly aware of the discord in the core of Montenegrin entity that was divided into a pro Serbian and a secessionists' block. Montenegro created the MUP units that could to a certain degree present a dissuasive factor. Other measures that were undertaken were intended for admission of officers to the VJ, which would in turn produce cadre and at the same time serve to produce psychological and human resources weakening of VJ in the territory of Montenegro. Only four men in the top leadership of Montenegro had information that I provided.*

*Major general***ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC**

*Sir, during the previous period foreign factor has carried out a focused assessment of situation in VJ units that are located in the territory of the Republic of Montenegro. The level and quality of relationship between the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Command and the present republic government, VJ members reactions to the introduction of two currencies payment system and measures that VJ undertakes to protect the standard of living of its members in that republic, state and activities of the units.*

*The leadership of Montenegro continues with their intensive separatist activities and completely avoids and obstructs the Constitution and federal laws in the key areas of social life. This has been indicated by a series of actions by the Montenegrin government, some of which are their complete opening of the land and sea routes for import and export of goods, possession and enabling of fuel transport of some 6,000 tons for KFOR's needs in Kosovo and Metohia, permissions for free stay and movements for Albanian terrorists among which there are some well known criminals with pending criminal procedures against them and with wanted circulars, along with many others.*

*Montenegrin MUP activities have been registered, together with the increased intelligence and reconnaissance activities against the VJ units in that territory, psychological and propaganda campaign according to the assessment of the VJ members by means of recruitment attempts to join their units. Six members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army and of the Navy were invited to the informative interviews during the observed period, and the interest to take over 10 antiaircraft guns that up to now used to be the property of the Vunko company in Bjelo Polje, formerly owned by the former territorial defence of Montenegro, which serves as an indicator of the fact that the leadership of Montenegro endeavours to jeopardize defence too, as the last remaining federal function that is still operational, and to take it over at a given moment and assume control over it.*

**In their efforts to win over the sympathies of the lower ranking officers, the «Patriotic Block» often used some unrealistic advertising moves that were related to finding solutions for the housing policy. Thus the apartments that nobody ever even started to build were allocated. That was especially evident in the period immediately before the elections in 2000. There were also orders pertaining to the**

allocation of apartments that went flying between General Pavkovic and General Nikolic. The officers were given grassy uncultivated land in some fields, with the explanation that their apartments would be built in that place exactly. NGS VJ reached the conclusion in a staff meeting before the 2000 elections that the allocation of the non-existent apartments would be a very good thing to do, and it was the first time in military history that people were given written decisions on apartments' allocation while the apartments were not even built. There were even some people from the military judiciary who were given such decisions, who until this very day never lodged any complaints against such a manipulation. There were even some cases when some of the unfortunate officers complained because they were not included in that list. General Staff Chief of Staff had the right to allocate an apartment on their own will, and he used that possibility to the fullest. NGS VJ used to have right to allocate 3 % of the available apartments without any explanation and it seems to me that later on the percentage amounted to 10 % of the total of available apartments. It is easy to calculate the reason why those non-existent apartment were allocated, because by doing that, the number of apartments that chief of staff could give away on his own will constantly increased. At the same time this method produced new voters for the "patriots". "Priority lists" for apartments' allocation, as they were called in the Army, grew bigger day after day. Serbian Government took the building in Nemanjina Street from VJ, and in return they offered an empty promise, when they should have given 800 apartments. That building was bombed later on.

*General Staff VJ Chief of Staff, army general*

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*The Government of the Republic of Serbia will fulfil their obligation in relation to the realization of the agreement on exchange of property right over the building in 9 Nemanjina Street in Belgrade for 800 apartments, that is for the provision of 200 apartments in the first instalment, which was planned to take place by September 1, 1999.*

*- A decision to allocate a set group of apartments for VJ according to the programme of state reconstruction, and that VJ is included in the programme of the state development, and that each reform in the country in the future has to pertain to VJ, too, and not only the civil structures of the society has to be reaches as soon as possible. In the process of*

*building or acquisition of apartments in the future the experiences of the Directorate for reconstruction and development of the country should be used in relation to the usage of funds and faster realization, acquisition and building of apartments and other buildings.*

*All the members of VJ have been informed about the conclusions and tasks set by the President of FRY, as well as about the measures for improving the overall financial position of professional members of VJ, which were adopted in the joint staff meeting of SMO and Head of GS and presented to all the members of VJ. In this way, we believe that the proposed measures reflect the minimal needs, and that the top military and state leadership make certain efforts to improve the overall financial position of the entire army.*

*Bearing in mind the abovementioned facts, it is necessary to include conclusions and tasks set by the president of FRY in the Action Plan for realization of tasks aimed at improvement of financial position of VJ members that you adopted. Kindly, send a copy of the Plan to the GS VJ.*

*Best regards,*

*Head of General Staff, Army General*

*DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC".*

## ***Preparations for a Conflict in Montenegro***

***December 9, 1999***

***Major general***

***BRANKO KRGA***

*As for the attitude of the foreign factor towards the internal situation in FRY, the pressures remain, and in that context we should expect further reactions on the situation in Montenegro in the first place. There are no official reactions to this activity of VJ in the airport, and the western media accused that as another measure of the Belgrade Government against the reformist Montenegrin leadership only. As for any potential future reactions by the foreign factor, it would be good to calm down this tense situation, because it is possible that it is all about a previously organized act of the Montenegrin MUP, which was performed in*

*agreement with the Western countries, with the aim to provoke reactions from the military and to air additional accusations against us, and thus we shouldn't let ourselves get dragged into that.*

*Svetozar Marjanovic was lieutenant general, Deputy VJ General Staff, a typical demagogue, with all sorts of silly stories, always ready to bother the staff at their meeting with his panic comments about all our generals that will end up disgraced and humiliated if the regime is overthrown, while the army is doomed to get disbanded soon after that. He was aware of his potentials, and he knew what he wanted. While he was selling his cheap dogma to the lower ranking officers, he at the same time accepted to sign capitulation in Kumanovo, and he was awarded for that with the villa in the Uzicka Street with 33 ares of land, which was additionally invested in, after the approval from the finance minister Milacic, all in order not to jeopardize all sorts of conveniences available to the distressed patriot. It was all worthwhile, undoubtedly. It is interesting what sorts of things the lower ranking officers and non-commissioned officers are ready to do to their own detriment. They arrested me although I believe that they were not satisfied with their own positions and with the state of affairs in the Army. The Army really survived all sorts of things. It went through Golgotha when it survived the impossible, and it survived its disgrace because it lived to see the impossible. It was probably not aware of the fact that it is better if an army of donkeys is headed by a lion, then if an army of lions is headed by a donkey.*

### ***Lieutenant general***

#### ***SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC***

*On Wednesday, the first day of this month, a group of people from some company came to the airport, in the civil part of the airport, to prepare, to level the ground, and they did the same thing on Thursday, and they measured the land to find the place to build a hangar, a place to build a landing area for helicopter, for helicopter landing, and the part of the runway connected to the --- runway.*

*Commander Kasatovic, a colonel in the air force base, warned them that they couldn't do that because they didn't have the necessary permission from the relevant institution, that is from SMO, and that on day they promised that they wouldn't build anything until they were able to bring all the necessary documents to show them. However, without any explanation they continued to do the same job on the 6<sup>th</sup>, and they were warned against that again, and they continued to work when they brought some ten to fifteen police officers to protect the workers on their job. With*

*all persuasion and warnings that they should not be doing that, they continued with their job, and they continued with their job on the 7<sup>th</sup>, too, when the RV and PVO Commander reached the decision to introduce a higher level of combat alert in the air base first, where he introduced the red alert for all the people there, he gave them the weapons, both to the officers and to the soldiers, and he allotted the ammunition.*

*Somewhere about one or two o'clock in the afternoon, according to the statement by colonel Kasatovic and one sergeant major who went out to see what was happening, they brought the additional 65 police officers, and he supposed that there were more police officers in the hangar, that means that there were some 100 police officers. We learnt all that on the 7<sup>th</sup> only, it was the day before yesterday. When I learnt that at 14:40, I phoned to General Obradovic to ask what he knew about that, and it turned out that he also had the same piece of information on the 7<sup>th</sup>, too. He phoned to the Montenegrin Government, to the MUP, and nobody there wanted to answer the phone. Only the head of State Security, Markovic Dusko answered his call. He spoke with him, and it was then that Markovic agreed to discontinue all the work there, to withdraw the MUP officers, and to recall the combat alert in the units. He also agreed to bring all the documents on the 8<sup>th</sup>, the permission for construction work.*

*Since the MUP officers did not go away, the combat alert was not revoked until the 8<sup>th</sup> in the morning. In the meantime, on the 7<sup>th</sup>, after the conversation they had, the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army increased the combat alert in the units that, according to the plan, were deployed in and around the airport, but in those in the barracks, too, in the barracks of Maslina and Moraca. The talks they had were long. Kasatovic talked with them, two or three times went there, inside, and the situation remained the same, except for the discontinuation of their work. Yesterday in the morning, I asked again from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Commander to talk to the Prime Minister, and since he couldn't reach him, I ordered him to write an official document, a letter to the Prime Minister. He addressed the letter to the Prime Minister. Based on that letter, Markovic and another man there asked to see the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Commander. They met at 18:00. They accepted that they had not discontinued the work there after two warnings, that they entered there thinking that they would be able to do it without the necessary documents, and practically they thought they would get off lightly. They were surprised by the reaction of the military, and by the way they reacted, they were surprised by the military presence in the airport, they were surprised by increase of combat alert in the Military Police ... in the barracks, and it was very*

*unpleasant for them that the RV and PVO Commander closed the airport at 16:00 on the previous day.*

*In the meantime, on the other side of the airport, they monitored the situation there, based on the agreement they had reached on the 7<sup>th</sup>, that a group of people would come to bring the permissions to the airport on the following day in the morning. A group of people consisting of six representatives, and they did not bring any documents, no permissions at all, and they quoted the legal acts of the Republic of Montenegro, which said that the land was their property. It was a presumptuous demand, and they claimed that they would continue to work there. Based on such a report that was sent in to Commander Kasatovic, he increased the level of combat alert for the whole airport area, for all the units in the airport and for the air brigade, and he also reached a decision to close the airport then. That is what went on on both the sides, based on the reports by RV and PVO, and on the reports from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army. After the conversation between the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Commander and with colonel Kasatovic and a representative, head of State Security of the Republic of Montenegro of the precious day, the overall situation is better to a certain degree, or at least nothing happened last night to worsen it, if we assume that it will get better. They agreed that they should submit a regular demand for the construction of that building there. We shall see what happens next. NGS accepted the measures that the Commander introduced, and I am not informed whether you ordered any changes or not.*

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*Yes, I did, I ordered that these planes should not take off, he should only transport the airplane that goes there with that group, and the airport will be opened again.*

**Lieutenant general**

**SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC**

*All the other measures shall remain until they completely withdraw all the MUP officers. According to some information, and it has not been confirmed, in my opinion that is not confirmed, because there is nothing in that report, except for what the RV and PVO Commander wrote, to indicate that they occupied the north bank of the Cevna River, but that has not been confirmed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Commander. The group that went yesterday night to make a round there said nothing of the sort to Obradovic. When they returned there they did not see the MUP officers there.*

*That means that the bottom-line is that they admitted that it was their intention to do that without any permission, without agreement issued by the Defence Ministry. Is this what Krga insisted on a question, was that a previously contrived provocation? It is my opinion that it certainly was.*

***Major general***

***GEZA FARKAŠ***

*General, Sir, I would only like to add that their tendency to provoke us was apparent, because the group of MUP officers that came to the airport was lead by Miskovic Borislav, formerly a colonel of ours.*

*Montenegrin leadership continues to carry out various separatist activities, by which they destroy the strength of our state defence in many different aspects and undermine the very essence of VJ. This has been indicated by a series of actions by the Montenegrin government, some of which are their complete opening of the land and sea routes for import and export of goods, possession and enabling of fuel transport of some 6,000 tons for KFOR's needs in Kosovo and Metohia, permissions for free stay and movements for Albanian terrorists among which there are some well known criminals with pending criminal procedures against them and with wanted circulars in the territory of Montenegro, and thus now they can move freely around. At the same time they are trying to find excuses for introduction of the two currency payment system, and to indicate that it does not represent a danger for VJ and its officers, in the territory of Montenegro.*

*In relation to that, Montenegrin President, Milo Djukanovic pointed out on the occasion of a round table discussion in Danilovgrad on December 1 this year that VJ was not jeopardized by anyone in Montenegro. They can receive their salaries, but only if Serbia fulfils its obligation to provide the equivalent amount of goods to be sold in Montenegro for the equivalent amount of dinars. VJ has to do its best to fend off all the attempts by the regime to make it a party governed army. If it is ready to accept proposals in the Montenegrin government platform, it will be welcomed in this republic, but if it continues with its tendencies to jeopardize civil government, I am convinced that the army will soon begin to feel uncomfortably in this republic. This has been a quote from his speech. They keep accusing the army of jeopardizing the civil government, and those tendencies, that is the publication of those things continues.*

*Montenegrin Prime Minister, Filip Vujanovic, said the following in a press conference held on December 2 this year: "There are no regular*

*paramilitary formations in Montenegro; there is only one section of the Army that do not perform its function, and that has been labelled as Military Police. Their officers have been recruited from the followers of one political party, there are more of those officers than it is necessary, and that is done intentionally, and they have gradually become like some military formation that controls the state and the army. Montenegrin government has been prepared and cautious with Military Police." More and more often those conflicts are incited with the members of Seventh police battalion. Two days ago, and even on the day before yesterday, we have had the similar situation, when they tried to arrest certain members of the Seventh battalion. That was prevented only through the activities of those units' command.*

***Major general  
GEZA FARKAS***

*Meetings organized by the Alliance for Change in Uzice, Prokuplje, Valjevo and Nis, in Kikinda and Novi Sad, in which they demanded that besides the legally elected government in Serbia and in Yugoslavia, the President of Yugoslavia be changed and dissolved, were of the violent nature in some places, like in Prokuplje and in Valjevo. The openly stated intention of certain political party leaders to try to change the government in Serbia and in Yugoslavia in a violent way. Increasing protests have been announced to take place from this day, July 16, when a rally has been scheduled at 12:00 in front of the VJ Club in Nis. It was called by the Alliance for Change. They scheduled that rally, and they organized it, and they called there the soldiers in the wars waged from '91 till '99, and Nis has been designated as the centre from which they are to be directed in the future. Talks between the chairpersons of the deputies' groups from political parties in Serbia and Montenegro and the Yugoslav Parliament about the existing relations in the Federation, in case that they fail to reach an agreement, will only additionally aggravate the situation in the country. In case that the agreement is not reached, we should expect even more radical demands in the future from the Montenegrin leadership, for further change of relationships in the Federation, and in case that their demands are not accepted, the bottom-line is that FRY becomes a loose confederation and activities to achieve Montenegrin secession will continue.*

*If president Milosevic does not resign, they have plans to organize a referendum vote on the Montenegrin secession in the autumn, and they*

