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INFO::: Transitional Justice > Seselj Case > Disoriented Serbia


Disoriented Serbia


penned by journalist Zoran Cirjakovic

1/25/08 HCHRS


Local passionate Europhiles and romantic Russophiles are totally bound by the fact that both are totally ignorant of the world lying outside their imagined "mothers". Serbia perhaps has a plan A and plan B, the old Brussels and the new Moscow option. But the state lacks the plan C, the one- if it turns out that both "mothers" are in fact cruel or careless step-mothers- which would become both middle- and long-term certainty (...) It would not be the quest for a new utopia, similar to expensive and mindless Kardelj-style self-management illusion, but rather a responsible effort to find, by dint of analysis of a wealth of transition experiences from many parts of the world, the best solutions for ensuring economic prosperity and stability of the state, which otherwise, because of strong political and emotional, internal and emotional reasons, might be thwarted.

Problem of Serbia lies in the fact that some of its principal political actors cannot imagine democratic Serbia "outside Europe", though our EU membership perhaps hinges more on whims and will of Brussels, Paris and London, than on coo-operative stand of Belgrade.

(...) Finding of new "strategic partners", currently mentioned by some politicians shall not be only difficult because of minor global importance of Serbia. A much greater problem is the fact that Serbia in the last 7 years irresponsibly pursued one-sided policy which presupposed that Serbia's EU membership was a certainty, and only a question of time. The mere mention of possible non-European prospects of Serbia was stigmatized as renunciation of the "European pathway" and return to the Milosevic era.

(...) Finding of genuine and reliable partners is a difficult and slow process. If frequently exacts reliance on many smaller countries worldwide, notably in Africa, for which are currently vying both the EU and China. But any mention of co-operation with Nigeria and Tanzania would here probably provoke a veritable eruption of anger and insults of the liberal elite which is so blinded by the united Europe and cultural racism that it fails to perceive achievements of Far Eastern economic "tigers" and giants, let alone the potential of sub-Saharan Africa.

(NIN, 17 January 2008)


Slobodan Samardžic, Minister for Kosovo and Metohija:

If there were no political stake of Kosovo's independence, the European Union would never with such a major award back a "democratic" (the EU should be held accountable for the inverted comas) presidential contender. The real reason behind that backing is expectation of both the Union and the United States that imposition of independence of Kosovo by dint of unilateral recognition would affect less the success of their action, than if the "non-democratic" (the EU should be held accountable for the inverted comas) presidential contender emerged victorious.

It is quite clear that after a crucial decision on the active support to unlawful secession of Kosovo from Serbia, the EU decided to use all its available diplomatic means in order to translate into reality independence of Kosovo. Hence the Stabilization and Association Agreement, a strategic document of principled importance for both Serbia and the EU, has morphed into a major stake in this genuine political campaign.

And what are the consequences of such a Serbia-minded policy of EU in Serbia proper.

(...) Some set their political priorities having in mind such a policy. Within that context for them preservation of Kosovo and Metohija within the framework of Serbia is more important than signing of the SAA at this moment of time. The others accept and favor a hasty signing of the SAA, though the 14th December 2007 marked a major shift in the official EU stand on the issue of secession of Kosovo. The problem with this stand is that in the meantime the SAA indeed became a vehicle from separating Kosovo from Serbia. (...) In official Serbia there is still much more concern for the political and legal facts than for opportunistic stands of others, be they even the EU politicians. The former is best attested to by all Kosovo and Metohija-related resolutions adopted by the National Assembly in recent years, notably the last one, passed on 26 December 2007. That resolution gives clear political guidelines for the state actions regarding the issue discussed in this article. Thus we may conclude that Serbia shall remain on its pathway to Europe, only if it implements the said resolution, and accordingly, on 28th January, thank the EU for its offer, until the SAA acquires anew its original political meaning.

(NIN, 17 January 2008)



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