Europeanising a reluctant learner?

European identity in the EU’s representations of Serbia
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Identity politics have long been a domain that mainly drew the attention of sociologists or anthropologists, remaining a rather peripheral area of scholarship to political scientists. Nevertheless, since the rise of constructivism in the latter discipline, identity has been established as an object of analysis in the study of international politics as well. As Alexander Wendt (1992: 398) put it: “Identities are the basis of interests”. The link with identity politics as studied by sociologists remains vague, however.

In the fields of history and sociology, scholars like Eric Hobsbawm have described how the construction of identity and the establishment of a nation-state are intertwined (see for instance Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Others who in the beginning of the 1980s discussed the origins of the nation and nationalism include Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (2006 [1983]). Their analyses all have implications for the development of national identity. Following Anderson, if the nation is an imagined community, then the identity that it spawns is part of this imagination, too, and thus a social construct.

Despite all this attention paid to analysing, indeed deconstructing identity in the social sciences, an essentialist exclusive form of national identity often remains a rallying beacon in times of war. An especially pungent example is formed by the wars that took place in former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999. Identity was here seen (or made to be seen) as a concept inextricably linked to the nation, the latter being perceived as an unchangeable fact of life, originating in distant history. Other identities than the ethnic one were eclipsed by war rhetoric and hate speech. Identification with one’s role in the family or at the workplace, or with one’s friends or interests was driven to the background, and people became foremost Serb, Croat or Bosnian Muslim (Wilmer 2002).

A European identity may be seen as an alternative or a complement to an ethnic national identity. Its construction may be driven by reasons of security, for instance. It is

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1 The definition of national identity depends on how the concept of a nation is defined. For the purpose of this thesis, a nation will be defined as a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991: 14). It is possible then to differentiate between an ethnic and a civic national identity, where the former refers to sharing a certain ethnicity, while the latter refers to the state one is a citizen of. Examples of the former include Croat and Serb identity, especially during the 1990s, while examples of the latter are formed by American and French identity. These are based on citizenship rather than descent.
clear that the European Union (EU) promotes a European identity as a means of integration for its existing members and their citizens. The Europe for Citizens programme has, for instance, been established in order to develop "a sense of European identity based on common values, history and culture" (European Union 2006: 8). The EU is, however, less vocal in explicitly promoting European identity towards its (potential) candidate countries, such as Serbia, the subject of this thesis. Meanwhile, the European Parliament (2005: n.p.) has argued that “the EU integration process cannot be guided by purely technocratic criteria but requires a wholehearted commitment to the fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”. These values may be seen as elements of European identity, as will be discussed in the following chapter, although they are problematic in the sense that they are hardly unique to the EU.

In fact, spreading European identity can be seen as a part of the wider EU enlargement process (Sedelmeier 2003; Sjursen 2006; Majstorović 2007). Several motives have been proposed for enlarging the EU, such as increasing security on the continent, the original rationale for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Other, rival, characterisations of the process include spreading the liberal peace by exporting its norms and values (O’Brennan 2008); attaining the ability to influence the policies of neighbouring countries without assuming responsibility, amounting to a modern form of empire (Chandler 2007); and opening up markets for transnational capital by ensuring the implementation of neo-liberal restructuring (Bieler 2002). The mechanisms by which identity politics, in the context of enlargement, are undertaken have, however, not been the focus of much research.

The ambition of this thesis is then, first, to determine how the EU employs the concept of a European identity in Europeanising Serbia, and second, to analyse how different groups in Serbian society respond to these policies.

In order to be able to proceed, it is imperative to first examine the key concepts in this research and their definitions. Therefore, chapter two will analyse the use of the concepts of identity, Europeanisation and collective identity formation in political science in order to establish an analytical framework. First, it will be examined what is meant by the term ‘Europeanisation’. Then, collective identity formation and identity in general will be discussed by drawing on the theories of Alexander Wendt and some of his critics. Specifically, Wendt’s causal theory of collective identity formation will function as the theoretical mainstay of this thesis. Moreover, attention will be paid to the
relation between identity and nationalism, as it is mainly a (supra)national identity that is under study in this thesis, as compared to e.g. class identity or gender. It will furthermore be analysed what constitutes European identity, if there is any, and whether this is a unique concept or multiple European identities exist. For the purpose of this research, it is not necessary to provide a definitive answer to these elusive questions; therefore, an overview of existing literature will be provided. Nevertheless, it should be established what the EU considers to be elements of a European identity, i.e. of what it means to be European. This idea will be distilled from major EU documents, such as the Treaties. These elements will together comprise the theoretical framework for this thesis.

In the third chapter, an analysis will be presented of how the EU represents Serbia in its official discourse, focusing as well on how European identity is used in this respect. This will be accomplished by presenting a discourse analysis of EU policy documents and speeches, supplemented by insights from my interview of an official of the European Commission’s Delegation in Serbia. This chapter will also consider how the EU’s representations and policies fit into Wendt’s model by assessing the levels of interdependence, sharing a common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint that are present in the relations between Serbia and the EU.

Then, chapter four will be devoted to the impact of this discourse and these programmes in Serbia. It will assess which response they generate in Serbia. In other words, how do they influence support for membership, and do Serbs adhere to a collective European identity? Moreover, the responses and motives of different groups in Serbian society will be examined here. This information has been obtained by interviewing members of several Serbian NGOs, a Serbian researcher and an official of the Serbian European Integration Office, and from surveys, NGO reports, newspaper articles and secondary literature.

Finally, a conclusion will be drawn as to the success of EU discourse and policies towards Serbia in Europeanising the country, and as to their effect on Serbian society. It will be shown how identity plays a role in the EU enlargement process, attesting to the importance of non-material factors in international politics.

The academic importance of this thesis lies foremost in its analysis of the identitarian aspects of the EU enlargement process, which are understudied. Moreover, it provides an application of Wendt’s model of collective identity formation to the specific case of relations between the EU and Serbia. In doing so, this thesis tests whether that theory’s predictions and implications hold in the case at hand. Politically,
this thesis is relevant as it analyses the effect of representations in the EU’s enlargement policy. Moreover, it examines Serbian reactions on EU policy, and the effects of the latter on Serbian society. This analysis will lead to several recommendations for a change in EU policy.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter develops the theoretical framework for the research undertaken in this thesis. It will focus firstly on the meaning of the concept of Europeanisation and situate this thesis within the field of those studying it. Secondly, a model of collective identity formation that was developed by Alexander Wendt will be discussed. This will be the lens through which the discourse and policies of the EU vis-à-vis Serbia are analysed in chapter three. Nevertheless, alternative ideas on collective identity formation will also be examined, including criticisms on Wendt’s theory. Then, an exploration of the literature on nationalism, national and European identity will follow, in order to ground this thesis in that area of study as well and to help circumvent the many pitfalls associated with the study of identity. Finally, attention will be paid to EU views on European identity. This chapter will ensure that the empirical analysis in chapters three and four is undertaken in a structured and well-informed manner.

THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEANISATION

As this thesis focuses on the Europeanisation of Serbia, it is imperative to consider first what is exactly meant by this term. It is a concept employed throughout the social sciences, with the result that Harmsen and Wilson (2000) identify no less than eight usages in their introduction to a volume of the Yearbook of European Studies that is entirely dedicated to this topic. Four of these are relevant for the interpretation of Europeanisation used in this thesis. First, Europeanisation can be defined as a version of modernisation, in the sense that it points to the process of structural transformation of the peripheral and underdeveloped member states of the EU, so that they are brought “back into the European mainstream” (Harmsen & Wilson 2000: 16). Second, it may refer to the adoption of the state model of Western European states by EU candidates, especially in the context of the enlargement round that took place in 2004 and 2007. Consequently, a state is Europeanised if it has successfully established a democracy, a market economy and a capable public administration. The third definition most closely approaches the viewpoint of this thesis, as it sees Europeanisation in the light of the reconstruction of identities. It refers to “the reshaping of identities in contemporary Europe in a manner which relativizes (without necessarily supplanting) national
identities” (Harmsen & Wilson 2000: 17). Harmsen and Wilson note however that this usage of the concept is generally limited to anthropological studies and no mention is made of analyses that study the influence the EU may have on prospective member states in this respect. Finally, a fourth definition relates to transnationalism and cultural integration between the different peoples in Europe. The first two meanings can be seen as part of a broader process of Europeanisation that induces the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to resemble their Western counterparts in their institutional and economic setup. Simultaneously, the fourth viewpoint suggests that all countries on the continent become more alike in a cultural sense. Undoubtedly, these developments have consequences for national identities and a tentative European identity, and for the role of the EU herein as well. These dynamics will be analysed for the case of Serbia in this thesis. Nevertheless, the discussion of the concept of Europeanisation has not been exhausted yet.

A draft report by the think-tank Policy Network, for instance, connects Europeanisation to the goals of European integration. Europeanisation means obtaining peace and reconciliation, achieving a greater level of prosperity, and the consolidation of democratic institutions (Tsoukalis, Cramme & Liddle 2009). Consequently, when a country has attained these goals it can be said to have been Europeanised. In this sense, a country like Bulgaria is still in a process of Europeanisation, as its standard of living is much below the EU average and its pervasive corruption may be a threat to democracy. At the same time, a non-EU-member like Iceland may already be fully Europeanised. Perhaps a country that is Europeanised is only then recognised as being truly European. The next chapter will also consider whether Serbia is considered fully European in this sense, and Serbian opinion on the matter will be examined in chapter 4. Conceived of as such, Europeanisation becomes a synonym for European integration, with the exception that the latter requires membership of the EU. For the purpose of this thesis, Europeanisation needs to be more encompassing however.

The alternative of Stojić adds some dimensions, describing Europeanisation as a “process of political, economical [sic] and social transformation” with the eventual goal of EU membership and sharing in its democratic norms and values (Stojić 2006: 312). The mechanisms by which the EU influences these countries are, on the one hand, its policies of conditionality and, on the other hand, its policies of norm diffusion or social learning. The latter amounts to transforming societies by making them accept the EU’s fundamental values and principles. This then triggers a positive or negative attitude in
domestic actors, as will be analysed for Serbia’s case in a later chapter. Another account of Europeanisation is provided by Anastasakis (2005: 80), who argues that its meaning is “dynamic, multifaceted and malleable”. He provides the following definition by Radaelli, making clear that the EU is its primary agent:

> Europeanisation are “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) implementation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2000: n.p., quoted by Anastasakis 2005: 78).

Depending on the level of development of the countries involved, Europeanisation may be about “structural transformation and modernization” or may simply be “a smooth process of steady reform and adjustment” (Anastasakis 2005: 78). A distinction is therefore made between different styles of Europeanisation, chronologically ordered as Western, Southern, Eastern and currently Southeastern. In the Balkan region, it is characterised as an externally driven process, with asymmetric and coercive power relations and an increasingly complicated agenda. Moreover, Anastasakis states that Europeanisation can also be considered as an application of soft power, in comparison with the military prowess of the United States, or as an exercise in identity formation in relation to some Other. The latter interpretation will be the focus of this thesis, yet viewed in relation to the social, economic and political aspects of the significant transformation that the Europeanisation of Serbia represents.

The conceptual framework of Europeanisation as developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) provides the opportunity to situate this thesis in the wider field of research on Europeanisation. They see Europeanisation in relation to the domestic impact of the EU, defining it succinctly as “a process in which states adopt EU rules” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 7). In their view, the dependent variable of studies on Europeanisation should then be rule adoption. Scholars should analyse its likelihood and in which form it takes place, distinguishing between formal, behavioural and discursive adoption. The mechanisms by which rules are adopted are differentiated along two dimensions. On the one hand, they can follow either a rational logic of consequences or a constructivist logic of appropriateness. On the other hand, they can be driven either by the EU itself or by its (potential) candidate states. The relevant mechanism for this thesis is then an EU driven process following a logic of
appropriateness, which is dubbed the *social learning model* (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 8). This logic leaves room for concerns about identity, which is indispensable given that this thesis analyses the EU’s use of a collective European identity to Europeanise Serbia. This social learning model is based on the tenets of social constructivism, which will be discussed more extensively below. It sees the EU as “the formal organization of a European international community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 18). The EU then attempts to persuade candidates’ governments that its rules are appropriate, either directly or indirectly through societal groups and organisations. Crucially, identity is seen as a factor affecting the EU’s persuasive power. Consequently, persuasion is more likely if non-members “regard the community of states represented by the EU as a valid ‘aspiration group’ whose collective identity, values and norms they share, whose recognition they seek, and to which they want to belong” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 19). This leads to the hypothesis that likelihood of adoption of EU rules by Serbia increases as its government and society identify themselves more with the EU. Accordingly, if the EU could successfully promote a European identity for Serbia, this would speed up the adoption of EU rules. The question is however whether the EU makes use of this insight in practice. This thesis will attempt to provide an answer to that question.

Nevertheless, while this approach regards identity as a means to a certain end, i.e. the adoption of EU rules, one can argue that EU membership is in the end more about questions of shifting values, norms and identities and that rule adoption is only an intermediary variable. Therefore, it is important to know how changes in collective identity can be realised. This is why the analysis now turns to discussions of collective identity formation in International Relations (IR), and specifically towards a model developed by Alexander Wendt that also provides a causal explanation for the formation of collective identities. Moreover, as the collective identity of the EU largely overlaps with European identity, the latter will be analysed, as well as what the EU believes its identity is.

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2 An EU-driven mechanism following a logic of consequences is named the *external incentives model*, whereas any process driven by a candidate state is called the *lesson drawing model*. 
Alexander Wendt is one of the main proponents of the constructivist turn in IR, although it is not difficult to link the framework he and others propose to the English School in IR (Bull 1977, Dunne 1998, Buzan & Little 2001). The turning point in the development of the constructivist alternative can be traced to 1992, when Wendt presented his seminal article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’ (Wendt 1992). In this plea, Wendt connects with neo-realists (Waltz 1979, Grieco 1988, Mearsheimer 1994) and, perhaps even more so, with neo-liberals (Krasner 1983, Keohane 1984), but argues, unlike them, for the inclusion of interests and identities as dependent and not only independent variables in IR analysis. He stresses the importance of using sociological and social psychological insights in examining the behaviour of states. This furthermore informs the title of his exposé: When applying his perspective, it becomes clear that it is neither inherently logical nor necessary that anarchy in the inter-state system should lead to the dominance of self-help and power politics. Wendt argues these are man-made institutions of anarchy and can therefore be changed; the consequences of anarchy become what states make of it.

In a subsequent book, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt (1999) elaborates on the ideas set out in this article. He defends a social or idealist ontology against the materialism and individualism on which neo-realism and neo-liberalism base themselves. Consequently, he advocates a prominent, though not exclusive, position for social constructivism in IR. His ontology is *social*, since “it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another,” (Wendt 1999: 372) and *constructivist*, as “these ideas help define who and what states are” (Wendt 1999: 372). He argues that this constructivist ontology is compatible with a positivist epistemology, stating that “[s]cientific realism legitimates a critical social science committed to discovering the deep structure of international life” (Wendt 1999: 41). Nevertheless, he also connects to critical theory by claiming the necessity to examine both causal and constitutive questions. Pursuing the latter prevents scholars from reifying the social world and enables us to think critically. As he puts it: “By highlighting the role our practices play in sustaining social kinds, therefore, constitutive theorizing enhances our collective capacity for critical self-reflection or ‘reflexivity’ ” (Wendt 1999: 375).

Returning to the ontological level, Wendt regards power and interests as secondary concepts; attributing explanatory power to them already presupposes ideas
about their importance. These ideas, rather than interests per se, should be the starting point for analyses of international politics, e.g. by asking which ideas ensure that a state perceives a certain course of action to be in its self-interest. Some Serbian politicians may cherish the idea that Russia is Serbia’s protector, and that it is therefore in Serbia’s self-interest to build close relations with that country. Others may harbour the idea that Serbia belongs with the West and that integration with the EU and NATO is consequently in its self-interest. The importance of power and interests is thus not an objective reality based in material forces, but rather constituted as such by ideas in the heads of political leaders and scholars. Wendt (1999: 135) provides the following advice: “[W]hen confronted by ostensibly ‘material’ explanations, always enquire into the discursive formations which make them work”. Anarchy is equally an ideational phenomenon, depending on representations of the Self versus the Other. In sum, ideational structures have autonomous influences, independent from material factors, although Wendt concedes that materiality can also have effects that do not depend on ideas. Identities can then be seen as part of ideational structures. Furthermore, an important assumption made concerns the nature of states. Wendt regards them as anthropomorphic, unitary actors, being therefore able to assume ideas and identities. Having discussed Wendt’s basic principles and assumptions, the following section will discuss his theory on the formation of collective identities.

A MODEL OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION

Particularly relevant for analysing the EU’s Europeanising practices with respect to Serbia is Wendt’s framework on collective identity formation. Indeed, the process of the Europeanisation of Serbia can be seen as the extension of the EU’s collective identity to include Serbia. Before proceeding to discuss this framework however, it is necessary to examine its underlying concepts, i.e. identity and collective identity. Wendt (1999: 224) defines identity as “a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions.” Thus, identity influences and even generates interests. This definition captures Wendt’s claim that interests are endogenously determined, not exogenously given. He argues that identity and interests work together. Interests require an identity, as one cannot know what one wants before one knows who one is, yet identity is hollow unless articulated in interests. Wendt (1999: 231) states that
“[w]ithout interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction”. Moreover, the identity we understand ourselves to have will be confirmed or rejected by others. I may consider myself Catholic, but without being baptised, others will probably reject that claim. Thus, identities comprise both an internal and an external element. A distinction is then made between four different kinds of identities, which are nevertheless interconnected. This categorisation distinguishes between personal or corporate identities, type identities, role identities and collective identities and will be examined next.

A classification of identities
The first category Wendt considers is personal identity, or corporate identity when the concept is applied to organisations, states included. What this amounts to is the knowledge of being separate from others, being conscious and aware that one is materially different from others. This goes for individuals (my body, and my thoughts, are not yours) as well as companies and states. Working for The Coca-Cola Company is different from working for PepsiCo. Conversely, the territory of the German state is not Polish territory, and Polish citizens are not Germans.³ It is imperative for states to have a collective identity that distinguishes them from other states, and that indicates the boundaries between their citizens and others. Not having one would mean not being able to make this distinction, with the consequence of losing corporate identity. In this sense, having a corporate identity signifies realising that one human collective is different from another, whereas the collective identity that is grafted onto this corporate identity indicates the specific characteristics that make them different. If a human collective loses its collective identity, e.g. through assimilation, it loses it corporate identity as well, as it does no longer realise it is different from the collective that assimilated it. An example may help to clarify this perhaps artificial distinction. After the Dutch revolt, the Low Countries split into an independent republic and a part that remained a dependency of Spain. This separation fostered the creation of two different corporate identities at a time when collective identities were probably mostly focussed

³ It should be added that when these boundaries become blurred, as in case of double citizenship, this may be perceived as a threat to the collective identity that is based on the state’s corporate identity. An example are the objections of the Dutch Party for Freedom to double citizenship (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2006).
on the immediate environment. This difference in administration has facilitated the gradual emergence of two distinct collective identities, one Belgian and one Dutch.4

A second kind of identities are known as type identities (Fearon 1999). These are used to label people or organisations that share, or are believed to share, some characteristic. A wide range of type identities exist, but they have in common that they have a social meaning. There are more or less formal rules to membership, and this in turn leads to others behaving towards the Self in a certain way. Membership conditions of a type identity are often partly determined by others, i.e. by those not considering themselves to have this identity. Consequently, a type identity can be attributed to the Self by these outsiders. Nevertheless, it is always based on some intrinsic characteristic of the individual. An example will help to clarify. Let us say red-haired people are constituted as having a separate type identity because they are considered anger-prone. Then other individuals may do their best not to incite this anger and will consequently differentiate their behaviour between redheads and people with other hair colours. Furthermore, people in society will develop a norm as to what qualifies as having red hair. Does having a red beard suffice? Do blonde-haired people with a red glow qualify? What is the position of those with chestnut hair? This will all be culturally determined, but the distinction will nevertheless be based on an inherent characteristic of the individual, i.e. the colour of his hair. When extended to states, type identities include e.g. liberal democracies and totalitarian regimes, but monarchies and presidential or parliamentarian systems as well.

Thirdly, Wendt lists role identities, which do not depend on intrinsic qualities, but exist by virtue of the Self standing in some particular relations to Others. Examples that come to mind include different roles within the family, next to for instance student-teacher, buyer-vendor and priest-believer relations. The expectations we carry of the behaviour of people identified as such stem from the institutionalisation of these roles in social structures. This logic goes even further as individuals internalise what is expected of them based on a certain role identity. As a buyer on certain open-air markets it is customary to haggle, so that is what we do. Wendt (1999: 228) mentions sovereignty as an example of a role identity for states. Sovereignty has largely been internalised in the behaviour of states, even as it only exists in the context of inter-state relations.

4 This is not to suggest that there had previously been one collective identity for the entirety of the Low Countries. Yet the development of collective identities in the region would certainly have been different had there been one corporate identity.
The final category consists of collective identities, the identification of the Self with the Other. Wendt (1999: 229) describes it as “a distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be ‘altruistic’ ”. Thus, the welfare of the group becomes an end in itself. This identification seldom comprises all aspects of social life, however; it is in general issue-specific. When travelling through Asia, a Dutch person may identify with other Europeans, but when the same person is on holiday in Italy, this identification is far less likely to take place. Wendt adds that a state requires a collective identity to be able to exist, in effect creating an entity that is hostile to the formation of any new collective identities. This is exemplified by EU member states’ urge to protect their national identities from being washed over by a European identity. Any mention of European identity is therefore likely to be accompanied by reassuring words on the importance of national identities. Indeed, the fact that individuals form collective identities does certainly not guarantee states will do so.