*are supported in it by the foreign factor, and especially by the NATO and USA, which has also been indicated by their threats addressed to Yugoslavia and caused by accumulation of troops in Montenegro and possible Serbian and federal government aggression against Montenegro. In relation to this situation and party influence, we have, I don't know whether you, General, have been informed about this incident, the public statement made by the lieutenant colonel Mijovic Rajko from the 250<sup>th</sup> rocket missile brigade, when he on July 10, over a dinner party with his colleagues, and he is from the second rocket battalion, he publicly said in one moment the following: "the political system in Yugoslavia should change, because Slobodan Milosevic is the biggest enemy of the people".*

*After the speech that he made, one group of the officers and reserve officers present there left the party, but there were a lot of them that expressed their support for what he said and who applauded to him. I do not know whether the Commander has sent a report on that, but we suggested there, in the meantime, that is, before he made his speech, he had submitted a retirement demand. We here propose that the demand is not granted, and to invite him for an interview, and do all the rest and expel him from the VJ, instead of granting him a pension.*

*There is a problem with such incidents or unconsciousness hints by other officers, too, and that can gradually become ---, by means of their public statements, that then become a very dangerous thing, and an indication, the fact that the others did nothing about it is indicative. The commanders did not react to such a statement.*

*January 2000*

*Army general*

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*They are testing us, whether we shall ... they will go even further than that, and then they will find something else, and again something else, and so on. This issue has to be explored further, from the aspect of command and from the aspect of jurisdiction of the RV Commander and 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Commander also, in the territory of the airport, but it is obvious that the issue of delayed reporting has appeared too, about this incident, reporting with a considerable delay. Secondly, the decision making process, when the state and military and political decisions are made, I am not saying anything, if something is urgent, the commander has the right, he is accountable, but they must send the draft decision for the higher level to verify it, including the cases when we are not sure whether*

*an action is right or wrong, we should consult the President of Yugoslavia.*

***Lieutenant general***

***SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC***

*The things I know is that people in GS got some information on the 7<sup>th</sup> at 14:40, and the first report, such as it was, came at 16:40. The next report came only after 20:00, and that was the regular evening report. He knows that I am here and sends the report to me, he didn't send it to the operational officer on duty. The report has to be sent to the operational officers on duty, and then he is to find whoever he needs to find.*

***Major general***

***GEZA FARKAS***

*General, Sir, I would like to say two things. Being aware of the complete situation in Montenegro, the attention has to be drawn to the existence of ---- Here we have a problem, the airport is practically on that territory, and all the other effectives that can come in handy in situations like these are under the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army command. Actually, it was the RV and PVO Command that slowed down the information flow in this case. I reacted to that and reprimanded the security organs, too, they simply must not report without a decision, which is to some extent all right, but in such a situation the security organs, too ----*

***Army general***

***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*Geza, let's not hold up this meeting. This issue calls for details analysis, and also need to tell everybody in their face who was wrong and in doing what. It is obvious that mistakes were made. First of all, it is unnatural that if the order on introduction of a constant higher level of combat alert envisaged that some forces were assigned to defend the airport, and those are the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army units, then the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army General has to be informed about that immediately. Secondly, at that moment the RV Commander has to be informed about it, it was not the commander's fault if that happened, but it was his fault that it happened at that particular moment, and he sent his report on some other particular moment. That was precisely five or six days later. If somebody thus tries to hide things and present his work as excellent, then it is somebody's serious delusion, and the consequences of all that could have been disastrous. We have to --- from the aspect of timely information, the accuracy of reporting. I also saw that scheme, I simply couldn't make head or tail of that airport*

*scheme, and I was not able to decipher a single thing there, I also gave it to Vasiljevic to have a look at it, to discern the things presented, and the disputed territory. That circle was drawn, there are two things presented in the legend, and I cannot understand what's what in it.*

**The things Ojdanic said seem tragicomic. He doesn't even know what that was all about. He can't even recognize the exact place in the scheme he was given, but is ready to wage war about it, although he cannot really make out the exact piece of Montenegrin stony land on which the MUP had decided to build something, which is by the way very, very small. We have lost the entire territory of Kosovo, there is the flight ban for our aircrafts that cannot fly nearer than 25 kilometres to the Kosovo border, but we shall incite a civil war against our own people over a couple of dozens of square metres of Montenegrin stony land that a general with four stars on his epaulet couldn't even find on a map. It is odd what sort of hatred can be born in our own mind. When somebody hates another nation, that phenomenon has its name, and there is even historical understanding for such an act, although such a thing is inexcusable. When somebody hates some groups of their own people due to their own blind obedience to a regime there is neither a name, nor an excuse for that. What did those people believe in? What kinds of ideas were born in their minds at that moment? Did they really think that their nasty games could remain a secret forever? The airport commander was colonel Kastratovic at that time, and that same man has been, if I can remember correctly, promoted to the rank of general by Kostunica. And for which merits?**

*Major general*

**GEZA FARKAS**

*General, Sir, I would like to say just one thing more. Their tendency to provoke us was obvious, because those MUP forces that were sent to the airport are under command of Miskovic Borislav, who was once our colonel.*

*Army general*

**DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC**

*He knows every detail, and they thought that we were --- well, we are, for letting them bury a single stone there. We shall see about that. We have the federal law, we have the Constitution, and it is well known who*

*owns the military property, who is in charge of granting approvals and permissions, and we are not interested in their willingness or unwillingness to cooperate with the Federal Government and its relevant Ministry. Kasatovic was right, I am doing my job in accordance with the Constitution, with the law, according to the orders of my superiors. By then, until I have those things, you gentlemen cannot do that. This has probably been a test of how ready we are to act adequately. Our weaknesses, which I presume causes this incident, have to be dealt with. A commander cannot --- if I do not verify his decision, he waged a war, he says --- and I remain adamant in my decision, and he cites the Constitution, the law, the Rules of Service. I --- Now what? There is nothing more to say. Nobody can imitate Misic. Smiljanic goes down there today, and when he's back, we shall sit down and calmly analyse every detail, and tell everybody the things they should be told.*

***Major general***

***GEZA FARKAS***

*The argument that the legitimate government in FRY presents danger for the region and institutes in that territory has been advocated persistently, and that calls for the urgent dismissal of this institution, and that means in FRY the president above all, and the legally elected government.*

*In the previous period, the foreign factor focused their investigations of the VJ units in the territory of the Republic of Montenegro and to whether they had been supplemented with the contingents from Serbia. The level and quality of relations between the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Command and the present republic government, the circumstances under which the spying terrorist group Spider was arrested, and the measures that will be taken in relation to that. Situation and units of the Pristina Corps, and especially whether we are preparing to return to Kosovo and Metohia, and whether there are some hidden VJ and MUP forces in that territory, and any elements of Serbian military organizing, the standard of living of the VJ members and the effects of their financial difficulties to their morale, their attitude towards the governments in Yugoslavia.*

*The registered Montenegrin MUP activities: increased intelligence and reconnaissance of VJ in that territory, psychological and propaganda campaigns directed towards the active VJ officers and MUP for potential conflicts with the army, which they are trying to provoke, and later on to accuse VJ for inciting them.*

## ***Yugoslav Army's Seventh Battalion and Montenegrin Interior Ministry***

**They did not learn a single lesson from the breakdown of SFRY, and they didn't need those lessons, either. It was none of their business. That had nothing to do with the generals' privileges. There were certainly some honourable exceptions. One of them was General Grahovac, whom I unfortunately did not have the honour to meet. Down there, in Montenegro, I met Nedjo Boskovic, former head of VJ Security Directorate, who was then advisor to the Prime Minister. While we were sitting in Buda's office he addressed me:**

- *We have met, haven't we? What do you do, son? – he asked me.*
- *I'm a civil engineer – I said, trying to cut the conversation short.*
- *It seems to me that we met somewhere, was it in Gemaks?*
- *Yes, it was in Gemaks, in Belgrade – I answered.*
- *You see, I knew we met somewhere, by god, did you see, Buda, what a memory I have – Nedjo said proudly.*

**He was a sworn enemy of General Aca Vasiljevic, for whom he provided imprisonment in relation to those scandals in RV and PVO in the beginning of the 90s. When Aca came back to life, Nedjo found a place in the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior, as one of the three retired VJ generals.**

**Most of the tensions in the Montenegrin public were caused by the military police Seventh Battalion, which was professional in the sense that there were no conscripts there. Its units were sent to ten garrisons in Montenegro. In each of those garrisons there was one company or a platoon. The battalion was in Podgorica, where its command was located, in Niksic, Bjelo Polje, Berane, Adrijevica, Pljevlje, Kolasin, Kumbor, Bar and Ulcinj.**

**During one of the meeting, Ojdanic himself admitted that the Seventh Battalion had practically been a foreign body that could be the cause of conflicts, even in situations when such conflicts would not be considered as favourable for the state leadership. At that time Momir Bulatovic was the Federal Prime Minister, and the late Pavle Bulatovic was the Defence Minister. Many people in the Montenegrin State Security Service, SDB, went to SNP after the split in DPS, and so they left the Montenegrin SDB, and found new posts in the Seventh Battalion. Some of them were formerly in the Budva branch**

of SDB, and they thus ended up in the North as heads of security service in some of the companies of the Seventh Battalion. After that, as they continued to move along the SNP lines, they moved to the Defence Ministry, from where they planned to go to our diplomatic missions. One of those people, who will certainly be able to recognize that I am speaking of him here in this text, made a lot of troubles for the people in the opposing camp. The problem lied in the fact that some of the orders from Belgrade did not follow the regular lines of command, but went directly from SMO to Kolasin. Thus, it happened that that same man got the orders directly, and he carried those orders himself, without any consultations with his superior officers. It seems to me that colonel Rajko Baltic was at that time the commander of the Seventh Battalion. Major Mianovic was his deputy, but soon afterwards he left the Army and found a job in MUP. I think that he is now the commander of the border units of MUP in Montenegro. He is a good officer and an honourable man. I have to admit that it was very hard for him to leave the Yugoslav Army, because he had taken the oath, and on the other he saw what was in store.

I helped him to find shelter in the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior, where he remained to this very day. He knew nothing about me, except that I had some good friends in MUP. He was even receiving his salary for several months, without coming to work. We couldn't take him in the Ministry of Interior immediately, because he would then stand in our way and prevent us from carrying out some plans, and he could have thus caused some suspicions in KOS. We couldn't tell him those things then. It bothered him that he received salary without going to work, since he was an honourable man. On one occasion he even said that he would return all the money he had received if he was not allowed to go to work immediately, so we had to assign him in PJP in the Montenegrin MUP. He has learned the truth by now.

### ***DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC***

*I would like to present only one piece of information in relation to this to Mister Prime Minister of the Federal Government and to the Federal Defence Minister, about the situation, the quality, about the behaviour so far, about their activities so far, the ways in which they acted, and about our expectation for the future, since they have also been among those people who have been involved in all those things. So, let them help the*

*military organization in whatever way they wish to do so. So, there is nothing to reach agreements about, we can handle them in no time, I don't give a damn who they are, because that Seventh Battalion can cause something that nobody wants to happen.*

**According to the estimates by both the military and the civil intelligence services, the only danger was the one that came from the SPO quarters – and that created a lot of space for the rest of the opposition parties to fight for relatively normal conditions for aligning themselves and fight against the regime. At the same time, that created a host of problems for SPO, and especially for its leader, Vuk Draskovic, who suddenly and completely unaware became a bulwark protecting DOS and its leaders. There is no doubt that had the intelligence services established that mister Kostunica or Djindjic presented any serious threats to the regime they protected, they would have organize their assassinations, too. Owing to such an estimate, and to the conflict between SPO and DOS, and also to the relatively low turnout in the opposition meetings, and based on the official estimates and under the influence of the people around him, Milosevic started to consider the possibility to hold elections. After a series of attempted assassinations of Vuk Draskovic, the "patriots" managed to make him retreat from the Serbian territory. His assaults against the regime seemed more like a justifiable anger and his own personal anger caused by everything that had happened to him, then a serious oppositional fight. That was no wonder, because Vuk paid too high a price in fighting against regime. Besides attacks on Vuk, there were numerous attacks on General Perisic, who got involved in politics very late. The answer for that can be found in the revolt of his former colleagues, who at that time had not been allowed to openly show their own politically orientated ambitions, as well as in his excellent insight into the military organization in general. Perisic also had a considerable psychological influence, because he had been one of the most important aides, who openly opposed Milosevic. The General Staff could not pardon those sins.**

*Lieutenant general*

**GEZA FARKAS**

*There is one danger, and it stems mainly from the state organs and official institutions. The opposition is mentioned, opposition, opposition, opposition, while the only opposition in this territory is SPO, and this group, informal group. They have not been verified as a political party, they don't have their representatives in the Parliament, they have not*

*been verified on the local level, and we should call that by its right name, since otherwise, with all those statements we only make them seem legitimate, and we also speak in public and call them "opposition". So, the only true opposition is SPO. And the Democratic Party, since it is mentioned in the local media.*

*This Alliance for change<sup>25</sup> leadership gather information, they have set up a commission and they gather data on all the promoted and awarded, commended newly appointed officers. They have a task and an aim to prove that were are members, that is, the hirelings of the ruling party, and that is exactly what they are trying to achieve.*

*We gathered intelligence indicating that the Montenegrin State Security had been performing thorough checks of all the officers, with the aim to gather certain compromising materials that would later on be used to compromise or blackmail those officers.*

*As for this group of generals, it is my opinion that they too have started their offensive in the beginning of this year. We know that Vuksic is the chief of Perisic's cabinet, and Perisic said the following thing: "The ruling power in our country cannot be handed over in a peaceful manner as long as the current political structure is in power." He also said that the methods Vuk Draskovic had been using were the same as those of the FRY President, Milosevic. And he disagrees with him. He assessed that a civil war was imminent, and that the only thing that was still unknown was how long and bloody that war would be. He said that he was trying to prevent it or to stop it in the very beginning. He needed weapons for that, and for the time being he didn't have any weapons, but he was trying to acquire them. That would be all about him, and I have to say here that we do not have a very good relationship with State Security, and thus we have to do that job on our own. As for the security state in the Yugoslav Army, we concluded that --- the morale has become significantly higher. In a sense, this strand of our activities has caused that. As for the public appearances and criminal activities, we have found out a rapid decrease there. And finally, about this incident during the awards giving, I would like to suggest that we should provide small cameras for such events from now on, and we should organize them ourselves. And in case somebody has demands like these, we only issue public statements, like after a meeting, to prevent those incidents, since we cannot know who will react and in which moment.*

***Brigadier general  
JOVO MILANOVIC***

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*During the entire months of November and December the potential situation in Montenegro in relation to January 13 was toyed with, and they of course use that to launch certain arguments, so that later on the situation would escalate to a conflict in the Montenegrin territory, to a conflict between the army and the citizens, that is the police loyal to the regime, and to make that a day D for a potential intervention in the territory of Montenegro. At the same time there have been no changes in the definitions of forces in the surrounding territories of Montenegro, and there has been no increase of combat alert in that respect.*

