According to her,
the international community is also somewhat responsible for escalation of the crisis in
Kosovo's north - "it has not truly tried so far to place the north under control,
which the Serb side saw as an opportunity for secession of the north."
Sonja Biserko is a years-long chairwoman of the Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights in Serbia. And her public statements have made her a target of strong
criticism by Serbia's nationalistic circles.
The latest bulletin of the Helsinki Committee quotes that Serbia
might be taken responsible for "consequent destabilization" of the region. In
your view, who's the key factor of destabilization and what are his motives?
- Recent escalation of the tension in Kosovo's north showed that the
status quo in Kosovo is unsustainable and hampers consolidation of Kosovo and Serbia
alike. The international community is also somewhat responsible for such a situation
because it has not truly tried so far to place the north under control, which the Serb
side saw as an opportunity for secession of the north. In the past couple of months such a
scenario has been openly discussed not only by individuals from academic circles but also
by party leaders of the ruling coalition. All of them have turned a blind eye to the
international community's warning that borders in the Balkans were final and that any
partition scenario was out of question for both Kosovo and Bosnia. Any change of borders
would destabilize the entire region of the Balkans, Macedonia and Bosnia in the first
place. It this context Belgrade has been warned that it could be taken responsible for
consequent destabilization. Hence, the control that is now established over border
crossings is considered legitimate act and an act that preconditions the implementation of
Ahtisaari's plan in Kosovo's north as well. This is more than obvious now after the visits
by US and German's high officials.
Serbia's powerful conservative bloc insists that Kosovo is an
inseparable part of Serbia. Other actors are also in play here such as tycoons from
Belgrade and groups in the Kosovo's north - rule of law does not play into their hands as
it jeopardizes their interests. They've been harvesting huge funds that would have
otherwise gone to Kosovo's and Serbia's budgets.
Some analysts claim that today's Serbia is pursuing Milosevic's
policy of 1990s but by "different means." Are they exaggerating?
- The fact remains that after October 5, 2000 with the election of
Vojislav Kostunica Serbia continued the same policy by other means. However, there was
another current within DOS /Democratic opposition of Serbia/ helmed by late Premier
Djindjic, which realistically appraised Serbia's position and was committed to the
country's Europeanization. Unfortunately, that current has been marginalized for years.
The incumbent government has taken a somewhat different attitude towards it by propagating
a "European" Serbia over the election campaign - which by definition implies
acknowledgment of regional realities. But it failed to make a fresh advance in the matter
of Kosovo and develop new policies for Kosovo, Bosnia and the region as a whole. And that
backfired on it now. I hope that the continuation of Pristina-Belgrade dialogue scheduled
for September 2 would produce tangible results and that Belgrade would seize this
opportunity to present itself as a constructive partner, who has fully understood the
message about Kosovo's north.
We witness some changes in the power structure within EU, as well as
the consequences of the economic crisis. Germany seems to be taking over the main role in
EU foreign policy and that for the Balkans. At least that's how some people interpret the
planned visits to Balkan countries. To what extent this possible change could be reflected
on EU's attitude towards Serbia?
- Like the entire world, EU is undergoing transformation and searching
for a new paradigm. That's a complex process implying many drawbacks as well. What we have
now is a reshuffle and redistribution of power. That's why the Balkans has been on the
agenda for so long. Consolidation of EU will also help put an end to the Balkan question.
No doubt that Germany is a driving force within EU and among most important member-states
as such. Visits by German Foreign Minister and the Chancellor testify of Germany's active
return to the Balkans. That was evident during the crisis in Kosovo's north. I think
that's a good sign, which will speed up the denouement of regional processes. That will
also affect Serbia and it would be good for it to adjust its stands with those of the most
powerful EU country, rather than with Greek or the like. What matters at this point is
that the government acknowledges all the messages it got this summer and courageously
starts moving towards compromises and solutions.
Do you take that the rhetoric of some regime politicians hints at a
change of foreign policy course and distancing from EU or just collects political points
for the upcoming elections?
- EU is Serbia's only valid alternative. Any other would mean isolation
Kostunica and circles close to him would only be glad to see. Judging by the rhetoric one
can only conclude that the election campaign is already on, a campaign that is more
populist and offensive to citizens' common sense than the one before. Political elites are
again fueling the basest stereotypes and underestimating people's common sense. And that's
surely not a good policy for voters' mobilization. Citizens want to see concrete offers.
The government must replace empty words about a pro-European Serbia with concrete actions
to convince us that it means what it says.
There has been much talk about "a big coalition," the one
between DS and SNS, after the elections. Some are ruling out such a possibility. In Serbia
we have witnessed all sorts of political surprises. Could this be another one?
- All that speculation about possible coalitions is a part of the
election campaign. A big coalition and all that talk about unity,
"togetherness," is what Kostunica has advocated once. It would be good had
Serbia already reached a political consensus on its future in Europe. But as things stand
and judging by the rhetoric of some coalition leaders not even the incumbent government is
quite sure about it. What I want to say is that this pro-European tendency is still
fragile in Serbia but enjoys more support among citizens than among elites. I don't
believe in the possibility of the so-called big coalition. It would slow down Serbia's
anyway snail-paced movement towards European integrations. I believe some pro-European
coalition would emerge from the upcoming elections, a coalition that would be pushing
Serbia on a desirable course with more courage and resoluteness.
Some intellectual circles claim that at present the society as a
whole is a bigger barrier to Serbia's pro-European integration than politicians. It used
to be the other way round once. All in all, how can one change an entire society? Is that
a lost battle the more so since we have been witnessing many retrograde trends? I would
like your opinion about it in the context of the announced Pride Parade.
- I wouldn't say such claims are valid. Elites are more responsible for
Serbia's present and future than citizens. By not doing and flirting with the
nationalistic project and retrograde trends they have contributed to the present
situation. They have refused to acknowledge that Milosevic's ideology - the one that ended
up in crime - was defeated. How can one expect more liberalism from citizens who are day
in day out bombarded with the theses about them as victims and a global complot against
Serbia. The issue of the Pride Parade belongs to this context. In the entire region (and
beyond it) the attitude of the great majority of population towards LGBT persons is
negative. It can be changed only through a changed behavior of the media and elites.
That's the way to shape the attitude towards the "other" - either towards LGBT
population or some other minority group. It is because the general public gradually learns
the accept differences that the Pride Parade is so important.
Nedim Sejdinovic |