The relative importance of these four categories for an individual cannot be determined a priori. It may even occur that individuals willingly give up their personal identity, that is, their life, for the benefit of the nation. In this case, the collective identity is seen as the greater good, and its survival carries greater weight than one’s own life (Wendt 1999: 230-1).

Identity formation and structural change

Having analysed these concepts, it is now possible to turn to Wendt’s model on the formation of collective identity. First, a short discussion will be presented on identity formation per se, followed by an analysis of the role of collective identity, and its limitations, in structural change. Finally, his causal theory of collective identity formation in an anarchic environment will be examined. This latter part includes the discussion of four variables that are considered the main preconditions for achieving collective identity.

Wendt argues that there are essentially two logics of identity formation, namely natural and cultural selection. These are both processes that ensure that changes at the unit level spread towards the systemic level, i.e. - in the inter-state context - that changes in state interests and identity are translated towards the state system. Natural selection works through the extinction of states with identities that are not fit for survival. However, the establishment of the Westphalian state system and the institution
of sovereignty have diminished the importance of this selection method. A state like Somalia is desperately being kept alive by other countries, rather than being annexed by its neighbours. Moreover, the NATO bombardments of Serbia did not lead to the complete dismemberment of the country, as military action in previous centuries might have done.\(^5\)

The second mechanism of identity formation Wendt labels cultural selection, which is equivalent to socialisation. It is an evolutionary process that concerns “the transmission of the determinants of behavior from individual to individual, and thus from generation to generation, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process” (Boyd & Richerson 1980: 102, quoted by Wendt 1999: 324). Rather than working through a logic of survival, like natural selection, it is an intentional, cognitive process. Its two main selection channels are imitation and social learning. The former relates to taking over the self-understanding of those we consider successful. With regard to states, success could be measured in terms of power or legitimacy. China’s taking over of large parts of the capitalist economic model can be seen as an example of imitation.

The channel of social learning, on the contrary, is considered most relevant by Wendt, and within it he establishes his constructivist model of interaction that informs possibilities and obstacles for collective identity formation. This model is based on sociological theories, namely Mead’s symbolic interactionism and Stryker’s identity theory.\(^6\) Social learning is seen as taking place when the identities and interests of actors change through interaction. As Wendt (1999: 327) puts it, “identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others”. Consequently, a state comes to see itself as it is seen by significant other states; it internalises this identity. For example, including Iran in the Axis of Evil confirmed its role as an enemy of the United States and will have done

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\(^5\) On the other hand, one could argue that the failure of Yugoslavia to build a viable collective identity for its citizens has led to its collapse and subsequent extinction. Not even in its last incarnation as a state union between Serbia and Montenegro was it able to do so.

\(^6\) Symbolic interactionism (or interactionism) as a term was coined by Blumer (1969) to encompass his interpretation of the writings of George Herbert Mead. It is founded upon three basic premises: “(1) humans act on the basis of the meanings which things have for them; (2) meanings arise in interaction between people; and (3) meanings are handed and modified through an interpretive process used by people in dealing with things encountered” (Hall 2007: 4910). Wendt describes identity theory as developing testable hypotheses from interactionism. It is based on a structural version of symbolic interactionism, as developed by Stryker (1980). Research within its domain focuses on “how identities emerge within social structures” and “sees the self as emergent from social interaction and portrayed to others through identities that are appropriate in specific situations” (Carter 2007: 2223).
much to reinforce this enemy role identity from the Iranian perspective. However, the altered behaviour of the Obama administration will lessen the extent to which Iran considers itself an enemy of the United States. This logic is called ‘reflected appraisal’ or ‘mirroring’ and in essence demonstrates how identities and interests are produced and reproduced.

Wendt argues that a rationalist model of interaction, where behavioural choices are made on the basis of identities and interests that are considered given, is effectively a specific case of the broader constructivist explanation. One could, for the sake of argument, consider the rationalist model as a short-term model, because it ignores changes in identity, seeing the latter as an exogenous variable. Meanwhile, the constructivist model has a broader temporal scope that allows for changing identities, since identity is taken as an endogenous variable. Nevertheless, if identities are “sticky” in the short-term, the models will resemble each other in that timeframe. The rationalist model would then be a short-term variant of the constructivist representation, a view to which most rationalists would probably object. Nevertheless, as the goal of this thesis is to analyse how a European identity is extended towards Serbia, the rationalist model cannot be of service in this respect, as it fails to explain or even recognise a possible change in collective identity. Moreover, long-term changes in identity also need to begin somewhere in the short-term, e.g. in daily contacts.

Obviously, interaction in general is a sine qua non for the formation of collective identities, which in turn is a condition for structural change. In Wendt’s eyes, this should be achieved in theory by moving from a Lockean culture, where states see each other as competitors, towards a Kantian one, where other states are perceived as friends. His argument is that the institution of sovereignty has already led the system away from its original Hobbesian culture, where states consider each other as enemies, to the current Lockean one. Structural change occurs from a constructivist perspective when “actors redefine who they are and what they want” (Wendt 1999: 336-7). From a rationalist point of view, on the contrary, it would occur when deviating from the norm yields higher expected utility than remaining committed to it, holding identities and interests fixed. The fact that Wendt sees the rationalist model as a specific case of the constructivist one does not preclude rationalists from defining structural change differently, however.

Hence, in order to achieve structural change in constructivist terms, a redefinition of collective identity is needed, i.e. “redefining the boundaries of Self and
Other so as to constitute a ‘common in-group identity’ or ‘we-feeling’ ” (Wendt 1999: 338). Some problems nevertheless exist that complicate this achievement. First, collective identity is a fully internalised culture with which individuals or states identify; it has become part of how they understand their own Self. As such, they have an interest in the preservation of this identity and are therefore likely to object to changing it. For example, the alleged suggestion by a Dutch minister to make the Muslim Eid ul-Fitr fest an official holiday in the Netherlands led to outraged reactions by some political parties because it would not fit in with Dutch Judeo-Christian identity (Trouw 05/09/2008). Second, collective identity will always be in conflict with egoistic identities; it is rare that people identify completely with their nation, for instance, which explains a need for propaganda, especially in wartimes. Consequently, Wendt (1999: 337) puts forward that identification involves “an on-going tension between desires for individuation and assimilation”; the best that can be achieved therefore is a set of concentric identities existing at the same time but being activated at different occasions. Third, despite the existence of international organisations and regional groupings, the environment states find themselves in does not have an overarching authority. These anarchic conditions make it harder for states to form a collective identity than it is for individuals inside a state, as the state maintains order at least by imposing a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The factors that contribute to the formation of collective identity among states in absence of these monopoly conditions will be discussed just below.

The dynamics of the model
The main emphasis of Wendt’s model is on how the Other casts the Self, i.e. the representational practices of one state vis-à-vis another. This representation in turn structures the choices the Self can make. He implicitly reaffirms the importance of discourse in international politics, as e.g. public speeches and policy documents set the tenor of how the Other should be seen. A good example in this respect is the Schuman declaration, which stood at the origins of the European Coal and Steel Community and which casts Germany as a partner rather than as the enemy it had often been. In turn, this increased the range of policy options Germany could choose from. Applying this model to the Europeanisation of Serbia means analysing how the EU represents Serbia, which will be treated in chapter three, and how Serbians react to these practices, which is the subject of chapter four.
Wendt argues that all these representational practices can be depicted on a spectrum. On the one side is Realpolitik, which amounts to casting the Other as nothing but an object. It will tend to produce enemies. On the other side are what Wendt describes as pro-social policies, which respect the security concerns of the Other and also help this other state when doing so is not directly in one’s own self-interest. Casting the Other as a friend, if reciprocated, will also produce friends. The next chapter will analyse where on this spectrum EU representations of Serbia can be situated and if a European identity plays a role in these representations. Major influence on these casting processes will moreover be exercised by the power and dependency relations that exist between the Self and the Other.

When considering the EU enlargement process, these differences in political clout and bargaining power, for example, are plain to see between the EU and Turkey, on the one hand, and the EU and the individual Western Balkan countries, on the other. As Turkey is less dependent on the EU, it will be represented differently than e.g. Montenegro. Existing power relations and commitments to a previous identity notwithstanding, Wendt claims that purpose will eventually beat power, even if actions are misinterpreted by other parties. Besides, it is possible that states exhibit pro-social behaviour because that it simply in their self-interest, yet this experience per se may still in the end lead to genuine pro-social policies. It is from these policies that collective identity formation then springs. Nevertheless, what is still missing in this model are the variables that cause states to institute these policies in the first place; these factors will be discussed in the following.

Wendt distinguishes between three active or efficient causes and one enabling or permissive cause. Pro-social policies will emerge when at least one of the former is combined with this permissive cause, which is the exercise of self-restraint. The three active factors are interdependence, facing a common fate and homogeneity. Their importance lies in the fact that they “undermine egoistic identities and help create collective ones” (Wendt 1999: 343), thus the more of them are present, the more likely the formation of a collective identity is. Schematically this logic can be represented as follows:
Interdependence exists when the outcome of an interaction depends, for all involved actors, on the decisions the other actors make. Consequently, no single actor is able to independently determine his own fate. Enemies can also be interdependent, as e.g. the outcome of a war generally depends on the decisions taken by both sides. The route from interdependence to collective identity formation functions through cooperation; choosing to cooperate amounts to choosing pro-social policies. The likelihood of collective identity formation increases with the level of interdependence and the density of interactions, as e.g. indicated by trade and investment data. It is most salient in dyads, like the Franco-German axis. Wendt moreover attempts to waylay realist arguments against the importance of interdependence in international politics. Realists state that in general the level of interdependence in the international system is rather low and constant. Where and when it is high or rising, collective identity formation will fail to take place due to constraining fears of being exploited by the Other. In short, interdependence brings vulnerability, which engenders objective insecurity (Waltz 1979). Wendt concedes that this is a genuine concern and affirms the need for self-restraint in mutual relations. Fortunately, however, in the Lockean culture that dominates the international system today, according to Wendt, states are usually restraining themselves from the outright exploitation of other states.

A common fate
Sharing a common fate is alike to interdependence, yet with the crucial difference that this fate is imposed upon states by a third party. Wendt (1999: 349) puts it as follows: “Actors face a common fate when their individual survival, fitness or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole”. Thus, interdependence does not necessarily amount to sharing a common fate, as interdependent states may well face different
outcomes. The welfare of one state does not depend on the welfare of the group as a whole, but on the individual decisions that led to that particular outcome. One could argue that the aggression of Nazi Germany constituted countries like the United Kingdom, France and Poland as objectively sharing a common fate. A more ambiguous example is the problem of global warming. It can be said to create a common fate for countries in the Sahel Belt, as they all face increased aridification. This fate is largely imposed upon them by a third party, industrialised countries, and the effects for a single Sahel country depend on how the entire group fares. However, for the international system as a whole, there is no third party, and global warming becomes a problem of interdependence, whereby the outcome for any single state depends on the decisions taken by all individual states. Furthermore, the consequences will differ enormously between, for instance, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso and Sweden.

Wendt argues that facing a common fate may lead to cooperation, as altruistic groups have an evolutionary advantage over egoistic ones when facing each other. If two groups in the same position cooperate against a third that threatens them, they are more likely to triumph. Nevertheless, this does not by itself explain the emergence of altruistic individuals and it is at this point that Wendt stresses the importance of discursive mechanisms, convincing people this common fate exists and proposing the necessity of cooperation, Entrepreneurs or ‘epistemic communities’ need to take the initiative if the issue is not salient. Al Gore’s project *An Inconvenient Truth* can be seen in this light. Again, it is important to bear in mind that sharing a common fate is by itself not a sufficient cause for collective identity formation.

*Homogeneity*

The third factor in the model is homogeneity, i.e. the Self and the Other being alike. Wendt proposes that this condition can occur between organisational actors in two ways. On the one hand, states are comparable in their functioning as units controlling a certain territory; they are alike in their corporate identity of statehood. This differentiates them from non-state actors in international politics. On the other hand, the type identities states have vary, mainly with respect to regime type. Liberals have for instance founded democratic peace theory on the proposition that the characteristics of a liberal democracy drastically decrease the chances of war, at least between these liberal states (Doyle 1986). But one could also think of cultural and linguistic factors that contribute to objective homogeneity. The fact that Germany and Austria both have German as their
main language, for example, increases the degree of homogeneity between these countries.⁷

The link between homogeneity and pro-social policies is formed by subjective categorisation. When the Other is put into the same category as the Self, he will be treated as a friend, not as an enemy. There are two processes that foster this identification. First, Wendt (1999: 354) writes that “internal differences may be one source of external conflict”. Consequently, if states become more homogeneous, they are likely to have similar interests, reducing the scope for an egoistic identity. One could argue that Russia under Yeltsin was in a process of becoming more comparable to the liberal democracies of the West and that cooperation was therefore easier as their interests moved closer. Conversely, during Putin’s presidency this transition has stopped or even been reversed, and cooperation has therefore become more difficult. The indirect effect of having fewer differences and comparable interests thus promotes identification between the Self and the Other. A second route is formed through altered perceptions of the Other, which will come to correspond more with reality due to homogenisation. This yields pro-social behaviour, because of the following reasoning: if they are like us, we should treat them as if they were part of us. This is thus a more direct effect that may eventually lead to collective identity formation. Wendt insists yet again on the fact that this variable by itself is insufficient to cause pro-social policies, for several reasons. Most importantly, becoming homogeneous in some respects may trigger differentiation in other respects, a phenomenon that is sometimes called the tyranny of small differences (Radnitz 2004). In such a case, boundaries between the Self and the Other will be raised again by focussing on the characteristics that separate the Self from the Other, e.g. by concentrating on a difference in religion when languages are similar. This indicates that controlled behaviour on the part of the Other is crucial for collective identity formation, as it prevents a differentiating backlash by the Self. Furthermore, Wendt realises that homogeneity by itself explains little collective identity formation; he argues, however, that “in practice communities require some consensus

⁷ Although it is possible to determine objectively whether languages are alike, one should not forget languages can go their own way, or be made to go in a different direction. Language and politics are intimately related. A differentiation between Croatian and Serbian has, for instance, taken place after the break-up of Yugoslavia, where the main language spoken in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia was previously known as Serbo-Croat.
on values and institutions” (Wendt 1999: 357). Therefore, the degree of homogeneity cannot go unstudied in an analysis of collective identity formation.

_Self-restraint_

In examining the three factors above, Wendt stresses that they are by themselves not sufficient to cause collective identity formation; rather, they explain moves towards it. A final variable that is necessary along with at least one of the others is self-restraint. It is imperative that the Self is convinced that it will not be destroyed or assimilated by the Other. In such an eventuality, it would not be possible to speak of a shared collective identity; it would amount to the imposition of state A’s identity on the people of state B, dismantling the latter state in the process. Thus, in order for collective identity formation to succeed, the Other needs to be assured it will be able to retain part of its individuality. Traditionally, the way to solve this problem is formed by a third party imposing an external restraint. On the domestic level the state constitutes this restraint; on the world stage this can be a Great Power, but military technology and security regimes equally play a role here. Nevertheless, Wendt argues that these are only temporary solutions, as they do not provide a direct answer to the problem of lacking trust; one should be able to trust the Others even without guarantees enforced by third parties, which asks for self-control on their part. Wendt (1999: 359) states that collective identity formation requires the “belief that the Other will constrain itself in the demands it makes on the Self”. The Other should thus not ask the Self to alter its behaviour too much, opening up the possibility that the Self will identify with the Other. This would imply for the EU that it should not attempt to propagate too many changes in Serbia with which the Serbians themselves do not agree. Collective identity formation obviously also requires analogous behaviour by the Self in its dealings with the Other. Nonetheless, Wendt signals that this attitude may still lead to nothing but indifference. Therefore, it is required that at least one of the aforementioned active driving forces is present. He adds that it may well be that the ultimate basis for collective identity formation is respecting each other’s differences.

The key problem in this respect, realists would be fast to mention, is how to know whether others will constrain themselves if there are no external constraints. Yet

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8 Italics in the original.
9 Italics in the original.
10 This scenario assumes, however, that there is a domestic consensus over what acceptable demands are. As chapter four will demonstrate, Serbian society is not united in this respect.
both people and states make correct inferences about others’ behaviour every day. Wendt provides an example about the Bahamas and the United States, which can easily be extended to e.g. San Marino and Italy. Although the military power of the United States and Italy is overwhelming with respect to their smaller neighbours, the latter do not have to fear invasion, as they know through experience that these states will restrain themselves. This empirical knowledge is created through three ‘pathways’, as Wendt labels them.

First, as states comply for longer periods of time with the norms prevalent in a pluralistic security community, they tend to internalise the institution itself. That is, its existence is perceived as part of one’s own identity and interests; the state defines itself to some extent as part of this security community. One could e.g. argue that Dutch state identity is partly formed by the conviction that disputes with its neighbours will be solved in a peaceful way, indeed, even that using violence against them is unthinkable. It is important that this attitude is reciprocated by the other members of the security community if it is to last. In this way, trust is accumulated between states, which convinces them that they are respected and others will limit themselves.

A second route is domestic in nature. Circumstances permitting, states will behave internationally as they do domestically. In a certain sense, democracies have therefore already internalised the norms of a security community. Wendt (1999: 361) argues that the reasons for this outward reflection of community values include “cognitive consistency, habit, and/or societal pressure”. This argument is perhaps a bit stretched; although liberal democracies probably have a disposition towards solving conflicts without violence, their not using it at all has only be proven among themselves as a group (Doyle 1986). There are numerous examples of democracies using or instigating violence for their own perceived self-interest, such as the United States plotting against Allende in Chile. Moreover, the fact that Israel is a democracy does not make it respect international law regarding the Palestinian Territories.11 States can cite many circumstances that supposedly do not allow them to transpose their domestic behaviour towards the international level. This does not, however, mean that they are not free to choose different policies; after all, anarchy is what they make of it themselves.

11 For instance, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2004 on the construction of a barrier by Israel on the West Bank, which was ruled contrary to international law.
A third, more specific, itinerary to mutual trust is self-binding, i.e. an attempt to diminish the fears of the Other about the Self’s intentions by making unilateral commitments that do not call for immediate reciprocity. As Wendt argues, this is a way of overcoming the security dilemma by critically examining one’s own behaviour. An example he mentions are Soviet New Thinkers like Gorbachev, who overthrew the logic of the Cold War (Wendt 1992: 419-22). Nevertheless, in order for these policies to be sustainable, they need to be reciprocated in the long run.

In these three ways, credible commitments to self-restraint are made. Combined with interdependence, having a common fate and/or homogeneity, they explain the establishment of pro-social policies. These policies, e.g. in the form of cooperation,\(^\text{12}\) then further the institution of a collective identity. It should be added that this mostly does not lead to the substitution of one collective identity for another; Scottish identity has for instance not been replaced by a British identity. Rather, collective identity formation adds an additional layer to already existing national identity. This process runs somewhat analogously to how nation states have previously superimposed national identity on pre-existing local identities, albeit less forcibly (or at least so it appears).

\textit{Limitations of Wendt’s model}

Wendt also lists two limitations of his model. First, it lacks a specification of who or what moves the four variables discussed, yet he argues that these factors will certainly not be reducible to domestic variables. Second, its focus rests on the micro-level, whereas structural change takes place on the macro-level. In order for culture to change, a certain number of actors need to change their dominant identity. It matters consequently how many states change and how influential these are. Answering the questions of this thesis requires nonetheless looking inside the state, as there is no homogenous Serbian opinion on European integration. Suspending Wendt’s assumption that the state is a unitary actor, it becomes possible to examine the societal force field that determines its direction. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between those groups and institutions “buying into” the new collective European identity and those rejecting it, since the Serbs cannot be seen as one collective in this respect. Moreover,

\(^{12}\) Development assistance or disaster relief are pro-social policies as well, because extending such support is not always in the donor’s narrow self-interest. The collective identity they foster, however, may not go beyond a vague cosmopolitanism.
the relative influence of these different groups on other parts of society needs to be taken into account.

An analysis of the Europeanisation of Serbia will benefit from a discussion of Wendt’s model in the context of other views in IR on collective identity formation because it will locate his theory in a larger whole. In particular, contrasting Wendt’s take on collective identity with those of Neumann (1999) and Lapid (1996) will yield a better understanding of the complexity of collective identities, as these authors do not see states and collectives as unitary actors. This will be the subject of the next section.

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION

Wendt is one of the scholars discussed by Iver Neumann (1999) in his book on the Others in European identity formation. Neumann traces how the study of collective identity formation entered IR. He actually finds that the first application of the Self-Other opposition to international politics was made by a literary critic, Tzvetan Todorov, in the light of encounters between the Spanish and the native inhabitants of America. Todorov (1992) makes a useful distinction between three axes of Self-Other relations. First, he defines an axiological level, i.e. a value judgement about the Other. Is he considered good or bad? A second level is labelled praxeological, signifying the extent of rapprochement or distancing. The Self can respectively embrace the Other’s values, impose his own upon him, or be indifferent. Third is the epistemic level, the amount of knowledge about the Other’s identity. Neumann argues that James Der Derian was the first author from within the field to utilise the Self-Other problematique, in his genealogy of diplomacy (Der Derian 1987). He is accompanied by Micheal J. Shapiro, who remarked that foreign policy is in general about creating others.13 David Campbell then applied this insight in a study of American foreign policy (Campbell 1992). Neumann notes Campbell’s ethical point of view, as the latter argues that “the trick is for a human collective to be able to carry out its practices of representation while living in difference; that is, without ‘othering’ other collectives” (Neumann 1999: 25). Following this line of reasoning, the EU should for instance guard itself from using Russia, the Arab World or the United States as the Other in creating and propagating its

13 Neumann (1999: 23-4) states that this remark was made in 1988, but fails to provide the occasion. I was not able to retrieve it either.
own identity. This may be a temptation difficult to resist, since othering presents itself as the easiest road for creating a collective identity.