*Thus, to conclude with, it is all about a psychological and propaganda operation that has been going on according to its plan, its planned dimensions et cetera, and it actually serves to create the necessary preconditions for justification of any potential reactions in the form of accusations against VJ and the existent plans for military intervention in Montenegro, that is, a return to Kosovo and Metohia by use of force.*

***Lieutenant general***

***GEZA FARKAS***

*As for the extremists on the territory, it is typical that certain political parties have begun their illegal military preparations. The characteristic thing there is that SPO organizes their youth units that in the formal and legal sense of interpretation have certain sound basis, but they also have their military wing, so that so far such activities have been registered in Novi Sad, Sombor, Stara Pazova and Nova Pazova. As for their numbers, they each have several hundreds of young men.*

*We also discovered the same sort of organizations in Leskovac, where they established an organization called "Serbian Knight", made up of purebred Serbs, which they train in martial arts, fencing, archery, firearms and tactical training, and prepare them for combat and for Serbs' return to Kosovo and Metohia. They intend to branch this organization out to Belgrade and Krusevac, too.*

*In spite of the fact that Coordination Body for controversial issues between Montenegrin MUP and VJ units in the territory of that republic has been established, the situation and attitude of Montenegrin government have not changed significantly, and we still identify cases of attempts to recruit VJ officers for the Montenegrin MUP, monitoring and attempted wiretapping of all the VJ activities and of all its activities in Montenegrin territory. This coordination body now has some recidivisms, since they invite only the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army for those meetings of theirs on the republic level, and they don't invite admiral Zec. Thus*

*they are trying to use their influence to effectuate an almost political indoctrination of these people that take part in their work, they exert pressure on them, and are trying to bring discord between those two army groupings, that is, between the Navy and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army, by launching the allegations about one commander's willingness to cooperate and another's complete refusal to cooperate. Parallel to this body, coordination bodies have been set up in all the seven centres, and they insist on having weekly meetings. That, however, is not a good thing, because in the very beginning, when we started doing this, we agreed that they should meet only in some special occasions, that is, only when a need arose, when there was a need for that. In this way they are in a constant contact with our people, and some unwise and rash things can happen, they have been preparing themselves in an organized and centralized manner, while our people have been preparing only partially. Thus, in relation to these meetings, we suggest that the preparations are made here for the level of army commander, that is, the level of Montenegrin Government, because there has always been an activity to follow after each of those meetings. Mihajlovic, Djuriscic, a war ship captain, commander of Navy SC in the Garrison of Tivat, accused the FRY President and Yugoslav government as the main party to blame for the present situation in VJ. He said some nasty things about the professionals in VJ who are of Serbian nationality, and gave preferential treatment for those of Croatian and Muslim nationalities. He advocated establishment of Montenegrin Army, and handed over the command of the units to the Interior Ministry of Montenegro in case that he was forced into an armed conflict with the Yugoslav Army. He also stated that in such a case he would not be ready to carry out the orders issued by the Yugoslav Army General Staff, because he would not shot at the members of his own people. He made the same public speech in the formal occasion of the Meeting in Tivat, which was registered. A team of the General Staff security service has been sent to deal with this case and to end it.*

*Milan Milekic, a colonel, commander of the Podgorica Military County, said in some conversations he had that Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic should be burned at stake, because they were doing everything to alienate the members of the same people, there in Serbia and in Montenegro, and that the military leadership was teaming of thieves who, together with Milosevic and Bulatovic stole the money that had been designated for the salaries of military personnel in Montenegro. He said that Milo Djukanovic was not a traitor, but only a criminal who would sell several leading Montenegrin companies, but that at that future time everybody would live even better in Montenegro. He accused the*

*Yugoslav Army generals for the present state in the Army, he said that they were appointed generals in a rash manner, and that he had been colonel for ten years already, and noted that he would soon become an academician.*

*Measures and activities that are being undertaken. Firstly, an interview of the FRY President has been published in "Politika" daily. In a clear and comprehensible way the standpoints on all the important issues of the present military and political position in FRY were expressed there. For the purpose of informing our staff about it, the whole interview will be published in the next issue of "Vojska" internal paper. A document issued by the administration was sent to all the units, which ordered that the interview be studied carefully with all the soldiers, and defined it as the basis for interpretation of the present situation. As for everybody else, and especially for the generals that are most prominent in the public and in media, there must not be any discord or disagreements in their interpretations of the present situation in their presentation of the army positions in public, and that is why I ask you all to study carefully this interview, and to always bear in mind the standpoints of the FRY President.*

**Towards the end of January the fissure that started to appear among the military became more and more apparent. There were more and more people who were ready to assist in prevention of a civil war. The atmosphere of a bloody outcome had been prepared for a long time. We have separated ourselves into different groups of those on our side and those on their side, of those who were traitors and those who were patriots, of those who were chetniks and those who were partisans for too long now. Everything was ready for the apocalypse to begin. When such a polarity among people is created in the media, military, politics and economy, even an innocuous situation can produce unforeseeable consequences. The war in Bosnia officially started after the murder of an honoured wedding guest, and the whole year before that everything was prepared for that war, and only an immediate cause was awaited. We had too many immediate causes at our disposal. Propaganda had already performed its job. Those who did not accept the media darkness as their reality were sent out from schools, universities, dismissed from job... In such a dangerous and over burdened situation in which the military leadership thought that they didn't anything else to lose, Serbia and Montenegro could easily have turned into Lebanon. I have to admit that all the people that I came in contact with were ready for any form of co-operation to avoid the conflict. I think, in fact I am sure that they had an incomparably better insight of the existing situation**

**than their superior officers did, regardless of the fact that they were in the lower positions and of lower ranks. I can only suppose the shock they experienced when only a year after October 5, they saw their new Supreme Commander surrounded with the old team of generals. They were embittered and disappointed.**

## ***SURVEILLANCE OF GENERAL MOMČILO PERIŠIĆ***

**February 2000**

**All the time, the Montenegrin leadership was acquiring, in every way it could, equipment that would offer it an advantage over the Yugoslav Army (VJ) in the sense of wiretapping and surveillance. They tried to compensate for their physical inferiority by being better organized. A major advantage for them was the fact that the West had understanding, at least as regards these defensive means. They also received enormous financial assistance. The army was located on its territory, which largely facilitated work. A considerable part of the military communication links went through civilian radio relay nodes that had been saved from destruction. These were the weak points used for wiretapping. It is true that the Montenegrin Interior Ministry (MUP) had updated information about all the members of the 7<sup>th</sup> battalion, which was, actually, not very difficult for them. A big thing was the fact that there was excellent coordination between the Montenegrin authorities and the Serbian opposition, which received from them or through them information and funds for their opposition struggle.**

***Colonel General***

***GEZA FARKAŠ***

*As regards Montenegro, the Montenegrin State Security Service had obtained photographs practically of all the members of the 7<sup>th</sup> battalion, updated criminal data, i.e. records on them and members of their families, it released among members of the 7<sup>th</sup> battalion the information that they were about to be disbanded, which additionally disturbed the entire formation and induced them to ask what would happen to them if they were to be disbanded and to leave the 7<sup>th</sup> battalion, they would be faced with harassment and would have problems with the present authorities.*

*On the territory of Montenegro, in Ulcinj, we arrested two deserters, brought them to the MUP which did not react even after the adoption of the Law on Amnesty. However, the Montenegrin Vjesnik daily published*

*this and criticized both us and the MUP for not having reacted in accordance with the law, i.e. according to the adopted law.*

*What is also characteristic and extremely important is the fact that all our communication links going to Montenegro, and even a considerable part of the military communications, are listened to in Montenegro. In this sense, I suggest that, together with the Liaison Administration, we review the communications, i.e. the pattern of the communications being realized, i.e. which exist in Montenegro, to look into the possibilities of protecting these communications. That's all I wanted to say, general.*

### ***Lieutenant General***

#### ***BRANKO KRGA***

*General, I would only like to confirm what General Geza said about that wiretapping. Namely, we have already received, a number of times, confirmation from foreign sources that they are listening to us. Thus, for instance, they openly said that they had been familiar with all our telephone communications between Belgrade and Niš, Priština etc., during the war. This means that it is absolutely necessary to pay attention to the things that are said over these telephones, nothing that could be indicative for those foreigners listening to us. There is the code exercise, and everything that is important should go through code exercises, telephones should be used minimally. We have pointed to this a number of times, but due to some kind of, so to say, habit or lack of discipline or I don't know what, is still present.*

### ***Major General***

*Thirdly, this psychological-propaganda activity is continuing as part the informative operation, specifically directed towards the president and towards the VJ, as well as part of the social problems that are being reflected in the negative occurrences mentioned by General Geza .*

*In view of the intensification of the psychological-propaganda activities by the enemy, I would like to emphasize certain characteristics. Everyone is included in this activity – the secretary general, representatives of the government and international organizations, many the media in the West, specialized bodies of NATO units. Unlike other information relating to the method, forms and activities, this activity resembles and is similar to the activity that took place just before the armed aggression.*

*Included in the informative operation, as I have mentioned, were the leaderships of opposition parties in Serbia, the current authorities in Montenegro and so-called independent media. Characteristic of the current authorities in Montenegro is their cyclical inclusion. This means that it is peaceful for two days, then they get involved for two days, and on and on like this.*

## **General**

### **MILEN SIMIĆ**

*For the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, it is the Serbs, Slobodan Milošević and the VJ that are to blame. Slobodan Milošević is a war criminal ... there is this warrant and the financial blackmail which are in the function of this, and the VJ is in the service of Milošević and is making preparations for an attack on southern Serbia and Montenegro. These are the message for the world public, and they have the greatest problems in this regard – to convince the world public that these messages are trustworthy.*

*The main messages for the public in Serbia are that “the regime of Slobodan Milošević is non-democratic and it is responsible for both the aggression and the sanctions”. Montenegro and its current authorities are democratic, but they are endangered by Slobodan Milošević and the Yugoslav Army. The West is not against the Serbian people, but against the non-democratic regime. Quite indicative is the statement of Albright who is once again claiming that she likes the Serbian people etc. She reiterated this even during the aggression and the message is that the army has been abused, but that this is not the opinion all the members of the army and this thesis is now topical again.*

*The message for the public in Montenegro is the regime of Slobodan Milošević is to blame for the economic, social and other problems in Montenegro. The regime in Montenegro is democratic and the democratic West supports it. The army is the main threat to Montenegro and not everyone in the army shares the views of the military leadership.*

*General Nikolić, whom I knew personally, looked funny to me, to say the least. At every meeting of the Collegiate Body, like some grieving tattletale, he kept reporting Perišić without whom he probably would not be what he is. As soon as he would open his mouth, he would tongue-lash Perišić. He either had some kind of a pathological hatred towards him or he had such an assignment. Perišić knew all that because he was warned, and he could also read it later on. I can only imagine what these meetings between those generals and him looked like when he became the deputy*

*prime minister. It is quite logical that they could hardly wait to 'throw him out of the saddle'. Pavković was probably also fed up with this - Perišić did this, Perišić did that. Pavković put an end to that painful situation with Perišić by ordering the arrest of the former chief-of-staff. Therefore, the decision on the arrest of General Perišić was issued approximately two years before it was carried out. In the army this is called a strategy, I suppose, and in civilian life it is described as a visionary quality. I informed Mr. Maraš and Buda about this, and as far as I know, Perišić knew well that his arrest was being prepared. Buda confirmed to me that he had informed Perišić about what his former colleagues were preparing for him. Even more ironically, I warned him again for the second time in 2002, seven days before our joint arrest, but this time the military strategy scored a victory over my visionary quality. Temporarily!*

*Perišić was accused of having been involved in the OSA (Wasp) terrorist group because he had given a book as a present to some wretched lieutenant who was allegedly the OSA leader. I believe the lieutenant's last name was Gajić. It was only in Hitler's Germany and in Sloba's Serbia that a book was considered to be a terrorist weapon. In Germany they burnt books, while here they arrested those who gave them away and possessed them.*

*The OSA group was conceived in the minds of generals as the direct counterpoise to the group "Pauk" (Spider), because it was necessary to find a potential "assassin" of Pavković, just as Milošević's potential assassin was found in group Pauk.*

*Therefore, the boss decided to have Perišić arrested because he gave a book to hardened "terrorist" Gajić. Very characteristic is the fact that the generals regularly went to the boss to get their opinion. It is, thus, quite logical that the continuity of lending opinions persisted even after October 5. Their identity was exclusively linked to the present political situation. That is how they were taught and they did not know of any other way. In order to have generals who will be accepted by the citizens as their generals, we need to take non-affirmed, young and prosperous officers who know that they must not tie themselves to politics. If they are dismissed for having a neutral attitude to politics, that is quite certainly less tragic than if they are dismissed for having been politicized. For the people and especially for the state. Politicians must renounce their habit of winning over officers for their goals.*

***Lieutenant General***

***STAMENKO NIKOLIĆ***

*General, as regards morale, while I served in the south, the former chief-of-staff, General Perišić went from house to house and simply kept saying that soldiers must not respond to the mobilization.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*Let's arrest him. If we have proof of this, he should be arrested. I don't know how far this thing with Osa has gone and whether the Osa group has been transferred to the Niš prison?*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*We need to see with a lawyer to intensify that trial of theirs and to see whether Perišić is involved in that in any way. If Perišić is involved in it, the necessary procedure should be initiated. These are the orders I have received from the boss. If he is involved in Osa, just like any other citizens, I will sign it all. The fact that he was the chief-of-staff makes no difference. He is involved in a terrorist action.*

**Colonel General**

**GEZA FARKAŠ**

*He is involved in the sense that he was in contact with Gajić, he gave him a book as a present.*

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*This means that this is now going through court proceedings and the statements of that Gajić – if there are any elements for raising the issue of his responsibility, let this be done, and this about him going from house to house and advocating... – if there is proof of this, arrest him. There is no dilemma about it.*

## **PERSECUTION OF ZORAN ZIVKOVIC**

**General Stamenko Nikolić dealt with criminal charges against opposition leaders. Not an easy task at all. He was alone, while the leaders were numerous. Thus, it was the turn of the famous “pole**

guy”, whom I would like to get to know in person, Nenad Čanak. The generals’ favourite topic. Especially since his threatening with the hanging on Terazije. That “executioner” had to be stopped. And who would be better for this than Nidža. Sloba and Šešelj, non-destined room-mates in The Hague, had pushed into the army’s hands yet another weapon – “the public information law”, which was actually directed against the opposition, while the media were only collateral damage. In fear of the sky-high penalties for conveying the stands and views of the opposition, newspapers and televisions avoided open conflicts with the authorities. The biggest loser in this was the Serbian opposition, because very few were those who dared and desired to present what the opposition wanted to say. That law was a real weapon in the hands of monsters. This weapon was used to shoot at everything and everyone who thought differently.

