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Technical talks between Belgrade and Pristina with
European Union facilitation have over the past two years produced
agreements that will improve the lives of both Albanians and Serbs.
Kosovo is now represented in regional organizations and events.
Integrated border management has confirmed its territorial
integrity, enabled freedom of movement and encouraged cross-border
security cooperation. A customs agreement brings revenue to both
Kosovo and Serbia. An agreement on civil registries and land records
facilitates resolution of property disputes. Mutual recognition of
university diplomas eases cross-border exchanges and employment,
especially for younger people. These are real and important
achievements that need wholehearted implementation.
The Pristina/Belgrade dialogue has been elevated
during the past six months to the political level. Kosovo Prime
Minister Thaci has met repeatedly with the Serbia Prime Minister
Dacic. The two presidents have also met. The objective of this
EU-sponsored process was to normalize relations between former
enemies. The first goal is fixing the anomalous situation in
northern Kosovo, where the majority Serb population of three and a
half municipalities refuses to accept Pristina’s governing
authority.
The latest round ended just last week in an
agreement consistent with the UN-sponsored Ahtisaari plan, which is
integral to Kosovo’s constitution. The agreement provides explicitly
for integration of northern Kosovo into Pristina’s constitutional
and legal framework with respect to police, justice and elections.
It provides ample self-governance to the Serb communities in the
north on many other issues, including through an association that
includes all the Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. The north
also gets a district appellate court and a role in choosing a
district police chief.
This is a good agreement. If fully implemented, it
would go a long way to establishing democratically validated
institutions as well as clear legal and police authority on the
whole territory of Kosovo. It also includes a provision that
“neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other
side’s progress in their respective EU path.” This provision
acknowledges implicitly that Kosovo is an independent and sovereign
state. It will progress towards the EU at its own pace and enter
separately without Serbia exercising a veto. I hope EU
non-recognizers will see this as an ample basis for proceeding with
recognition of Kosovo, once Belgrade stands down from its campaign
against it.
Belgrade, however, is still saying that it will
never recognize Kosovo’s “unilateral declaration of independence.” I
take this seriously. Normalization has to include eventual
recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. Without that,
Kosovo will have to regard Serbia as a potential military threat, in
particular to the Serb-majority municipalities of the north but also
farther south. Kosovo should not have to arm itself to meet such a
threat. An arms race between Serbia and Kosovo would serve the
interest of neither. Nor should we be helping to foot the bill for
NATO to remain in Kosovo to guard against a threat that should not
exist.
Mr. Chairman, some propose settling this issue by
an exchange of territory, with northern Kosovo incorporated into
Serbia and the Albanian-majority communities of southern Serbia into
Kosovo. It seems a simple and straight-forward solution.
It is not. Let’s leave aside the legal issues:
Kosovo’s constitution prohibits it, and in any event Kosovo could
only engage in such a territorial swap if it is first recognized as
sovereign. Let’s also leave aside Serbia’s commitment to its
territorial integrity and its particular interest in strategically
important land that lies near its vital north-south route to the
Mediterranean. Let’s even leave aside the international community’s
distaste for moving borders to accommodate ethnic criteria, an
exercise that can never satisfy everyone and would likely generate
ethnic cleansing, irredentist sentiment and violence.
There is still another issue: a territorial swap
between Kosovo and Serbia would destabilize Macedonia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. I know of no way to prevent this. There is every reason
to believe that Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo would see it as
reason to seek union and that the Serbs of Bosnia would likewise see
it as reason to seek independence or union with Serbia. The Dayton
agreements and their implementation for the better part of two
decades, the UN preventive deployment in Macedonia and the
US/EU-sponsored Ohrid agreement could all be for nought, incinerated
in a paroxysm of violence and ethnic cleansing.
I would not take that risk. I don’t think Pristina
and Belgrade should either.
What this means is that Serbia, despite what its
president still proudly asserts, is going to have to recognize
Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations with it based on its
universally acknowledged territory before Serbia enters the EU. That
day is closer than many imagine. The International Court of Justice
has advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no
international law. If Kosovo governs, polices, administers justice,
holds elections and also applies for EU membership like a democratic
state on a well-defined territory, it is one, independent and
sovereign. The “normalization” agreement initialled on Friday
confirms it.
Now comes the hard part. Implementation is never
automatic in the Balkans, though the European Commission’s reports
include a positive picture of how the previous “technical”
agreements are being implemented. The problem now is that the
current leadership of the population in northern Kosovo is opposed
to integration into Pristina’s police, judicial and electoral
frameworks, which is the heart of the new agreement.