Other scholars mentioned by Neumann (1999) are those from the Copenhagen School, such as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, who analyse identity formation from the perspective of clashing discursive representations and examine the consequences of given Self-Other relations for the possibility of international cooperation. An important point here is the possibility of clashes between state representation of the Self and the Self as seen by society or groups within it (Wæver et al. 1993). This conflict can be witnessed, for example, in the referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 and more recently in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The states’ approval of continuing integration was rejected by their people, who may basically have been afraid of losing national identity.

Subsequently, Neumann discusses Wendt, whom he credits with launching questions of collective identity into the mainstream of IR, since the analyses discussed above took place rather in the margins of the discipline. He argues that the main contribution of Wendt is connecting the intersubjectively constituted structure of the international system to collective identity formation, i.e. examining how structural change can take place through altering representations and the creation of a collective identity, as described earlier in this chapter. Nevertheless, Neumann presents several criticisms on Wendt’s analysis. First, he rejects the assumption that “human collectives are unequivocally bounded actors” (Neumann 1999: 33); Wendt should thus allow for overlap between collectives, in effect even between the Self and the Other. The collective of Roman Catholics, for instance, coincides partly with the collective of Dutch citizens, but does certainly not cover it entirely. This problem widens, moreover, when Wendt ascribes these bounded actors with an unequivocally given Self. Neumann argues that, by doing so, Wendt reifies the Self and disregards the multidimensionality of identity formation. These insights will be taken into account in the analysis of Serbian society in chapter four, as indeed the collective of Serbs can not be called an unequivocally bounded actor with an unequivocally given Self.

A third argument presented by Neumann is that Wendt limits himself to Todorov’s praxeological level. He exclusively discusses the degree of identification between the Self and the Other, that is, Wendt stresses the relevance of representing the Other on a scale that runs from friend to enemy. This viewpoint obscures the relevance of both value judgements and the acquired knowledge about the Other. Fourth, Wendt
assumes that rising interdependence and homogeneity, or the convergence of values, facilitate collective identity formation. Neumann retorts that this claim is refuted by numerous anthropological studies.\textsuperscript{14} He adds that ‘objective’ cultural differences are not what matters here, but that emphasis should lie on how certain symbols are used. One could, for instance, argue that, ‘objectively’ speaking, cultures in the area of former Yugoslavia are rather alike, e.g. people enjoy listening to the same music and they virtually speak the same language. Yet, religion is a major instrument in dividing communities and in this sense becomes a symbol for their being divided. In addition, movements along the axes described by Todorov are not necessarily correlated; increases in knowledge about the Other are not equivalent to embracing the Other’s values. One last point raised is Wendt’s state-centrism, which is, however, not considered a major obstacle to insight, but rather a legitimate analytical choice.

The insights of Neumann’s survey of the Self-Other nexus in world politics furthermore yield some important insights for the purpose of this thesis. He concludes that there are two notions omnipresent in the literature: on the one hand, the finding that the formation of the Self is inextricably linked to the formation of its Others and, on the other hand, the idea that failing to consider one’s Others in their own right will have serious consequences for the formation of the Self. This latter result is related to Wendt’s argument that respecting the Other is necessary for collective identity formation. Besides, Neumann lists some important insights scholars should take into account when analysing collective identity formation. He argues that distinguishing the Self from an Other is “an active and ongoing part of identity formation” (Neumann 1999: 35); social scientists need consequently to study the emergence, maintenance and change in boundaries, including social ones. Further, all politically relevant collective identities should be considered, i.e. not only national or supranational identities, while not ignoring their multifaceted character. One needs moreover to realise that the Self and the Other are unbounded and merge into one another. This should not be taken in a dialectical and teleological sense; they do not necessarily move towards a bigger whole encompassing both of them. In contrast, this process should be understood in a dialogical sense, i.e. without such a progressive goal in mind (Neumann 1999: 36). Finally, as social scientists do not work in a vacuum, it is imperative to pay attention to the normative side of analysis and to the consequences one’s writings may have.

\textsuperscript{14} A fact apparently so obvious he does not provide any references.
Neumann states that achieving integration by proposing othering, as Samuel Huntington (1993) seems to advocate, is too high a price to pay. Neumann (1999: 37) concludes by writing that the study of collective identity formation “offers no less than the possibility finally to theorize the genesis and maintenance of the human collectives of world politics”.

Yosef Lapid (1996) also presents some pertinent reflections on the use of identity in the study of world politics in his introduction to a volume that comments on *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Lapid & Kratochwil 1996). He argues that the increased attention for culture and identity in the discipline is part of an emerging movement of more critical scrutiny and greater intellectual openness. When thinking about the world, he continues citing Shotter (1994), it is possible to see it in two ways. On the one hand, we can think of it as a fixed universe, where changes are perceived as problematic. On the other hand, however, we can consider the world to be in a state of flux, or an ongoing process, where attaining stability is indeed the problem. Lapid argues that IR has remained stuck in the first option for too long by focussing exclusively on stability and continuity. Renewed attention for identity has corrected the balance, since identity itself is a variable that is always in process, as e.g. confirmed by Wendt’s analysis of collective identity *formation* and continuing representational practices.

The two dominant motives in social scientific thinking about identity are then, according to Lapid (1996: 7), “the perception of multiplicity and the pervasive theme of construction”.15 The dimensions of identity and culture stressed are consequently the following:

- their socially constructed (as opposed to primordially given) nature; their optional (as opposed to deterministic) dimensions; their fragmenting/diversifying (as opposed to integrating/homogenizing) implications; and their multidimensional/dynamic (as opposed to unidimensional/static) features (Lapid 1996: 7).

This theoretical view is, reduced to its essence, the conceptual framework for the use of the notion of identity in this thesis. A collective European identity is seen as constructed rather than essential. The focus on different reactions to this identity in Serbian society stems from the recognition that these groups have a choice and that

15 Italics in the original; Lapid paraphrases from the foreword by George and Louise Spindler to Fitzgerald (1993).
collective identities often have fragmenting consequences; both a European identity and a nationalistic Serb identity have their supporters and detractors inside Serbia. The analysis of elements of European identity further below will moreover demonstrate that identities are dynamic in character.

Lapid argues as well that the analysis of identity and culture will offer solutions to the knowledge problems of multiplicity, reification and parochialism, thus helping students of IR to develop a faculty for greater reflexivity. Lapid furthermore insists on the necessity of metatheoretical thinking and warns against settling too easily in a positivist mould, i.e. in systematic empirical studies determining how identity matters in international politics. Before moving there, he argues, one should reflect on “historical context” and “scholarly practices” (Lapid 1996: 9). When comparing this position to Wendt’s, it seems that the latter has not shied away from the metatheoretical debate; yet, he has chosen a positivist approach to international politics to be able to make contingent generalisations.

A number of observations made in a further chapter of the same volume (Lapid & Kratochwil 1996) have implications for the formation of a European identity. In it, Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) comment on the fluidity of polities from Mesopotamia in the third millennium BC to the European Community in the 1990s. They argue that “the best ideology to legitimize a larger polity is one that is at once distinctive and yet makes use of ideological strands already within the expanded domain” (Ferguson & Mansbach 1996: 29). In addition, “[p]olities survive only if they can co-opt […] old memories, identities, and loyalties – those that once supported other polities – or fit them into their own ideologies” (Ferguson & Mansbach 1996: 36). The task for the EU is thus to skilfully feed into the already existing polities in its member states.

Nevertheless, any agent that wants to use collective identity, as well as any researcher studying this subject, should be aware of the dangers surrounding the issue. Both ethnic and national identity are common examples of collective identities. They have been used to create hostility and to mobilise people for violence, such as during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore, the following section will take a closer look at these phenomena, including the question of how to prevent the characteristics of a European identity from serving these goals.
QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

National identity and nationalism
There are several factors related to this thesis that necessitate a discussion of the concepts of national identity and nationalism. First, the local background for the EU’s attempts to include Serbia in its collective European identity is obviously formed by the Serb domestic political landscape, in which national Serb identity has played a paramount role for decades. Two instances that brought to the fore the importance of Serb identity have been the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Memorandum of 1986 and Slobodan Milošević’s speech at Kosovo Polje in 1987. The rise of nationalism after the Cold War, of which the Serbian case is only one example, was in fact one of the reasons for the increased prominence of identity in IR (Wæver 2005). As recognised by Wendt in the formulation of his framework, nationalists will oppose the inclusion of national identity in a larger collective identity. 16 Once individuals have committed themselves to a certain collective identity, they have an interest in perpetuating that identity. There always exist tensions, therefore, between attempts at supranational identity formation and national identity,17 between those advocating participation in a wider identitarian community and those fearing to lose the feeling of who they are altogether. This tension and ways to overcome it are crucial focal points in this thesis, as the same process is at work between a European identity and Serbian identity. Chapter four will analyse in this respect which groups in Serbia think that it is possible to reconcile European and Serbian identity and which strata believe that the EU and its identity threaten to destroy everything genuinely Serbian.

Second, although Wendt writes about collective identity formation between states, this collective identity needs to be supported and internalised by at least an influential part of each state’s population. This resembles the logic of the creation of national identity, which is a process of collective identity formation taking place

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16 Nationalists may not be the only ones to object. Furthermore, nationalists may want to create a larger polity, without compromising national identity, to realise their goals. Croatian nationalists in the 19th century for instance advocated the formation of a kingdom of South-Slavs through the Illyrian movement. Nationalists can furthermore define their nation as spread over different states, as in the case of pan-Arabism.

17 There are many variants on this theme. Tensions may exist between national and regional identities (e.g. between Italy and Padania; between France and Brittany), but also between different national identities where one claims the higher ground (e.g. China and Tibet, Turkey and Kurdistan, but also Serbia and Montenegro). Often, the existence of a separate nation is rejected, as is the case in some Serbian views on Montenegro. Thus, the boundary between what constitutes a regional and what a national identity is blurred and open for multiple interpretations.
between individuals rather than states. Nevertheless, the important role of the state in this process may be compared to the role of the EU in creating and spreading European identity.

National identity then exists by grace of being an attribute of the nation.\(^{18}\) However, the origins of nations are contested. Ernest Gellner (1983: 55) argued significantly that nationalism engenders nations instead of vice versa, a view shared by Eric Hobsbawm (1992: 10). Anthony Smith (1991: 100) on the contrary rejects this claim and suggests that nations in Western Europe existed before the advent of nationalism in the 18\(^{th}\) century. Smith emphasises the link between a pre-existing ‘ethnie’ or ethnic community and the nation. He states that “[w]e must not overstate the mutability of ethnic boundaries or the fluidity of their cultural content” (Smith 1991: 24), arguing against considering the nation completely as a social construct. The questions around the emergence of nations are thus to be addressed in terms of the ethnic ties and identities that form their cultural basis. Additionally, he proposes that “nations and nationalism are no more ‘invented’ than other kinds of culture, social organization or ideology” (Smith 1991: 71).

Smith’s proposal may be valid, but the problem is that it is not seen this way by proponents of nationalism, causing its detractors to focus, excessively perhaps, on its nature as a social construct. It seems that the normative side of social science is never far away in the debates on this matter. Hobsbawm (1992: 11), for example, wrote that no one who seriously studies the concepts of the nation and nationalism can be a political nationalist. Moreover, nationalism, defined by Gellner (1983: 1) as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”\(^{19}\), requires according to him mass-murder, mass-expulsion or mass-assimilation in order to achieve its goals.

The authors mentioned above do not agree on the causes for the emergence of nationalism. Gellner argues that nationalism is grounded in industrial society, which is made possible by the existence of the state. Therefore, nationalism does not exist when there is no state. Simultaneously, a homogeneous high culture emerges from this industrial society, a culture that is perpetuated by the state through, for instance, education. Nationalism can then be alternatively defined as “essentially, the general

\(^{18}\) There are myriad definitions of the concept of nation (cf. Barrington 1997); see footnote 1 for the definition employed throughout this thesis.

\(^{19}\) Underlined words in the original have been replaced with italics.
imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority” (Gellner 1983: 57). The link to identity is then that “the culture in which one is taught to communicate becomes the core of one’s identity” (Gellner 1983: 61), pointing to the importance of education in creating and maintaining national identity. The right to follow education in one’s mother tongue is consequently an important issue of contention in many ethnic conflicts.

Hobsbawm (1992: 10-11) remarks that Gellner attributes too great a role to the state and consequently obscures the view from below. He notes for instance that national identifications do not necessarily exclude nor are they always superior to the other identifications humans as social beings have. Moreover, a national consciousness will develop unevenly across social groups and geographical regions. Benedict Anderson (2006 [1983]) sees nationalism primarily as a cultural system, the successor to the axioms of the religious community and the dynastic realm. The decline of these two, plus a change in the apprehension of time, made it possible for people to imagine nations, i.e. to think of “a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together” (Anderson 2006 [1983]: 36). He then argues that capitalism and print technology created the conditions for forming these imagined communities that we call nations, based on vernacular languages. Thus, it can be argued that a, perhaps rather weak, collective identity based on religion, with Latin as a universal language, was replaced by a plurality of more territorialised identities based on local languages. Gellner would have added that this is also a process of elevating a particular vernacular dialect, part of a certain low culture, to the status of national language and thus making it the instrument of transmission in high culture.

Smith on the contrary does not provide a structural explanation, but grounds the emergence of nationalism in philosophy. He argues that the ideal of autonomy that Kant developed on behalf of the individual was applied to groups by thinkers like Fichte and Schlegel. This then led to “a philosophy of national self-determination and collective struggle to realize the authentic nation will – in a state of one’s own” (Smith 1991: 76). Therefore, intellectuals occupied a primary position in creating a cultural nationalism, which provided the ideology for political nationalism. This is a reminder of the situation

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20 A renewed recognition of this argument, on both the political left and the right, has led in the Netherlands to the creation of a historical canon for use in schools and the decision to build a National Historic Museum.

21 This argument is obviously rather centred on Western Europe. If we consider the nation however as a product of modernity, then it is also originally a European invention.
in Yugoslavia, where intellectuals reawakened nationalism in a political environment that was hostile to it. Smith furthermore makes a distinction between civic and ethnic aspects of the nation, nationalism and national identity, stressing however that every nationalism contains aspects of both. For example, the Western, civic conception is related to a certain delimited territory, while the non-Western, ethnic conception stresses descent. Questioning Smith’s view, one could discuss, however, to what extent the purportedly civic French and American nations are based on their respective Gallo-Frankish and White Anglo-Saxon Protestant heritage.

Smith conceives of national identity as providing the socialisation of individuals as nationals/citizens through mass education. It confers upon individuals a social bond and a reminder of a “common heritage and cultural kinship” (Smith 1991: 16-7). Crucially, it is a means for these individuals to define and locate themselves. Nevertheless, all these seemingly benign effects may have adverse consequences to the extent that they exclude other individuals. What matters is not the exclusion per se, but the way in which the excluded Other is represented, reflecting the importance of representational practices Wendt insists upon as well. These drawbacks notwithstanding, Smith (1991: 175-6) argues that “national identity is the most potent and durable collective identity” and is likely to remain so “for a long time to come”.

An interesting contribution to this debate is made by Stavrakis (2005). He argues that the affective dimensions of national identity are ignored in many of the discussions around the topic, connecting national identity to the theories of Freud and Lacan (see e.g. Freud (1985 [1921]) and Lacan (1998)). People have a need for identification because they in effect lack an originary identity. They want to identify themselves with something they desire, e.g. Serb identity. However, as collective identities can never achieve “a closed, self-contained and absolute identity” (Stavrakis 2005: 70), a full acquisition of this identity can never be attained. Therefore, the enjoyment of this identity is kept at bay, and this failure is attributed to some Other. For instance, the full realisation of Serb identity is hindered by the Croats, and Dutch identity is threatened by Muslim immigrants. Stavrakis connects nationalism to Freud’s Eros by arguing it is connected to the body rather than appealing to people’s ratio. Nationalism is not just symbolic but links people together in their lust for enjoyment, and teaches them to hate those that stand in the way of attaining it. In this sense, American patriotism loses much of its civic connotations if we see the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or Muslim terrorists nowadays, as the Other that stands in the way of achieving the enjoyment of
absolute American identity. These observations lead Stavrakis to conclude that “contrary to what some postmodern theories of ‘multiple’ or ‘fluid’ identity imply, ‘national identity cannot be exchanged like last year’s clothes’” (Stavrakis 2005: 77, quoting Billig 1995: 139). This reflects Smith’s opinions; the emotional aspect of nationalism is also present in his writings when he argues that “[t]o identify with the nation is to be offered personal renewal and dignity in and through national regeneration” (Smith 1991: 161).

In summary, it is possible to say that at least originally, nationalism emerged to fill a void created by industrial society, as old identifications with city, region, or religion no longer sufficed. One might argue that it is the inevitable corollary of capitalist development. Consequently, nationalism as an ideology created essentialist notions of the nation and national identity, taking elements at will from manifold low cultures in order to forge them into a uniform high culture with a codified language. In lieu of the continuum that existed beforehand came the apparently discrete division between nation-states. It seems moreover not opportune to dwell too much on a strict division between civic and ethnic nationalism. Furthermore, as Smith and Stavrakis emphasise, the fact that most Western scientists agree on the constructed nature of the nation and national identity does not mean that these concepts live their public life as such. When Princess Máxima of the Netherlands commented that the Dutch identity did not exist because of the diversity of Dutch people (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst 2007), a host of angry reactions followed, claiming it was absolutely possible to pinpoint Dutch identity. Thus, the invented bonds of nationhood do not necessarily appear less real for being invented. Nevertheless, it remains a dangerous practice for politicians and intellectuals to focus on what separates us as nations rather than on what binds us as humans.

Elements of European identity

It is perhaps fitting to begin an analysis of constituents of European identity by looking at what it is not, as it often seems that the Other in European identity is the most important element in its construction. Delanty (1995) writes that European identity has its basis in adversity rather than unity. His book is an attempt to question “the idea of a European identity as a totalising project and the ethno-culturalism that accompanies it”

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Delanty argues that at the times of the crusades, the ideas of Europe and Latin Christianity overlapped, given the clash between Islam and Christianity. The Other was formed by Muslim adversaries on the Iberian Peninsula, on Sicily and in the Holy Land. Consequently, “[t]he unity of Christendom was only a unity in the face of a common enemy” (Delanty 1995: 34). However, after driving this external enemy out of Western Europe, e.g. during the Reconquista, attention was shifted towards an internal Other, namely the Jews. Thus the persecution of minority groups became an integral part of European history.

Another important antithesis in European identity formation has been that of Europe as the West versus the Orient. When religious unity ended due to the Reformation, the idea of Europe became secularised. Nevertheless, there was still continuity with the past, as the Christian aspiration towards universality was maintained in secular Europe. While this new Europe was supposedly characterised by freedom, progress, civilisation and Christian humanism, the oriental Other was the opposite of all these. This advanced development then provided a justification for colonising and exploiting the Orient. This leads Delanty (1995: 98-9) to conclude that “[t]he identity of Europe emerged out of violence and colonialism”. Politicians currently employ this adversarial framework as a legitimisation of a politics of setting up limits against the Third World and preventing the alleged Islamisation of Europe. Islam has thus once again become the bogeyman of Europe. Delanty (1995: 155) puts it as follows: “European identity is rapidly becoming a white bourgeois populism defined in opposition to the Muslim world and the Third World”. This remark becomes especially relevant in face of a possible Turkish accession.

Kastoryano (2005) argues that the debate on this question, together with the one around the Constitution for Europe, has clarified the need for a European identity. She argues this is still a weak process; there is the risk that European unity will be built on excluding others from the European social order guaranteeing welfare and security. Part of this threat is that Europe seems to experience a kind of unity as result of Turkey’s

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23 See also Said (2003 [1978]) on how Europeans developed a systematic view of the Orient as the Other and its consequences for the European Self.
24 A definitive split between Latin and Greek Christendom had already occurred in 1054. Byzantium had taken over the heritage and identity of the Roman Empire (also calling themselves Romans), while the western half lacked this political unity and took Latin Christianity as collective marker. Its different language and its fusion of temporal and eternal authority set Constantinople apart from developments in the western part of the former Empire (Delanty 1995).
altérité; a unity based consequently not on a civic political culture, but rather on religious or civilisational criteria. Turkey risks once again becoming Europe’s Other. This is also the theme of Neumann’s book that was discussed before. His main thesis is that “‘the East’ […] has become a generalized social marker in European identity formation” (Neumann 1999: 207). In the course of history, different entities have fulfilled this role of Europe’s Other, such as Turkey and Russia, but it is inevitable that there is an ‘East’ that occupies this position.

The Others described above are constructed as being what we are not, or rather as representing the opposite of our virtuousness, our achievements, our singularity. What are the elements of European identity then that are proposed to justify this attitude? Smith lists several characteristics of a European pattern of culture that may serve as the basis for European identity. These are the heritage of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, the humanism and individualism of the Renaissance, Enlightenment rationalism and science, artistic classicism and romanticism and, most importantly, the traditions of civil rights and democracy (Smith 1991: 174). In another context, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) wrote an article pleading for a common European foreign policy in which they also mention several historical experiences that serve as candidates for building a European identity upon. They stress moreover that this would be a process of self-conscious construction to enhance self-understanding instead of carrying the aura of a nature-given identity. The candidates listed are the following: the private exercise of faith; a particular view on the relation between politics and the market; a certain sensitivity that citizens have to the destruction inherent in progress; a penchant for a more socially just society; low tolerance for injuries to personal and bodily integrity; the need for mutual limitations of sovereignty for successful supranational cooperation; and the capacity of states to consider themselves in a reflexive manner (Habermas & Derrida 2003: 295-7).