This time, it was the turn of today’s Prime Minister Živković. Otherwise, my colleague “spy and traitor”. By profession, of course. I am sorry I did not have an opportunity to get to know him personally. I do not know whether the Montenegrins had warned him about what was in store for him, but I believe they did. For Milošević’s generals everyone was a spy, the question was only what to try to prove for whom. His direct approach bothered them. It suited them more when someone attacked the regime in a wrapped up form. This is as if he had been deluded. But when someone, like the then mayor of Niš, keeps developing opposition activities in his city, and also has contacts with his colleagues in Europe, then that is a finished matter. Every military prosecutor could raise charges against him without being given a new rank and apartment.

*Colonel General*  
**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*Who else had assignments to carry out?*

*Lieutenant General*  
**STAMENKO NIKOLIĆ**

*I had two criminal charges against Nenad Čanak. Proceedings have been instituted through the military prosecutor and that is undergoing procedure, as are the misdemeanour charges against the Glas daily.*

*As regards the situation in Montenegro, the West continues to offer support to the Montenegrin leadership, but quite characteristic is the thing that the president also emphasized yesterday – that there is no resolute support for independence, but only as a platform, through which*

*they continue to exert pressure against the Yugoslav leadership. Characteristic in this sense is also what the Montenegrin foreign minister said in a conversation with us – that it is obvious from their contacts with the West that the world is in panic regarding Kosovo and Metohija, and even Montenegro, that they do not know what to do, that KFOR is not managing to cope etc.*

*The stronger presence of the foreign media was registered in Montenegro over the previous days. CNN teams came from Macedonia and they are interested in the further course of developments. One should not rule out the intention of certain factors in the West to use media manipulation to redirect attention from Kosovo to Montenegro so as to divert attention from the failure on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Quite indicative is the statement Clark made yesterday in which he once again attacked President Milošević of wanting to destabilize Montenegro and said that NATO forces were following this very carefully. The SFOR command in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) has been ordered to prepare to receive refugees from Montenegro.*

*As regards the situation in Montenegro, the West continues to offer support to the Montenegrin leadership, but quite characteristic is the thing that the president also emphasized yesterday – that there is no resolute support for independence, but only as a platform, through which they continue to exert pressure against the Yugoslav leadership. Characteristic in this sense is also what the Montenegrin foreign minister said in a conversation with us – that it is obvious from their contacts with the West that the world is in panic regarding Kosovo and Metohija, and even Montenegro, that they do not know what to do, that KFOR is not managing to cope etc.*

### ***Lieutenant General***

#### ***ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIĆ***

*During the previous week, those carrying out intelligence-subversive activities towards our country focused their attention on the activities of VJ units on the territory of Montenegro, in the immediate vicinity of Kosovo and Metohija. As regards the security situation in the territory, it is complex, there are activities by separatist, extremist and terrorist forces and they have a negative effect on the VJ's security. The main danger is the possible escalation of terrorism by Albanian separatists in southern Serbia. However, due to incessant separatist activities by the leadership and MUP of Montenegro, the security of the VJ in this republic is largely endangered. Last weekend, in a number of towns in Montenegro over 2,500 members of MUP's reserve forces... weapons*

*and uniforms were distributed to them, the functioning of the military calling-up service was checked out, and shooting from infantry weaponry was carried out. Those who received call-ups were told that the activity had been carried out for the purpose of checking out the mobilization alert of the units since, Montenegro, as stated by MUP officials, is endangered by the army's intention to attack MUP and occupy this republic.*

*It is characteristic that the statement of Mr. Djukanović concerning the army and the situation on the territory of Montenegro is constantly being repeated on the domestic scene. As regards psychological-propaganda activities against the FRY and the army, they continue with unabated force and everything is proceeding exactly according to their plan. For now, we have shattered the thesis about an alleged mobilization of the army, preparations for forcible return, but we have not eliminated the thesis about the army entering Montenegro and this should be, and I suggest that this be the main task for next week, we have started with that.*

*The conclusion is that, despite the activities by the factors who have been demonstrating this negative influence over a longer period of time, the morale is stable for now and no major problems concerning the morale are expected in the upcoming period.*

*As regards proposals for measures, I suggest that we forward to the units part of the president's speech, of course with approval and authorization, in the original form, especially the assessments and especially certain measures, with the exclusion of what should not be presented, because that has a positive effect on the morale, and already the very presence is provoking positive comments.*

*I would like to ask, if it is technically possible, for this protected channel also to be used in communication with the assistant for morale, because the situation in the units and adequate measures are reported on every morning.*

*As regards measures on the territory of Montenegro, the statements of two commanders will be presented today.*

***Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ***

*We should see what is happening with this lawsuit against Perišić for the statement that a paramilitary (unit) is being formed within the army. We said that this should be done, and I called the lawyer. As regards television, information 3.A will go. Primarily that Čorbić woman, that is of course..., I don't know whether anyone had an opportunity to watch that television, but they have lately been so poisonous that it is*

*unbelievable. There were also unsettled relations regarding the lease, and we decided to turn that space into housing space, like other business spaces as well, and to give it to someone to use, and this will also help us get her out of there, because her conduct is inappropriate, everything she writes and says is in that function.*

*And this Živković, the mayor, whom they are mentioning, we have sued him for that statement, because he is constantly giving statements, making assessments about the army, putting requests to the army etc. Today, Deutsche Welle carried his statement. Here is what he said: there is a dangerous game being played by certain people in the army who still believe that political commissioners should exist in the army.*

*I gave my man an order once again thoroughly to examine and to present a response – no political commissioners in the army, but he probably believes that he as a politician can deal with political issues. He is one of those... whom we should have arrested during the war, but I made the biggest mistake there, because he did not even serve the army, he put on a uniform and started interfering in the work of the army and then I held a meeting and told him that we will introduce military rule there if everything does not function as it should. However, during the aggression, he most directly cooperated in a manner which I am not familiar with, but he is in constant contact with the mayors of certain cities in the NATO member countries. He gave a statement saying that he did not know why, that he was surprised that NATO was targeting barracks and tearing down barracks when the army is hiding there and there and there, and he said where it was hiding. However, we have no proof of this but at issue is a man who should be fully unmasked. This is just a game... if you followed that entire correspondence, he requested to be relieved of responsibility as the mayor, because in the city council there are also councillors who are members of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), of the Radicals, so that he would lose in the vote, and he, therefore, asked his party to strip him of that immunity.*

*However, we will see. He gave a statement, a very bad one, several times, saying that the army was raising the level of its combat alert, that it was sending troops to the territory of 3.A, that the 63<sup>rd</sup> parachute brigade was sent at the time when those things were happening at the airport, which caused disturbance among the citizens of Niš, and we sued him for it and will continue to sue him.*

**The subconscious desire to have former colleagues convicted was probably the result of the fact that the boss could suspect that they too would probably be against him as soon as they take off their uniforms. There were various pressures and threats towards them**

and those close to them. The army is considering possibilities for taking away their apartments. How to take away the apartment of Colonel Stojadinović and to get rid his wife who was working for the army. Pavković's radicalism can best be seen in his speech. One should bear in mind the fact that these speeches were made before about a dozen people and that the conversations were recorded. I can only imagine what it looks like when they meet with operatives who need to carry out these decisions. However, this clearly shows the direction in which the military leadership was heading.

### *Colonel General*

#### *NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ*

*The latest information... the thing the air force commander is writing about the conduct of Grahovac down there and everything he is doing. We have to be sharp in our actions towards such persons. The fact that we have data and information about what is happening means nothing to us if there is no action. It means nothing to us, reading all that information just gives you a headache. If we know that this Grahovac is doing that... I wrote it down there, and a Court of Honour and to initiate the procedure of taking away his apartment and everything else, and [to present him] in the media... constantly to publish articles about what he is doing, so that the people would know what that general is doing. It is only in this way that we can unmask him, and not just keep presenting conclusions, as we are doing. We will even live to see him come here and kill us all, right here in the office. And not just about him, but about all persons in this regard. If we know that someone is carrying out hostile activities towards us, we have no business to provide him with documented proof, you have to arrest him, to bring him in for questioning for two or three days, as long as we can hold him, and then we will apologize to him later. And not as it is being done now - having them create chaos, kill, liquidate and we let them come and go. They have to be arrested, he is not to exist, if we want to protect the personality and the military organization and everything else.*

*I believe we are over-sensitive when it comes to carrying out an adequate activity on the basis of information we have. We either do not find the information absolutely reliable, or we do not have this, or are still checking out that and then one gains the impression that we are being drawn into some kind of spiral where we want to - we don't want to, there is - there isn't, there will be - there won't be etc. What is that Kalalić, who is he? If we know that he is messing around, that he wants to liquidate someone, we should liquidate him first. Therefore, the situation*

*needs to be followed well. Smiljanić is doing that, we need to do it, let the service do it. You know how it is, someone could make some kind of ... etc. and then we will be surprised by what had happened. So, it is necessary to know well the pilots, to know well the commanders, to establish well the organization... the possibility of taking aircrafts... one thing, another thing, the third thing etc, and not to have someone create some kind of an excess, after which we will all be surprised.*

*Does anyone else have anything to say about the tasks that were carried out, does anything need to be explained? And if it's finished, there is no need. No. Yes, Krga, please.*

***Lieutenant General***

***STAMENKO NIKOLIĆ***

*General, we have three proposals regarding your orders for a disciplinary investigation against the former chief-of-staff and there are three proposals of the sectors. Vlade Nonković, Branislav Petrović and Ljubomir Draganjac are to state before the Collegiate Body that a procedure can be launched, a disciplinary investigation, and your decision to initiate a procedure before the Court of Honour is to be passed afterwards. The generals have to be active. We looked to see who is free. This is also the proposal of the head of the Legal Administration who is involved the most in conducting the procedure.*

***DETERIORATION OF THE CONFLICT WITH  
MONTENEGRO***

***ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIĆ***

*Separatist activities in Montenegro are intensifying, numerous characteristic activities which endanger the security of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) have been registered and they include the following:*

- 1. Non-corroborated attacks on the VJ about it endangering the security and sovereignty of Montenegro, and the further arming and training of police units, with the training being carried out by former army officers*
- 2. In every larger building in Podgorica and in other larger buildings in Montenegro two observers are placed to monitor the movements of the army and officers-tenants, and even some kind of records on this are being kept*

3. *The Montenegrin Interior Ministry (MUP) has formed groups for the intimidation of citizens and for the overnight stays of certain military conscripts who responded to the military call-ups to defend their country*

5. *Incessant observation of army units and facilities, except certain military facilities such as the Golubovci airport at command 2.A, the command of the fleet has prepared forces for an attack on these facilities.*

*Certain retired generals, Grahovac and Martinović, are spreading anti-army propaganda, stating that the army had carried out an aggression against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), that the Slovenians were right to have seized the border crossings, that half of the professional VJ members in Montenegro are for Milo Djukanović, while the other half has been deceived, that Montenegro should seize the airports and border crossings because this is its country and that the wise and capable have been expelled from the VJ, while only obedient generals have stayed.*

*Extremists from the Serbian opposition are preparing to provoke unrest in the country and the forcible takeover of power, which certain parties are intending to use for the realization of their secessionist goals. Representatives of certain political parties in Vojvodina demand the status of a republic for this province. As the reason for organizing the protest rally planned for April 14, this year, they mention the endangering of the media in Serbia. Their preparations for violence during the protest rally is also indicated by the forming of crisis headquarters and strike groups for conflicts with bodies of the Serbian MUP. One such group in Čajetina is being led by a former VJ non-commissioned officer, and their nucleus consists of members of... from the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Otpor organization. For this occasion, they are even carrying out special training in martial arts, the use of inflammable means, baseball bats and so on, part of which has also been shown on television in the show "The Radicals' Waves" on March 28, 2000.*

*The security situation in the army as a whole is favourable. There are individual cases of party and other forms of negative expressions by army members, but they have had no impact on the state of security. However, they have contributed to the partial compromising (of the damage) and its reputation. An analysis of the conduct and contacts of VJ members who have left the army and have gone to work for the Montenegrin MUP undoubtedly confirm that this category of professional members is being used for the realization of intensive intelligence activities towards the army, both at the beginning of the testing of their suitability for being*

*accepted into the Montenegrin MUP and later on. They are establishing planned contacts with their former colleagues from the army units and commands and are bearing influence on them to leave the VJ.*

*The importance the Montenegrin MUP is attaching to the contacts of its members with VJ members is best attested to by the fact that all members of that MUP are obliged to report to their superiors all the contacts they had achieved with VJ members for any purpose. Operative findings indicate that three students of the navy Military Academy - Jovan Vračar, Ljubiša Krgović and Darko Vasiljević – will leave the army immediately after the completion of their schooling. Among the proposed measures, we believe that it is necessary to issue an order that would oblige all VJ members to report to their senior officers all the contacts they and their family members made with members of the Montenegrin MUP, and also to take measures to relieve of their duties all those for whom we learn that they have submitted requests for a transfer to MUP bodies, because they submit such requests, have interviews, but stay on and work for months in the commands, during which time they are practically considered to be their people in our ranks. Secondly, we should re-initiate the drive for all army members in their basic units to return the automatic weapons which they have illegal possession of, without any consequences for them. That is all I had to say.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*Throw them out immediately, if the information about their conduct is correct, and he can go to whichever television he wants to and talk.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*That should be prepared and we should present something through the media about this, and secondly, acquaint those in the lower commands with this. This order which the First Administration will write, is to regulate the realization of special measures at border crossings on the territory of Montenegro. They can prepare the same scenario – since this Grahovac constantly keeps referring to it – like in Slovenia, taking over the border crossings. So, they can go after these crossings, they do not want the watchtowers, but they would be going for the crossings that can be used. Let those watchtowers that are covering the crossings be well organized and reinforced.*

There is a great similarity between the events in Slovenia, where I once worked, and in Montenegro. This is quite logical, in view of the protagonists on both sides. On the one hand, we had the desire of the democratic forces not to secede, but to redefine the relations within the federation, and on the other side there was Milošević's regime which behaved as it did in 1991. In such a constellation of things, it was quite logical that a conflict would break out. Actually, the only obstacle to Milošević provoking an open conflict with the help of loyal people from his surroundings, was the West's unequivocal intention to go all the way in that case. The manner in which he ruled did not allow the citizens to live without tensions and wars. As much as he needed a reconstruction of the country, on the one hand, even if only in the marketing sense, he just as badly needed a situation in which he would be able to use petty intrigues and conflicts to maintain the tension and keep the people's attention away from the real social problems.

The Montenegrin MUP did everything to compensate for its physical inferiority with a better organization and technical advantage. Wrong is the belief that the West was arming the Montenegro. Quite the contrary, the West was of the opinion there was an excess of history in these regions, as one of their publicists said, and of weapons as well. The Montenegrins could obtain defensive police equipment, as well as surveillance equipment. A great advantage for them was quite certainly also the fact that they could rely on an exchange of information with Western services, which was normal in conditions of coinciding interests.