Pristina should do its best to make integration
attractive. It can do this by making funding available for the north
and moving with “all deliberate speed” on implementation. Provoking
the northerners will do Pristina no good. Moderate language and
actions are in order. At the same time, the agreement is admirably
clear and requires concrete steps be taken. Transparency is
important: people need to know what to expect. There will be
resistance. Pristina needs to be patient, but firm.
Belgrade has an even greater, if less visible,
role. Northern resistance is financed with funding from Belgrade
security institutions and from smuggling. Both need to shut down.
Some northerners will not want to stay in Kosovo. Their entirely
voluntary movement needs to be welcomed in Serbia. Belgrade and
Pristina need to collaborate in blocking the illicit trade in goods
that are brought into northern Kosovo tax-free from Serbia only to
be returned to Serbia or sold south of the Ibar in Kosovo. The
political economy is no less important than the politics.
While relieved that an agreement has been reached,
I am still concerned about the future. The Belgrade/Pristina
dialogue is a classic case of elite pact-making without a broader
peacebuilding process. The underlying drivers of conflict have not
been addressed. Serbs and Kosovo Albanians still think badly of each
other and rank themselves as victims. There has been little mutual
acknowledgement of harm. Few Albanians and Serbs have renewed
personal ties. It is becoming increasingly difficult to do so as
many younger people lack a common language other than English. It is
almost 14 years since the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war. To be
self-sustaining, this peace process is going to need to go deeper
and involve many more citizens on both sides.
Let me finish with a word about the European Union
and the United States.
First, we owe props to the EU and its High
Representative, Catherine Ashton, for her hard and productive work
in negotiating this first agreement on normalization of relations.
Second, we should be grateful to the EU for having put forward vital
incentives that helped bring the negotiating process to a successful
conclusion. For Serbia, this means a date to begin its EU accession
negotiations. For Kosovo, this means a date to begin negotiating a
Stabilization and Association Agreement as well as progress in
obtaining a Schengen visa waiver. These incentives must now be
delivered. They will provide real benefits for all the citizens of
Kosovo and Serbia.
As for the US Government, it shares supporting
actor credit with the leading Lady Ashton. While staying out of the
political talks, the Administration has pushed, pulled and cajoled
both Pristina and Belgrade. This is not leading from behind. Vital
U.S. national security interests are not at stake today in the
Balkans, but we would be remiss if we did not try to ensure that
things go smoothly, stability is maintained and the rights of all
are protected. We have many other foreign policy priorities. It is
correct to expect Europe to lead. But Europe is correct to expect
that Washington provide support.
The road has been long, Mr. Chairman, but we are
near its end and need to keep going in the right direction.
EXTRA
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the
pathway to peace for Kosovo and Serbia, which has been a long and
difficult one. With your permission, I’ll summarize and submit my
full testimony for the record.
I’d like to make five points:
1. This is a good agreement. If fully implemented, it would go a
long way to establishing democratically validated institutions as
well as clear legal and police authority on the whole territory of
Kosovo while allowing ample self-governance for Serbs in northern
Kosovo on many other issues.
2. Implementation will be a challenge, one that requires Pristina to
make integration attractive and Belgrade to end the financing that
makes resistance in northern Kosovo possible. Belgrade and Pristina
will need to cooperate to end the smuggling of tax-free goods that
has enriched organized crime and spoilers, both Serb and Albanian.
3. The agreement should end any discussion of exchange of territory
between Kosovo and Serbia, which is a bad idea that risks
destabilizing Bosnia, Macedonia and even Serbia proper. We should
work to make northern Kosovo a model of win/win reintegration for
the rest of the Balkans. 4.
Belgrade and Pristina have taken an important step towards
normalizing relations, but they will need to do more, including
eventual recognition and exchange of ambassadors. If that does not
happen, neither will be able to get into the EU and both may try to
arm themselves for a possible new confrontation. In accordance with
this agreement, each will apply for EU membership as an independent
and sovereign state. 5. We
owe props to the EU and in particular Catherine Ashton, not only for
the mediation work she did but also for the vital incentives the EU
provided. The US government shares supporting actor credit with
leading Lady Ashton, which is as it should be.
Mr. Chairman, I am relieved that an agreement has been reached, but
still concerned about the future. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue is
a classic case of elite pact-making without a broader peacebuilding
process. The underlying drivers of conflict have not been addressed.
Many Serbs and Kosovo Albanians still think badly of each other and
rank themselves as victims. There has been little mutual
acknowledgement of harm. Few Albanians and Serbs have renewed
personal ties. It is becoming increasingly difficult to do so as
many younger people lack a common language other than English. It is
almost 14 years since the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war. To be
self-sustaining, this peace process is going to need to go deeper
and involve many more citizens on both sides. The
road is long, Mr. Chairman, but we are near its end and we need to
keep going in the right direction |