A further list of European social and cultural peculiarities is presented by Kaelble (2005) in a book chapter on changes in European self-understandings. He argues that Europeans have gradually given up the idea of their own superiority in the period from the end of World War I to the 1960s, embracing the view of Europe as one civilisation among others and accepting the existence of multiple modernities. The idiosyncrasies he lists are divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are those that have weakened or disappeared altogether as particularly European in the second half of the 20th century. These include first the European nuclear family, with young couples
living independently from their parents. A second feature is the importance of industrial work for European societies and the concomitant emergence of working class culture. Third comes the impact of Europe’s specific class division on its society. On the other hand, there are those particularities that still distinguish Europe from other parts of the world. To begin with, European cities grew relatively modestly after World War II, a process that was moreover often carefully planned. Second, the European welfare state is a distinct institution, both in terms of GDP percentage and population covered. Finally, the European mode of mass consumption stands out in e.g. a higher proportion of income spent on food and clothing and in persisting scepticism regarding the phenomenon displayed by European intellectuals.

Nevertheless, all the characteristics mentioned above are in a sense arbitrarily chosen and may lead to criticism of what is not included. The elements most common in descriptions of the cultural roots of European identity are the Judeo-Christian tradition, Hellenism and the Enlightenment (Kraus 2008: 39). Kraus argues however that “by trying to find substance [scholars] essentialize particular cultural features and discard alternative identity patterns” (Kraus 2008: 39). Notably, he states, by focussing on Judeo-Christian elements, the role of Islam in European history is obscured. Furthermore, seeing the Enlightenment as at the core of European identity neglects the importance of subsequent Romanticism. In doing so, scholars, and politicians, make a deliberate choice to exclude other possibilities for collective identification. Moreover, Kraus comments that cultural and political markers often have a very broad character that covers the entire Western world.

Another characteristic of these elements of European identity that stands out is that they do not include negative events or developments. Delanty (1995) argues for instance that anti-Semitism and colonialism are inherent to European identity. In the same vein, there is a strong point to be made that the Holocaust should be included in any notion of European identity, perhaps even as the culmination of every development that came before it.²⁵ Eder (2005: 216) argues that such a reflexive mode of collective learning, that involves dealing with a traumatic past to create a culture of both guilt and mercy, is the most probable road for narrating the past and creating a strong European identity.

²⁵ Delanty cites Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1979) as a major theoretical background to his writings. He notes, “this celebrated work […] poses the question of the very possibility of a European identity in the wake of the Holocaust” (Delanty 1995: x). Later in the book, Delanty (1995: 113) comments that “[t]he extermination of European Jewry in effect led to the destruction of European culture and the possibility of a genuinely cosmopolitan European identity”.

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identity.26 Also in regard to the darker side of European identity, Delanty argues that there is a close connection between nationalism and the idea of Europe. He argues for instance that “[t]he notion of the essential unity of Europe was central to fascist ideology” (Delanty 1995: 111). Moreover, the formation of European identity by the EU may risk being based on a nationalist format. Neumann (1998: 410) comments that “a nationalist-style, exclusionary mode of talking about European identity formation is very much part of contemporary discourse”. He also mentions the fears of Hannah Arendt that the European project may lead to the development of pan-European nationalism (Arendt 1958).

What are viable candidates then to build European identity upon, without leading to dangerous developments? Habermas and Derrida (2003: 294) provide a useful starting point: “The acknowledgement of differences – the reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other in his otherness – can also become a feature of a common identity”. Delanty argues that making use of Europe as an idea and an identity is only feasible for politicians if they connect it to post-national citizenship and multiculturalism. If they fail to do so, using European identity will lead to essentialist claims of universality based on ethno-culturalism, and an adversarial value system. Therefore, he advocates breaking all bonds between ethno-culturalism and the idea of Europe, and between citizenship and nationality. Then, it is possible to think of a post-national European citizenship that is based on residence. In this light, Delanty (1995: 104) argues that “[t]he crucial question for the twenty-first century will be whether or not Europe can absorb an Islamic identity”. Kastoryano reflects as well on the possibility of multiculturalism becoming a fundament of European identity. She argues that there can be no doubt that Europe is at the same time one and many. A European civil society has emerged, as affirmed by the protests against the Iraq War of 2003. Yet, a unified European public sphere is still far away, hence the need for a multiculturalism based on multiple public spheres. Neumann adds to this that some agents may want to establish a uniform conception of European identity by attempting to smother the debate around this question, yet, in his view, “there cannot be such a thing as a European identity in the singular, but only a plurality of European identities” (Neumann 1998: 413).

26 A reflexive mode of collective learning is one of three modes that were proposed by Giesen (1998). The other two modes are the primordial and the traditional one.
Smith’s opinion is rather different from those examined above. He argues that a new type of collective identity in Europe can only be forged if it has popular resonance, and therefore, in order to succeed, a pan-European movement needs to create “common European myths, symbols, values and memories” from this heritage, so that it does not replace individual nations, but overarches them (Smith 1991: 175). This is diametrically opposed to Delanty, who rejects any relation between ethno-culturalism and the idea of Europe in a political sense. Nonetheless, if the concept of European identity is ever to assume any practical value, it should be able to appeal to the people on the street everywhere in Europe. Smith claims this necessitates the use of symbols, but also the evocation of a mythical past.

Is it possible then to synthesise these views and make a common myth out of multiculturalism? Fact is that a European identity based on ethno-culturalism is probably superfluous in the face of already existing essentialist national identities. When a polity such as the EU, which prides itself on having overcome centuries of violence, makes use of European identity, it should not repeat the mistakes of the past. In order to analyse whether the EU has managed to evade these pitfalls and to ascertain what its policies have been, the following section will examine how the EU itself conceives of European identity. This is, moreover, a necessary element in the analysis of how the EU uses European identity in Europeanising Serbia. Without knowing how the EU sees a European identity, it becomes rather difficult to assess how the concept is used in politics.

The European Union and European identity

The year 1973 is commonly taken as the beginning of analysing the EU/Community approach towards European identity (Stavrakis 2005, Kraus 2008). In that year, the foreign ministers of the European Communities issued a Declaration on European Identity, in the wake of the first enlargement. Kraus (2008: 44) argues that ever since, the main components of the “‘official’ identity discourse” by the Community or Union have remained largely the same. The discourse contains on the one hand a reference to a set of shared political values, while on the other hand reaffirming the importance and centrality of the Union’s cultural diversity. This duality is clearly present in the 1973

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27 They did so on the occasion of the Copenhagen European Summit of 14-15 December 1973, where the Heads of State and Government decided that European identity should be introduced in the framework of their common foreign relations. The declaration was thus based on a decision at the highest level.
declaration, which affirms the wish to respect “the cherished values of [...] legal, political and moral order” and to preserve “the rich variety of [the member states’] national cultures” (Commission 1973: n.p.). It is important to note that, throughout the document, the ministers refer to the European identity, using the definite article instead of employing none. This could indicate a rather essentialist view on European identity. The elements they consider constitutive of European identity are “the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice [...] and of respect for human rights”, as well as “a common market, based on a customs union, and [...] institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation” (Commission 1973: n.p.). Stavrakis (2005: 81) comments that this is a “dry, institutional, symbolic conception of identity”, which fails to bring about true identification due to a lack of passion.

A further instance of how the EU has handled the concept of European identity is formed by the Adonnino Committee’s final report of 1985. The Committee proposes for instance the establishment of May 9 as Europe Day and advocates the establishment of a “comprehensive European inter-university programme of exchanges and studies” (Commission 1985: n.p.). Moreover, under the heading of “strengthening [...] the Community’s image and identity” (Commission 1985: n.p.), the Committee proposes adopting a Community flag and anthem, both of them related to the Council of Europe. Notably, the Committee does not mention European identity, but focuses on the identity of the European Community. Nevertheless, by taking over symbols of the Council of Europe, the continuity with Europe as a whole is emphasised. This difference deserves a comment at this point, as the notion of Europe overlaps with the EU as organisation, but they do not coincide. Given that the EU currently covers a large part of the European continent, however, it has become more difficult to differentiate between the two. Many of the citations in the next chapter will make clear that the EU and its Member States regard the EU as speaking for Europe as a whole.

A reference to European identity, not the Union’s identity, can also be found in the preamble of the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. The Member States commit themselves to “implement a common foreign and security policy [...]”, thereby

28 The Committee, officially known as the Committee on a People’s Europe, was set up by the European Council of 25-26 June 1984 at Fontainebleau and was mandated to propose measures to strengthen Europe’s identity and to respond to citizens’ expectations of the Community (Commission 1984).
29 The Committee in fact advised putting a golden E in the circle of stars, to differentiate the flag from the one of the Council of Europe. The European Council nevertheless opted for the exact same flag, the one known to us today. As an anthem Beethoven’s Ode to Joy was chosen, the fourth movement of his ninth symphony, which had been acknowledged by the Council of Europe as representative of the European idea (Commission 1985).
reinforcing the European identity and its independence” (European Union 2002: 9). Simultaneously, they affirm in Article 6(3) that “[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States” (European Union 2002: 12). A European identity was therefore explicitly valued as identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world, while the formulation of its internal relevance was perhaps deemed too divisive or inappropriate, as the new Union did not yet cover a large part of the continent. Additionally, the Treaty of Maastricht established citizenship of the European Union for those holding the nationality of one of its Member States, and it laid the basis for a common currency, which has today grown to become a potent symbol of Europe.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 also provides an important, albeit implicit, enunciation of the European identity in view of the Union. It states in the preamble:

Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities […]. The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States. (European Union 2000: 8)

The two elements of common values and cultural diversity are again evident in this fragment. What stands out, moreover, is that the Union is based on values it holds to be universal, which complicates their use as markers of identity. Specific values can become important elements of an identity differentiating the EU from the rest of the world. However, if these values are deemed to be universal, they no longer hold any differentiating power. Valuing democracy is, for example, hardly a characteristic specific to Europe. Especially the question of how to differentiate Europe from the wider West is relevant in this respect. Yet, to what extent are the values cited genuinely universal? To mention just two examples, the degree of solidarity, as measured by the size of the welfare state, differs significantly between different parts of the world; besides, solidarity may exist within societies, but to what extent is it present between them? Thus, this presumed universality might be a bit precocious. Next to that, a

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30 Article 6(3) is the reference for the consolidated Treaty on European Union; in the original Treaty this is Article F(1).
31 The Charter was solemnly proclaimed by representatives of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 7 December 2000 at the Nice European Council.
striking element is the emphasis on putting the individual at the centre of the EU’s affairs, evidence of the Union’s liberal inclination.

Most recently, the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty has attempted to establish what the EU stands for. It refers for example to the “cultural, humanist and religious inheritance of Europe” (European Union 2004a: 3). Much debate was waged at the time on whether to mention explicitly Europe’s Christian heritage, but it was eventually decided to maintain the less controversial reference to religion in general. Consequently, it can be said that the Union does not regard itself as an exclusively Christian club, at least on paper. Moreover, many of the elements that Delanty criticised in his description of European identity are present. One cannot but retain the image that the European Union sees itself as the moral vanguard of the world. There is again the mention of “the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” (European Union 2004a: 3), which are said to derive from the European heritage mentioned above. Next to that, “Europe [...] intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity [...] to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world” (European Union 2004a: 3). The theme of being united in diversity is elaborated upon as well. The Member States are “[convinced] that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny” (European Union 2004a: 3). The Treaty of Lisbon, however, only retains the reference to the universal values that stem from Europe’s inheritance, as amendment to the preamble of the Treaty on European Union (European Union 2007).

Summing up, the European Union perceives itself as built on a common heritage of a cultural, religious and humanist kind, but does not make it concrete. Nevertheless, this general legacy of a historically unique experience has led to a set of values that are both indivisible and universal. These values are then seen as the true foundations of the Union and conversely as building blocks of European identity. The problem with these values is, however, that they lack the specificity that could encourage popular

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32 Its official name is Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, once again indicating the EU’s ambition to represent the whole of Europe.

33 See for instance “Christianity bedevils talks on EU treaty” (The Guardian 25/05/2004).

34 Italics added.

35 The Charter of Fundamental Rights formed an integral part of the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon does not include it, but contains a reference, Article 1(8), that gives it the legal status of a Treaty (European Union 2007: 13).
identification. The other side of the coin, just as seen on the real euros, is Europe’s
diversity, which is also perceived as an integral part of European identity.36 This
diversity corresponds to the multiculturalism propagated by Delanty and Kastoryano
and is perhaps more fertile ground for the construction of European identity. It is
precisely the absence of one dominant culture that sets Europe apart from nation states,
even pluralistic ones, like the United States.

The theoretical concepts and arguments surveyed above will guide the empirical
analysis presented in the next chapters of the EU’s Europeanisation of Serbia. While the
framework by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier helps situate this thesis within research
on Europeanisation, connecting to Wendt’s constructivism and Neumann’s more critical
approach helps locate it within the field of IR. Specifically, Wendt’s causal theory on
collective identity formation will be the lens through which the Europeanisation of
Serbia is analysed by focussing on representations and the four causes for the formation
of collective identity, a collective European identity in this case. The examination of
national identity, nationalism and European identity has served furthermore to show
how both national and European identity have been used to separate rather than link
people, a practice any study on the use of identity should be aware of. Extending a
European identity to Serbia should not end up simply providing a substitute for the
nationalistic behaviour of the past. In that case, European identity would just be a new
collective identity that leads to radical othering, violence and Euro-nationalism, which
would defeat both the goals of the EU and the purpose of promoting collective identity
formation between the EU and Serbia. Awareness of the functioning of collective
identity in nationalism is a first and indispensable step to prevent this from happening.

36 For those not familiar with the single currency, the coins have one side that is the same for all countries,
and one side that varies with the state issuing the currency.
CHAPTER 3: REPRESENTATIONS OF SERBIA

This chapter analyses the empirics of Europeanisation as a form of collective identity formation in the case of Serbia, focussing on the period from June 2000 to May 2009. This will be accomplished by using Wendt’s model as presented in the previous chapter. The object of this analysis are in the first place the representations the EU presents of Serbia. Does it cast Serbia as a friend, an enemy, or something in between? Moreover, to what extent does a collective European identity play a role in these representations? This section will throughout also consider what this implies for the EU’s own identity, as representations of the Other have consequences for the perception of the Self as well. The nature of these representations will be established by performing a discourse analysis of EU policy documents. The first section of the chapter below will elaborate on the methodology employed.

Wendt moreover proposes that interdependence, a common fate and homogeneity, coupled with self-restraint, lead to friendly representations and pro-social policies and hence to collective identity formation. Therefore, these four factors will be a second set of objects of analysis. An assessment will be provided of whether Wendt’s theory holds in this particular case. Criticisms on Wendt’s lack of attention for the domestic sphere are addressed in chapter four, as that chapter concentrates on how Serbians react to the EU’s representations.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

*Reconciling a constructivist ontology with poststructuralist methodology*

The methodology used for the empirical analysis of EU discourse on Serbia has been mainly drawn from a book by Lene Hansen (2006), *Security as Practice*. This methodology is used as the means to establish which representations are made of Serbia in EU policy documents. A problem however is that Wendt’s theory, as elaborated in the previous chapter, and Hansen’s discourse theory do not derive from the same ontology. Wendt’s constructivist ontology sees ideational and material factors as existing side by side; they are related, yet in certain situations the former are more important, in others the latter. He argues as follows:

37 Sometimes this stance is described as light constructivism (Hansen 2006).
The point is that the real world consists of a lot more than material forces as such. Unlike a potentially more radical constructivist position I do not deny the existence and independent causal powers of those forces, but I do think they are less important and interesting than the contexts of meaning that human beings construct around them (Wendt 1999: 136).  

A more radical viewpoint is taken by Hansen, who argues that “for poststructuralism neither ideas nor materiality have a meaningful presence separate from each other” (Hansen 2006: 22). Material conditions are but one part of discourse, inseparable from ideas and identities in an ontological sense.

These different ontologies are reflected in the authors’ epistemological thinking about causality. Wendt for instance attributes causal powers to interdependence when it comes to the creation of collective identity, albeit in combination with other factors (Wendt 1999: 344). He furthermore claims that the representations of Others that are an integral part of foreign policy directly influence the nature of our relations with them, whether we identify them as friend or foe (Wendt 1999: 341). Again, this indicates a causal relationship. Hansen however argues that foreign policy and identity are mutually constitutive and that it is therefore impossible to speak of a causal relationship between the two (Hansen 2006: 17). Our own collective identity is both a product of foreign policy discourse and simultaneously the foundation on which foreign policy is built.  

If a subject like the EU considers democracy to be at the core of its identity, then this is likely to figure in its foreign policy as well. Yet, at the same time, stressing the importance of democracy at the international stage reflects back upon the EU, and this element of its identity is strengthened.

How to reconcile these two views then? Wendt’s focus on representations begs for a discourse analysis that explores these depictions. His view of discourse, albeit implicit in his writing, is less encompassing than Hansen’s and he sees a separate role for materiality. Nevertheless, as their ontological positions are reconcilable in the sense that both accord importance to ideational factors, this does not necessarily need to have repercussions for the methodology of executing a discourse analysis. Especially if

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38 Italics in the original.
39 Campbell (1992) has for instance described the importance of the adversarial representation of the Soviet Union for the construction of American identity.
40 See also Sedelmeier (2003) for the role of the practice of enlargement in the construction of EU identity and its influence on EU foreign policy.
41 It is telling that the index to his Social Theory of International Politics does not have an entry for discourse; yet, this is exactly the sphere where representations are manufactured.
we consider the analysis of foreign policy to methodologically entail “investigating empirically the constructions of identity and the formulations of policy within a given debate” (Hansen 2006: 30), it is possible to use Hansen’s methodology of reading in this thesis.

**A methodology of reading**

Hansen argues that any reading of identity construction should “begin by identifying those terms that indicate a clear construction of the Other [...] or of the Self” (Hansen 2006: 41-2). These terms or signs are then juxtaposed and divided into privileged and undervalued signs. In the context for instance of Western foreign policy towards Iran, the privileged sign of ‘secular’ is attributed to the West, while the undervalued sign of ‘religious’, or even ‘fundamentalist’, is part of the construction of Iran. The analysis should then establish which signs are used and how they are coupled to achieve a stable discourse. This coupling takes place through processes of linking and differentiation.42 As described above, the marker ‘secular’ is differentiated from the marker ‘religious’, while simultaneously, ‘secular’ is e.g. linked to freedom and ‘religious’ to oppression. As such, discourses produce a web of signs that represents the identity of the Self and the Other. The analysis of these processes of linking and differentiation exposes “how discourses seek to construct stability, where they become unstable, how they can be deconstructed, and the processes through which they change” (Hansen 2006: 44-5).43 It is possible to draw a parallel here to the distinction that Wendt makes between representing the Other as a friend or as an enemy. In case the Other is cast as a friend, linking processes dominate. In the opposite case, however, differentiation processes are prevailing.

Next to these processes, Hansen presents three analytical lenses to be used together with the dimension of linking and differentiation. These lenses are equivalent to the three aspects of identity along which political communities are constructed. The first element is spatiality, i.e. the construction of boundaries. Differences are made both in concrete space, as with national territory, and in the abstract, as with savages or heathens (Hansen 2006: 47). Second is the temporal aspect, or the conception of the possibilities

42 Hansen has based these processes on the logics of equivalence and difference that were developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 128-30). See also Hansen (2006: 222 fn. 1); Torfing (2005: 14-7) presents an overview of Laclau and Mouffe’s key arguments.

43 It must be noted that this thesis focuses mainly on how a stable discourse on Serbia is constructed and rather less on deconstructing this discourse, although weaknesses in it will be touched upon.
for change and progress. The third dimension centres on ethicality: the responsibility that policies carry. The debate around the concept of the responsibility to protect is an example of this dimension. The combination of a certain representation with its analysis along these three dimensions yields a basic discourse, i.e., an analytical tool to provide structure to representations. For example, the two basic discourses Hansen (2006) has identified with respect to the Western debate about the Bosnian war are, one the one hand, a Balkan discourse and, on the other, a Genocide discourse.

Another important concept in discourse analysis is intertextuality, which holds that “[t]he meaning of a text is [...] never fully given by the text itself but is always a product of other readings and interpretations” (Hansen 2006: 55). It is therefore imperative to examine the references, both implicit and explicit, that are made also in foreign policy texts. The intertextual focus of this thesis will be on official discourse and texts. The backbone of this discourse is formed by the policy documents the European Commission compiles annually. These range from individual reports on Serbia to more general reports on enlargement and the Western Balkans. These regularly published publications are the following:

- Communication on Enlargement Strategy (2005-2008);
- Communication on Western Balkans (2003, 2006, 2008);

Moreover, when references were made to other documents, these were analysed as well. Examples include presidency conclusions of the European Council, conclusions of the Council of the European Union, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the

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44 The concept of intertextuality was coined by Kristeva (1980).
45 The European Parliament also produces reports on Serbia and has its own rapporteur for the country, currently Mr. Jelko Kacin. Parliament documents have not been analysed here due to both time constraints and its lower profile in this matter. Moreover, references to parliamentary documents are only sparingly made by the Commission.
46 In 2002 the report was written on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), while between 2003 and 2006, reports were written on the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In these cases, the emphasis of the analysis has been on the sections concerning Serbia and the Federal Republic/State Union as a whole. Montenegro declared independence on 3 June 2006; from that date onwards, separate reports were published for both states.
Thessaloniki Declaration and Agenda of June 2003. Additionally, an analysis was made of speeches given by EU officials and commissioners. These were retrieved from the website of the Commission Delegation in Serbia, covering the period from 24 January 2005 to 29 May 2009. Finally, my interview with Mr. Alberto Cammarata, Head of the European Integration and Economic Section of the aforementioned Delegation, will form an integral part of this analysis as well. All the above constitute the key texts of this discourse analysis. The period of analysis ranges from June 2000, during the run-up to Milošević’s downfall, to May 2009, the date of the above-mentioned interview.

