Belgrade-Prishtina Agreement

A Positive Sume Game

Zero-sum games in which a gain by one side is matched by a loss by another are played in Europe no more. Negotiations in Brussels were meant as a win-win game, the game in which everyone gains but also loses something. If Belgrade’s tandem acknowledges the rules of the game and proves its knowledge in the field, Serbia and its citizens could look forward to prosperity and the two parties to a long-term rule.

By Miroslav Filipovic

Everything was like in a folk epic: Who would expect miracles to come…but then miracles did come. We have an agreement with Kosovo. Or to paraphrase Vatican: Habemus concordia! It makes no difference that our scared politicians are trying to abate its significance and effect, while their Kosovo counterparts to pump up the same. It makes no difference that Belgrade claims that it did not recognize Kosovo, though it did. Instead of being ashamed, justifying themselves and apologizing signatories of the agreement should be proud of themselves and accept compliments. If someone should be ashamed that would be all of us doubting “our side” would sign an agreement with Kosovo.

As is seems, the agony called the Kosovo problem is coming to an end. The pressure from the international community was so rockhard that petty Balkan politicians stood no chance for their trickery. The millstone round Serbia and its citizens’ neck seems to lose weight. And yet, surprises are not to be ruled out. Smart people in this region should never feel totally sure that things signed would be implemented.

Even should it approach the task of the agreement’s implementation with utmost sincerity and agility, Serbia would have to cope with at least three groups of problems in the period to come.

First, there are Kosovo Serbs who have been convinced for years that the sun moves around Gazimestan and encouraged to measure every decision by Belgrade by their own yards. And so it happened that several thousands of Kosovo Serbs have held hostage seven million citizens of Serbia. Of course, the biggest majority of Kosovo Serbs became reconciled with Prishtina long ago. They were not exactly thrilled about it, they are still uneasy about Kosovo realities but are definitely more afraid of secret police black jeeps the silently patrol their streets and scare away house husbands, children and dogs. The handful of big-mouthed Kosovo Serbs is now facing an era of self-denial, dire straits and “new businesses” to start. Those smart among them will acknowledge the new reality and try to keep their businesses going but with new partners. Those whose names are too often in papers will end up either in a prison, Kosovo or Serb, or in a ditch.

The bad news is that they will be mercilessly used by the darkest part of Serbia to which, to tell the truth, most prominent among them actually belong. Now that they have been deprived of populist of other support from Serbia they have nothing but Kosovo Serbs. They will be trying to deny Belgrade’s and Prishtina’s agreement and to radicalize their protest: we shall again witness logs on the roads, probably another torched border crossing station or precinct and maybe a murder of a police officer. They will probably establish an assembly of sorts, like the one in Pale in May 1993, but will hardly find another Milosevic or Mitsotakis to crown their action.

Another problem could pose various Cossacks and other Eastern Orthodox dogs of war who would shoot anyone if that anyone is a Muslim or a Muslim supporter. Not long ago Russia told a Serb delegation its opinion about Serbia, the delegation itself and Kosovo. But Russia is a big power and big powers reveal their interests to no one, especially not to their little, undutiful and poor cousins. A stable Serbia it can control in EU suits Russia but what also suits it fine is a controlled conflict in the Balkans only it could possibly mediate.

Then we have Serb clero-fascists. All the governments since 2003 have boosted their morale. They have been allowed to operate by whim, put Belgrade on fire when they wanted to. One government at least has used them as its own street army recruiting only juveniles who have been promptly released if arrested or taken into custody. Hordes of hooligans have organized themselves, held meetings, planned actions, etc. under the nose of regular and secret police forces. They have had a para-military hierarchy, professional codes for communication, rented apartments as safe houses, street containers full of stones…Like the Corleone family they had their reporters, politicians, judges, prosecutors, policemen. The state would do them no harm.

At least two governments after 2003 have made army and police generals negotiate with chiefs of the partisan-fascist “urban guerilla,” trying to persuade them to allow a Pride Parade. Not a single government since 2000 staged even a mock action against Serb clero-fascists and their phalanges, not even they turned Belgrade into Beirut and inflicted one-million damage to Belgraders.

Now we learn that as many as 40 charges have been pressed against certain members of the urban guerilla, who have never been put on trial or spent a single day in prison. Now we learn that some members of the guerilla on fugitive lists decide by their own when to show up at the police station. Citizens of Serbia are really lucky that the strongest and the best organized right-wing Serbia cares not a straw about Kosovo. To them, Kosovo is a failed investment, a doomed battled on which time or money should not be wasted.

Those hysterically shouting at town squares are annoying but do not pose a real danger. Not even in the Germany of 1920s ballroom fascists posed a danger. I would recommend them an uprising should that not be punishable under the law. An uprising would have been the most consequent and fair manifestation of their ideology. As UÇK or UÇPBM did at their time. Say, as I cannot stand anyone, I take a rifle and go strait to Kosovo. But a microphone in hand, loudspeakers and cries “Dacic is this, Dacic is that,” that’s nothing. The English would say “a fart at night.”

The third, potential problem Belgrade might face is the reaction by Albanians in the Preshevo Valley who have been asking a reciprocal status for themselves for long. For, if the Serb minority in Kosovo is entitled to “this or that,” why the Albanian minority in Serbia should not enjoy the same rights? How could Belgrade have the nerve to ask for Serb judges and policemen in Mitrovica, when in Bujanovac, until recently, out of 80-odd employees of the municipal court only one was an Albanian – and he was a interpreter. Or, why should Preshevo have “VR” car plates while Bujanovac, located between Preshevo and Vranje – “BU?” Or why Albanian women from the Preshevo Valley go to Gnjilane to give birth to their babies so that Gnjilane is nowadays the birthplace of more than 90 percent of Albanians in the Preshevo Valley? Doctors in the Preshevo Valley speak not Albanian and are treating non-Serb speaking people!

By persistently ignoring the demands from Preshevo testifies that it understands not and recognizes not the problem-solving language Europe has using over decades. The language it actually understands has already tragically affected citizens of Serbia and resulted in the loss of Kosovo. Zero-sum games in which a gain by one side is matched by a loss by another are played in Europe no more. Negotiations in Brussels were meant as a win-win game, the game in which everyone gains but also loses something. If Belgrade’s tandem acknowledges the rules of the game and proves its knowledge in the field, Serbia and its citizens could look forward to prosperity and the two parties to a long-term rule.