*Colonel General*

**SVETOZAR MARJANOVIĆ**

*I believe we need to start taking measures towards those for whom we are not sure that they will carry out our orders, we must no longer keep delaying this and these measures could include dismissals, secondments, transfers from positions and the filing of criminal disciplinary charges. I believe we must no longer keep postponing this, because it can easily happen that we have... etc., and then we constantly keep wondering whether something will be blown up, whether someone will do this or that, and we constantly keep concluding that we have this kind and that kind of officers.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*We have to have a list of such persons. We need to look into this, to call the army commanders and to see with them and to resolve this immediately, on the spot. It is better that we order them to leave than for them to leave by themselves.*

**Colonel General**

**GEZA FARKAŠ**

*They are investing maximal efforts into psychological-propaganda activities and are presenting information that a conflict will soon break out between the army and the Montenegrin police on the territory of Montenegro, they are creating a kind of psychosis in that region and are preparing for NATO, in such a situation, to be in the position, i.e. to have to intervene.*

**Colonel General**

**GEZA FARKAŠ**

*It is characteristic that, on the territory of Montenegro - and we discovered that on March 21, we received this information and we have finally established that it is true - a truck full of weapons came from BiH. We do not know what was in it, and that truck went to Nikšić. There are currently around 250 members of special units in Nikšić, at Motel Vidovdan, and these specials are gathering in other garrisons as well and they have received the task of preparing to block the barracks and possibly prevent the army from leaving.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*This information should be prepared for 2.A for the army commander to prepare a blockade of that motel and other measures, and then we will see who will be faster.*

**Colonel General**

**GEZA FARKAŠ**

*Last week, an officer crossed over, he transferred from the army to the MUP, and a non-commissioned officer is preparing to cross over as well. In commanding positions in the MUP there are currently 65 of our officers, our former officers who are commanding police units of various levels, among whom there are 16 senior officers. The Montenegrin government is organizing and preparing to adopt a Law, i.e. a decision on the formation of the Montenegrin armed forces. The government is preparing a proposal to forward it to Parliament. A wiretapping centre of the MUP has been established in Podgorica. It has a task and it is listening to all our communications, both radio and telephone communications.*

*Secondly, I said here that I believed it was really necessary to toughen the transport and the supplying of Montenegro, so that they would not come into conflict with our Serbian police because of these channels through which they are passing. This is a large quantity, they transferred here 98,000 litres of milk out of which only 15,000 went to the army.*

***Colonel General***

***NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ***

*Let this be looked into. Who transferred this?*

***Colonel General***

***GEZA FARKAŠ***

*That is from Ribnica. They concluded those contracts and it left from Sjenica.*

***Colonel General***

***NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ***

*That is our zone of responsibility. See to it that this is looked into, who did what, and immediately arrest all those who are doing so. They are violating the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and that's that.*

*You and Milen Simić should see to what extent was there an outpour of military information in that feuilleton in the Vecernje Novosti about the air force and anti-aircraft defence, because, in my opinion, it is unheard-of to publish things in such a manner and to make a promotion of one unit and certain personalities, and to give the complete information on the organizational and personnel formation of such a unit. And*

*everything that we kept [as a secret] until now in regard to certain activities during the aggression, it was all said and told there. So, the Security Administration [should see about this], and the Information Administration... I ordered that an order be issued saying that such projects, as are these, cannot be presented to the public. I can tolerate statements by commanders, I can tolerate interviews, I can tolerate everything, but such a project... Even the president asked me yesterday what that was.*

***Major General***

***MILEN SIMIĆ***

*General, on the basis of facts which had a negative effect on the morale, there are no major changes compared to last week. I would like to emphasize here only a higher intensity of inspections and visits to units, which is already said to have had a positive effect and I point out that the signal of the Yugoslav television has now finally covered the zone of responsibility of the navy.*

*Among the negative factors, the reports still emphasize the problem of army members on the territory of Montenegro and the proposal of General Nikolić for the upcoming period will partly resolve that part of the problem and it refers, later on, to the payment of allowances to persons without an apartment, persons living away from their families. This is pointed out by the commands of the strategic groups and I believe it is good that they are exerting pressure on the general staff.*

*In regard to the attitude of the media to the army, as far as the domestic public is concerned still prevailing are features with positive messages, and as regards the foreign public, attempts are mostly being made to use new propagandist messages to cover the aggression and the failure of the aggression. However, this is not reaching the world public. Negative messages about acts by the army during the war and afterwards are immediately revealed as such. As regards the attitude of the media, it is characteristic already today that they are starting especially to attack organizational units of the general staff. Until now, it was the military leadership, while attacks are now directed towards the Security Administration as the body with influence on the president, while the Administration for Morale is being described as ideological and of an agitprop nature.*

***Colonel General***

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*Who is describing it like that?*

**Major General**

**MILEN SIMIĆ**

*This was published by all the media in Montenegro and by Stojadinović<sup>26</sup> in Glas.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*You should call in that Stojadinović for a conversation and we should give him a lecture.*

**Major General**

**MILEN SIMIĆ**

*He will publish that too, general, he will immediately publish it.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*Let him publish it.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*We will discuss a bit the new organization of the administration. You should give me, as soon as possible, proposals for the person who would be the VJ spokesman and we have to agree on his presentation of things and he must be the one to present all this. As regards the information about the newspaper that wrote about alleged crimes, a serious denial should be prepared in regard to it. Everything they have been accusing us of so far, in such a manner, all that is based only on allegations, there is nowhere any proof. So, this should be seriously denied and that spokesman should be prepared. I don't know whether you already have someone in mind?*

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<sup>26</sup>

## ***FIRST OPEN CONFLICTS IN MONTENEGRO***

*May 2000*

***Colonel***

***ACA TOMIC***

*General, Sir, general Farkas ordered me to make a report on this group from the Seventh Police Battalion in Bijelo Polje. They came into a conflict with four members of the Montenegrin MUP Special Unites. That was one of those characteristic safety incidents that happened last night. There were no other safety incidents. That would be all from me.*

***General***

***SIMIC***

*The first anniversary of the battle of Murin and the beginning of reconstruction of buildings in Murin were celebrated in the North of Montenegro, and a large number of Montenegrin citizens from the North gathered there. The activity bore political significance, and I'd rather not talk about that. However, I would like to stress that the Army did everything to organize, prepare and carry out the festive occasion properly.*

*These increased levels of control and units' inspection with the aim to gain an insight into the situation and to offer assistance have made positive influence. Among the elements that have had negative influence on the morale, and we expect that the negative influence continues to be present in the following period, is the reaction that came as the result of late payments, and salaries above all.*

*As for these fights, since mister Tomic noted them as being important, as I have made a joke about it, the important thing is that our guys won, that is that they were not beaten. Later on that night they tried to arrest a sergeant, from the same unit in Bijelo Polje,, you know, and he had to use a hand grenade as his argument against that, and the special unit guys withdrew after that and gave up arresting him. We reached a mutual agreement that they would not speak about the incident in public, and to solve that problem*

*with the MUP leadership, since we have the preparations for the competition in Podgorica underway, and it has been jointly organized by MUP and 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Command.*

***Lieutenant general***  
***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*But it is very important that we are all fully aware of the level of importance of the things that we are speaking about here, and it is especially important that the general public is fully informed about it, and especially the general public in Montenegro. Secondly, every piece of information we gathered, that is the public statements that we issue have to be made available to the television. Everything you give to Tanjug, everything that you give to RTS, has to be given to Info<sup>27</sup>, too. Don't let me keep reminding you about that! I begin to get the impression that those heads of departments, heads of groups and those administration officers have begun to behave casually and negligently, and that when they are given a task, they determine the deadline for it themselves. Well, we are going to determine the deadlines ourselves, and in a great precision, and we are going to ask for reports about all those things. We asked for that official report to be made to inform our soldiers, to inform the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army and the Navy in that territory, and also for us to be able to take the necessary measures with the Federal Government in case they stall us off. So, we should send that in there, and ask that it is published in the media as soon as possible. Have we found a way to calculate salaries and payment for Army members separately from other things?*

***Lieutenant general***  
***GEZA FARKAS***

*In the territory of Montenegro, there have been some reactions to these articles, to these activities, reactions that have been published in the papers. They reacted by means of some headlines, and we shall probably hear more details about that. Here are some of the*

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*characteristic headlines: "Generals Dislike that Montenegrin Leadership Don't Give Money", that's one of the headlines. When in a democratic country Army turn against a member of the Supreme Command, and then a headline saying that Ponte has asked Kremlin to explain why they didn't arrest General Ojdanic in Moscow, and so on. The same propaganda campaign has been continued. We had one serious conflict near Mojkovac, where the members of the Seventh Battalion in their civilian clothes, when they were not on duty, in a restaurant, came into a conflict with a group of civilians and a Montenegrin MUP officer who was with them. He pulled his gun out, and then they all jumped on him and took his gun away, and then everybody started to fight. The outcome of that all was that he went out of the restaurant when the fight was over, and the Seventh Battalion officers got out of the restaurant, too, there were seven of them, and then the owner of the restaurant fired his automatic gun at them, and wounded one of our men and his brother who is not from the Yugoslav Army. This was a serious conflict that could have resulted in some serious problems. We did something about it, both along the command lines, and along our line, we went out to the site of the incident first of all, and then did everything we always do in cases like that. These people that took part in, that is, the one that shot at them is at large. We can hardly ---, he is Asanin Zoran, the restaurant owner.*

**Incidents like this one presented serious danger for the safety of Montenegro, and I know for sure that, as a rule, they always drew the attention of the Montenegrin leadership. The most serious problems were made by the units of the Seventh Battalion that were deployed in the north of Montenegro. Head of security service in one of these units, Anicic, was a very interesting character in those incidents. As far as I know, he was an operational officer in the State Security Service in Budva. After the crack in the ruling party, he became the SNP follower, and became the security service in one of those detachments. He was rewarded for his loyalty and transferred to the Defence Ministry, where, according to my sources, he waited to be sent further on to the military diplomatic missions. As far as I know now, he is still in the same position, and to top it all, he is sitting very near the Cabinet of Maras. The Army has always had**

problems with the Seventh Battalion cadre. Most of them were sent there with some politician's letter of recommendation, and most of them never attended the relevant military schools. They did not allow that to stand in their way to get high ranks and non-commissioned officers' ranks, and with those the status of active members of the armed forces, with all their rights and privileges.

*Lieutenant general*

**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*Can we issue an arrest warrant for him?*

*Lieutenant general*

**GEZA FARKAS**

*An arrest warrant. We can, he is at large somewhere in Montenegro, so whom shall we sent the arrest warrant to? He chose carefully where to hide. He is hiding there. They simply said, there in those meetings, that he had escaped. We turned to the Interior Ministry for help. The commission we set up had a meeting, and a criminal charge was brought against him. We'll get organized and do something, now that we know who he is. They started fighting over the music in the restaurant, because the musicians refused to play Serbian songs, and so on. They refused to play the song about the St. Vitus Day. They also reacted, Glumac<sup>28</sup> called a meeting, and the State Security Chief was there. They expressed their reactions to that meeting of ours, when you were down there, and so on. They said that they had made an assessment of that, that they had not expected such a thing to happen, that it had been inappropriately silly, and even that we had had a chat over drinks and food, and that there had not been an official meeting at all.*

*Lieutenant general*

**GEZA FARKAS**

*Further on, yesterday during the riots, and so on, there was --- you know what happened there starting from the afternoon, the delay,*

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*and so on, and finally how it all ended. It was characteristic of them that a message and a telegram with Solana's support were read in the rally. And there ---, some leaflets were handed out, a proclamation to the citizens of Serbia. Last night in that proclamation, they called on a renewed occupation and in all the free, that is, oppositional towns, in which they ordered that tonight and in the afternoon people start gathering and continue doing that. The problem lied in that that went out, because they were not able to reach a consensus. They were all in the City Parliament building, all the opposition leaders were in there, and they couldn't agree upon who would make a speech, what would be said there, and they didn't have enough people there, either.*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*You shall continue to monitor their activities, and see whether they are coming out tonight, too. It is simple; we should publicly proclaim that everybody who called for a rebellion and destruction of the state shall be arrested. I'm telling you, half of them will run away. And then a wanted circular should be sent for them, so that they never return to this country. It's that simple.*

***Lieutenant general***

***GEZA FARKAS***

*Sir, Canak sent us a letter, a letter to our generals, and so on. That letter should be read, his reactions are there, in it. He said that we were protecting Milosevic's family, and everything else along these lines, that we were not protecting the workers, that he possessed reliable information, that he knew for sure that the lower ranking officers were not supporting us, and so on.*

*This helicopter, the one that entered that air space, went out of the corridor. A wounded criminal was in that helicopter, a mafioso from Banja Luka, which got wounded several times during a mobsters' clash. He is now referred to as a casualty, in the communication between the Military Medical Academy, and the Banja Luka Hospital...*

***Lieutenant general***

**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*And who sent a helicopter for him to come here? The state, of course. Dodik sent a helicopter for him. And everything is clear now, the Army of the Republic of Srpska has nothing to do with that, that's clear. And so, I'll tell this so that you all know it, we have forbidden that, there would be no more aircrafts flying in from the Republic of Srpska. Please, I want to see that document. I personally signed it yesterday. It says here that it is forbidden that the aircrafts from the Republic of Srpska enter our territory, except for the cases with special permission. You, don't play games with this one! If you didn't put it all down in this one, correct it all! So, not a single aircraft can go in here. When it is permitted, then they will need some special criteria to be met so that it can come in this country. NATO troops are in the Republic of Srpska. The Army of the Republic of Srpska is now not what it used to be, and we do not know who is there working in that Army nor who has been involved in that. And now we have just discovered that that one was a criminal. Maybe a NATO officer was also in that helicopter, and maybe he came there to take pictures, to drop those locators there, and so on, who knows what sort of things he could have done there. So, from now on, no one can come in here any more. And that one that has sent those complaints to you, let that general complain to his heart's content. First of all, he has to send, as we have said ---, for all the pilots, but that would mean nothing to us now. They cannot come in here. He can go somewhere to get medical treatment, like he came to Belgrade; he could have gone to Sarajevo to get medical treatment. He has to meet the same criteria there. He can get medical treatment in Zagreb; he meets the same criteria there, too. He goes in a foreign country. That's it, done and over. We got an order for that there. Don't try to play with that. They got ---, they units received an order to shot down all the aircrafts. So, we have, and our units have to inform our soldiers and our pilots about that. So, each aircraft will be shot down, every one that is found above the zone of forbidden flights. And this here, this above us is also a no flights zone. We have units that should be ready, ready to do all those things.*