Following the requirements of intertextuality, it is necessary to read these texts in relation to a wider frame of general material, such as editorials, parliamentary debates and academic texts (Hansen 2006: 82). Ideally, for instance, a reading of Financial Times editorials and articles and the debates in the European Parliament would need to be included. However, a Master’s thesis knows its limitations; therefore, readings of general material have been focussed on Serbia itself, as acquiring this information was also necessary for the following chapter. Background information on Serbian politics, society and culture in more general terms has been acquired from Ramet and Pavlaković (2005), Seierstad (2006) and various interviews held in Belgrade in May 2009. Although these sources are primarily relevant for the following chapter, the discourse analysis conducted in this chapter also requires knowledge of the wider Serbian background. This material includes, moreover, all articles within the category ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ on the website of B92, a well-known Serbian broadcaster that also publishes its articles in English. These articles range from the period of 24 April 2006 to 16 September 2009. Some of them are also part of the key texts for this analysis, as they contain statements of and interviews with protagonists of the discourse, such as Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn.

A full intertextual analysis would furthermore include a reading of older text, such as conceptual histories, that shed light on the genealogy of concepts used today. The analysis of national identity, European identity and the EU’s conception of a European identity, as carried out in the previous chapter, can be seen in this light. Having discussed methodological concerns, the following section will first present a

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47 The Council of the European Union (or Council of Ministers) will henceforth be referred to as the Council, whereas the European Council will be referred to as such.

48 The Financial Times may be considered the most authoritative English-language newspaper on the European Union. In order to be more comprehensive, one would need to include newspapers in other languages as well, such as Le Monde or Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
general picture of a basic discourse that depicts Serbia as a learner, after which the separate markers that compose this discourse will be examined.

SERBIA REPRESENTED

Serbia as a learner
A reading of the EU policy documents on Serbia makes clear that Serbia is in general represented as a learner, a student or a pupil. It is a country on the road towards obtaining a certain diploma, the prize of EU membership. By casting Serbia as such, the EU ipso facto takes upon itself the role of teacher and tutor, an entity that knows what is good for you and how to proceed. Students however can take on various characteristics. The EU, through its policy documents, attributes to Serbia certain features, the juxtaposed signs that Hansen distinguishes. Serbia is first seen as ultimately carrying its own responsibility for the progress it makes. Yet, it is also in need of a stimulus to move ahead because it is sometimes perceived as a reluctant learner. Serbia as a peripheral student is moreover in search of its own identity. Nevertheless, both teacher and student are building upon shared values. These have already been fully incorporated by the teacher, whereas the student is still in the process of internalising them.

Opposite these markers are the signs that identify the EU as a teacher vis-à-vis Serbia, i.e. the processes that differentiate them. The EU is enthusiastic about Serbia becoming a member state, but it can in the end not be held accountable or responsible for the result. Serbia is moreover stimulated through the provision of guidance and support. The EU expectations are therefore that Serbia will eventually join the mainstream of Europe, embodied by the EU, despite its current odyssey (see figure 2).

The processes of linking and differentiation that figure in the EU representation of Serbia are to be supplemented by an analysis based on spatiality, temporality and ethicality. The basic discourse of the EU locates Serbia within Europe, but not yet completely, as it is still to become a part of the European mainstream. Serbia’s current location is only half in Europe, as the EU (and by extension Europe) is seen as primarily built on values, and Serbia is only in the process of adopting these shared values. The temporal dimension of this discourse is consequently that it is possible for Serbia to change. Its explicit goal is even a transformation from student to being part of the club

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49 See Neumann (1996) on the idea of Russia as an unwilling learner.
of teachers. In the ethical sense furthermore, the EU accepts responsibility, yet only up to a certain point. It recognises the duty to provide assistance and support, yet states, in the best tradition of liberal ideology, that ultimate responsibility for its destiny rests with Serbia itself. Support is furthermore conditional upon progress made. The following section will elaborate upon the markers that constitute this basic discourse.

![Diagram of responsibilities and values between Serbia and the European Union](image)

**Figure 2:** The representation of Serbia and its implications for the EU, based conceptually on Hansen (2006: 42).

**Own responsibility**

Already from the beginning of the period analysed, the EU emphasises Serbia’s own responsibility. The Thessaloniki agenda, as adopted by the Council on 16 June 2003, formulates this as follows: “The EU stresses that the pace of further movement of the Western Balkan countries towards the EU lies in their own hands and will depend on each country’s performance in implementing reforms” (Council 2003a: 12). The Commission’s Feasibility Report furthermore mentions “the authorities’ responsibility to comply with the political and economic criteria of the Stabilisation and Association process” (Commission 2005a: 3). 50 Serbian responsibility is moreover stressed during Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn’s speech on the event of the ceremonial opening of negotiations on the SAA. During this address, he leaves no doubt about the fact that progress on the negotiations will depend exclusively on the Serbian and Montenegrin side, as the Commission has already gone through this process on multiple occasions.

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50 The Feasibility Report assesses the readiness of Serbia and Montenegro to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Words in bold type have been replaced with italics.
He then outlines a number of directions that would allow easing the negotiations and concludes by saying ‘[w]e will proceed as fast as you allow us to go’ (Rehn 2005a: n.p.). Later on, the Commission stresses however that this is not solely the responsibility of the Serbian authorities. In the Enlargement Strategy for 2008/2009, it comments on the countries of the Western Balkans:

> The EU should be ready to accelerate their pre-accession preparations […]. However, ultimately progress on the way towards membership lies in the hands of the people of the region and their leaders, as its pace depends on each country's achievements in adopting the necessary reforms (Commission 2008a: 8).

The populations of these states are thus held directly co-responsible for their countries’ progress. The interview with Mr. Cammarata affirmed that the progress already made by Serbia does not signify the inevitability of EU membership, but that it continues to be the responsibility of the Serbian authorities.

Next to that, the framework of the European Partnership establishes certain responsibilities that Serbia needs to accept if it wants to make progress. The partnership’s purpose is “to identify priorities for action in order to support efforts to move closer to the European Union within a coherent frame” (European Union 2004b: 22). The Council states then that “the competent authorities in Serbia and Montenegro should develop a plan with a timetable and details in terms of measures Serbia and Montenegro intends to take to this end” (European Union 2004b: 21).

It is no large surprise that the priorities listed in the annex are provided in the imperative, such as “[l]iberalise remaining prices and remove administrative controls” and “[s]peed up the restructuring, privatisation and/or liquidation of large socially- and State owned enterprises” (European Union 2004b: 25). The Annual Reports become a kind of grade lists that assess the progress made with respect to these priorities, not unlike the report cards with which teachers regularly provide their students. The bulk of the financial assistance Serbia receives through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is connected to the priorities in the European Partnership.

Together, the statements above bear witness to the fact that the EU never fails to mention Serbia’s own responsibility when discussing progress in the Stabilisation and

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51 Especially in the Serbian case this is a valid argument. A bigger mandate for the larger pro-European parties would make passing laws easier, as they would have to rely less on smaller coalition partners.

52 Italics added.
Association Process (SAP). It is one of the most pervasive signs in the representations of Serbia made by the EU.

**Reluctance and the need for stimulation**

As the EU emphasises that advancing in the accession process depends to a large extent solely on Serbia, and not on itself, it is quick to attribute any lack of progress to Serbia’s reluctance and unwillingness. Nevertheless, it concedes to the existence of mitigating factors, such as the recent economic and financial crisis. Thus, the Commission states in the Stabilisation and Association Report of 2003 that:

> Progress on many issues has been slow [...]. [M]echanisms and occasionally willingness is partly lacking […] to ensure that reforms are compatible with European standards […] Such actions risk distance from the EU rather than rapprochement and may indicate a slowing of reform momentum (Commission 2003a: 36).53

The Commission summarises that

> EU efforts, even on the scale of recent years, cannot substitute for a lack of political will within the state. Only with full commitment and co-operation within the state, and decisive action to pick up the pace of reform, will the state be able to make the necessary progress (Commission 2003a: 1).

The reluctant Serbian stance that speaks from these fragments can be found as well in the Report of the subsequent year. The EU had always stressed Serbia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), but in the 2004 Stabilisation and Association Report, it concludes that “[c]ooperation with ICTY is seriously deficient” (Commission 2004: 2). It argues moreover that “[t]he country’s clear EU perspective […] has not yet become the determining framework of reference for many decision-makers, both at state and republican level” (Commission 2004: 30). More recently, reluctance is mainly associated with the failure to cooperate fully with the ICTY, i.e. to extradite the accused Radovan Karadžić, Goran Hadžić and Ratko Mladić. Lack of cooperation was cited for instance as the reason to suspend negotiations on the SAA in May 2006 (Commission 2006a: 4-5). In this light, the arrest and extradition of Radovan Karadžić was hailed by Xavier Solana, Secretary General of the

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53 Emphasis in the original.
Council, saying that the “new Serbian government has proven its firm devotion to European values” (B92 22/07/2008: n.p.). So instead of reluctance the EU now speaks about firm devotion. Nevertheless, this extradition did not change the situation much as, at the instigation of the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Belgium, the SAA remained suspended. 54 Commissioner Rehn has acknowledged Serbian disappointment about this apparent lack of appreciation for Karadžić’s arrest and extradition (B92 05/09/2008). To this date, the Netherlands continues to block the unfreezing of the SAA on its own.

Unwillingness or reluctance is consequently the image that takes root. Nonetheless, this is interpreted by the Commission as rather a reason for support and guidance than a reason to stand aloof. In its first Communication on the Western Balkans, the Commission mentions “the European Union’s determination to continue to support [the Western Balkans] in their efforts to realise their European aspirations” (Commission 2003b: 2). Next to that, the EU foreign ministers promise during a joint forum with their Western Balkan colleagues that “[t]he EU will continue to do its utmost to support the efforts of the countries of the region in moving closer to the Union. Available instruments will be geared towards this objective” (Council 2003b: 3). This promise builds on the Thessaloniki Declaration of earlier that year, in which “[t]he EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” (Council 2003c: 2). The Commission sees the European Partnership as an important instrument in this respect, as it “will continue to be a key tool for guiding Serbia and Montenegro’s efforts to move closer to the EU” (Commission 2005b: 59).

The priorities articulated in these Partnerships are thus intended to guide Serbia towards the EU, that is, to influence Serbia’s legislative agenda in order to make it more compatible with the acquis. The most convincing instance of the readiness of EU support is articulated in the preamble to the SAA. It states that the Parties take account of the Community's willingness to provide decisive support for the implementation of reform and to use all available instruments of cooperation and technical, financial and economic assistance on a comprehensive […] basis to this endeavour (European Union 2008a: 7). 55

54 The SAA, which would introduce for the first time contractual relations between the EU and Serbia, is currently still suspended. It has been signed by all parties, and ratified by Serbia, but the EU governments will only submit it to their parliaments for ratification once Serbia is judged to cooperate fully with the ICTY (Council 2008).

55 Italics added.
Serbia is thus offered essentially all the support it could wish for. One could only wonder whether withholding ratification of the agreement itself amounts to providing this decisive support.

It becomes clear from the above that reluctance is another of the markers attributed to Serbia. One could argue that Serbia is factually reluctant and that its description is therefore as such. Nevertheless, one could also comment that, given the difficult semi-authoritarian regime Serbia is emerging from, its modest progress is actually quite an achievement. The more important issue is accordingly not Serbia’s actual behaviour, but the manner in which it is represented, and that is as a reluctant learner. However, despite its reluctance, Serbia can rejoice that the EU presents itself as ready to provide its full support.

In search of identity
In its publications, the EU recognises that Serbia is emerging from a difficult situation, although this is not regarded as an apology for its reluctance. It does acknowledge this past and the sense of being lost that it created. The 2002 Stability and Association Report, the first one of this kind on Serbia, notes in this respect that “[t]he ‘classical’ problems of a country in transition are [...] compounded by unsolved issues of constitutional status” (Commission 2002: 3) and mentions “the ever-present and overriding complexity of the situation within the country” (Commission 2002: 5). Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić was seen by the EU as someone who had made a clear choice for Serbia’s future. He is described as a man “who courageously worked to build democracy and played a key role in bringing Serbia out of its isolation” (Commission 2003a: 1). His murder, which took place on 12 March 2003, is commented upon as being “a reminder of the difficult legacy of the past” (Commission 2003a: 1). Yet, the EU is resolved to haul Serbia out of its peripheral position and bring it into the so-called European mainstream. The preamble to the SAA confirms this, as it considers “the European Union’s readiness to integrate Serbia to the fullest possible extent into the political and economic mainstream of Europe” (European Union 2008a: 5). Next to that, the Commission’s Enlargement Strategy for 2006/2007 mentions that “[t]he EU is also working to bring the Serbian people into the European mainstream through visa

56 In 2002 Serbia and Montenegro together still formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. De facto, there was no clear-cut division of competences between the federal and the republican level. This problem was moreover compounded by uncertainty over the status of Kosovo (Commission 2002).
facilitation” (Commission 2006b: 14). Yet, the EU also wants popular confirmation that its efforts are appreciated, that the Serbs choose for the European mainstream. It argues in this respect that “[t]he presidential elections held in February 2008 confirmed Serbia's European aspirations” (Commission 2008b: 6). At the time of publication of this report in March 2008, however, Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, and its subsequent recognition by the majority of EU members, soured relations between the EU and Serbia. Therefore, in the conclusion to this report, the Commission “calls on Serbia to reaffirm its commitment to a future within the European Union” (Commission 2008b: 21). The EU obtained what it wanted, as a report in the autumn of 2008 is able to conclude that “[f]ollowing presidential and parliamentary elections, Serbia has renewed its commitments to a European future based on shared values” (Commission 2008a: 4).\(^57\) Nevertheless this was hardly a full-blown victory or rock-fast commitment. In November the 2007, the Commission had already stated that:

> In Serbia, despite the victory of democratic forces in the parliamentary elections and the formation of a reform-oriented government, extremist parties and nationalist rhetoric remain strong and affect negatively the overall political climate. Democratic forces are fragile (Commission 2007: 6).\(^58\)

Moreover, one year later it comments that this climate prevails and that “[p]arliamentary activities were affected by deep divisions between political parties on key policy issues” (Commission 2008c: 7). The Commission realises that a majority of Serbian citizens is in favour of the European choice, but that this is not an overwhelming majority and that Serbia remains searching. Mr. Cammarata confirmed that the political spectrum in Serbia is split, although he observes that the potential basis for a political consensus on European integration has improved, due to e.g. a split in the Serb Radical Party (SRS).\(^59\) Nevertheless, one cannot speak about a consolidated support that is beyond any doubt. Serbian nationalistic opposition may still attract those that are loosing from Serbia’s ongoing transition.

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\(^{57}\) Parliamentary elections were held on 11 May 2008 after Serbia’s government collapsed due to rows over how to reconcile European integration with the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by most EU members. The EU did its part in influencing the elections by offering to sign the SAA. This was refused by Prime Minister Koštunica, but President Tadić and Deputy Prime Minister Delić signed anyway on 29 April 2008 (B92 02/05/2008).

\(^{58}\) This reform-oriented government would thus prove unable to withstand Kosovo’s declaration of independence (see previous footnote).

\(^{59}\) The SRS is led by Vojislav Šešelj, who is currently on trial at the ICTY. The party split over the issue of ratification of the SAA. Šešelj was against this, while his deputy leader Tomislav Nikolić was in favour. Nikolić then founded the Serb Progressive Party (SNS) (B92 08/09/2008).
In his speeches and during interviews directed at a Serbian public, Commissioner Rehn focuses specifically on the choice he believes Serbia needs to make. This choice is represented as choosing between, on the one hand, the nationalism of wars and violence, i.e. staying in the past, and, on the other hand, a choice for Europeanisation, the integration of Serbia in the European mainstream or in short, a choice for the future. In January 2005 he argues for instance that “[f]undamentally, [Serbian politicians] have to choose between a nationalist past and a European future” (Rehn 2005c: n.p.). Later on, he argues that “[i]t is high time for Serbia to turn the page on its painful past, and fully approach its European future” (Rehn 2007: n.p.). These statements resurface in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2008. He is quoted as follows: “Serbia again approaches a crucial decision at the May 11 elections, and the Serbian people have to choose if they want to head for a European future, or to expose themselves to the danger of self-isolation”, adding the hope that “Serbia will choose Europe” (B92 14/04/08).

Serbia is consequently represented not only as a reluctant pupil, but also as a country that has not yet made an unambiguous choice regarding its future, a country without a clear sense of direction. One gathers the impression that a relapse to nationalism is not quite impossible. What should be seen as beyond questioning in the discourse, however, are the EU’s willingness and commitment to guide Serbia into the European mainstream, provided that Serbia makes the right choice.

Shared values

An important constituent element of this mainstream are shared European values. The insistence on values is a process that simultaneously links and differentiates Serbia and the EU. On the one hand, a link is made, since the values mentioned are the same for both parties. On the other hand, their difference is that the EU claims to have fully internalised these values, whereas Serbia is thought to not have achieved this yet. The importance of shared values is paramount in a lecture held by Commissioner Rehn at the University of Novi Sad in 2005. He argues that:

Accession is about taking European values into the fabric of daily life. Our core values are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities. They constitute the nucleus of the European way of life, and they are pre-conditions for closer relations with the EU (Rehn 2005b: n.p.).
The fact that a reference to internalising European values is present in two other speeches made that year testifies to its relevance in the Commissioner’s eyes (Rehn 2005c, 2005d). Another fragment explains this further:

I am often asked where Europe’s ultimate borders lie. My answer is that the map of Europe is defined in the mind, not just on the ground. Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe. Enlargement is a matter of extending the zone of European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rehn 2005c: n.p.).

Rehn is not the only commissioner to venture into the realm of values. Commission President Barroso also refers to values as forming the cornerstone of the European Union in an address to the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro (Barroso 2006). During our interview, Mr. Cammarata also insisted that the process of European integration is one of sharing values, next to rules and best practices.

The statements by Rehn spell out that these values may be shared in principle, but that they need to be genuinely incorporated before membership can be realised. On other occasions, however, this distinction is not made. The Thessaloniki Declaration of 21 June 2003 states for instance the following:

We all share the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, solidarity and a market economy, fully aware that they constitute the very foundations of the European Union” (Council 2003c: 1).

This statement consequently does not differentiate between the countries of the EU and those of the Western Balkans. Such a declaration, however, made by the Heads of State or Government, is by nature rather about good intentions than concerned with factual implementation. The SAA between the EU and Serbia does not make a distinction either. The preamble considers “the strong links between the Parties and the values they share” (European Union 2008a: 4), which Art. 2 then enunciates as follows:

Respect for democratic principles and human rights […], respect for principles of international law, including full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the rule of law as well as the principles of market economy […], shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement (European Union 2008a: 11).
Nonetheless, in its Enlargement Strategy papers, the Commission states indirectly that these values have not been internalised yet by applicant countries. It comments that “[t]he perspective of moving to the next stage in relations with the Union is a powerful incentive for countries to transform themselves and to adopt EU standards and values” (Commission 2005c: 3). If aspiring member states need incentives to adopt certain values, that means in effect that they have not yet incorporated them.

Altogether, the EU and Serbia are mostly represented as in principle sharing the same values, such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Nevertheless, practicing these values in everyday life is a different matter, and this is what the Serbs are still learning in the view of the European Union. The EU conversely considers itself the best teacher in this respect. A critical note might be made here, as focussing too much on the inadequacies of other countries and boasting about own standards, however, could blind the EU’s eyes for shortcomings at home, such as concerns over press freedom in Italy, judicial independence in France or discrimination of women in the Netherlands.60

Presence of a European identity in representing Serbia

The basic discourse described above does not make reference to a collective European identity. Shared values are ubiquitous, however, although these are not explicitly connected to a European identity. Nonetheless, the previous section and the theoretical framework in chapter two have demonstrated that these shared values, such as freedom, equality and democracy, are indeed perceived by the European Union as part of its identity. Consequently, a reference to shared values can be considered as an indirect evocation of European identity.

This indirectness does not mean, however, that there is no mention at all of Serbia being part of a larger European collective. These instances are rather infrequent and therefore cannot form a part of the basic discourse that pervades all EU policy publications on Serbia. Yet, there are occasions where the Council and the European Council, or its representatives, use the metaphor of a family to depict Serbia as already being part of the European collective. The biblical parable of the prodigal son also

60 Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi owns three of the six largest Italian television channels and his government has political influence over two of the three others. French president Nicolas Sarkozy has named ‘guilty’ those accused in a lawsuit in which he is personally involved. The Netherlands knows a political party that refuses to submit women as candidates for political positions. These may seem like isolated incidents, but if they occurred in Serbia, they would certainly not go unnoticed by the EU.
springs to mind in this respect. It is noteworthy, however, that Commission reports have only once used this metaphor and that Commissioner Rehn has not used this wording in his speeches or interviews, at least insofar as this researcher has been able to ascertain. Yet, it was mentioned by Mr. Cammarata during my interview with him.

The family metaphor first emerges in the year 2000, during the run-up to the elections that would topple Slobodan Milošević. The presidency conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000 note that “a democratic, cooperative Serbia, living at peace with its neighbours, will be welcome to join the European family” (European Council 2000a: n.p.). The Heads of State or Government add that “[t]he European Council appeals to the Serbian people to take their future into their own hands and to reclaim their place in the family of democratic nations” (European Council 2000a: n.p.). The Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000 reiterates this claim. It confirms that “[a] democratic, cooperative FRY living in peace with its neighbours will be a welcome member of the European family of democratic nations” (European Council 2000b: n.p.).

