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A groundbreaking report just released in Prishtina
provides important details on how Moscow seeks to transform Kosova
into a failed state. It demonstrates that the attempted coup in
Montenegro in October 2016, reportedly engineered by Russia’s
intelligence services, is part of a broader Balkan offensive to
divide societies, corrupt political leaders, unseat governments,
foster inter-state conflicts, and reduce Western influences.
The report, issued by the Kosovar Center for
Security Studies (KCSS) and authored by Pëllumb Kallaba, tackles two
fundamental questions, as specified in its title: “Russian
Interference in Kosovo: How and Why?”
The why question is essential to comprehend and
dispel the conventional wisdom that Moscow only seeks to be a
“spoiler” for the West and has no long-term strategic objectives in
the Balkans. In reality, Kremlin leaders view the region as the
West’s “soft underbelly” where the process of EU and NATO
enlargement can be stopped and Russian influences magnified. In this
equation, Kosova is a key target because the United States and its
allies have invested so much political capital to consolidate a new
state after the massacres perpetrated by Slobodan Milošević’s
Belgrade.
The report details the tools of influence and
subversion that Moscow uses to undermine Kosova, both from inside
and outside the country. Above all, it seeks to delegitimize the
country’s independence, by for instance comparing Kosova to Crimea,
which allegedly returned to its “Russian motherland.” Likewise,
Kosova needs to return to its “Serbian home.” On the diplomatic
front, Moscow obstructs Kosova’s integration into the United Nations
and other international organizations and poses as Serbia’s main
defender.
Kosova is exposed to a formidable
Russian-orchestrated campaign to undermine state construction and
institution building. This includes infiltrating Russian
intelligence services, encouraging separatism, spreading
disinformation, penetrating parties and institutions, and corrupting
minority leaders.
Although it does not recognize Kosova’s
independence, Russia is represented in Prishtina through its Liaison
Diplomatic Office - a branch of the Russian Embassy in Belgrade.
This provides Moscow with diplomatic cover to penetrate the country
with spies and provocateurs. According to the report, more than
1,000 Russian citizens visit Kosova every year, as holders of
Russian diplomatic and service passports under the Special Category
exempted from visa requirements. It is unknown how long they remain
in the country while engaging in Kremlin-sponsored activities.
Simultaneously, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian
Center based close to Kosova in the Serbian town of Nis, is viewed
in Prishtina as a long-term security threat. The Center is an
outpost for Russian military and intelligence activities in the
region and a potential headquarters for active subversion.
Russian media outlets, including Sputnik and
Russia Today, conduct propaganda barrages and incessantly depict
Kosova as a regional threat. Their attacks are repeated by the
Serbian media and target the Serbian community living mostly in
northern Kosova to prevent them from integrating into the new state.
In addition, Moscow-directed media in Western Europe presents Kosova
as riddled with organized crime and ISIS terrorists, allegedly as a
consequence of NATO intervention.
Moscow endeavors to stimulate Serbian separatism
through several channels. Ties have developed between Putin’s United
Russia and Srpska Lista, the largest Serbian party, which has three
ministers in the new Kosova government. The planned creation of the
Association of Serbian Municipalities inside Kosova, according to
the Brussels agreement between Prishtina and Belgrade, could present
new opportunities for Moscow to push for a Serbian entity similar to
the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Russian presence in Kosova is also enhanced
through links between the Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches, the
report argues. Both are bastions of ultra-conservatism and
anti-Westernism. As Kallaba asserts, the Kremlin channels funds to
front organizations such as humanitarian groups and friendship
societies that promote Russia’s interests as well as the Serbian
Orthodox Church, which refuses to be financially audited by
Prishtina.
Moscow pursues economic inroads through energy
contracts with Serbia that also involve Serb minority leaders in
Kosova. The Kremlin is intent on expanding Russia’s energy network
to Kosova, Albania, Macedonia, and southern Serbia, and seeks access
to Kosova’s gas market. Moscow intends to raise the dependence of
Serb-populated states on the Russian economy and will also test the
thesis that Albanian and Kosovar politicians are not corruptible by
Russian money.
The Prishtina report also issues several warnings.
Kosovo’s central institutions are not properly equipped to prevent
Russian economic and political penetration. The government has no
consistent strategy to address its diplomatic relations with Moscow.
At the same time, the EU is not ensuring equal treatment for Kosova
with the rest of the Western Balkan countries when it comes to joint
foreign policy statements and positions toward Russia.
One of the key KCSS recommendations is for Kosova
to pursue institutional cooperation with Baltic, Scandinavian, and
other countries to share experiences with Russian subversion and
disinformation. This should include Latvia’s Strategic
Communications Center of Excellence and Estonia’s Cyber Center of
Excellence. Indeed, Kosova itself is now accumulating evidence and
experience of Moscow’s attacks on statehood, democracy, and Western
institutions that it can share with other vulnerable states.
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