**Lieutenant general**

**GEZA FARKAS**

*I suggest, sir, since two days ago there was another flight, and I suppose that it undergone the same procedure like that one with that helicopter, and it didn't go out of the ---. But in cases when they land here, we have no control over those cases, and we cannot know who is in the helicopter...*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*Everything has been taken care of, and so the control procedures are the same as those in the airport, the customs, and all the rest. When they get the permission, it is not sure that one will get the permission. That means that they cannot come here just like that. A helicopter from the Republic of Srpska comes in here, and nobody of us can do anything about it. This means that they cannot come in just like that, if the permission is granted they land in the Batajnica airport, it is thoroughly examined down there, and only then can they do everything else. That's the decision. They can send all sorts of things in, with that helicopter, they took everything from them, the weapons, they search through and control everything there, they can even take away their helicopter, they can even take away their pilot, they can send in five terrorists here in such a helicopter, they can send in those special unit soldiers here, and land them in the helicopter on VMA building, as if they were patients. They can then go wherever they like from the VMA, and do whatever they like. Let's not play with those things any more. They kidnap people, of course they do. They may even kidnap somebody who has come to the VMA for a treatment, and take them away.*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*He have people who are getting medical treatment in the VMA, too, and there are some other people there who are also getting their medical treatment there, with approval by the responsible people in VMA. I know that, too. And they get better treatment than our general when he is sent there. And as for this head of security in the VMA, you shall suggest somebody to me immediately, and he is to get retired immediately, now, he gets retired in June, and you shall*

*suggest to me a man to replace him there. You can prepare the order; just wait for Geza to suggest somebody to me. We have to handle that. He has to inform the security directorate there what is happening and in what manner. Geza should not be chasing anybody to do that; Geza should not run there in VMA to ask his whether this one has been admitted or not. Everybody should do their job, there's no doubt about that. They transferred the one that took part in the assassination of Arkan to VMA, too. And the Interior Ministry transferred him there, we know nothing about that. MUP what? You have to be informed about everything, too. VMA is subordinate to you. It is all right when they carry a casualty there, but we have to be informed in advance that the wounded man is being brought there. And after all, why bring him there in the first place? Why did they leave us with this hot potato, with security on our shoulders, with all the work for us, everything to organize, to be involved in all that? There are at least a hundred hospitals here. Who is that Gagi guy that shot the other one, and why did he have to come there of all the places? That's not acceptable for us. People who work in VMA should handle those things. They should not tempt me to start asking why they accept such cases. They should handle these things. And you should have a meeting with them to discuss it in a serious manner, and if necessary, you should bring the VMA people there, all those chief people should come here in my office, and I'll tell them the things that I have just told you, I'll tell them. What do they think they are doing? We are a medical institution, we are this, we are that. There are hundreds of medical institutions, and not a single one of them have even considered the option to bring them there. And once they bring them, they don't even inform us about that. Whose interest is it in to hide those things? We have a team that render services; they provide medical treatment to patients out of the health institution. He doesn't want to come to VMA because he hasn't got an adequate suite, and then he receives his treatment at home, the team with doctors, nurses and everything get ready, go to his home and provides treatment for the patient there. Which ones of those generals demanded such a treatment at their homes? And afterwards nobody knows anything about what happened. Nobody knows anything, the doctor himself decided to do so.*

***Lieutenant general***

**GEZA FARKAS**

*There is another proposal, since police officers here have also started to get sick and take longish sick leaves, and then they call us to say that they have patients from the Ministry of Interior, and groups of mobsters. We have now a Military Police lieutenant in Novi Sad, who has been on sick leave for two months now. So, my suggestion would be that we should examine the sick leaves of our officers, to see who suffers from what, and so on.*

**Lieutenant general**

**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*You know yourselves what's that all about. It is all about the fact that those are people who have official documents, permissions to carry arms, and they are suitable. They pay them well, he sits besides him, when the police stops them they have documents to show them, and suddenly he becomes somebody's body guard. That's what's been happening.*

**Lieutenant general**

**GEZA FARKAS**

*And they do those things, and get the amount equal to their annual salary for one such operation only, they get the annual salary.*

**Lieutenant general**

**NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC**

*That is only the issue of somebody's safety, or are there some other crafty schemes that can be achieved by means of obtaining and abusing of official papers? So, this order should be issued and immediately send.*

*Is there anything else?*

*So, in relation to this situation that has arisen now, we should establish a team tasked with monitoring and following of this situation and incident that is going on now in Belgrade and in the country. Let the deputy chief of General Staff lead this team, one officer from the staff sector should be in the team, one from the morale department, that is the Information Directorate, one from*

*Yugoslav Army land forces and from the Security Directorate. So, that would be a team that would constantly hold their meetings, follow things, etc.*

*And secondly, a team is to be set up to monitor all these measures, the measures that should be undertaken these days, today, tomorrow, in relation to our buildings for a potential invasion. I am almost sure that those from Otpor, the mercenaries, not the students, of course, that they would try to attack some of the buildings, as an attempt to get hold of weapons, or only to provoke us in some way. I'm almost sure of that. So, that should be examined on the army level, on the general staff level, our buildings that should be protected and units that should be tasked with securing them. Those units should be designated precisely, together with who should be their commanders, the liaison that we shall have with him, and who can issue orders to them. So, this team should practically coordinate all those activities with the commands of one and the other Army, both in the units made up in Belgrade and of course, deeper in the territory. Well we cannot allow that somebody attacks that building of our General Staff in the centre, and that we do not have a unit that has been tasked with protecting it and intervening in such situations. And to gather our forces only after such incidents, only after something happens that makes us gather our units. That unit has to be set up, formed into ranks, ready to act. Only a signal, the men come, the unit is on their way. We know who can sound the alarm for them, and who is here. Look here, we must, I am for that, we have to protect the interest of the Army.*

*The thing that that one there in Montenegro did, we have to know everything about it, he can escape now, but he has a restaurant there, and he is bound to return sooner or later. Montenegrin Ministry of Interior will do nothing to catch him, or if they catch him, they will release him. But we shall catch him, like when Aca Vasiljevic caught that one in Split. We shall catch him and put him on trial. There's no other way. Everybody who is doing things contrary to the Army interests have to be punished. And we shall we whether it would be the civilian judiciary or the military one that will catch him first.*

*And the thing that happened in Nis, I have already said what I had to say in relation to that. With the judiciary that we have here, and with everything else, we have to deal with it ourselves. Why,*

*Suvakovic<sup>29</sup> phoned me last night, he was looking for Ojdanic, and couldn't find him; Suvakovic was trying to find him, the man from the Operational Information Centre.*

*Well, in the city. That would be the Ministry. They give information to these bullies that we running in the streets last night trying to find the suitable ones to use them. From the Operational Information Centre. That was probably done by a man from the Ministry, he might be a soldier or a civilian, maybe from that Defence Directorate, or something, and that man informs those --- by means of a radio link they tell them which street to go, which street is empty, and so on. And these here called me, they didn't know what to do. I found Ojdanic by mere chance later on, and they are dealing with this issue now. So, it means that it is all connected.*

*And there's another thing for us to do. That letter that Canak sent --- Those are their surmises only. The tales they tell. We have to explore that attitude issue of our people deeper in the territory. Is there somebody who works with them, have them been informed properly or not, and so on. The Morale Directorate should send them an official letter, too. We should maybe carry out a routine control in relation to that, and so to see in a special way, by using a special method of talking with those people, to find that out. It might be that they managed to win some platoon commander over, or some lieutenant, or a tank commander, and gave him 10,000 German Marks to do who knows what thing in a certain moment. He could take a tank, or go in it to the streets. That is a problem. That's it, a complex situation, and we have to have that team that should practically be on duty 24 hours a day, but we also have to provide for this opportunity to work on that.*

*Let's go on. The Morale Directorate.*

### ***Lieutenant general***

#### ***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*Well, there's nothing much to say. We don't have to waste our time with those figures. The important thing for us is to say to the general public that they have not funded us at all, and that in return they ask everything. That is the only issue.*

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*The other issue is that we didn't exclude anybody from the Supreme Defence Council; he excluded himself from the Supreme Defence Council. His support of NATO, his siding with NATO during the aggression, his refusal to accept all the military honours that were offered to him there, and not only once, but several times, his refusal to respond to our invitations to come. We invited him on the celebration and promotion of the second lieutenant, didn't we? – That means that he excluded himself. Well, what does he want now, somebody to beg him to come? Everybody knows that. Those things should be told to them openly, let the people be informed about those things, and they will always make their versions of the same story. But it should be concluded that they should always fulfil their duties towards the Army, and that it is only then that they can ask a question. This way we do not attack them, we are only defending ourselves. We offer explanations to their accusations.*

*The people that are afraid to give the exact data think that Milo and he, if only he could, would protect them, leave them. The first thing he will do is to send them away. We all know that.*

### **MILEN SIMIC**

*As for these negative things, that is, negative phenomena, it is the standard of living, which is still characteristic for Montenegro, in spite of the fact that better quality measures have been undertaken now, and also General Pantelic, and the renewed propaganda activities in Montenegro. That means that they managed to get consolidated in two to three days, and that they now started a propaganda campaign against the Yugoslav Army.*

*We have not mentioned anyone there, which is a good thing, and however, everybody recognized themselves in it, and the things that General Geza had said were noted here, in the "Vijesti" papers, that he was controlled by the Ministry of Interior and that the Ministry of Interior was the main propaganda source, the main propaganda source against the Yugoslav Army. That much is clear.*

*As for the media attitude towards the Yugoslav Army, during this week there have been a considerable number of positive messages, positive comments and information, and what is important at that, those were published in the most important media. The negative*

*comments were mostly published in those media that are not all that influential.*

*There is only one thing that I would like to say. The "Danas" newspaper has the circulation of 8,000 copies, as well as the "Vreme" magazine. So that the only paper that caused problems was the "Blic", with its large circulation.*

*May 13<sup>th</sup>, the Security Day, was given great publicity in domestic media, and from those characteristic incidents, there was the appeal by Vuk Draskovic, in that - I wouldn't know how to call it – address to the Army and Police.*

*It has also been characteristic for these last weeks that the "JU-INFO" signal has been disrupted in the Republic of Montenegro, and that means that they have learnt its scheme and waves' directions, and they are disrupting them.*

*As for the foreign media, they are mostly dealing with, or beginning to deal with Montenegro and relationship between the Interior Ministry and the Yugoslav Army, but it has also been characteristic that a large number of them have been dealing with the NATO aggression and NATO failure in the FRY territory. All in all, the morale has been stable, there are no important problems, but as for the territory, the characteristic thing is that the situation in the Republic of Montenegro has begun to get complicated, and thus we shall dedicate one strand of our propaganda activities towards Montenegro.*

*These concrete tasks that you have ...*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*Yes, I know, but that should be done in the afternoon, or in the morning. Maybe we could do that tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow --- Why can't we? We could gather these ---, you could prepare for an appearance in the media concerning this new situation. I am not sure what kind of official statement we could offer. So, it's us. But we should have a statement ready in relation to that. So, it's what we were always advocating. That the Army should be the stability factor that would prevent any attempt to initiate a fratricide and a civil war. This is exactly what I was saying earlier.*

*They attacked me for saying that then, saying that I was invoking that war, and I was only saying that the Army should prevent it, that it should be a buffer zone between one and the other side, and that it could serve to prevented it. Well, now they have realized that they haven't a single chance to win the elections. Or at least that is what I think. And I also think that they are aware of that. They are frightened now, for they know that the elections are bound to take place by the end of the year, and they are not sure that they would win, and in order to achieve their aims they have decided to instigate conflicts and so on.*

***Brigadier general***

***MILEN SIMIC***

*But, it is characteristically, Sir, and General Geza knows it, and you know that, too, the large numbers of people are important to them. So, to instigate a conflict, they would need a mass of people that cannot be controlled, and that mass for Belgrade is some 300,000 of people and more, while they haven't been able to gather 30,000 people. Thus, that gathering of people is definitely a failure even before it starts. They are...*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*No, the only thing that can be done in that respect, since they are not in a position to gather that number of people, the only thing they can do is to instigate an even bloodier conflict. So, those mercenaries, and I expect that they will use the Romanians, or those people from the Republic of Srpska, or who knows who else can be used to kill police officers, to kill citizens, and to say later on that soldiers did it, that the Police did it. You know what happens when somebody kills someone in a large group of people. Police have weapons, and so on. We have to be prepared for that. We mustn't let that happen, and everything is going in that direction, and legally, at that. So, we should prepare one official statement and keep it ready in case we need it, and we shall see – if it continues to get complicated, we shall publish the statement. It could happen that the state of emergency is*

*proclaimed, although I doubt that it will happen. There is no reason to do that now. Not under these conditions, no.*

*The current Chief of Yugoslav Army General Staff, Branko Krga, has been clear and open in dividing the people to "us" and "them". He was advocating a more radical action under the present circumstances, which that was to arrest everybody who protested against the taking over of Studio B. I have recently seen footage of protests that were organized at the time when Studio B was taken over, and there I saw the late Prime Minister Djindjic, who was trying to enter the Beogradjanka building. Since there were only a small number of people who gathered for that rally against the taking over of Studio B, the operation was easily carried out.*

**By a mere coincidence, I was near the Serbian Government Building at the time when they assassinated Prime Minister Djindjic. I came there, in front of the Government building at the time when the government officials started to gather there. At one moment General Krga appeared there, accompanied by a jeep. He stepped out of his BMW, but they immediately put him back in the car and drove him in the underground garage of the Serbian Government building. I presume that it was done for his safety. For a long time after that incident I thought of the irony of life. I'm sick and tired of people like these.**

*Major general*

**BRANKO KRGA**

*... however, the general impression is that there is some kind of scheme, and that we have not been able to get hold of it, of that material, of the proof, the proof that these events are only parts of that inclusive scheme. I will be free here to say that even this decision that was reached yesterday, about the seizure of Studio B, is something to their advantage. Not to our advantage, but to their advantage, to the advantage of the same people that plotted that scheme. They foresaw such a development, they were warning that this would happen, that the regime would --- I don't know --- according to the media, do this, and according to some other media do that. It would be far better if you had done what you just said, if you had arrested them, those individuals that advocated...*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*Well, fine, they will start; they will use every conflict with them for their own purposes. If those, those leaders got arrested, they would gather around the prison, and we would have the same thing.*

***Major general***

***BRANKO KRGA***

*Yes, but you see, they had during their last rally--- Simic was right in saying that this was very close to their end. There were only a small number of people there. And now, with this next move, they will again have a larger number of people gathered in the streets.*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*This move can prove to be a good one, and it can prove to be the end of it all.*

***Major general***

***BRANKO KRGA***

*Well, I would like to say that, perhaps you should, in those proposals there --- I don't know whether it would be in our best interest to introduce the state of emergency. And they are doing everything to get the support from abroad, to do this, to do that. All the impostors in this world made their statements only five minutes after that, and expressed their reactions. This kind of tensions is certainly not good for us. It is particularly not good for us, the Army.*

***Lieutenant general***

***NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC***

*How is it going? Not good at all. We have to be cautious. We have to be ---, to act like we did immediately before the bombing campaign*

*started. Thus, we shall have to have teams in our organizational units and structures, somebody who shall be present there, somebody who shall be coordinating that body, and it has to be set up as soon as possible. We should have a meeting, and particularly carry on with those documents for monitoring; this is exactly what we need. There's nothing else for us to do.*

*As for the things that should be done in relation to our next task, we shall go through that quickly now. I don't want to spend too much time on that now.*

*We cannot reach any new decision now, we can only look at it in a general way, to see what has been going on.*

***Lieutenant general***

***GEZA FARKAS***

*General, Sir, I would only like to briefly point out to the current safety situation, in the whole territory of FRY, that is currently in the focus of attention of the security services and the overall safety of the country.*