These pronouncements seemed to give the Serbian people the impression that by voting against Milošević, Serbia would rather quickly become part of the European mainstream again, and perhaps the EU had genuinely expected this to happen. This has led to false expectations on both sides. On the one side, the EU had probably expected that Vojislav Koštunica, Milošević’s opponent, would be less nationalistic and more reform-minded.61 On the other side, the EU can be said to have stretched the meaning of the term cooperative to indicate having achieved a certain goal, i.e. having handed over all the indictees of the ICTY, instead of merely meaning being cooperative in trying to achieve that goal.62

A press release of the Council on the eve of the presidential elections is more unequivocal and directly addressed at the Serbian people. It states “[w]e will suggest to the FRY that it draw closer to the European Union so that it can occupy its rightful place in Europe. We have never forgotten that the Serbs are Europeans” (Council, 2000: n.p.). This latter phrase is obviously an example of a process linking the European Union and its population to the Serbs. It will not be a coincidence that these statements were uttered at this point in time. They are clearly support for the opposition against Milošević, as the

61 This was pointed out during my interview with Mrs. Sonja Biserko, Director of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.
62 Within the EU it is especially the Netherlands that defines cooperation as such.
EU asks Serbia to become the opposite of what it was under Milošević’s regime. The EU had already supported this opposition through e.g. its Common Position on the support to democratic forces in the FRY (European Union 1999).

The notion of a European family resurfaces at a press conference that was held in the wake of an informal meeting of EU and Western Balkan foreign ministers in Salzburg on 11 March 2006. Ursula Plassnik, the Austrian President of the Council, comments as follows on the accession process:

…und wir haben darüber auch eine sehr offene Debatte geführt heute, die durchaus auch […] kritisch war, von Frustrationen geprägt war, die aber trotzdem die Debatte einer europäischen Familie war (Council 2006).

Xavier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council, adds:

It has been a meeting of a completely different nature than the one that took place in Thessaloniki [on 21 June 2003]. We were now around the table, members of the same family, talking about the issues that members of a family talk about (Council 2006).

It must be highlighted that, in this instance, the Council representatives are speaking about the Western Balkan countries as a group rather than addressing Serbia individually. Nevertheless, by using this family metaphor, both Plassnik and Solana stress the collective identity the EU and Western Balkan states share as members of the European family, and this includes Serbia.

Another instance of this metaphor is found in the presidency conclusions of the European Council in Brussels of 14 December 2007. There it is stated that:

The European Council reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans lies within the European Union. It considered that a stable and prosperous Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations is important for the stability of the region (European Council 2007).

The statement implies, however, that Serbia is not yet completely integrated into this family. In September 2008, David Milliband, British foreign minister, adds to this that

63 “…and we have held a very open debate on this matter, a debate that was certainly also critical and characterised by frustration, but nonetheless the debate of a European family” (author’s translation).
64 Commissioner Rehn also spoke at the press conference, after the two other speakers. He did not refer to a European family, however.
Serbia has a place in the European family of nations, but that place doesn’t just depend on political, economic and cultural matters, but is closely interwoven with respect for European values, European conceptions of a legal state, and respect for human rights (quoted by B92 13/09/2008: n.p.).

The only occasion in which the Commission used this wording was in its 2008 Communication on the Western Balkans, in which it writes that “Serbia is also important for the stability of the region, which would benefit from a stable and prosperous Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations” (Commission 2008b: 6).

A collective European identity is moreover furthered by measures that the EU proposes in its policy documents. As chapter two described, the report of the 1985 Adonnino committee advocates more contacts between the citizens of member states in order to foster the strengthening of a European identity. In the same vein, the Council and the Commission commit themselves to promoting people-to-people contacts. A concept first mentioned in the context of Neighbourhood Policy (Council 2003a: VI-VII), it is applied to the Western Balkans in the Commission’s Enlargement Strategy for 2006-2007. The Commission writes that “[t]he EU will promote people-to-people contacts, both by making available more scholarships to students and researchers and by simplifying visa procedures” (Commission 2006b: 8). This message is reiterated in the 2007-2008 report (Commission 2007: 18), and the 2008 Communication on the Western Balkans reaffirms its importance:

Promoting people-to-people contacts between the Western Balkans and the EU is of paramount importance: citizens from the region acquire a better knowledge of the European Union, its values and its rules, and way of life. Contacts between the people of the Western Balkan countries help reconciliation (Commission 2008b: 8).

The promotion of people-to-people contacts can consequently be seen as a way of spreading European identity to Serbia and the Western Balkans.

The presence of European identity in the EU’s programmes and policies towards Serbia was also one of the topics in the interview with Mr. Cammarata. He argued that European identity should be seen as an overarching consideration, that integration is about sharing basic values and being part of a family. This is an image he argues should

65 Further research would be necessary to find out if there is any intentionality at work here. One might argue that the Commission would prefer one pan-European family to a family of European nations.
be taken into account when reading the annual progress reports of the Commission, which are by themselves rather technical. He holds the view that creating a European identity can even be considered as the overarching rationale for enlargement. Having a European identity is an assumption that is often taken for granted, yet it is an indispensable prerequisite for accession that Serbia conceives of itself as European. He added moreover that the identity of the EU should be seen not as static, but as evolving over time and changing with every round of enlargement. Therefore, Serbia itself will make a contribution to the EU’s identity on its road towards accession.

In relation to EU programmes in Serbia, Mr. Cammarata regards the presence of a vibrant civil society as contributing to the European identity of Serbia. Hence, projects supporting civil society organisations, both financially and morally, strengthen European identity. The Commission has for instance made available € 2.5 million for civil society support in Serbia through the IPA of 2008 (Delegation 2008: 1). Supplemented with programmes such as the European Initiative for Democratization and Human Rights, the total support amounts to more than € 6 million in 2008 (Commission 2008c: 6). Moreover, the Delegation in Serbia executes the Hello Europe programme, in which high-school youth answer questions on the EU and its member states in a television quiz (Delegation 2009a). According to Mr. Cammarata, this is a programme that produces a wide impact at small financial cost. It is intended to draw attention to what is beyond the borders of Serbia and to what Serbs and others in Europe share. Next to that, it should better prepare the Serbs for a future as EU citizen.

In sum, the conclusion is that a European identity is present in both EU policies and programmes, albeit in a rather implicit fashion. The interview with Mr. Cammarata has pointed out, at least insofar as he is representative for the Commission, that European identity is a consideration taken into account by the Commission and its officials. Nevertheless, the annual reports remain occupied with the more technical issues, also because identity is not part of, for instance, the Copenhagen criteria for membership. As it does not focus more explicitly on European identity, the EU in its policy towards Serbia has probably not taken note of, or disagrees with, the proposition of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier that the likelihood of rule adoption will increase as Serbia identifies more with the EU and Europe. Incorporating these views would imply for the EU to incorporate the promotion of European identity as an explicit goal.

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66 See the section on Europeanisation in Chapter 2.
of the enlargement process. Its policies could even focus first on identification with Europe and only in the second place on establishing a stable democracy and a functioning market economy, since increased identification would speed up the rule adoption necessary to attain these latter goals. However, making the promotion of European identity a principal and explicit focus for enlargement policy could also backfire. As chapter four will demonstrate for Serbia, it is likely that only a small part of potential member states’ societies identifies completely with a European identity. 67 Many of those in favour of accession would not hold this view if they believed accession would harm their national identity. Focussing excessively on a European identity would then decrease the support for membership and consequently the scope for rule adoption. Thus, the EU may in fact limit its insistence on identity because of these concerns; this is possibly an example of self-restraint, which will be discussed further below. The next section will begin by considering how the EU’s representations fit into the model developed by Alexander Wendt.

**WENDT’S MODEL APPLIED**

*Between friend and enemy*

The discourse analysis of the previous section has described that the EU represents Serbia as a somewhat reluctant learner in its discourse on that country. Returning to Wendt’s causal theory on collective identity formation, the question arises where to situate this representation within it. Wendt presents a spectrum ranging from casting the Other as a friend to casting him as an enemy. Obviously, Serbia as a learner is more like a friend than like an enemy, which becomes clear when considering the separate elements of this basic discourse. The EU giving support to Serbia already indicates that it is closer to being a friend than to representing an enemy, as states do not tend to support their enemies willingly. Moreover, the insistence on shared values is a sign of emphasising those processes that link Serbia and the EU rather than those that differentiate them from each other. If the EU did not think that Serbia could become like it, at least in the medium-term future, it would not have designated the country as a potential candidate state. 68 Next to that, the use of the family metaphor indicates that, occasionally, Serbia is even regarded as something closer than a friend, a family

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67. This percentage may even be smaller in existing member states.
68. This is probably where Morocco’s application for membership in 1987 failed.

64
member. Yet on the other hand, one can choose one’s friends, but not one’s family, and that is why the EU is doing its best to nudge Serbia in its direction. Altogether, this means that Serbia’s representation is situated on the friend-side of the spectrum.

Wendt’s model then implies that casting Serbia as a learner friendly to the Self will be accompanied with pro-social policies, most importantly in the form of cooperation. An example of a policy that falls under this category is the simplification of visa procedures and lowering visa fees. Moreover, the EU is about to abolish the Schengen area visa requirements for Serb nationals (Commission 2009a). This is clearly a step that is of great importance to Serbians, but that is not directly in the self-interest, narrowly defined, of the EU, as it might increase concerns over security. A second example is the provision of financial support, either to the state or to society directly. As described above, the EU provides funds to Serbia through e.g. IPA, which allocated €190.9 million to Serbia in 2008 (Commission 2008c: 6). Moreover, the Commission granted €100 million in budget support to the Serbian government out of IPA funds in July 2009 (Delegation 2009b).

Furthermore, Wendt describes power and dependency relations as having an influence on casting the Other and on the policies towards it. The power asymmetry between Serbia and the EU is reflected both in the EU’s representation of Serbia and in the nature of its pro-social policies, which should come as no surprise since Wendt argues that representation and policies are essentially two sides of the same coin. The relationship between a teacher and a student is evidently marked by their difference in experience and knowledge. Besides that, teachers have the power to impose rules upon their pupils and to enforce them, such as by establishing deadlines or making them write lines. This power is mirrored by the fact that all support provided by the EU is subject to conditionality, which is described by the Council as follows:

Assistance to the Western Balkan countries is conditional on progress on satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and on meeting the specific priorities of this European Partnership. Failure to respect these conditions could lead the Council to take appropriate measures (European Union 2008b: 48).

Thus, it becomes clear that Serbia is not in the position to make many demands. In fact, Serbian progress towards membership is currently mostly dependent on the Dutch verdict over its cooperation with the ICTY. This leaves no doubts about Serbia’s position in this process.
A further important prediction of Wendt’s model is that representations will be mirrored by those who are represented in them, i.e. that Serbia will in fact behave as a reluctant student because it is cast as such. Although it is difficult to validate this claim, it may have important consequences for the way the EU treats aspiring members, given they are represented in a similar fashion. It would imply that, because Serbia is represented as a reluctant student, it is less involved in the enlargement process and, complemented with the dependency relation, that it will come to react only in response to external pressure, rather than being driven by an intrinsic motivation. The danger is then that Serbia changes only superficially, while the EU’s goal is to induce changes to the deeper fabric of society.

Wendt’s model predicts moreover that interdependence, a common fate and/or homogeneity between Serbia and the EU, coupled with self-restraint on both sides, have a causal impact on the representations which Serbia and the EU make of each other and the policies they carry out. These then determine the chances for the formation of a collective identity. If at least one of the first three variables and self-restraint are present, this will increase the likelihood of pro-social policies. The following analysis will assess the state of these four variables in the relations between Serbia and the EU.

Interdependence
A first statistic that may be used to gauge the interdependence of Serbia and the EU is trade data. Thereafter a second statistic, on foreign direct investment (FDI) will be examined. The trade figures make clear that the bulk of Serbian exports has an EU member as destination and that the majority of imports is obtained from within the EU (see figures 3 and 4). It stands out that the other Western Balkans countries are also an important export market for Serbia, but that this is not reflected to the same extent on the import side. Notably, the Western Balkan countries, together with Moldova, form the parties to the Central European Free Trade Agreement. Combining the percentages for the EU and the Western Balkans, more than 88 percent of Serbia’s exports had a destination in these countries in 2007. The most significant countries in this respect were Italy and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The interview with Mr. Cammarata and several B92 articles indicated that some politicians in Serbia see Russia as an alternative to the current European economic orientation. Nevertheless, at least where trade is concerned, Serbia is far more integrated with the EU and its immediate neighbours than with Russia. Yet, imports from Russia
are considerable and almost six times the value of exports.\textsuperscript{69} This is most probably related to Serbian energy imports from that country, which make Russia the single largest exporter to Serbia, leaving Germany and Italy behind. The energy issues will return in discussing the common fate of the EU and Serbia. In sum, with respect to trade, it can be concluded that Serbia and the EU are interdependent, although it should be remarked that this interdependence is asymmetric.

What is then the picture that the data on FDI paint? As table 1 shows, 82 percent of all foreign direct investment in Serbia from 2000 to 2008 came from countries that are currently in the EU.\textsuperscript{70} It indicates furthermore that Russia is only a marginal investor in the Serbian economy.\textsuperscript{71} Next to that, Serbia invests more in other Western Balkan countries than the other way around.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Pos. & Country                  & $ value (x 1000) & \% of total \\
\hline
1   & Austria                  & 2.633.585       & 21,4\%   \\
2   & Greece                   & 1.687.437       & 13,7\%   \\
3   & Norway                   & 1.556.700       & 12,6\%   \\
4   & Germany                  & 1.477.990       & 12,0\%   \\
5   & Netherlands              & 1.063.757       & 8,6\%    \\
6   & Italy                    & 753.942         & 6,1\%    \\
19  & Russian Federation       & 54.203          & 0,4\%    \\
   & European Union (27)      & 10.110.901      & 82,0\%   \\
   & Western Balkans          & -308.460        & -2,5\%   \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Net cash foreign direct investment in Serbia 2000-2008. Source: National Bank of Serbia (2009), own calculations.}
\end{table}

Again, the conclusion follows that Serbia and the EU are interdependent. On the one hand, Serbia presents an investment opportunity for EU companies, most notably in Austria, Greece and Germany. On the other hand, these investments represent additional resources, both financially and in terms of knowledge, to the transforming Serbian economy. The EU is an important actor in this respect, as it demands of Serbia that it opens up its markets and that it privatises its state- and socially-owned companies, bearing witness to the asymmetric nature of this interdependent relationship.

\textsuperscript{69} The 2007 figures are $ 451 million for exports towards Russia and $ 2628 million for imports from Russia.
\textsuperscript{70} These data reflect the country that the payment was made from, rather than the country from which the actual investment was made. These do not necessarily coincide.
\textsuperscript{71} The figures for the first semester of 2009 also include Russia’s purchase of a 51 percent stake in Petroleum Industry Serbia, which would propel Russia to about the eighth rank.
Other issues that make the EU and Serbia dependent on each other are concerns about the stability and security of the region. The EU considers Serbia to be a pivotal player in the Western Balkans, as it has stated on many occasions.\textsuperscript{72} The wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s demonstrated that instability in the region reflects upon the entire continent, not least in the form of refugees seeking a safe haven. A permanent and satisfactory solution for Kosovo is perhaps the most important question of stability both sides are involved in at the moment. Besides that, global warming and the current economic crisis contribute to interdependence between the EU and Serbia. Summing up, the factors discussed above all attest to the fact that Serbia and the EU depend on each other for their wellbeing, albeit that Serbia depends more on the EU than the EU on Serbia.

\textit{Common fate}

The presence of a common fate is a second variable in Wendt’s model that can help to explain the emergence of pro-social policies. Serbia and the EU face a common fate if the decisions of a third party influence outcomes for both of them. One could for instance argue that regarding energy matters they face a common fate. For their energy imports, Serbia and the EU are both dependent on Russia, and any actions the latter may take in this respect will influence the availability of oil and gas for both. When Russia and Ukraine had a dispute in the winter of 2008-2009 and transit of gas was halted, both Serbia and Eastern European member states suffered from shortages. Already, this common fate has fostered cooperation through the South Stream project, which is intended to bypass Ukraine rather than to reduce dependence on Russia.\textsuperscript{73}

Next to that, Serbia and the EU both suffer from cross-border organised crime; solving this issue requires that they work together. The EU claims, for instance, that “Serbia is on one of the major Balkan routes for transit of heroin, cocaine, marijuana and synthetic drugs, with organised groups originating from Serbia being an important part of the criminal network” (Commission 2008c: 50). These groups have harmful effects on society, both in the EU and in Serbia. The EU therefore stimulates more cooperation between the countries of the Western Balkans in this matter. It funds, for example, the establishment of so-called International Law Enforcement Cooperation

\textsuperscript{72} See the citations in the previous section of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{73} South Stream is a natural gas pipeline planned by the Russian company Gazprom and the Italian company Eni. It will link Russia to Bulgaria through the Black Sea; in Bulgaria, the pipeline will be split up to reach both Italy and Austria. Serbia is on the latter trajectory.
Units in the Western Balkans (Commission 2009b). Serbia also has an agreement on strategic cooperation with Europol (Commission 2008c: 10).

Moreover, faced with the emergence of new global players such as China, India and Brazil, Serbia and the countries of the EU find themselves in a similar position. Being of relatively small size in terms of population, unifying foreign policy may be the only way to assert a convincing European presence on the global stage. Otherwise, most European countries will probably share a fate of political marginalisation. Nevertheless, as an independent foreign policy is one of the hallmarks of sovereignty, this seems like one bridge too far for the near future. The Lisbon Treaty spells out the establishment of a European diplomatic service, however, which may be the next step in this process. The ability to play its part on the international level is also important for Serbia in light of the past. Under Milošević Serbia stood rather alone, but before that, Yugoslavia took pride in being a founding and leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Overall, one can conclude that Serbia and the EU share a common fate in a limited number of policy areas, most specifically in matters of organised crime and energy security. Nevertheless, as is also the case for some EU-members, Serbia seems to see a solution for the latter problem rather in intensifying cooperation with Russia than in diversifying energy sources. This may eventually lead to diverging fates between Serbia and the EU, but also within the EU itself. The cooperation that is caused by a common fate therefore adds to the effects of interdependence, but in a rather marginal way.

*Homogeneity*

Wendt’s model presents homogeneity, i.e. two collectives being alike, as a third variable that may cause pro-social policies to be executed. Greater homogeneity between Serbia and the EU is exactly what the EU is aiming at with the Stabilisation and Association process. The intention is to make the EU and Serbia alike with respect to both rules and legislation, and values and norms, obviously in the sense that Serbia moves towards the EU model, not vice versa. Nevertheless, Wendt argues that the road from homogeneity to pro-social policies runs through subjective categorisation. Do Serbs and citizens of EU countries consider themselves as part of the same category? The Serb attitude towards this question will be analysed in the following chapter, yet how do the Dutch, for instance, think about this? A definitive answer would in fact require a survey, but one could argue that identification is complicated by the legacy of the wars in the 1990s.
Regardless what its responsibility has actually been, blame for the war has been placed on Serbia more than on the other parties involved.

With respect to subjective categorisation, the EU plays an ambiguous role. As analysed in the previous section, the EU simultaneously links and differentiates itself and Serbia. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that its insistence on shared values is intended to foster homogeneity. It confirms in fact that there is already a perceived degree of homogeneity. The EU would not associate itself this closely with Serbia if there would not be a basis to build upon. As the description of the EU’s representation of Serbia in the previous section indicates, the EU sees Serbia as in principle sharing its values. In practice, however, Serbia is perceived as still in the process of fully internalising them.

Consequently, although it remains difficult to objectively assess the degree of homogeneity between them, the EU perceives homogeneity between itself and Serbia to be of a level sufficient to involve itself very actively in Serbia. This can only lead to the conclusion that homogeneity helps to foster pro-social policies in this case.

Self-restraint

Wendt argues that self-restraint is a necessary condition for the emergence of collective identity formation. The main emphasis in this respect is on the EU as the more powerful entity. In order for collective identity formation to succeed, the EU must make an effort not to appear too dominant. To be sure, it must not give the impression that the Europeanisation of Serbia will lead to the disappearance of Serb national identity, and clarify that this is not its intention.

One may hypothesise that this is exactly the reason why an explicit European identity has such a low or rather nonexistent profile in EU discourse towards Serbia. On the other hand, policymakers and politicians may just be failing to recognise the importance of identitarian issues, perhaps due to their rather realist or neo-liberal orientation.

Furthermore, the EU restrains itself with respect to the position of Kosovo. Currently, the EU does not demand that Serbia recognise Kosovo’s independence. In fact, such a demand would be impossible to make since not all member states have recognised Kosovo as a sovereign state. Nevertheless, this internal aspect does not change the relevance of the EU’s position for Serbia. The EU will also realise that insisting on recognition would alienate the Serbian government and a large part of the
Serbian population, as an overwhelming majority of political parties see territorial integrity as an important objective, if not an overriding one. Serbia may also been seen as exercising some self-restraint here, as it has not required a revocation of recognition as condition for continuing relations. It could have taken a hard-line stance and focussed on Russia, for instance.

In contrast, Serbians may not perceive the EU to be practising self-restraint. As will become clear from the following chapter, many Serbians actually think the EU is asking too much of their country; this lack of self-restraint is precisely what Wendt describes as having a negative effect on the possibility of collective identity formation. Moreover, many nationalist organisations are afraid the EU’s demands will destroy Serb national identity.

In sum, the degree of self-restraint on behalf of the EU is questionable. It is perceived, at least by part of the Serbian population, as being too demanding. Notably, however, the EU has not made the one demand that would sour relations to a considerable extent, which is to demand the recognition of Kosovo.