*What was not achieved by the war, by the psychological and propaganda operation is aimed at achieving now, by the following phase, and that is terrorism. Terrorism, as a form of activity is very dangerous, and its aim is to destabilize Yugoslavia and to remove the present government by force. To instigate disorder, riots and insecurity in the country. What we are facing here is a mass organization called "Otpor", which is extremely dangerous, because it gathered a large number of young people above all, young people from the school children to students, and that also has its militant wing, which has been commanded from abroad, by the international intelligence services, that is by the CIA. It is from there that they recruit the perpetrators of the most horrid of all acts, like kidnapping and murders. This is where they are doing things that were forbidden by the Geneva Convention and by the documents reached at all the international conventions and meetings, and those are manipulations of the young people and of children. Besides that, as the perpetrators of these crimes there are also delinquents, drug addicts, psychologically disturbed people, convicts, homosexuals, and above all, a large number of people belonging to religious cults. So, their activities are comprehensive, and it has been directed to*

*the bosom of this nation, to the young people. This is very important for us, to record and to be aware of that, since those same young people, from both the sides, will come to serve their military service. And here I would like to immediately draw your attention to all the measures that should be undertaken jointly by the safety organs and state and public security services, and that is to register those persons, that is to check the recruits. However, some of them might pull through our filters, and thus we shall have to take certain measures against that.*

*As a part of their activities on creating insecurity, these extremist parties, that is, the destructive parties, or organizations like SPO, have undertaken in the whole territory, and above all in Belgrade, upon themselves to make a list of all the officers according to their places of living. This part of their activity has already been carried out in Montenegro, so that it was already done by the Montenegrin MUP, they registered and make a list of all our officers, and they even check everybody in their files, to see if there's anything else to find out, so that they can use that for their propaganda purposes.*

*And thus, a comprehensive campaign has begun to destabilize this country, create the sense of insecurity, and to act, to act zealously against VJ.*

*I will tell you here several things, which are ---, that is, there are only several organizations that practically have their military wings, and that can be characterized as paramilitary. Those are the Falcon Detachments, set up by SPO, in the form of sports organization, which, however, have their military programmes. Serbian knights, this one has ---, was set up in the territory of Leskovac, and they are spreading there. They also have their military programme. Serbian Guards, Serbian Volunteer Guards, Serbian Volunteer Detachment, Association of Serbian Volunteers, Serbian Liberation Army, OSA -- - we have in fact arrested their key men, we put them on trial, and you know the outcome of that. We have concluded that bearing in mind the things that they prepared, that they wanted to do, the Military Court was lenient, and the President of FRY also complained about that. It is probably on the Military Judiciary to examine their criteria. Then the Serbian Liberation Army, SOVA, and now this Otpor organization.*

*These perceived problems have to be constantly present in our operational activities and the command system. I would like to ask*

*you, in relation to this, since this is about murders and kidnapping, capturing of people to be sent to the Hague, that the prominent, that is the commanders all the way to the battalion commanders, and especially those who took part in wars since 1991, they are all their targets, in their public and in their secret lists. Thus, we should all improve our personal safety.*

*We have made a plan, a programme, an instruction; I don't know whether it has been sent to you, which has envisaged the general measures and the special measures of personal safety. You in the first place should, every individual should take care of that, to avoid situations in which they can become targets, although it is difficult to do, since their plan envisaged that a liquidation takes place, or a kidnapping of some of the military leadership figures.*

*These problems have to be present in your activities, too, and on a daily basis.*

*The intelligence services have set in motion their sensors, their members, in the whole territory. They have become active in their military diplomatic missions, in the legal way and by means of their secret organizations and people that were sent to all sorts of informal groups, that is in the non-governmental groups and various humanitarian organizations.*

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## ***MOCK TRIAL OF ZORAN ZIVKOVIC***

**The assessment of the second army commander was quite realistic because I had an opportunity also to talk to people from the Montenegrin Interior Ministry (MUP). This information clearly indicated that the army would interfere in the conflicts in Montenegro the moment these conflicts start suiting Slobodan's company. They were working on the strengthening of those units that could be operative in some kind of future conflict in Montenegro. This primarily refers to the 7th battalion and other units of the**

military police. Also correct is the presumption that, in a possible conflict, the MUP would probably be far more inferior, because it could not count on the support of the entire Montenegrin nation.

It was at such meetings that the fates of individuals, groups and, ultimately, the state itself, were decided. The speech of General Lazarević, who was the commander of the third army, clearly shows that his attention focused on the conflict with the then mayor of Niš, Zoran Živković, who was under the constant surveillance of the security services of Serbia and the Yugoslav Army. His attacks on the military leadership could no longer be tolerated and General Nebojša Pavković gave the green light for his arrest. During those days, the newspapers wrote the following:

*The mayor of Niš, Zoran Živković, said today that the police had stopped him and asked for his documents on his way out of Niš, when heading for Požarevac to attend a rally of the opposition. Živković told the Beta news agency that the police let him pass after having taken down his personal data. According to him, one of the policemen told him that the police would not allow him to enter Požarevac, but he could not explain why. Today, a bus with members of the United Branch Trade Unions "Nezavisnost" and the Otpor movement also set out from Niš to Požarevac.*

- *BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT in Niš, the mayor of Niš and the vice-president of the Democratic Party, Zoran Živković, was heard on the basis of the criminal charges filed against him by Military Post 3755 in Niš for the spreading of false information. Živković did not invoke his immunity as an MP: "I have no right to refer to my immunity when this could not be done by (founder of the Civil Resistance in Valjevo) Bogoljub Arsenijević Maki, (the initiator of the protest of citizens in Leskovac) Ivan Novković, (editor of Television Soko) Nebojša Ristić and many others who are under similar pressure from the regime in Serbia", said Živković. (Beta)*

*Lieutenant General*  
**VLADIMIR LAZAREVIĆ**

*The situation in the zone of the army from the aspect of activities by extreme forces... we assess that the activities of the external factor in conjunction with extreme forces, and especially the militant Sokol*

*detachment and so on are increasing their intensity, with the possibility of their escalation into broader civil unrest. The activation of so-called crisis headquarters for the defence of free media, which started yesterday in Niš, and today they are announcing Kruševac and other centres, the organizing of protest gatherings and calling on the citizens to demonstrate all forms of civil disobedience, and yesterday they started calling on VJ members to deny obedience to military leaderships.*

***Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ***

*Arrest them, Laza. If we do not arrest them now, and if he is openly calling on the army to deny obedience, you look up in the law what that means. You take out an armoured battalion and arrest Živković, if he said that. Don't think that they will not attack us, they quite certainly will. The moment they sense that we are afraid, that we are hesitant, they will do it. If he really did say that, you should come out with an announcement saying that all those issuing such calls will be caught by the military authorities and arrested. They will, thus, shatter your army.*

***Lieutenant General  
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIĆ***

*Practically, the centre of destruction is Niš. Constantly coming one after another to Niš and Pirot are Stambolić, Perišić and who knows who else.*

***Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ***

*They should be captured and beaten up, and then you'll see whether they'll do it again.*

***Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ***

*We should see to it, Simić - so that we don't forget later - to prepare for tomorrow a statement, but we will all take a look at it. If this is so, Lazarević should provide the information about him calling on the army to deny obedience, under whose competency does this fall and so on.*

***Lieutenant General  
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIĆ***

*General, he literally said: we call on our fellow citizens, our brothers simply to deny obedience to the leadership, to their generals who are leading this nation towards ruin etc.*

**Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*Tomorrow a statement is to be issued and tomorrow we are to refer to the statement of this Živković and some other leaders of opposition party and to announce: that the military authorities will take adequate measures against all those calling for the undermining of the army.*

*So, the situation there is also quite unstable for us. As we have seen, all the assessments in the country are that the foreign factor has also realized that the opposition cannot do the job as envisaged. They too are now starting to panic pending the elections which will quite certainly be held by the end of the year - whether they will win or not - and since they know that they will lose these elections, they have to do something before the elections, and that is precisely what they are doing now. Otpor is a very perfidiously infiltrated organization who, as was well assessed by Ivan<sup>30</sup> (31)... it is the most massive organization, it has entered all the pores of society, it is not known who is in it, who runs it, from where etc. Worst of all is the conclusion that it has entered all the pores of society, that is the most dangerous for us. This means that it has entered kindergartens, primary schools, high schools, colleges, factories etc.*

*With the adoption of the anti-terrorism law and a planned action, this organization is to be unmasked. We presume that the largest, the most conscientious part of the society which has entered this, will distance itself. Those who do not do so, who stay - it will be known that they are, actually, the Otpor members who are to cause chaos, to attack and to stir up a rebellion in the country. You have seen those who were arrested, who were waiting for the rally to take place in Požarevac, all six of them are the most hardened criminals. A large number of those present from their ranks are from Romania, and let me remind you that people live there with 20 marks per month, while here they get a hundred or two hundred. Therefore, someone like that will not only put on a black T-shirt and jump on a policemen and throw things at him, but will do whatever you want him to. If we add to this the Montenegrin mafia, our mafia, etc., the power struggle and the gradual drawing of certain criminals into political games, then we truly have a complex situation.*

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<sup>30</sup> (31)

*Attacks have stated will the calls for the denial of obedience, the story that there is a rift between the military leadership and the troops etc, it is, of course, being advocated by those who are not familiar with the situation in the army. You are probably familiar with the situation in your units. If this is so, then we should be hanged here as soon as we come out. This means constant presence in the units, constant conversations, constant informing and monitoring. Surprises are not to be ruled out. We should not rule out the possibility of certain people at all levels of command surprising us. Perhaps younger soldiers who have relatives in Otpor etc, or are under (certain) influence or who are being financed, junior officers who also have relatives etc, or have been deluded for various reasons, and that is why this network of associates in the units should be even more developed, so that we know what is going on in the platoon.*

*So, we have to know, we must fully control the situation, see that these people have been deluded, perhaps they do not understand the situation and we must not go against children, against young people against students etc. Not all of these are students, you have militant students. Of course, you cannot stand still and watch while he is throwing a stone at you, but the one throwing the stone is not a student and he is doing it for big money, and the one believing he is a student is standing by him and watching, and is now demonstrating solidarity with him. Therefore, the two should be separated.*

*We have to do everything to prevent this from spreading into the units. If it does get spread, we must act energetically towards both officers and soldiers.*

*So, we must be ready for any kind of surprises, we should not delude ourselves by thinking that they will not attack us, that they will not touch us, the way we were taken by surprise in the previous Yugoslavia when we were hesitant – let's do it , let's not do it, while they were carrying out their part of the job. So, if you want to be victims or targets, you be passive and you will see what will happen to you. As long as you show resoluteness, courage, resolve not to allow attacks on the army, you will be respected both as individuals and as soldiers. The moment you abandon this, you will be faced with the danger of even part of a unit turning against you and siding with them. Therefore, we have to deal with that. This means that we have to be ready for such surprises. We have sent information to Otpor and I ask you, please, to have all this done nicely. The army, i.e. the uniform can also be abused by those who kept VJ uniforms, all those who did not – and you know you did not –*

*withdraw uniforms, withdraw weapons. We have part of the weaponry for which we know that it was stolen. These weapons are being sought, these are the weapons that shot on Ravna Gora and these are the weapons that are hidden in haystacks. Attention should now be paid to those weapons. Therefore, security bodies at all levels must intensify their work, and if you know where there are individuals or groups who have weapons, who have equipment that they did not return, go there with the police and disarm them in cooperation with the civilian police, in cooperation with the military police, this village, that house, straight there tomorrow morning at 4 o'clock, and please carry out a search and the confiscation of weaponry. Of course, there must be a legend, either that he is a fugitive, or that we know that he did not return it, etc. This has to be done or else we will have problems with that weaponry.*

*Units should go out into the field according to your assessment and units towards the commands that are to intervene... For everything else you yourself should make an assessment so as not to be taken by surprise somewhere. I personally doubt that there will be attacks on military facilities, but if the situation deteriorates, we cannot intervene in street fights and so on, but if the mob is entering the Parliament, if it is entering barracks, if it is terrorising the people etc., then we will see, a decision will be taken. We have to put a stop to that, not to side with anyone, to stop it, so that this does not happen. Well, (this is what they want now) and they see in Otpor now the only organization that should carry out their goals and they will now press to finance it, to put it to use and to let them do their job. That is why we should now act quickly. They are now once again announcing attacks on the television, then a return etc. So, please, deal with this.*

*As regards the combat readiness of our units, it is in your interest constantly to control it and to know. If you do not have 150 men, you have a hundred, but those one hundred are 100% full (?). They know, they are prepared, they are linked to the commanding, and do not let something happen, and only then say I will do something. No, I will do everything, so if anything happens, I will use etc. We have to see those prepared forces, equip them with the necessary means, if we have them, and we should not keep them in some kind of stocks – these grenades, shock grenades etc. for surprise actions which will injure no one, but will repel the attack. Earlier on we had this obligation - we had combat groups, we had the forces, but we also had units for preventing such unrest, demonstrations, and we trained them for this. Along with a combat group, I always had one such company, two companies that were familiar with these activities etc.*

*It is necessary to work on the development of a climate in Montenegro in which the people will condemn that Montenegrin police, instead of us attacking it now. We have said that they are more numerous than necessary, while they say that it is not the army's business to assess how many policemen there should be. Well fine, that is true, but it is our business to assess what they are arming themselves with and what kind of activities they are carrying out etc. I have information that special weapons, Stingers <sup>31</sup> (32) etc, were brought to Montenegro through Debelo Brdo to Herceg Novi, and I do not know where they went from there. Perhaps it is just a story, maybe it is not, but we should see to develop a climate in which the people of Montenegro who are for Yugoslavia, who see what is being done there, let them speak about MUP, and then let that MUP feel unsafe among those people there. We will easily deal with the Montenegrin MUP. You must not allow yourselves to be taken by surprise. You must be a step ahead of them – if you think that they will attack you, you attack them and their leaders. We said that the decision is yours. If someone decides to attack the army, you go ahead with the attack and first go for that man and then everything else. You have the advantage, you have the unit, the force, you have units that can shoot from a distance, you can direct your fire in any way you want to. So, you should be a step ahead and allow no surprises. If you allow surprises, you're finished.*

*Regarding this case, we said that Vasiljević had been given the task, and Geza, to look into this case with the member of the 7<sup>th</sup> battalion. He should not have gone there and behaved as he did and it is his fault. And this man then went out, got into the car, they drew them apart and then this one fired. So, do not expect the Montenegrin MUP to resolve this for you. He should be followed and caught. In ten days, ten days' time, after ten days it should be known that the army had caught him.*

*And now we should see about this case in Niš. We should issue a statement and deal with it. If Živković was calling on the army to deny obedience, we should see under whose competency this falls. Aca, pack your things and go to Niš. You, Gaja, everything you need, when the opportunity arises, get him and let us put him on trial. He had deserved long ago to be caught, long ago, and we now have to do it. Look into that, Simić, we have to prepare that for tomorrow, we have to quote him exactly, to say that, at a session of the municipal council, the mayor of Niš, Živković, publicly said, called on members of the army to deny obedience to their commands and units. In this regard, the Information*