Is it now possible to assess whether Wendt’s conclusion hold? An exhaustive and definitive analysis of the explanatory power of Wendt’s theory is beyond the confines of this thesis. However, it is possible to pass a judgement on its merits in explaining the representations and policies of the EU towards Serbia. The analysis of Wendt’s four causal variables has yielded that there is at least a considerable degree of interdependence between the two main actors here, although in an asymmetrical fashion. Especially in the areas of trade and investment, the EU and Serbia have closely intertwined relations. Confirming Wendt’s predictions, the empirical conclusion that Serbia depends more on the EU than vice versa leads to a representation that also emphasises this dependency; it juxtaposes the more dominant teacher to the weaker pupil.

With respect to possible common fates, the threats of an insecure energy supply and organised crime could lead to cooperation between the EU and Serbia in order to counteract them. This hypothesis seems to hold in the case of cross-border crime, but not quite in the context of energy security. The significance of sharing a common fate seems therefore rather marginal in this case.

The level of homogeneity between Serbia and the EU, however, is a more important variable. Shared values point to a medium-high level of homogeneity and also
appear frequently in the EU’s representations of Serbia. One the one hand, this similarity may indicate a direct causal effect: because the EU and Serbia are rather homogeneous, the EU represents it as such. On the other hand, the EU may also be presumptuous in this respect: because it believes Serbia will eventually belong to the European mainstream, it is represented as already sharing the mainstream’s values in principle, while in practice Serbia could still go into another direction. In that case, inferring the existence of a causal link would amount to following a circular reasoning, which could indicate that the relationship is in reality constitutive rather than causal. Wendt’s theory points to the first explanation, while empirically, this may be a problematic claim. As the following chapter will demonstrate, a not insignificant part of Serbian society is rather nationalistic and does not subscribe to values such as respect for human rights and the protection of minorities, neither in principle, nor in practice. The homogeneity that the EU perceives, or wants to perceive, may therefore be exaggerated.\footnote{One might speculate that homogeneity is a decisive normative factor, in the sense that accession by the Western Balkan countries completes the puzzle of European reunification, bringing (almost) the whole of Europe under the umbrella of one political organisation, the European Union.}

This discrepancy simultaneously points to the difficulty of seeing the EU and Serbia as two unequivocally bounded actors and attributing them with an unequivocally given Self, and consequently labelling them as being homogeneous or not. For example, there may be homogeneity between the liberal-democratic mainstream of the European Union and a large part of Serbian society, but homogeneity may exist between European far-right groups and Serbian nationalists as well.

Altogether it seems that these three variables take on sufficiently high levels in order to warrant positive representations of Serbia and a considerable degree of cooperation between the Serbia and the EU.\footnote{More specifically, Wendt’s model requires that at least one of them is sufficiently present.} Nevertheless, it is necessary that they are complemented by self-restrained behaviour on both sides in order to lead to collective identity formation. Although the EU is not explicitly pushing European identity, its demands for reforms are rather intrusive and seen by some Serbs as threatening their society. This would make problematic the eventual formation of a collective identity that includes both the EU and Serbia.

Despite the fact that there are no established levels of interdependence, homogeneity and self-restraint to which these empirics can be compared, it may be concluded, following Wendt’s theory, that they have at the minimum helped the EU to
establish pro-social policies, like visa facilitation. Moreover, a process of moving closer together has been initiated, which may prove difficult to stop. Nevertheless, the EU may need to show more self-restraint if true collective identity formation is to take place. The next chapter will examine if these policies have had the effect of bringing the Serbian population closer to a European identity.

76 Although it is certainly not impossible that a more nationalistic coalition in Serbia would, perhaps only temporarily, suspend to road to membership.
CHAPTER 4: ATTITUDES IN SERBIA

Whereas the previous chapter focussed mainly on the EU side of the Self-Other relations between Serbia and the EU, this chapter will concentrate empirically on Serbian society. This should not come as a surprise, as collective identity is always constructed in a dialogical process between the Self and the Other. The object of analysis is formed by the different Serbian reactions to EU attempts at Europeanising their country, with additional focus on how they see the relation between Serb national identity and a European collective identity. Could these differences between groups then be attributable to different degrees of homogeneity and interdependence, for instance? The goal of this chapter is thus to analyse what the effects of EU rhetoric and policies are on Serbian society, as far as support for membership and identification with Europe are concerned. Moreover, it will be demonstrated how some aspects of Wendt’s theory can play a role on the sub-state level as well. In doing so, this chapter follows Neumann’s claims that the collective of Serbs cannot be ascribed with an unequivocally given Self. It will become clear that also within the groups discussed, there is no universal support for or opposition against membership, although certain tendencies can be demonstrated.

The principal data for this chapter have been obtained through six interviews taken in Belgrade in May 2009. The interviewees include, next to Mr Cammarata, Dr. Marija Obradović from the University of Belgrade, Vladimir Ateljević of the Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO), Dragana Petković Gajić of the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions in Serbia, Sonja Biserko of the Serbian Helsinki Committee and Miloš Milovanović and Ana Ranković, both of the NGO Fractal. It should be pointed out that they in general share a pro-European view, but the main reason for choosing them is that they can be expected to have a good insight into the relevant dynamics in Serbian society. These interviews are supplemented with newspaper articles from the B92 website and two surveys, the Gallup Balkan Monitor (Gallup 2009) and a poll by the Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO 2009), as well as secondary literature. A full-grown study would obviously require a wider analysis of Serbian language media, and more insight into people’s motives would have been obtained through a customised survey of views throughout Serbia and interviews with representatives of groups that oppose European integration. This does not fit, however,
within the possibilities of this thesis, nor within the linguistic capacities of its author, for
that matter. Consequently, this chapter should be seen as a first exploration into these
issues.

The division of the chapter is as follows: first, some comments will be made on
the general socio-economic background in Serbia, after which overall support for
European integration will be assessed. Then, an analysis is presented of how different
societal groups think about both membership and European identity.

Socio-economic background

Many of the interviewees stressed that it is important to see current developments in
Serbia against the socio-economic background in which they take place. This will allow
considering Serbia’s position in a wider perspective, both on a temporal scale and in
comparison to other countries in Eastern Europe. It is no exaggeration to state that
twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Serbia is still in the middle of a difficult
transition process. This is all the more remarkable considering that Yugoslavia was
relatively well placed, compared to the other states in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, the wars of the 1990s intervened and Slobodan Milošević managed to keep a
hold on power until October 2000, when many other states in Eastern Europe were
already well on their way towards EU membership.

The length of this as yet unfinished transition has had a major impact on
people’s lives. Summarising the interviews with Dr. Obradović, one could say that
Serbian society is fragmented, atomised and exhausted, and that its social fabric has
been destroyed. Ramet describes how during the late 1980s and 1990s, Serbia was
suffering from collective neurosis and paranoia: “social alienation, heightened
antagonism toward others, and an attitude of hostility toward the outside world” (Ramet
2005a: 130). Next to that, the transition process, including the privatisation of numerous
firms, has had a large social cost for which the state proved unable to compensate. In
this sense, FDI is vital for Serbia to create jobs. Mrs. Gajić even explained that she
sometimes had the feeling of living on the Galápagos Islands, in an anachronistic colony
different from the rest of the world. Yet on the other hand, Mrs. Biserko describes
Serbian society as autistic, in the sense that it receives too much outside pressure to
change and therefore does not know how to react and retires into its shell. As the
previous chapter has demonstrated, the EU is a significant actor in this respect, although,
as Mrs Biserko remarked, at first it had little understanding of the dynamics and the state of Serbian society.

The interview at Fractal confirmed that this atomisation can also be witnessed in terms of political participation, although one should concede that civic activism is probably a rather novel phenomenon to the region as a whole, due to the restrictions of the socialist era. Many people feel they have no grasp on the future and that they have few alternatives; sometimes this leads to apathy, but more importantly it leads to huge social discontent. Nevertheless, Serbian society remains state-centric. People look towards the government to bring the necessary changes, even while NGOs like Fractal try to create more opportunities for people to take matters into their own hands.

This fragmented, state-oriented society tired of transition is the daily environment in which Serbs choose whether to support EU membership or not, and whether to look towards a more European identity or to hold on to nationalist convictions. This should be borne in mind in reading the following.

OVERALL SUPPORT FOR EU INTEGRATION

Opinion polls are obviously one way of assessing the overall support among the Serbian population for EU integration. A regular SEIO survey presents data on whether people would vote for or against EU accession if a referendum would be held tomorrow. The results, from various polls held between June 2002 and May 2009, consistently indicate that a majority of Serbs would vote in favour of membership. The percentage in favour ranges from 78 percent in April 2004 to 61 percent in December 2008 and May 2009, while the percentage against range from 18 percent in November 2007 to 6 percent in March 2003 (SEIO 2009: 3). Currently, the percentage in favour is at an all time low, while there is a significant minority of 17 percent against. These figures are generally confirmed by Gallup’s Balkan Monitor 2009, which represents data gathered in September and October 2008. It states that 58 percent of Serbs interviewed think that membership of the EU is a good thing for Serbia, while 9 percent think it would be bad. The same figures for 2006 were 61 and 10 percent respectively (Gallup 2009: 2). These figures of slightly falling support for EU accession were also confirmed by Mrs. Biserko and Mr. Cammarata.

The SEIO poll (2009: 4) also presents what people think the EU would mean for them personally. The three implications mentioned most often are that the EU would
present a better future for the young, that it would provide employment opportunities, and the possibility to travel freely inside the EU. One in five people also mention that they see the EU as a risk for their own cultural identity.

Levels of support for EU integration may also be deduced from voting patterns in national elections. The year 2008 saw two of those in Serbia: first the presidential elections over two rounds on January 20 and February 3, and second the parliamentary elections on May 11. The second round of the presidential elections was a stand-off between Boris Tadić of the Democratic Party (DS) and Tomislav Nikolić of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Members of the DS represented this choice as a referendum on EU membership (B92 21/01/2008), as Tadić is by far the more pro-European politician of the two. Tadić eventually beat Nikolić with 50.31 to 47.97 percent, which is clearly not an overwhelming majority. Parliamentary elections were called later that year due to disagreements in the coalition over how to continue with European integration after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Prime Minister Koštunica wanted to include in the SAA that Kosovo is a part of Serbia (B92 15/04/2008), while the DS could live with the status quo and did not want to let the Kosovo question block the European integration of Serbia. G17 Plus health minister Milosavljević commented that the elections amounted to a choice between “a normal path towards the EU or a return to isolation and darkness” (quoted by B92 13/03/2008). The DS and its partners participated under the banner of a coalition called For a European Serbia, which became the biggest party with 102 seats of the 250 in total, followed by the SRS with 78 seats. The DSS lost seats, whereas the pro-European Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won seats as well. Ironically, a pro-European coalition government was formed with the participation of Milošević’s old party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which was crucial for acquiring a majority.

As the majority of Serbs have recently voted pro-Europe, an interesting question is to what extent Serbians consider themselves European. Mr. Cammarata stated that he often heard from his Serbian interlocutors that they are European, but simultaneously that they want to join Europe, too. This paradox demonstrates the difference between the geographical Europe and Europe as a community of values and norms. This image was confirmed by Mr. Ateljević, who stated that the opponents of European integration say they are European, but refuse to discuss European norms and values. Additionally,

77 G17 Plus is a political party. It allied itself with DS for the 2008 parliamentary elections.
Mrs. Gajić was adamant about Serbia being in Europe and therefore having a European identity. However, Dr. Obradović commented that, in some respects, Serbia has become more and more oriental after the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Ramet (2005a: 131) reports that propaganda in the 1980s and 1990s portrayed Serbia as “simultaneously non-European and the most European of all”.

Obviously, it cannot be disputed that Serbia is geographically a European country, but what does this mean for connecting to a European identity? The Gallup poll also posed a question on how strongly people identified with Europe. In Serbia (excluding Kosovo), only 23 percent of respondents replied that they identified very or extremely strongly, compared to e.g. 72 percent of Kosovo Albanians, or 24 percent of respondents in Croatia (Gallup 2009: 2). The SEIO poll (2009: 5) also includes a question on this issue, asking people whether they personally feel like a European. Most recently, in May 2009, 40 percent of respondents said they did, while 35 percent replied they did not. The remainder answered “yes and no”. These figures have been rather constant for the whole period of testing, which began in September 2006. The notable exception, however, is formed by the results of May 2008, with the survey being conducted around the parliamentary elections. At that point in time 49 percent replied feeling like a European, while only 26 percent reported not doing so. Nevertheless, since then identification with Europe has fallen back to previous levels.

The outcomes of surveys and elections discussed above show that a majority of Serbs favour EU membership. Nevertheless, support has diminished during the last years, and it is far from overwhelming. Mrs. Biserko comments that this is due to the fact that Serbian expectations proved too high. Surely, the Serbs would have expected the extradition of Karadžić to lead to unfreezing the SAA. On the other hand, Mr. Milovanović and Ms. Ranković stated that a lack of patience is caused by politicians who represent certain goals, such as visa abolition, as quickly realisable. Next to that, people also feel that the EU uses too many sticks and too few carrots. No less than 50 percent of those polled by the SEIO perceive the EU’s policy of constant conditionality to be the most important reason for slow progress towards accession, while 20 percent choose the inability of Serbian leaders and just 15 percent cite a failure to fulfil international commitments (SEIO 2009: 9), which would be the formal reason from the EU’s perspective. Mrs. Gajić remarked that EU pressure helps to improve workers’

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rights, but that this pressure can also go against the interests of labourers. In general, she argued for the use of more carrots by the EU. Accordingly, it seems that many Serbs think the EU does not restrain itself sufficiently in what it demands of Serbia. This does not bode well for the formation of a collective identity, since self-restraint is a sine qua non in this respect, according to Wendt.

Stojić (2006) argues that public opinion is overall pro-European, but that it is mostly ignorant about the process, e.g. about the costs of enlargement. Furthermore, he states that views on cooperation with the ICTY are much more negative. This could indicate that people fail to grasp that both European integration in a narrow sense and Europeanisation in a broader sense imply cooperation with the ICTY. Spoerri and Freyberg-Inan (2008) argue, however, that international actors like the EU have to blame themselves for these attitudes to some extent. In Serb domestic political discourse, the ICTY is continually linked to conditionality and threats of isolation, rather than to norms of reconciliation or justice. This specific linkage has been made possible by, for instance, the EU’s continuing insistence of full cooperation with the ICTY as a prerequisite for progress towards membership. Consequently, Serbs have come to associate the ICTY with persecution and humiliation rather than reconciliation. Spoerri and Freyberg-Inan claim that these negative attitudes towards the Tribunal undermine the efforts of Serbian reformist political parties to put Serbia firmly on the path of liberal democratic transition.

Next to that, Stojić argues that European integration is not a mobilising political issue in Serbia, but that domestic issues come first. This may, however, have changed since the publication of his article, as the 2008 parliamentary elections could be seen as a referendum on continuing integration, won by the pro-European parties. Mr. Cammarata confirmed that there is little knowledge in Serbian society of what being an EU member amounts to and of what the accession process requires of Serbia.

Both the SEIO and Gallup survey validate these claims. The Gallup poll (2009: 4) shows that 41 percent of Serbians are very well or well informed about the European Union, while 57 percent are not well informed or not informed at all. Utilising somewhat different categories, the SEIO survey (2009: 18) reports that 23 percent of respondents are very well or rather informed about Serbia’s EU accession process, whereas 46 percent are weakly informed or not informed at all. The remaining 28 percent fall in between these categories, calling themselves neither informed, nor uninformed. Nevertheless, the SEIO poll demonstrates that the Serbs know very well
about the requirement of cooperation with the ICTY (or ‘The Hague’). It was cited by 79 percent of respondents as a condition for acquiring EU candidate status (SEIO 2009: 10). This knowledge, however, does not increase support for the ICTY. This is reflected in the discrepancy between support for EU accession and support for the ICTY, as indicated by both Stojić (2006) and Mr. Cammarata. The Gallup survey (2009: 9) found in this respect that just 19 percent of Serbs think that the ICTY helps reconciliation and strengthens peace, while a majority of 54 percent believe that it does not serve the interests of region but rather keeps old conflicts alive.⁷⁹

It might tentatively be suggested that this is a reminder of past tendencies, as after World War II no attempts were made to come clean with the fascist, četnik and communist violence. This heritage was kept silent and proved a fertile breeding ground for the propaganda and nationalism of the 1990s (Wilmer 2002). Mrs. Biserko adds to this that the effect of the ICTY on Serbia is negligible and that cooperation, especially under Koštunica, was rather cynically motivated. Generals were extradited in exchange for EU support, and those who surrendered voluntarily were seen as bringing sacrifices for the Serbian nation. She stresses that cooperation with the ICTY is still important, as it indicates accepting responsibility for the deeds of the past. Embracing such a norm will then contribute to a more European identity for Serbia.

A lack of knowledge about the EU may be caused by low visibility of the EU and its delegation in Serbia. Mr. Ateljević argues, for instance, that as Serbia’s main donor, the EU is not visible enough in demonstrating what its aid accomplishes. Mr. Milovanović and Ms. Ranković add that there is little direct communication out of Brussels; messages are transmitted more through the Serbian government, civil society organisations and of course the Serbian media.

ATTITUDES OF DIFFERENT GROUPS

This section will discuss the diverging opinions on European integration between different social strata. Attention will be paid first to the nomenklatura, which represents an amalgam of closely connected businessmen and politicians.⁸⁰ The analysis is then

⁷⁹ The exact question asked was: “In your view, what is the role the ICTY plays in the future of the region?” (Gallup 2009: 9). The proportion of reconciliation versus keeping conflicts alive was 21% to 43% in Croatia, 34% to 39% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 56% to 9% in Albania.
⁸⁰ This term, referring to the leading elite in communist systems, was suggested by Dr. Obradović during the interview.
shifted to the views of political parties. Next is an examination of attitudes among Serbia’s young people, who are explicitly targeted by the EU, e.g. through the provision of scholarships. Furthermore, the views of the Orthodox Church, cultural elites and civil society organisations will be examined.

**Nomenklatura**

An important element in Serbian society is the existence of what may be called the nomenklatura, coalitions of businesspeople and political elites. These strong links were mentioned in interviews by Dr. Obradović, Mrs. Biserko, and Mr. Milovanović and Ms. Ranković. Miljković and Hoare (2005) describe how these elites came into being under the rule of Milošević. They argue that:

During Milošević’s first years in power, a small but extremely powerful political and economic elite formed around him that was drawn from three different social categories: (1) high-ranking members of the communist authorities; (2) directors of the state firms and banks; and (3) the owners of formally private but in fact para-state economic enterprises. (Miljković & Hoare 2005: 195)

The nomenklatura were not, however, a homogenous group. Rival factions were formed that pitted, ironically, the supporters of Milošević against those of his wife, Mirjana Marković, and her party, the elitist Yugoslav United Left (YUL) (Miljković & Hoare 2005: 201). Yet, business and politics not only collided, but also formed close connections to security forces and criminals: “Politicians and businessmen were deeply involved in illegal deals and with organized crime” (Miljković & Hoare 2005: 202).

The fall of Milošević did not mean less influence for the nomenklatura. They simply shifted alliances and supported the leaders of the opposition; crucial in this respect was that Milošević was abandoned by the security forces and the army (Pavlaković 2005: 29). In doing so, they avoided large-scale purges, even if only temporarily. The murder of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić on 12 March 2003 set off operation Sabor against organised crime and those institutions involved in this assassination (Pavlaković 2005: 39). Nevertheless, Miljković and Hoare (2005: 222) conclude that, despite reforms “to introduce a genuine free-market economy based upon the rule of law, […] Serbia is still burdened by a criminal-bureaucratic infrastructure inherited from the Milošević regime, and this slows the pace of reform.”
Just as the nomenklatura was divided under Milošević, so it is split today. Dr. Obradović remarked that they have different orientations, both towards the EU and towards Moscow. As Mrs. Biserko added, many of the Serbian tycoons benefitted from clientelism and an opaque privatisation process; they are afraid their political protection will diminish if Serbia joins the EU. Moreover, some enterprises see free trade within the EU as a threat, as pointed out during the interview at Fractal. Nevertheless, as Mr. Ateljević explained, other, more export-oriented businesses are strongly in favour of EU membership. Following Wendt’s theory, in this sector the chances for identification with Europe may be greater than on average, as the level of interdependence is high and already a fact of daily life. In general, Mrs. Biserko remarked that, taken as a whole, Serbian elites are more conservative than society at large. She argues that many of them are afraid of losing national identity when joining the EU, which, in addition to personal and business interests, makes them obstruct the accession process. However, she recognises that there are isolated islands also among these elites that do good work in moving towards the EU.

One would expect those business elites that stand to benefit from membership to have close connections to the more pro-European parties, such as DS. Potential losers, such as monopolists, can conversely be expected to be in league with the more nationalistic parties, such as DSS. It is beyond the limits of this thesis, however, to ascertain what these linkages exactly look like, and how much they influence government policies and actors. Nevertheless, as suggested in several of the interviews, these networks of politicians and businesspeople exist and are an important element of Serbian society.

Political parties

Serbian opposition parties and movements against Milošević only managed to overthrow him in October 2000, uniting under the banner of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Nevertheless, they quickly relapsed into old behaviour and the movement fell victim to the conflicting personalities of Vojislav Koštunica and Zoran Đindjić (Kesić 2005). Moreover, many opposition parties were even more nationalistic than Milošević himself, such as Šešelj’s SRS and to some extent Koštunica’s DSS as well (Pavlaković 2005, Kesić 2005). As described above, Kosovo’s...
unilateral declaration of independence furthermore has had a large influence on parties’ views on European integration. It caused the end of cooperation between DS and G17 Plus on the one hand, and DSS on the other hand, and ensured that the May 2008 parliamentary elections turned into a referendum on Serbia’s European priorities. DS and G17 Plus did not want the declaration to prejudice Serbia’s EU accession, while DSS demanded guarantees from the EU that Serbia would be able to accede with full territorial integrity, e.g. including Kosovo (B92 15/04/2008).