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<sup>31</sup> (32)

*Service, the military authorities are announcing that adequate measures will be taken against him and all those working on the undermining etc.*

**Lieutenant General**

**BRANKO KRGA**

*General, should we add what it means to deny obedience?*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*We have people who fought honourably for this country and who are against this, and we can hardly bring influence to bear on them and restrain them so that they would not react to their conduct. And what would it mean if they were to make a move? We know what these soldiers of ours were like, volunteers, reservists, that mass fleeing from Belgrade. He has no immunity, he was stripped of his immunity.*

**Admiral**

**MILAN ZEC**

*General, as part of these measures, we would be very happy if the judicial bodies were to review a bit the work of their bodies on the territory of the Republic of Montenegro. We in the navy would be very satisfied if the military prosecutor in Podgorica were to be replaced.*

**Colonel General**

**NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ**

*We have launched the initiative. The president has supported it. The minister knows. We have scheduled for Friday a meeting with everyone from the military prosecutor's office and the military court, and I am even thinking that you should come too. At it, we will clarify all that, both as regards the personnel and this. I am now ready to sign the order to pension off the one in Niš<sup>32</sup> (33). I will now tell him that when I see him on Friday, because they are behaving the same as... they have escaped control. They think they are outside the army and instead of representing the interests of the army, most important for them is the law and the way they interpret it. That Radisavljević... it is with great difficulty that we managed to persuade the MUP to intervene in the case of Filipović who sent an interview by e-mail, I don't know where. In it he said all sorts of*

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<sup>32</sup> (33)

*things, he revealed military information, secrets etc, and then he said that the army, a certain lieutenant-colonel from the army, he did not give his name, had practically carried out a genocide against the Albanians, that he had seen 800, 900 people killed etc, that they shot with a 10 cm anti-aircraft cannot at... at those people and that he had seen no Albanians in Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija) and terrorists, but that they were all civilians and our tanks were running over civilians. That was his story. And then those guys arrested him and filed charges on 150 typed pages. He was supposed to take a decision on the launching of an investigation within 24 hours, but he sat for 24 hours somewhere in some field. He did not care and then he passed a decision to release him and said that when I found it suitable... That was the answer. Alright, we will finish with this.*

## **INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION**

*After the victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) on October 5, 1999, there was not a revolution of the kind that was necessary for this nation, but there were revolutionary changes in the sense of the place and role of the mentioned coalition. DOS was created to change Milošević's regime and for this it received the support of the people, the intelligentsia and the West, but it was not prepared to take over power in the sense of building a new state and a new system of values in the radical sense in which this was necessary to accelerate certain democratic processes. They were simply taken aback by the speed with which Milošević's empire was crumbling. Numerous holes were being opened in the state apparatus for which DOS did not have quality people. Rotten compromises started being made and they produced new shortcomings so that, in the end, a chain of lobbies was created and it used democracy as a guise for greed and scandals. Composed of numerous small parties, DOS was the right response to Milošević's tyranny, but not to the post-Milošević renewal of Serbia. The slowness in the adoption of the key laws and the non-defining of the main issues on which a national consensus would be reached (borders, Kosovo, transition, the Constitution, the Hague Tribunal...) became the main reason for conflicts instead of being a magnet around which the wisest Serbia could offer would rally. Vanity, greed and the terrible slowness is doing away with the people who were burdened by scandals, only*

*aggravated the already chaotic situation. The lack of new ideas that would be presented and realized by new people rendered barren the political solutions that were offered. Until the moment when progress was measured by the annulment of the grotesqueness of Milošević's laws (the smuggling of fuel, cigarettes, murders, inflation...) the semblance of the successfulness of reforms was maintained. Once it became necessary to produce and support certain new ideas that would essentially mark transformation and a discontinuity with Milošević's dictatorship, quarrelling started and everything began losing momentum. When it was necessary to offer Serbia something more than ordinary donations, to define cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, establish the rule of law, we stopped. It is with greater speed that the people were forgetting the poverty they were emerging from than the government could provide the promised prosperity. We once use to be overwhelmed with joy when inflation was not measured by millions of percentage points per day and when bombs were not falling on our heads, while today we are dissatisfied with the length of time needed for us to enter Europe.*

*Since I am not a politician and have no obligation, nor the habit, to toady to anyone, especially not to my own people, I believe that the greatest responsibility lies with the people themselves. The people kept electing Milošević, the people put up with inflation, the people went to wars and, ultimately, I myself was also bombed. These are the facts, no matter what this may sound like to someone. What we put up with is something no other nation in Europe would. What we are doing today, supporting and reviving those same people who had pushed us where we are, best attests to this. If the German nation had the greatest merit for the fact that it resurrected from the ashes of Fascism and built a modern state, then the Serbian nation is, quite certainly, the most responsible for the things that happened to it and for being where it is now. We have to agree with this, but we must not reconcile to it.*

*One of the main presuppositions of any reform is a reform of the personnel. That is, probably, where we fell short the most. In the places where Milošević's people were replaced, the successes were the greatest. The reforms were delayed the most in the security services and the judiciary. The situation there is, actually, the most critical. At the moment when it was not possible to go any further without starting with dismissals in the army, the judiciary, police, Prime Minister Đinđić was murdered. When we were unable to resolve the murders that accumulated in the last decade, when the Hague Tribunal sat on our back, pulling bodies out of the Danube, we remembered Milošević's rallies of support and we devalued practically everything we thought would represent the foundation of some new Serbia. We became hostages of Milošević's generals and once again we resurrected the anti-Tribunal lobby dressed*

*in some new uniforms and lined up in front of the monument at which the first demonstrations on March 9, 1991 started. When dictators become democrats, it is just as puzzling for the people as when Democrats, toadying to the people, organize such rallies. DOS was exhausting itself the most from within, through rash and hasty moves, and the West was helping by believing that everything that says "democratic" truly is that. Everything that was written on the previous pages has been conveyed by myself and my friends to the Montenegrin government as of August 1999, and to the Serbian government since October 5, 2000.*

*Minister Vladan Batić received this book just before it came out, and thanks to him a meeting was organized with the special prosecutor, Mr. Jovan Pijić. I have to admit that Mr. Batić was never in a dilemma for a single moment as regards its authenticity or the responsibility of the main protagonists of our drama. A high-ranking official of the Security Administration was also acquainted with the material, and I returned to him, in his cabinet, all the documents I had on abuse in the VJ. According to my information, Mr. Pijić requested from the Counter-intelligence Service (KOS) an explanation and confirmation of the authenticity of the book and documents. Real panic spread within the Security Administration of the VJ when they read the book. I believe Mr. Pijić took the book to the wrong place to inquire about the authenticity of the mentioned documents. This is as if we would ask Legija to arrest Milošević or to testify in the case of the Ibar Highway and the assassination attempt against Vuk Drašković. I do not know whether anything was done in this regard, As far as I know, nothing was done. The only thing left for me to do now is to address the public, but not for the purpose of punishing criminals, this is something the courts should do, but in order for such things to be called by their real names in the future.*

***At the end of this book, I gave a long thought to what its conclusion should look like. Maybe I did not know how to write what I wanted to, but I did know whom I would write about and what kind of a message I would send to the normal part of Serbia and Montenegro. I will write about an honourable officer who requested service in return for the great deed he did and who experienced a veritable Golgotha for not being indifferent to the abuse and criminal acts perpetrated by those who were supposed to represent the most glorious part of our nation and state. His sufferings continue even while I am writing this book. Of course, at issue is Lieutenant-colonel Miodrag Sekulić, head of informatics in the Cabinet of the VJ chief-of-staff. If he is to blame for anything, than it is for not being immoral and hypocritical, for differentiating between black and white, a catastrophe and success, an opportunity and a debacle. He was not inspired by evildoing, but by deeds, he did not ask for a rank in exchange for his honour. He shared***

*the fate of other officers, unprepared to sacrifice the very foundations of humanity and morality for a handful of seeming glory and lies. He could not watch court fools playing kings. His mother did not teach him to bring misery upon others and to call these tragedies coincidences, by which he would spit on the root he had originated from. Good grades in his work made him a witness who bothered everyone. He found himself in the position to be tried by the one whom he had helped the most and whose guilty sentence would be a guilty sentence to the generation which, faced with a choice between submission and a just sacrifice, would choose the later. That is his guilt! The conviction of this honourable and honest officer would represent a conviction of the normal people in this Serbia and Montenegro. I wish to use this opportunity to call on both Prime Minister Đukanović and Prime Minister Živković, as well as President Marović, as avowed democrats, to lift the anathema from this honourable man. Your struggle would have had no sense or effect if it had not been for thousands of individuals like Lieutenant-colonel Sekulić who, by risking his life and the lives of his family members, was ready to make an enormous sacrifice in order for Serbia and Montenegro to become what it is today. I expect responsible and moral people to say what that man, who was ready to risk everything to save what was lost and to help unknown people to place this country among the ranks of democratic states, meant for this nation. He attended meetings of the Collegiate Body of the VJ chief-of-staff, listened and saw with his own eyes where all that was leading. What was he supposed to do in those difficult days? To push the cart that was heading down towards an abyss or to act like a hero who had the courage which others did not and to do everything in his power to prevent Milošević's tyranny and the wailing of some new mothers for their children. We cannot, gentlemen, for the sake of daily political events, trample on the bodies of living people, because, sooner or later, we will trample on ourselves.*

*For this reason I thank him immensely in my own name and on behalf of all the people who differentiate between a military secret and a crime hidden under the mystery of a military secret.*

*“Patriots” did everything to explain that October 5 was the product of semi-literal criminals who brought DOS to power, and no one opposed them by saying that intelligent and educated officers, of whom there were thousands in Serbian history, saw where Milošević's junta was leading us and clearly demonstrated their patriotism and love for their fatherland. These were veritable “Apis-es” who, after the change of power asked for neither promotions nor popularity. They stayed where they were, while Milošević's general and colonels rose up skyward with only one desire – to take revenge upon those who were different from*

*them, in order to present they shame as a glorious battle for their nation and state. This revenge was inspired primarily by fear of the proof of what they were doing in the past decade. Lieutenant-colonel Sekulić deserves to have a prominent place in the history of the recent period, and Montenegro should have the honour of pinning a decoration on the chest of a great man. On this occasion, I also wish to thank other officers who helped me, directly or indirectly, and who are also persecuted only because it is suspected that they too, like Sekulić, could say what they know.*

*Sekulić's sacrifice is even more valuable if one bears in mind the fact that, although he knew what he had done, even after he was arrested he pointed a finger neither at the Montenegrin nor at the Serbian government, because he realised that this is what Aca Tomić and those like him, would hardly wait. He did not do this even when, two years ago, they suspended him and halved his already miserable salary, or when his quasi friends turned their heads away, or when they denied him the rank of colonel which he has deserved by his years of service and his best grades. A future Ph.D. in informatics, he withstood all the harassment in a stoical and dignified manner, as befits such a great man. I never expected anything less from him.*

*Finally, I would like to thank all those politicians who offered me support to persevere in the writing of this book, and they will recognize themselves in this sentence. With this book, I have reduced an internal pressure provoked by those resurrected ideologists of Milošević's patriotism, who are constantly appearing on front pages and on pre-election billboards.*

*The only other thing I would like to know is how Branko Krga feels when he reports to “domestic traitors and foreign mercenaries” and also the reasons why reports are accepted from such a man?*

*I thank everyone for their support and patience.*

## A N N E X E S

*Letter of the Yugoslav Left (JUL) to the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP) dated May 19, 1998 (Annex no.1)*

*Interior Ministry of the Republic of Serbia – for comrade Danilo  
Pantović*

*A few days ago, we learned that a certain group of the Obrenovac mafia, dealing with the unlawful seizing of construction documents and lots, is preparing to hire persons to beat up, and possibly also kill several members of the JUL secretariat who were engaged in preventing the plunder and seizure of free construction zones in the centre of Obrenovac. At issue are very large investments and profits of private persons.*

*Unfortunately, certain employees of the municipal administrative body are also participating in this.*

*The most active in this scam are:*

- 1. A man known in Obrenovac under the nickname Viraga. A private entrepreneur, he left active military service prior to the outbreak of the war in 1991 in the rank of sergeant. (Viraga is the nickname of the author of this book - V.V.)*
- 2. Slaviša Krsmanović living in Belgrade, employed at the Obrenovac Municipality as an architect in the town planning section*
- 3. Ranko – owner of a private exchange office in Obrenovac.*

*We ask you, please, to call them in through your service and seriously warn them that the highest bodies of the Serbian Interior Ministry have been informed about their threats and secret evil intentions towards the leadership of JUL in Obrenovac and that they are fully monitoring the situation in Obrenovac and taking measures to prevent such excesses from happening.*

*The persons whom the threats and evil intentions are directed towards are:*

- 1. Ljubomir Dragačevac – chairman of the JUL municipal board and member of the town council*
- 2. Dušan Bratić – vice-chairman of the JUL municipal board and member of the town council) and*
- 3. Slobodan – Bobe Filimonović – member of the Secretariat of the JUL municipal board*

*Best regards,*

*P.S. – In the course of the night, an attempt was made at demolishing the passenger vehicle of comrade Slobodan Filimonović.*

***Chairman of the municipal  
Board of JUL Obrenovac***

***Ljubomir Dragačevac***

*(Instead of Dragačevac, the letter was signed by Dušan Bratić – remark  
of the author)*

29/05/1998 08:28 8723-714

S poštovanjem i drugarskim pozdravom,

F.S. - U toku prošle noći  
pokušano je demoliranje putničkog  
vozila druga Slobodana Filipovića.



PREDSEDNIKA OPŠTINSKOG  
OPŠTINA JUL-OBRENOVAČ  
Ljubomir Dragičević

29-MAY-1998 08:28

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*Text of JUL's apology to the author of this book, of February 17, 1999, two and-a-half months before his arrest by the Yugoslav Army (Annex no. 2)*

***Municipal board of JUL-a  
Obrenovac  
Reg.no.23-99  
February 17, 1999  
Obrenovac***

*Mr Vladan Vlajković,*

*On the basis of your request of February 4, 1999, we inform you about the following:*

*On February 5, 1999, at a session of the municipal board of JUL in Obrenovac, after having discussed your request, we inform you:*

- 1. That at no session of the existing bodies was it discussed, or was a decision taken to send the letter of May 29, 1998 to the Serbian Interior Ministry.*
- 2. That the municipal board of JUL in Obrenovac is distancing itself from its contents and that this does not represent the stand of the municipal board.*
- 3. That we are truly sorry about any unpleasant situations such a text may have caused, so that, with no direct guilt on our part, but in view of the fact that such a letter was forwarded with the seal of the municipal board of JUL Obrenovac, we apologize to you and your family.*

***MUNICIPAL BOARD OF JUL-  
O B R E N O V A C  
S E C R E T A R Y  
Đorđe  
Komlenski***