Stojić (2006: 323) portrays the DSS as moderately nationalist and in general pro-EU, while having reservations about cooperation with the ICTY. One might argue that Kosovo’s declaration of independence has brought out the true nationalistic nature of the DSS, with Koštunica attempting to shift Serbia’s orientation toward Russia (Helsinki Committee 2009a: 525). Stojić (2006: 324) states furthermore that DS and G17 Plus are strong supporters of membership; DS, moreover, wants European standards to become a genuine part of Serbian society, which corresponds with the EU’s call for the internalisation of European norms and values. The party most sceptical about EU membership may well be the SRS. Stojić (2006: 321) argues that it rejects Western liberal norms and does not see EU membership as a priority for Serbia, although it is not rejected in general. Then, there is the SPS, Milošević’s former party, which Stojić (2006: 322) reports to have gradually assumed a more pro-European position. Finally, the small LDP is probably the most pro-European party, and the only one admitting that Serbia lost all rights over Kosovo by its actions in 1999 (B92 03/04/2008).

Mr. Cammarata observed that there have been two major developments in 2008 in Serbia’s political landscape. First, the SPS entered a coalition with DS and G17 Plus to form a pro-European government in June 2008, after having negotiated earlier with DSS and SRS (B92 15/05/2008 & 17/06/2008). DS and SPS (2009) have composed a cooperation agreement in which they affirm the strategic importance of EU membership for Serbia. They state that Serbia is still a part of Europe and that it therefore shares European values. Moreover, they argue that Serbia’s history confirms its European identity. 82 Mr. Cammarata comments that the SPS is moving in the direction of European social democrats. A second major development is the split that occurred in the SRS over ratification of the SAA. The newly formed Serb Progressive Party (SNS) led

82 I am grateful to Sabina Kekić for translating this agreement.
by Tomislav Nikolić seems less hostile to Europe (B92 02/07/2009). Moreover, opinion polls suggest that the SNS has taken with it around 70 percent of the SRS electorate, becoming one of the largest parties in Serbia (B92 28/09/2009).

These developments notwithstanding, the political spectrum in Serbia remains divided on how to combine the wish to maintain territorial integrity and a strong national identity with continuing European integration. This can be illustrated with the outcome of the parliamentary vote on ratification of the SAA. Just 140 out of 250 parliamentarians voted in favour of the treaty entering into force (Helsinki Committee 2009a: 527).

Young people

Young people as a group have a more positive attitude towards European integration than their elders. The SEIO poll (2009: 19) of May 2009 indicates for instance that 69 percent of those aged 18 to 29 would vote in favour if there would be a referendum on EU accession tomorrow, whereas this figure is only 61 percent for the general population. The Gallup survey (2009: 9) confirms this view, reporting that 67 percent of young people would support membership, while this is only 58 percent in the entire sample.

In general, the issue of visa abolition is especially important to young people, who, just like their counterparts within the EU, would like to see more of the world. Mrs Biserko adds that is also relevant in a psychological sense, e.g. in feeling equal to those in the rest of Europe, who incidentally do not need visas to enter Serbia. In this respect, the disappearance of long queues in front of European embassies in Belgrade will do much good. From the perspective of Wendt’s theory, more contact with the rest of Europe may also increase the possibility of collective identity formation if these visits lead to a higher degree of perceived homogeneity.

Nevertheless, just as in the general public, there are divisions among the young. Not few of them turn to the Orthodox Church, a fact which can also regularly be observed in Belgrade churches. A part of these, and others, also turn to hooliganism and nationalist groups, such as the Obraz and 1389 movements. Mrs. Biserko also comments on the influence of universities, which she sees as bastions of conservatism.

83 Obraz means honour in Serbian, and 1389 is the year in which the Serbs lost the Battle of Kosovo against the Ottomans; the battle is employed as one of the most potent symbols of the Serb nation. Graffiti referring to 1389 was easily observed in Belgrade’s centre during my visit in May 2009.
and nationalism. She argues that at the University of Belgrade, especially the faculties of law, political science and philosophy are strongly anti-European (Biserko 2008a). In general, the curriculum in the education system is outdated and nationalistic, while it could in theory work to promote a European identity. On the other hand, identification may also proceed through more mundane connections, such as tennis or the Eurovision Song Contest. In this context, Mrs. Biserko also mentioned the fact that Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina share a common media sphere as a positive development. In general, she concluded that there is much frustration among young people in society, and that it matters greatly who manages this frustration.

**Serbian Orthodox Church**

The Church still wields a strong influence on Serbian society, according to Mr. Milovanović and Ms. Ranković, and it is also connected to nationalist groups like Obraz. Some Serbs have lost all faith in the state and society and turn to the Church as the only road for salvation. It should be clarified that the Orthodox Church is in essence a church of the nation, rather than aspiring to universalism, such as religions like Roman Catholicism and Islam (Ramet 2005b: 255). This is a significant feature in the sense that it stands in contrast to both the aspiration towards universality that has been present in the construction of a European identity through the ages and the universal values that the EU sees as important elements of its identity. Although the Orthodox Church is not a monolithic institution, Ramet characterises it as follows:

> Within Serbia itself, the Serbian Orthodox Church has looked to the past, insistently fighting internationalization, globalization, secularization, tolerance, and, for the most part, any admission that many Serbs might bear some responsibility for the atrocities perpetrated in the years 1989-2000. (Ramet 2005b: 271)

Stojić (2006) argues that the clergy is split on the issue of EU accession, but that the majority reject it. Mrs. Biserko adds that the Church promotes anti-Western attitudes. Dr. Obradović perceives it to be in league with the nomenklatura, yet holds the Church as a secondary force in society.

**Intellectual and cultural elites**

In addition to the Orthodox Church, intellectual and cultural elites can be seen as defenders of Serb national identity. Consequently, they are in majority suspicious of
European integration, and Mr. Ateljević stated that many strongly oppose it. This defence of the Serbian nation goes back to the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), which was published in 1986. This document advocated the Serb national project and held that Serbs were suppressed in Tito’s creation of Yugoslavia, especially by the 1974 constitution, which provided extensive autonomy to the Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces. One of the key figures in this nationalist elite is Dobrica Ćosić, whose work has become the mainstay of Serbian official history as adopted by universities, the media and the cultural elite (Biserko 2008b). He writes about Albanians, for example:

These social, political and moral dregs of the tribal, barbaric Balkans chose as their allies the United States and the European Union, in their struggle against the most democratic, civilised and enlightened of the Balkan nations – the Serbs. (quoted in Biserko 2008b: n.p.)

The fact that this man is seen as the father of the nation attests to the prominence of nationalism in Serbia, also among proponents of EU membership. The discrepancy between support for membership and accepting its implications, as described earlier in this chapter, is evident here as well. Statements like these go against the values the EU considers to be fundamental to its identity. The EU would stop to function if these ideas would pervade only a fraction of its members. Therefore, spreading European identity, which should reject this brand of nationalism, is an indispensable part of enlargement – only copying institutions will not suffice. Some would argue that identity will spread by itself once the institutions are in place, but this is not sufficient justification to set this identitarian problem aside for the duration of the enlargement process.

Civil society

With respect to civil society, Stojić (2006: 325) argues that most NGOs in Serbia advocate membership. One of these is evidently the Helsinki Committee, which even advocates Serbia’s Europeanisation, or accepting the norms of the modern world and integrating into the mainstream as it is described (Helsinki Committee 2009b). Mr. Cammarata also comments that civil society is in general close to the EU, which should not come as a surprise given the foreign assistance that is provided to civil society organisations. Referring back to Wendt’s model, it can be argued that levels of

84 I am unable to ascertain whether this citation is representative for his entire work. Nevertheless, Ramet (2005c: 395) argues that he certainly glorifies nationalism.
interdependence and homogeneity between the EU and these NGOs are considerable. These Serbian organisations depend on the EU for a certain amount of their funding, whereas the EU sees civil society as vital to a functioning liberal democracy. Moreover, the EU may hope NGOs influence public opinion and the government. With respect to homogeneity, the concept of civil society as understood by the EU has been introduced to Serbia in recent times, and probably largely by institutions like the EU. It is therefore not surprising that these NGOs are based on the same values as the EU, which contributes greatly to their homogeneity.

As for trade unions, Mrs. Gajić states that they generally support European integration, but that the process has two sides. On the positive side, integration improves workers’ rights, and her union also benefits from contacts with other national trade unions. On the negative side, however, the EU has required the privatisation of many enterprises, leading to job destruction; moreover, some legislation passed to comply with EU expectations is too liberal and burdens workers.

The position of groups like Obraz and 1389 deserves some further discussion. These groups could in principle be considered a part of civil society as well, as they are organising themselves to attain certain goals, albeit nationalistic ones. Nevertheless, despite the fact that they openly claim to be tolerant (B92 25 September 2009), in practice these are violent groups that do not allow manifestations of other organisations. A gay pride parade, for instance, was cancelled after police expected it would be unable to contain the violence against it, which was propagated by both Obraz and 1389 (Loza 2009). Therefore, these organisations should actually not be discussed under the heading of civil society; they violate the norm of non-violence that should pervade it. However, they need to be mentioned here in order not to give the impression that there is no organised resistance towards EU membership and a European collective identity outside of Serbian elites. The example of the parade illustrates that they are a significant and powerful force in Serbia.

Summing up, it is clear that although a majority of Serbs is in favour of EU membership, this support is not overwhelming, nor often given wholeheartedly. It is, moreover, problematic to see Serbian support for membership as a proxy for adhesion to a collective European identity. One can have a predominantly nationalistic orientation while still supporting EU membership in principle, and nationalism remains an important factor in Serbian daily life. One could say there is a split both in politics and
in society, but is the EU then to blame for this? This could imply that the effect of the EU’s Europeanisation practices has been to effectively emphasise or deepen this cleavage. The corollary of this reasoning would then be that the EU is promoting a collective identity that includes one part of Serbian society, but marginalises another. Empirically, two contrasting arguments can be made with respect to this hypothesis.

One the one hand, the opposition against Milošević was already divided before the EU came into the picture, and its moment of unity was short-lived. The EU is obviously supporting those who advocate modernisation, reconciliation and a change in national identity, such as the Helsinki Committee. The EU is financially generous to these civil society organisations, which are perceived as agents for change. This support is to a certain extent given in order to fasten reforms in Serbia, as these organisations are probably expected to exert pressure on the government to carry through the reforms needed for EU membership. This corresponds to the indirect route of rule adoption as described by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005).85

On the other hand, NGOs that advocate a European future for Serbia, and especially those that explicitly condemn and reject Serbia’s nationalist past, such as the Helsinki Committee, are sometimes perceived as a fifth column. This is e.g. witnessed by a series of verbal attacks on and intimidation attempts against its director Sonja Biserko. The worldview of these assailants and opponents of EU membership in general is characterised strongly by the following hope expressed in the tabloid Blic: “shall Serbs ever understand that the coarse Serb shirt befits them better than the European coat” (Blic 08/02/2009, quoted in Helsinki Committee 2009a: 541). Combining these two lines of reasoning, one might conclude that the EU is not at the origin of the divisions in Serbian society, but that the effects of its representations and policies are such that these divisions are intensified.

Furthermore, as was pointed out during the interview at Fraktal, European integration also concerns other Europeans getting to know the Balkans, and this is an argument that should not go ignored. The point being that collective identity formation can only be called that way if both the Self and the Other contribute to this identity, i.e. it should contain elements from both Serbia and the EU. If not, Serbia would just be assimilated by the EU, which is clearly not what Wendt’s model is about, or what collective identity formation in general should be about. Moreover, this message also

85 See chapter two.
fits within the ideas of Delanty (1995) and Kastoryano (2005) on European identity, which they argue should be based on multiculturalism. Next to that, diversity is one of the pillars of the EU. Serbian membership would certainly make the European Union a more diverse polity.

Another notable issue is the possibility the travel freely within Europe. Mr. Milovanović and Ms. Ranković could not emphasise enough the importance of visa abolition in increasing enthusiasm for the EU. They argue that pressure on Serbia’s elites needs a critical mass, which may be accomplished by liberalising the visa regime. It is especially this perceived lack of progress that has recently made support wither. The Dutch blockade against ratifying the SAA achieves the opposite of what is intended. Greater domestic support for a pro-European government, arising from the step forward that the implementation of the SAA signifies, would probably increase that government’s capacity to find the two remaining indictees. This support is certainly not created by freezing the SAA.

In general, it can be argued that the EU’s rhetoric and policies towards Serbia have the effect of deepening the already existing divisions in politics and society between those advocating liberal democratic reforms and those who want to follow a more nationalistic road. Some of the latter believe, however, that it is possible to reconcile these views with EU membership; this is a delusion. Proponents of membership include export-oriented businesses and large part of civil society, and the young are more likely to be in favour than the population at large. Scepticism or opposition prevails among the cultural and intellectual elite and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Arguably, these differences in support for membership, which is an example of pro-social policy, can occasionally be explained by referring to the variables of interdependence and homogeneity that Wendt discusses. Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude whether Serbian society as a whole satisfies the levels of interdependence and homogeneity with the EU that are required for the formation of a collective European identity. In fact, the road towards membership may lead to the inclusion of one group of Serbs in this European identity, whereas others remain incapable of genuinely identifying themselves with Europe.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

As all questions surrounding identity can be seen as lying in a minefield, this thesis has started by providing both a thorough background on identitarian questions and a theoretical model to guide the analysis of the EU’s Europeanising practices in Serbia. This model has been found in the first instance in Alexander Wendt’s theory of collective identity formation, which is grounded in his social-constructivist views of global politics.

The first characteristic of this model is that it emphasises the importance of representations in foreign policy, i.e. how the Other is cast. It claims that representations reflect policies and vice versa. Secondly, the model argues that structural change can take place through collective identity formation and, most importantly, that this can be explained causally by a combination of, on the one hand, the variables interdependence, a common fate and homogeneity, and on the other hand, the variable of self-restraint. Furthermore, this model has been supplemented with alternative views on collective identity formation, which urge us to take into account that the Self and the Other flow into one another and that collectives, such as the Serbs, can never be ascribed with one single Self – a warning that was empirically illustrated in chapter four.

Applying Wendt’s model requires determining the nature of the EU’s representations of Serbia, which was accomplished by means of a discourse analysis of EU policy towards Serbia, presented in chapter three. The result was an image of Serbia as a reluctant learner, by which the EU casts itself in the role of an enthusiastic teacher. Serbia is moreover represented as carrying its own responsibility, and as a peripheral country in search of its place in the world. Nevertheless, teacher and student do in principle share the same European values, which forms the basis of their cooperation. This is at the same time the only element in this representation that implies a collective European identity. Yet, outside this basic discourse, EU representatives employ the metaphor of a family to emphasise that Serbia belongs in Europe and that it possesses a European identity. In sum, despite critical elements, representations of Serbia are such that they could form the basis for the formation of a collective European identity that includes both the EU and Serbia.

The logic of Wendt’s model implies that at least one of the variables interdependence, a common fate and homogeneity, and the variable self-restraint are
sufficiently present in the relations between the EU and Serbia to enable such an emergence of collective identity. Do the empirics confirm this expectation? In the first place, interdependence between the two seems rather strong, albeit with the qualification that, relatively speaking, mutual trade and FDI are far more important for Serbia than for the EU. Serbia’s forte is that it is seen as key to the Western Balkans’ stability, i.e. for peace and quiet in its backyard, the EU depends on the cooperation of Serbia. The presence of a common fate seems less significant to explain the EU’s representation and policies, as it is limited to a few policy areas and not referred to frequently in the discourse. The level of homogeneity is in the view of the EU in principle significant, yet this may be based on presumptions rather than empirical findings. Besides that, the EU is exhibiting self-restraint in the sense that it does not explicitly promote a European identity towards Serbia and has not asked for the recognition of Kosovo. Nevertheless, this behaviour is still not seen as self-restrained by many Serbs, which endangers the eventual formation of a collective European identity.

Inasmuch as Wendt’s preconditions are present, they should also cause an increase of identification with Europe in Serbia. What is perhaps lacking in this respect are contacts with the rest of Europe, which the abolition of visa for Serbians would help to change. In general, however, the majority of Serbs support EU membership, whereas identification with Europe is rather less common. Nationalism is still widespread, most importantly among the intellectual elite, but also in politics. Moreover, support for the EU is currently diminishing due to a standstill in the accession process. Applying for candidate status would be the next step, but not likely to be successful without a ratified SAA.

An obstacle to further Europeanisation is the Serbian perception that the EU lacks self-restraint, which is a necessary element in collective identity formation following Wendt. Many Serbs see ever-increasing demands by the EU as the reason for a lack of progress towards accession. This in turn decreases support for membership and identification with Europe.

Another obstacle to the development of an encompassing collective European identity is that interdependence and homogeneity between the EU and Serbia are not uniformly distributed in Serbian society. The EU’s efforts therefore risk emphasising divisions in Serbian society, connecting to and including proponents while marginalising opponents.
The first main question of this thesis asked how the EU employs the concept of a European identity in Europeanising Serbia. The answer is that this is not a notion explicitly present in the EU’s policies, but that it might still be an overriding rationale in the background of the entire enlargement process. The Europeanisation of Serbia cannot be complete without at least a significant part of the Serbs accepting a European identity as part of who they are, next to being Serbian and everything else they may individually or collectively identify with. Moreover, as was said during the interview at Fraktal, everything connected to the EU eventually promotes its identity. This is perhaps somewhat optimistic, but it must not be forgotten that Serbia is still in economic and social transition, which is accompanied by insecurity about its identity. The EU may appear a safe haven in this respect.

The second main question asked how Serbs react to the Europeanising attempts of the EU. In general, Serbs are positive about the EU, but they would like to see more progress. Support is most readily measured by whether they would say yes in a referendum on accession, which 61 percent would have done in May 2009. Levels of identification with Europe are lower, however. Interdependence between the EU and Serbia may be an important factor in causing positive attitudes, whereas a perceived lack of self-restraint on behalf of the EU may lower their number. Nevertheless, a significant minority are not persuaded by the EU’s policies, programmes, and identity. They want an independent Serbia with a strong orientation towards Russia.

Wendt’s model has served well to structure the preceding analysis. There are some difficulties, however, in applying the notion of homogeneity to the relationship between the EU and Serbia. The distinction between objective and subjective homogeneity is perhaps useful to compare states, but when analysing collectives of people and their chances for collective identity formation, it is rather the subjective side that counts. Perceptions of whether others are like us are subjective and not necessarily based on objective factors; they may vary, moreover, between different societal groups. Furthermore, the most important reason for some Serbs to support EU integration is that they already identify with Europe, so that identification precedes pro-social policies. Consequently, one might question the causal logic that Wendt presents. It has been difficult to show empirically in this case that the arrows point in one direction. It is tempting then to defect to the more radical constructivist position that policies and identities are mutually constitutive, rather than arguing that pro-social policies lead to collective identity. More concretely, it may ultimately be the conviction that Serbia
belongs to Europe that inspires these policies on behalf of the EU; this identification may in turn be confirmed and strengthened by cooperation.

There are three policy recommendations that follow from this study on the EU’s Europeanisation practices in Serbia. First, as may already have become clear from the analysis in this thesis, I would recommend to the Dutch government and parliament to end their blockade of the SAA. Their refusal of ratification is weakening precisely those forces that would increase the chances of arresting Hadžić and Mladić. The large popular support for EU membership, at its zenith at the time the parliamentary vote of May 2008, is waning due to slow progress. If as a result a government led by nationalist parties would come to power, this would reduce the chances of arrest to zero and defeat the possibility of attaining the Dutch goals.

Second, EU attempts at realising reforms in Serbia, and Serbian support for membership, would benefit from a change in the perception that the EU is too demanding. The EU should, therefore, be more consistent and make sure conditions for membership are not altered along the way. More importantly, it should make sure that this consistency is understood by the Serbian public, which is currently under the impression that demands keep piling up. Perhaps the other EU members and the Commission should also put more pressure on the Netherlands to lift its blockade, as this too is an example of being too demanding. By making sure it is perceived as more self-restrained, the EU will increase chances of Serbs adhering to a collective European identity.

Third, the EU should pay more attention to the dividing effects its policies and rhetoric have on Serbian society, as it intends to bring the entirety of Serbian society into the European Union, and not just proponents of membership. A split society cannot be a healthy fundament for the future; thus, the EU should exert itself to avoid widening this split, perhaps by entering more into discussion with sceptics of membership.

Obviously, this thesis knows its limitations, which could be addressed in further research. The fact, for instance, that this thesis is largely based on English-language sources means that it has its limitations in penetrating the dynamics of Serbian society. It would be worthwhile to investigate further the motives of nationalist groups, as well as the more general adherence to a nationalist outlook. This could shed more light on levels of interdependency and homogeneity between these groups and the EU. Detailed interviews and an analysis of their statements may deliver an insight into their reasons for rejecting a European identity and for seeing EU interference as unwanted. One
might also analyse whether casting Serbia as a reluctant learner causally determines that it will behave as such, as is suggested by Wendt’s theory. Depending on the outcomes, this might lead the EU to better consider how it portrays aspiring members. Next to that, this thesis has focussed on how Serbia is represented in the official discourse of the EU, meaning that attitudes of the EU citizens have not been taken into account. Moreover, an analysis of Serbian representations of the EU and their uses in the domestic sphere may clarify why many Serbs perceive the EU as too demanding.

In the end, promoting European identity towards Serbia is not an explicit goal for the European Union. However, concerns of identity, especially in the guise of a focus on internalising European values, play an important role in the background of the enlargement process. This has become clear from the image that pervades the EU’s discourse on Serbia: Serbia as a reluctant student, aided by a supportive teacher, the European Union. The EU’s cooperative policies towards Serbia reflect this positive representation, but have the effect of deepening existing divisions in Serbian society. This is a noxious and unwanted effect that should be avoided.
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